From jailbird to jihadi

[keith]

From jailbird to jihadi
By Michael Scheuer

Much is written about how non-indigenous, would-be Islamist fighters enter the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting US-led coalitions in both countries. Do they enter Afghanistan from Pakistan? Or Iran? Perhaps Central Asia? What about Iraq? Which border is the most porous? Does that dubious honor belong to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Iran?

These are, of course, important questions. To know and close the entry points of these aspiring mujahideen would slow the pace at which foreign fighters could join the fray. It also would make local insurgent field commanders unsure about the dependability of the flow of replacement fighters for their units, and thereby probably limit their willingness to undertake operations that are likely to result in sizable manpower loses.

A more basic question, however, is seldom asked or debated. While it is clear that closing points of entry would give the US-led coalitions a better chance to reduce the level of each insurgency, the more important path to victory probably lies in determining exactly from where these prospective insurgents emanate.

There has been an intense concentration in both the media and academic literature on the role that madrassas play in producing young men eager to join the war against the West. Indeed, so thoroughly has this been discussed and analyzed that we are nearing the point where it will become common wisdom that if Washington, London and their allies can close down the madrassas, we could halt the flow of reinforcements to the Iraqi and Afghan mujahideen.

On the basis of at least two factors, it would be wise to hold off on enshrining as common wisdom the belief that madrassas are the main producers of nascent mujahideen. The first lies in some recent academic work. Marc Sageman, in his excellent book Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia, 2004), and Robert Pape, in his equally outstanding study Dying to Win (New York, 2005), demonstrate that few of the non-indigenous Islamist fighters the West is encountering in the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies are the products of madrassas.

Both Sageman and Pape show that these fighters are, more often than not, young men educated in areas beyond the strictly religious studies that dominate the madrassas' curriculum. Many have studied sciences and engineering and hail from stable, middle-class families. In short, Sageman, Pape and a few other analysts have concluded after extensive research and statistical study that the largest number of foreign fighters who travel to participate in the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are not madrassa graduates. The exception to this conclusion is Pakistan, where it seems likely that madrassas produce the majority of Pakistanis who join the Afghan insurgency.

The second factor that argues against accepting that madrassas are the main source of the insurgencies' reinforcements requires a bit of historical background. During the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union (1979-89), the Afghans played the overwhelming role in defeating the Red Army. Non-indigenous Muslims did, of course, travel to Afghanistan to assist the Afghans. Their numbers grew as the war wore on, and among the foreign fighters were Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ibn Khattab, Mustafa Hamza and many others who later helped to form al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations. Others simply returned to their homes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and began to attack their national governments.

Where did the non-indigenous Muslim fighters come from during the Afghan jihad? Their travel to the battlefield was certainly facilitated by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations - and some members of those groups, such as Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and the Saudi Wael Julaidan, joined the fight - as well as by some wealthy Muslim individuals and Arab governments. It is well known, for example, that the bin Laden family business helped aspiring mujahideen travel to Afghanistan and that Riyadh ordered Saudia, its international airline, to offer reduced-fare "jihad" tickets to young men on their way to Afghanistan.

Many of these non-Afghan Muslim mujahideen came out of the prisons of Arab states. The West often forgets that Arab prisons are built not only to house criminals but to confine ideological opponents of the regime. Thus the prisons are generally full to overflowing with Islamic militants who, for example, oppose the brutality of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's regime or the al-Sauds' greed, corruption and opulence in Saudi Arabia. Incarcerating these militants helps the regimes maintain societal control. Their detention, however, also has proved to increase their Islamic militancy, because the extremist inmates tend to congregate and to be easy targets for instruction by jailed radical Islamic scholars and clerics, both of which breed a sense of fraternity.

Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri emerged much more militant after his incarceration and torture in post-Anwar Sadat Egypt, as did Abu Musab al-Zarqawi after his imprisonment in Jordan and his instruction by the renowned Salafi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

Faced with a large population of young, Islamic-extremist prisoners during the Afghan jihad, governments across the Arab world found a release valve for radical religious pressures in their societies by freeing ideological prisoners on the condition that they would go to fight the atheist Soviets in Afghanistan. Many such prisoners agreed and were released by regimes that hoped they would go to Afghanistan, kill some infidels and be killed in the process.

Many of these fighters were killed, but many were not and returned to bedevil their respective governments to this day. Still, for more than a decade, the Afghan jihad allowed Arab governments to redirect domestic Islamist activism outward toward the hapless Red Army. Although the policy proved shortsighted, it reduced domestic instability for most of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.

Today, it is hard to know for sure whether this trend is repeating itself. Yet we do know three things for certain: (a) every Arab government faces a domestic Islamist movement that is broader and more militant - though not always more violent - than in the 1980s; (b) the insurgency in Iraq, because the country is the former seat of the caliphate and is in the Arab heartland, is an attraction for Islamists far more powerful than was Afghanistan; and (c) the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan seems to be more than sufficient to allow a steady increase in the combat tempo of each insurgency. Thus the situation seems ideal for Arab governments to try a reprise of the process that lessened domestic instability during the Afghan jihad.

This circumstantial argument that the current situation in Iraq is an almost ideal opportunity for Arab regimes to export their Islamic firebrands to kill members of the US-led coalitions and be killed in turn is augmented - if not validated - by the large numbers of Islamic militants who have been released by Arab governments since the invasion of Iraq. The following are several pertinent examples drawn from the period November 2003-March 2006:

November 2003: The government of Yemen freed more than 1,500 inmates - including 92 suspected al-Qaeda members - in an amnesty to mark the holy month of Ramadan [1].

January 2005: The Algerian government pardoned 5,065 prisoners to commemorate the feast of Eid al-Adha [2].

September 2005: The new Mauritanian military government ordered "a sweeping amnesty for political crimes, freeing scores of prisoners, including a band of coup plotters and alleged Islamic extremists" [3].

November 2005: Morocco released 164 Islamist prisoners to mark the end of the holy month of Ramadan [4].

November 2005: Morocco released 5,000 prisoners in honor of the 50th anniversary of the country's independence. The sentences of 5,000 other prisoners were reduced [5].

November-December 2005: Saudi Arabia released 400 reformed Islamist prisoners [6].

February-March 2006: In February, Algeria pardoned or reduced sentences for "3,000 convicted or suspected terrorists" as part of a national reconciliation plan [7]. In March, 2,000 additional prisoners were released [8].

February 2006: Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali released 1,600 prisoners, including Islamist radicals [9].

March 2006: Yemen released more than 600 Islamist fighters who were imprisoned after a rebellion led by a radical cleric named Hussein Badr Eddin al-Huthi [10].

The justifications offered by Arab governments for these releases vary. Some claim they are to commemorate religious holidays or political anniversaries; others claim they are part of national-reconciliation plans. In some of the official statements announcing prisoner releases, Islamists are said to be excluded from the prisoners freed; in others, they are specifically included. In all cases, the releasing governments are police states worried about internal stability in the face of rising Islamist militancy across the Islamic world, the animosities of populations angered at Arab regimes for assisting the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the powerful showings Islamist parties have made in elections across the region.

While the motivation of Arab governments in releasing large numbers of prisoners is impossible to document definitively, it seems fair to conclude that those governments are not ignorant of the attraction that the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan will exert on newly freed Islamists, nor of the chance that it might take no more than a slight incentive to dispatch some of the former prisoners to the war zones.

It may well be that the West is seeing but not recognizing a reprise of the process that supplied manpower to the Afghan mujahideen two decades ago.

Notes
1. "92 al-Qaeda suspects freed in amnesty", Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2003.
2. "Algeria pardons 5,065 prisoners to mark Muslim feast", Deepikaglobal, January 18, 2005.
3. "Mauritania: Junta declares general amnesty for political prisoners", Reuters, September 5, 2005.
4. "One hundred and sixty-four detainees belonging to the Salfia Jiahdia group are pardoned," quote in Annahar al-Maghribiyah, November 5, 2005.
5. "Morocco pardons 10,000 to mark independence", Reuters, November 17, 2005.
6. "Saudi Arabia: Almost 400 prisoners released", adnki.com, December 19, 2005.
7. "Algeria to pardon or reduce sentences for 3,000 terrorists", Evening Echo, February 2006.
8. "Over 2,000 Algerians to be released under reconciliation charter", Radio Algiers/Channel 3, March 1, 2006.
9. "Ben Ali frees 1,600 Tunisian prisoners", Middle East online, February 27, 2006.
10. Yemen frees 627 Zaidi rebels, Middle East Online, March 3, 2006.

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)

(Copyright 2006 The Jamestown Foundation.)

[keith]

Radical Networks in Middle East Prisons

By Chris Zambelis

Prisons have traditionally been breeding grounds for some of the world's most violent street gangs and organized criminal organizations. The hostile and dangerous environment of prison life inspired the creation of a diverse array of well-organized gangs and networks that thrived behind prison walls in everything from extortion, drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling, gambling and other illicit activities. In a testament to their organizational capacity and reach, many gangs spread to prisons outside of their place of origin and continue to flourish among seasoned members released into the general public.

Originally, U.S. prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia (MM), also known as La Eme, the Aryan Brotherhood, and its prison offshoot the Nazi Low Riders, and the Black Guerilla Family (BGF), to name a few, were formed in an effort to bolster ethnic and racial solidarity among jailed Hispanic, White, and African-American inmates who competed for power and influence inside the penal system. In varying degrees, penal systems in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia are struggling with their own breed of dangerous prison networks.

In many cases, these networks are comprised of effective leadership councils, chains of command, and strict codes of conduct for members that often include sworn oaths of allegiance and a complex system of communication based on secret codes and signs designed to circumvent prison authorities.

Members of prison gangs often include psychologically vulnerable inmates seeking the physical protection that gang membership appears to provide. Many are also forced to join a particular gang on the threat of violence by gangs determined to swell their ranks. For others facing long-term sentences, gang affiliations based on ethnic, racial, or regional allegiances provide aspiring members with what they perceive as a worthy cause or a sense of belonging, in addition to the protection of membership in a larger social network that claims to speak and act on their behalf.

Prisons in the Middle East

Given this background, it is worth considering the recent prison riots in Jordan and Afghanistan reportedly instigated by jailed radical Islamists, including alleged members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, respectively (al-Jazeera, March 2; Azadi Radio, March 6). The daring escape of 23 high-profile al-Qaeda inmates from a Yemeni penitentiary also raises interesting questions (Yemen Times, February 4).

Regional sources are convinced that organized radical networks operating within the confines of the prisons in question planned each of these incidents in concert with assistance from the outside and the support of new followers recruited from within. These cases may shed light on the nature and scope of radical networks and organizational structures in foreign prisons in countries of critical importance in the war on terrorism.

These incidents also have serious implications when we consider that the periodic release of incarcerated Islamists that run the gamut from moderate democratic reformers to others tied to violent extremist activities is a favorite political tactic employed by incumbent authoritarian regimes in the region. This strategy is generally aimed at easing internal tensions centered in the Islamist opposition over the lack of progress toward political reforms, increased repression and other grievances.

For example, Egypt recently released over 900 members of the radical Gama'a al-Islamiyya, some having spent over 20 years in prison (al-Jazeera, April 12). Tunisia recently freed over 1,600 members of its own Islamist opposition. Algeria also released over 2,000 imprisoned Islamist activists in a sign of good faith as part of its plan to promote its Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation initiative (al-Jazeera, March 4).

It is not in the interest of the governments in question to release inmates considered to pose a credible and immediate terrorist threat, given that the incumbent regimes would likely be targeted in due course as they were in the past. Moreover, the release of jailed extremists is generally accompanied by a negotiated pact with former radical leaders who in turn often praise the incumbent government's action as a sign of goodwill while renouncing the use of violence and terrorism.

In fact, it is precisely this process that contributes to the creation of extremist splinter groups headed by emerging radical leaders determined to carry on their war against the hated incumbent regimes or their benefactors in the West.

A number of prominent Islamist radicals, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, spent years in prison in Egypt and Jordan, respectively. By all accounts, both were subjected to harsh conditions that included systematic torture and often humiliating abuses against them and their fellow inmates. Many observers believe that these experiences contributed to their radicalization and that of many of their followers (see Montasser al-Zayat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Ladin's Right-Hand Man).

In March, Jordan's penal system was struck with a series of what appeared to be simultaneous and coordinated uprisings in three separate prisons. Rioting inmates in Jwaideh prison took hostage Colonel Saad al-Ajrami, director of the kingdom's prison system, along with a host of security guards. The Jwaideh inmates reportedly took up arms in a demonstration of solidarity with two prisoners incarcerated in Swaqa prison that Jordanian officials link to al-Qaeda, including one convicted for the 2002 assassination of a U.S. diplomat in Amman. They also demanded the immediate release of the would-be Iraqi female suicide bomber who participated in the November 2005 attacks in Amman and protested conditions inside the jail (al-Jazeera, March 2).

Jordanian officials claim that over 180 radical Islamists, including extremists linked to al-Qaeda, are currently being held at Jwaideh prison (as-Sharq al-Awsat, March 3). After a period of tense negotiations, the 14-hour siege ended peacefully with all of the hostages released unharmed.

According to Judge Ali al-Dhmour, Jordan's secretary general of the Justice Ministry, rioting inmates at the Jwaideh facility coordinated their planned takeover of the facility with their fellow inmates in other prisons through an elaborate system that included cell phone and internet communications and messages passed along to visiting relatives. Al-Dhmour also raised questions regarding the wisdom of having violent Islamist extremists serve their sentences alongside their known colleagues, essentially ensuring that already tight-knit networks remain cohesive and operational behind bars. He also questioned the logic of placing ordinary criminals together with hardened extremists in the same facilities due to fears that the latter may influence disaffected prisoners (al-Jazeera, March 2).

Ibrahim Zeid al-Kailani, Jordan's former religious affairs minister, echoes these sentiments. He believes that radical extremists, especially individuals tied to al-Qaeda, should be insulated from other inmates and separated from their known associates in an attempt to weaken networks. He also claims that because many prisoners suffer from depression and frustration, they are more likely to be attracted to radical and violent strains of Islamism (al-Jazeera, March 2).

In another incident in April, inmates in the Qafqafa prison rose up violently, taking two guards hostage before Jordanian security forces stormed the facility to end the crisis (as-Sharq al-Awsat, April 14).

Rioting inmates took security guards hostage in Afghanistan's notorious Pol-e-Charkhi prison in Kabul in February, the second uprising of its kind in a little over a year in Afghanistan. Apparently, grievances stemming from systematic abuses and poor living conditions boiled over when prison authorities tried to implement a new policy requiring all inmates to wear bright orange uniforms. According to Afghanistan's Deputy Justice Minister Muhammad Qasim Hashemzai, rioting inmates received instructions from outside of the prison via cell phones. It is still unclear how the inmates managed to acquire the cell phones. Afghan security officials claim that 350 out of the approximately 1,000 inmates estimated to have participated in the uprising are linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Azadi Radio, March 6).

In February, 23 members of al-Qaeda managed to escape from the maximum security Political Security Central Prison in Sanaa, Yemen. Among the escapees included 13 radicals tied to al-Qaeda cells believed to be responsible for the attack against the USS Cole in October 2000 and the strike against the French oil supertanker Limburg in October 2002. A similar escape orchestrated by ranking al-Qaeda members, this time from the Political Security Central Prison in Aden, occurred in 2003 (Yemen Times, February 4).

Initial reports from the scene claimed that the fugitives managed a daring escape by digging a 300-meter long tunnel from their cells to the women's prayer yard at the al-Awkaf Mosque located just outside the prison. Other reports, however, say that the prisoners left from the main entrance of the facility. Considering the high-profile stature of the inmates and the heightened level of security at the facility, it is inconceivable that the escapees could have succeeded without close coordination and assistance from prison staff and others from the outside (as-Sharq al-Awsat, March 10).

Conclusion

As the incidents in Jordan, Afghanistan, and Yemen demonstrate, the activities of convicted terrorists and other radical extremists inside prisons in countries of strategic importance in the war on terrorism should remain of vital concern. It is also worth considering the effect that systematic and indiscriminate torture in penal systems across the region has on creating potential recruits for al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations.