Private Military Corps.

[keith]

Iraq Struggles With Rise of Guns-For-Hire

By ALEXANDRA ZAVIS, Associated Press Writer
Sun May 7, 5:03 PM ET


A half-dozen armored sport utility vehicles with guns pointed out the windows careen onto Baghdad's busy airport highway, bringing traffic to a screeching halt.

Iraqis have learned to keep a wary distance from the convoys of foreign guns-for-hire in mirrored sunglasses and bulletproof vests, who have a reputation of firing at any vehicle that gets too close because of the ever-present danger of suicide bombers.

Iraqi officials accuse many of the companies providing protection in violence-plagued Iraq of being a law unto themselves, prompting a flurry of attempts to better regulate an industry that is expanding rapidly around the world.

South Africa and Britain are proposing tough new laws governing the participation of their nationals in foreign conflicts. Humanitarian groups are trying to identify gaps in international law. And the industry itself is pushing greater self-regulation.

Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, who oversees the activities of private security companies, accuses them of being "militias." Some companies counter that Jabr, who has himself been linked to a private Shiite force accused of widespread abuses against Sunni Muslims, is contributing to the problem by refusing to register security contractors.

Since militaries were slashed at the end of the Cold War, private companies have been a growing presence on the world's battlefields, performing jobs conventional forces can no longer handle. It is a hugely competitive, multibillion-dollar industry, with clients ranging from governments and blue-chip corporations to warlords, drug cartels and terror groups.

In Iraq, at least 20,000 contractors — local and foreign — are guarding coalition bases, protecting U.S. officials, training Iraqi security forces and interrogating detainees. They also protect businessmen, journalists and humanitarian workers, among others.

Doug Brooks, head of a U.S.-based association of military contractors, says reports of abuse in the industry are exaggerated.

"In general, companies are using people who are middle-aged ex-military, so they know what they are doing, and they don't make as many mistakes" as the armed forces, he said.

The companies say they recognize the need for regulation in a dangerous industry: "We would prefer a high level of professionalism across the board. It makes it easier and safer for everybody," said Greg Lagana, spokesman for U.S.-based DynCorp International.

Many top firms have joined associations like Brooks' International Peace Operations Association, which impose stringent human rights standards on their members.

Firms say they also are subject to volumes of legislation in the countries where they are based, recruit and operate, including arms-trafficking and anti-corruption laws.

Their employees are bound by international conventions on war crimes, just like their uniformed counterparts. Those working for the U.S. government can also be prosecuted in an American criminal court for offenses committed abroad.

And there is the pressure of the marketplace: "Failure in this industry comes soonest to those who openly violate sound business principles and disregard the moral, ethical and legal high ground," said Chris Taylor, Blackwater USA's vice president for strategic initiatives.

Abuses happen nonetheless. In Iraq, civilians mistaken for car bombers have been shot and killed. There also has been gunfire exchanged between contractors and Iraqi security forces.

"Normally, it would be that state in which the companies operate that is responsible for policing this, but these companies typically operate in failed states," said P.W. Singer, an expert on private military companies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. And he said human rights violations are rarely prosecuted outside the country where they happened because of the logistic difficulties.

Two military reports have implicated contractors working as interrogators and translators in the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, but unlike their military counterparts, they have not been tried. Their employers deny the allegations.

The United Nations, African Union and International Committee of the Red Cross, among others, are working on proposals to tighten the regulatory framework.

South Africa is proposing the most sweeping reform. It is embarrassed by the participation of apartheid-era defense force members in African conflicts, including a foiled 2004 plot to overthrow Equatorial Guinea's dictator in exchange for oil concessions.

A bill before the South African Parliament would bar virtually any activity in a conflict zone without government authorization — even humanitarian work.

U.S. officials in Iraq have expressed alarm. South Africa's former soldiers are among the most sought-after there, due to their professionalism and experience in African wars.

"Combat experience counts," said Lt. Col. Wallace Dillon, deputy commander of the Reconstruction Operations Center, or ROC, which uses contractors to escort personnel to building sites and guard convoys of material. "Would you want a doctor operating on you who has never performed surgery before?"

Britain, where some of the biggest companies in Iraq are headquartered, is considering less drastic measures. A parliamentary Green Paper outlines options including licensing the companies and approving their contracts.

Andy Bearpark, head of the British Association of Private Security Companies, welcomed this approach but worried about the length of the process and criteria to be used.

"The British industry doesn't want to lose out to the American industry because it takes too long to get a contract licensed," he said.

In Iraq, the former U.S. authorities started registering security companies and issuing weapons permits. But the process stopped after sovereignty was returned to a transitional Iraqi government in 2004.

Jabr says there are already too many companies, many of them recruiting from Saddam Hussein's feared former forces. He is refusing to license more firms without vetting their employees.

But the ministry's mostly Shiite security forces are accused of torturing and killing members of the Sunni Arab minority that dominated under Saddam, making companies reluctant to give out information about whom they hire.

Meanwhile, lawlessness reigns. More firms are entering the market, and no one knows who they are.

For their own safety, many companies have started reporting to the ROC: the military operations center offers daily security briefings, a vehicle tracking system and panic buttons.

The system has improved coordination between the military and civilian contractors, Dillon, its deputy commander, said. But participation is not a requirement of most U.S. contracts.

The Department of Defense insists its contractors abide by the same rules of engagement as coalition forces, but that is not a requirement of other U.S. departments operating in Iraq, Dillon said.

"Governments have to be smarter about this," said Singer, arguing they can use their buying power to shape the industry. "Support those that have good oversight. If they find out their contractors did anything wrong, hammer them."

___

Associated Press reporter Sameer N. Yacoub contributed to this report from Baghdad.

Copyright © 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of The Associated Press.


Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.

[keith]

Dubai Does Brisk War Business
by Pratap Chatterjee, Special to CorpWatch
February 24th, 2006


Every morning, from dawn till about noon, cargo and passenger flights to Iraq and Afghanistan make Dubai airport’s Terminal Two possibly the busiest commercial terminal in the world for the "global war of terrorism." Conveniently located between the two countries, Dubai is the ideal hub for military contractors and a lucrative link in the commercial supply chain of goods and people between Afghanistan or Iraq and the rest of the world.

The trade from this relatively small air terminal is completely legal but some of the flight operators have been known to flout the law in order to keep the profitable business going. Tickets to either destination go for about $400 a seat round-trip, cargo travels for about $2 a kilogram.

The European and American travelers arriving at the much larger Terminal One never see this part of the world's second busiest sea/air hub. They are whisked away by banks of gleaming silver escalators to duty-free shopping, sunbathing at the seven star resorts and the famous gold markets.

But at Terminal Two, the most common destinations on the overhead list are Baghdad and Kabul, via airlines like African Express, Al Ishtar, and Jupiter. Most of the passengers on these flights are Afghan or Iraqi, but every morning a few Americans, Indians and Philippinos arrive, often accompanied by minders to make sure that they catch their flights. Some are from the United States embassy or military, others from Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), the biggest contractor in both countries.

Labor Supply

On Saturday, December 10, 2005, flight XU 106 of African Express airways, officially based in Nairobi, Kenya, was scheduled to take off from Terminal Two in Dubai for Mosul when immigration intercepted 88 Philippino workers. The men had just arrived in Dubai on tourist visas and were ticketed to leave on the early morning flight to northern Iraq.

Officially the Philippine government has banned its nationals from working in Iraq after truck driver Angelo de la Cruz was kidnapped in July 2004. In addition at least six Philippino workers have also been killed while working in Iraq over the last two years. In an attempt to prevent workers from going to Iraq, all new Philippino passports are now stamped with "Not Valid for Travel to Iraq."

Yet some 6,000 Philippinos are estimated to continue to work in Iraq. Some were lured by of the relatively high pay for unskilled jobs; others were forced to take the jobs, according to interviews with workers conducted by CorpWatch.

Some of those detained in December say that they paid a Manila labor recruitment agency, Tierra Mar, between 40,000 to 70,000 pesos each (US$760 to $1330) for the jobs. Arrested with the 88 workers was Jordanian national Mah'd Moh'd Ahmad Hamza who was issued a temporary visitor's visa to the Philippines by the country's consulate in Dubai on September 19, 2005.

The 88 workers were deported back to Manila the following week and Tierra Mar has been placed under investigation for breaking the ban. However, government officials say the incident may just be the tip of the iceberg.

"United Arab Emirates seems to be a favored jump-off point because of the facility in obtaining a visit visa to this country," Philippine Labor Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas, told reporters. "We received information that the modus operandi of those circumventing the government restriction seems to be the use of old passports without the travel ban stamp," she added.

Prime Projects International

One of the key players in the supply of labor to Iraq is located a 20 minute ride from the airport in a skyscraper that overlooks Dubai Creek. Prime Projects International (PPI) is on the fifth floor of the office building of the Twin Towers, behind the dark blue glass windows that reflect the sun as it sets over the ocean in the evening.

PPI was created just months after September 11, 2001 when British businessman Neal Helliwell and his partner, Toby O'Connell, won a subcontract from Halliburton to help construct prisons in Guantanamo Bay for KBR. They kept costs down by using low-wage Philippino labor.

Since then Helliwell and O'Connell have supplied workers to build Camp Anaconda, a U.S. military base in Balad, northern Iraq. They are estimated to supply over 7,000 workers to their clients, many of whom are from the Indian sub-continent or the Philippines.

Indeed on November 10, 2005, Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, gave a special "International Employer Awards" at Malacanang palace to Neil Helliwell, chief executive officer of PPI. The award was for "displaying continuous preferences for Philippino workers and providing them with excellent career advancement and generous package of employment benefits."

But their workers who have made it into Iraq complain that they have been treated badly. "TCNs (Third Country Nationals) had a lot of problems with overtime and things," recalls Sharon Reynolds of Kirbyville, Texas, who was employed as an administrator by Halliburton . "I remember one time that they didn't get paid for four months."

"They don't get sick pay and if PPI had insurance, they sure didn't talk about it much," Reynolds recalls. "TCNs had a lot of problems with overtime and things. ...I had to go to bat for them to get shoes and proper clothing."

"(They) had to stand in line with plates and were served something like be curry and fish heads from big old pots," Reynolds says incredulously. "It looked like a concentration camp."

(see Blood, Sweat & Tears: Asia's Poor Build U.S. Bases in Iraq)


PPI officials have refused to talk to the media at all but CorpWatch has learned that the company is being monitored by the State department for "human trafficking" of workers into Iraq.

One thing is certain - Helliwell and O'Connell have made good money in this business. In May 2005 the two men bought a yacht named "Pacific 50, Yo!" that they raced off the coast of Thailand on the island of Koh Samui.

Cargo Supply

This January, a month after the Philippino workers were deported from Terminal Two, business is still brisk. Most mornings liaison staff from two companies can be seen at the airport: SkyLink, a Canadian company provides flights for employees, and Eagle Global Logistics (EGL), a Texas company, provides cargo handling services for the company into Iraq. The staff, armed with clipboards and pens, make sure that each passenger and each pallet of goods is safely on its way. And every evening, the liaison officers to greet returnees who touch down from Afghanistan and Iraq in the late afternoon and continue arriving until late into the night.

SkyLink and EGL are the last link in the global supply chain of Iraq-bound goods and people that got to Dubai on better known commercial carriers. The United States military uses Federal Express (FedEx); the German airline Lufthansa recently delivered a dozen armored vehicles to Dubai on one of its cargo planes. A United States military officer, working out of the FedEx office, checks cargo manifests every day at Terminal Two, bypassing the country's national customs staff for sensitive cargo.

Many of the goods also arrive into Dubai by ship into Port Rashid and Jebel Ali, the country's two main ports, which rank among the busiest in the world. Barwil, Inchcape and Maersk, shipping companies from Norway, Britain and Denmark respectively, have major import operations that allow cargo to arrive anonymously into the region.

By contrast, Afghanistan has no sea ports and Iraq has just two: Umm Qasr and Khor az Zubayr, both of which face major operational challenges from years of sanctions and neglect. Even after goods arrive at these ports to be transported by truck into the country, they face substantial security threats from attacks and road-side bombs, not to mention skyrocketing insurance rates.

Dubai's choice as the central hub for war traffic is not accidental. A sleepy Middle Eastern port for centuries, famed for its pearl trade and central location on the spice trade from India to the rest of the world, it became suddenly wealthy with the oil boom of the 1970s like the neighboring nations of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. But the emirate wisely decided to invest its money in developing other businesses, such as tourism (which accounts for about a sixth of the national income) and the import-export business (which accounts for two-thirds).

In the last few years as Dubai has become quite expensive. many companies have moved their bases to Sharjah, the neighboring emirate just 30 kilometers away, where rents are half those of Dubai. Indeed many of the aircraft used at Terminal Two are owned by anonymous and shadowy companies in Sharjah. Some of these aircraft owners like Air Bas have been linked to notorious arms smugglers including Victor Bout. Instead of dealing directly with the U.S. government, these companies rent their planes to middle agencies like Chapman Freeborn and Coyne Air, which in turn provide them to Skylink and EGL.

Phony War Surcharges

This profitable re-export business has recently come under scrutiny for overcharging. Under the sub-contract to Halliburton , EGL has been in charge of shipping military equipment ranging from "armor-plated vehicles to trash bins" from Houston to Dubai en route to Iraq for the last two years. The company uses old Russian cargo workhorses: Antonov 12's that can carry 15 tons and Ilyushin 76's that can carry up to 40 tons

In December 2005, the company announced in a Securities & Exchange Commission filing that it was being investigated over these shipments. The focus of the probe was insurance surcharges added by Christopher Joseph Cahill, the regional vice president of EGL, soon after a rival company's plane was shot down in late 2003 while trying to land at Baghdad airport.

Federal investigators in Texas were informed by a whistleblower that the extra 50 cents per kilogram of cargo that was supposedly imposed by Aerospace Consortium (which supplied aircraft to EGL) were in fact, phony. The charges were added to 379 air cargo shipments costing a total of $13.2 million over several months

Mike Lockhart, an assistant U.S. Attorney General in Beaumont, Texas, told CorpWatch that the investigators subpoenaed EGL, seeking information about the surcharges, and were given a letter from Aerospace Consortium explaining the reason for the charges. The documents "looked very suspicious, not what you would expect to see at all," he said. The charter company was also unable to provide any evidence of the insurance increase.

EGL has since fired Cahill and has offered to pay back the military the $1.14 million in "improper charges" that the auditors estimated had been added to the bill. But the Department of Justice wants the company to pay an additional $2.86 million fine.

Lockhart says that the company may have been aware of the charges all along and did nothing to stop it. "They defend their actions and say they were confused, but is is likely that they knew," he told CorpWatch.

"Cahill recognized an opportunity to unilaterally institute war risk surcharges and thereby increase profits to EGL," court documents stated. Cahill also "knew that he did not have to seek approvals from elsewhere within EGL to add such purported war risk surcharges."

"U.S. taxpayers are asked to carry a significant burden during times of war. But they will not be asked to tolerate merchants of war who seek to profit unlawfully from legitimate wartime expenditures," said Rodger Heaton, U.S. attorney for the Central District of Illinois.

An EGL spokeswoman said Cahill was dismissed when the company learned of the fraud. EGL "feels he should be treated appropriately for those violations" under the law, she added.

But Cahill's attorney Edward Chernoff told the Houston Chronicle that his client wasn't collecting any money for himself from these surcharges. "It was a business decision. He wasn't even getting bonuses from it," Chernoff said.

Cahill, who pleaded guilty in mid-February, is to be sentenced May 26 where he faces up to 10 years in prison and a $5 million fine.

Business As Usual


Meanwhile business at the ports of Dubai remain strong and profitable. Indeed Dubai Ports World, the wealthy state-owned company that controls Jebel Ali, into which most military cargo arrives, has stirred tremendous controversey in the last few days by buying up P&O, a British company, giving it control over six major ports in the United States including New York.


David Phinney and Lee Wang contributed reporting for this article

http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13322

[keith]

Date: 10 May 2006
Amid rising insecurity, Baghdad residents look to private security companies[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]

BAGHDAD, 10 May 2006 (IRIN) - Some residents of the capital say that private security companies represent the best way to guarantee their safety given the deteriorating security situation and the inability of police, military (Iraqi and US) and local militias to respect human rights.

“When you go out in the street and you see Iraqi police or army, you’re afraid that you could be shot dead or arrested at any time,” said 45 year-old Baghdad shopkeeper Abbas Kubaissy. “They behave outside the law and without the minimum respect for locals.”

Often fearing for their lives, Baghdadis have learnt to keep their distance from the military convoys constantly rumbling down the city’s streets, despite the fact that such convoys are ostensibly intended for their protection. “My two sons were killed because they got too close to an Iraqi police car,” said Safa'a Madd'aa, 56, a Baghdad resident. “They shot them dead without the minimum of compassion.”

Military officials, however, pointing to the tense security atmosphere, defend such actions as inevitable. “It can be seen as aggressive behaviour, but every Baghdadi is aware of the dangers faced by the Iraqi Army and police countrywide,” said senior interior ministry officer Major Col. Hassan Ali. “They have been informed to stay away from convoys because terrorists are everywhere.”

Ministry officials have also accused private security companies of being de facto militias, often using the name of private security groups to specifically target Sunni Arabs. “Our ministry has decided not to register any more security companies and to try to deactivate those which already exist to prevent the emergence of more militia activity,” said Ali. He went on to estimate that at least 20,000 local and foreign contractors were currently active in the country protecting clients, training personnel and “assisting” in interrogations.

While Ali insisted that government security personnel were “much more understanding with the civilian population” than private security companies, some locals disagreed. “Last week, when I was entering a government building, the private security guards at the door were very respectful,” said Omar Rabia'a, 34, a government employee in the capital. “But when an Iraqi policeman nearby heard my Sunni name, he shouted at me and took me aside for additional questioning.”

With gunfights between private security contractors and Iraqi security forces becoming a common sight in the streets of Baghdad, residents express exasperation. “Weapons should be in the hands of the state, not in those of independent militias,” said Suha Bartiar, spokeswoman for a local NGO. “But first, government security organs must learn more about human rights and how to behave with their fellow Iraqis -- then they might be respected by the population.”


Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)

[keith]

9 May 2006
BRITISH FORCES TOO STRETCHED

By Colonel Tim Collins

HUGE and dangerous cracks are beginning to show in the Basra security operation, and it is not the fault of the British Armed Forces.

It's clear that a great deal of luck was involved in containing the riot at the weekend - and that luck may not hold next time it turns nasty.

In Northern Ireland we had a ringfenced support back-up if anything went wrong.

We don't have anything like that system in Iraq.

The resources are stretched already and the strain means that we simply do not have a full-time support unit that can quickly deploy to the region or the locale where the tension is happening.

It was incredibly fortunate that there was a quick reaction force in place on Saturday.

It did its job but they had to rely on the help of the Iraqi police - something which cannot always be relied on - and they were very lucky too that the private security companies were there to help.

These companies played a major role in helping out on Saturday - because of their military experience they knew exactly what to do.

But these stop-gap solutions are only papering over some very large cracks. The cracks have appeared because British forces do not have the resources to do all that they are being asked to do.

I do not believe that it is possible for Britain safely do what it is doing in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans.

Those are three arenas when one is more than enough.

Something has to give and British troops are being put in a very difficult position because of it.

The new Defence Secretary Des Browne needs to talk to the Chancellor about the amount of resources being put into the operation in these places.

That's where the problem lies - it's all about the money - and Des Browne needs to ask Gordon how they are going to get more.


http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/tm_objectid=17050866&method=full&siteid=94762&headline=british-forces-too-stretched--name_page.html

[keith]

Peace Corp.
As the international community dithers over Darfur, private military companies say they've got what it takes to stop the carnage, if only someone would hire them.

At left, a guard from a private security company at work in Iraq. At right, a UN peacekeeper in Freetown, Sierra Leone. (Reuters Photos)

By Rebecca Ulam Weiner | April 23, 2006
THREE YEARS OF FIGHTING in the Darfur region of Sudan have left an estimated 180,000 dead and nearly 2 million refugees. In recent weeks, both the UN and the US have turned up the volume of their demands to end the violence (which the Bush administration has publicly called genocide), but they've been hard pressed to turn their exhortations into action. The government in Khartoum has scuttled the UN's plans to take control of the troubled peacekeeping operations currently being led by the African Union, and NATO recently stated publicly that a force of its own in Darfur is ''out of the question." Meanwhile, refugee camps and humanitarian aid workers continue to be attacked, and the 7,000 African Union troops remain overstretched and ineffective.

But according to J. Cofer Black, vice chairman of the private security firm Blackwater, there is another option that ought to be on the table: an organization that could commit significant resources and expertise to bolster the African Union peacekeepers and provide emergency support to their flagging mission.

A few weeks ago, at an international special forces conference in Jordan, Black announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force to conflicts like the one in Sudan. ''We're low cost and fast," Black said, ''the question is, who's going to let us play on their team?"
Private security companies like Blackwater have thrived in Iraq, where the US military has relied on them for everything from guarding convoys to securing the Green Zone. But these companies recognize that the demand for their services in Iraq will eventually diminish, and Blackwater, for one, is looking for new markets. It's not alone in seeing peacekeeping as a growth area. Competitors such as Aegis and Dyncorp have also realized that while conflicts like the one in Darfur may not bring them profits on the order of Iraq, there's no shortage of them. And if such companies are able to help the international community succeed in peacekeeping, it could improve the image of an industry that hasn't enjoyed much support from the press or the public.
Private military companies have had a hard time convincing the international community that privatizing peacekeeping would be as good for Darfur, and for the rest of the world, as for their industry. In part that's because of the mixed reputation their work in Iraq has earned them and because the explosive growth of the industry has raised fears that security contractors working for the US government in Baghdad (and post-Katrina New Orleans) could become bona fide armies for hire. But the discomfort also has deeper roots, in the complicated history of private intervention in these kinds of conflicts. When Kofi Annan was UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping, he explored the option of hiring the South African private military company Executive Outcomes to aid in the Rwandan refugee crisis. He ultimately decided against the option, declaring that ''the world is not yet ready to privatize peace."

The world still appears to be unready-and representatives of private military companies believe that's shortsighted. ''When traditional peacekeepers can't provide an adequate response because of their home country obligations, there's an alternative that should be openly and frankly discussed. And that's a private professional group," says Chris Taylor, Blackwater's vice president for strategic initiatives. As he sees it, his company could provide the necessary security in places like Darfur ''so that traditional NGOs and aid agencies could do the work they can't do [now]."

The UN and others clearly have legitimate questions about whether private military companies can do what they claim. But the industry, agitating to lend a hand where the international community has dragged its feet, has raised some legitimate questions of its own. When the world's governments and multilateral organizations have proven as ineffectual as they have in Darfur, should they turn to the private sector for help? In the absence of a viable alternative, is the international community's aversion to what some call ''mercenarism" stronger than its will to fight genocide?

Private contractors have been providing logistics in low-intensity conflicts in African nations for years, and conducting training operations as well. Dyncorp, for example, is currently involved in what is by most accounts a very successful mission in Liberia, helping train the army and national guard in the aftermath of Liberia's long and bloody civil war.

Indeed, while the industry has grown and matured in Iraq due to the US military's unprecedented reliance on contractors there, it's actually in Africa that early private military companies first did significant work.

In the mid and late '90s, the South African firm Executive Outcomes and British firm Sandline International offered direct combat support to the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone. In Angola, 500 ex-special forces officers working for Executive Outcomes conducted sophisticated airstrikes and commando operations to help the Angolan military retake its diamond mines and oil fields from the rebel group UNITA. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes and later Sandline were hired to combat the RUF insurgency. With targeted helicopter attacks and ground assaults, both firms dominated tactically, but fighting broke out soon after their respective contracts ended.
The legacy of these operations, as a result, is mixed. On the one hand, the firms' tactical prowess efficiently and effectively stopped the fighting, saving thousands of lives and leading to the return of over a million refugees. But the benefits were not long-lasting.

What companies like Blackwater are proposing to do in Darfur today is very different from the combat missions of a decade ago. ''We have no interest in offensive operations," says Taylor flatly. Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, the industry's trade association, agrees: ''[Executive Outcomes] and Sandline were supporting offensive combat operations. I don't think that'll happen again, and certainly not that way."

Today, private military companies are offering defensive services-they propose to secure refugee camps and vulnerable villages, guard humanitarian aid agencies and NGOs, or, depending on the requirements of the contract, assist peacekeepers like the African Union troops in Darfur. ''Security work is more about avoiding violence, it's not about inflicting violence," says Joe Mayo, formerly with the security and training firm Triple Canopy, and now an independent consultant to the industry. ''A good day for a security guy is when nothing happens."

Aid agencies and NGOs in Darfur haven't had many good days lately. The beleaguered African Union peacekeeping force has few resources to spend defending an NGO like Save the Children, and the ability of such organizations to continue working in the area is very much in question. ''You can't expect people to work in conflict zones without protection," says Christopher Kinsey, a scholar with the Joint Services Command at King's College London and author of the forthcoming book ''Corporate Soldiers and International Security" (Routledge), ''especially as noncombatant immunity is no longer respected." Kinsey believes there's a legitimate role for private military companies in humanitarian operations.

There's little question that companies like Blackwater could be more effective operationally than the African Union, which has been hampered by its peacekeepers' lack of command and control experience. Private military companies boast a roster of former special forces officers and law enforcement officers who are accustomed to volatile conflict and post-conflict areas like Sudan.
Blackwater also subjects all of its personnel to an impressive array of extra training-whether they're training to work in Baghdad or the firm's North Carolina headquarters. They take classes in international humanitarian law, leadership, ethics, regional awareness, and ''customs and traditions." They've recently approached Amnesty International about teaching human rights education classes. And the International Peace Operations Association boasts that its code of conduct was written by human rights lawyers.

The industry also claims that it's far cheaper than its multilateral or military counterparts. ''We offer the ability to create a right-sized solution-which creates a cost savings right off the bat," says Taylor. By contrast, Brooks notes, ''NATO is insanely expensive; it's not a cost-effective organization. Neither is the [African Union]. Private companies would be much, much cheaper. When we compared their costs to most UN operations, we came up with 10 to 20 percent of what the UN would normally charge."

But while many would agree that there's an enormous need for the peacekeeping services that companies like Blackwater are willing and able to supply, that does not mean there's a market. ''The question isn't their operational ability," says David Isenberg, senior analyst at the British American Security Information Council, ''they've demonstrated an ability at least equivalent to a decently run UN operation. It's a question of political will."

As the industry is the first to admit, this political will remains elusive. ''The political dimension to this discussion is far more difficult than the tactical dimension," says Taylor. In 2003, a consortium of for-profit companies was formed to try to supplement the UN mission in Congo with everything from aerial surveillance to ''armed rapid deployment police." It was never adopted. Asked whether the UN's official position on using private security contractors has changed, UN spokesman Farhan Haq replied, ''The one-word answer is no."

Such an answer may suggest a reflexive discomfort with privatizing force. But it also represents some nuanced, widely shared concerns. The first, and most common, is accountability. And it isn't merely hypothetical, considering the alleged involvement of private contractors in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the recent conviction of the military contractor Custer Battles for government contract fraud in Iraq, and earlier, in Bosnia, the involvement of Dyncorp contractors in a forced prostitution ring.

''There are some legitimate reasons to be skeptical," allows Isenberg. ''How do you ensure oversight, compliance with international humanitarian law, follow the rules of warfare, rules of engagement, comply with the Geneva Conventions, and the whole bureaucratic panoply of rules that come into play?" Particularly when you're trying to preserve fast, flexible, and inexpensive deployment.

Compounding the problem of accountability is the fact that private companies are of course not just out to save the world, but to make money. Assuming an industry made up of rational actors, eager to maximize profits, can loyalty to a particular firm-or a particular client-be maintained? Can standards? What happens when there are conflicts of interest? The industry claims that it would only accept contracts from legally recognized bodies, but what if this body were an unsavory regime?

Without uniform regulation of the private military industry, the answers to these questions largely depend on one's faith in the market's power to encourage good behavior. As Kinsey sees it, the industry actually takes corporate responsibility quite seriously. ''It's not because the companies are being altruistic," he says. ''It's beneficial in the long term for them to conduct themselves responsibly."

More fundamentally, many believe that the international community has a special responsibility to take on problems such as Darfur-and that outsourcing humanitarian interventions to the private sector is just another way of sidestepping the hard political debates that should take place in public.

But the abstract ideal of an engaged international community might seem a rarefied consideration in light of the realities on the ground.

''This came up a long time ago. People were saying that if we use private sector in the Congo, the international community will never get its act together," says industry spokesman Doug Brooks. ''But that was 3 million dead Congolese ago. The international community isn't going to wake up no matter how many people you kill. I think that it would be a good idea for the international community to get its act together. But we've got to find another way."

Rebecca Ulam Weiner is a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
© Copyright 2006 Globe Newspaper Company.

[keith]

Interesting article from 2 years ago.

Blackwater commandos in Najaf Battle

Eli at Left Eye points out this Washington Post article which describes Blackwater commandos engaging in firefights with Iraqis alongside American soldiers.


An attack by hundreds of Iraqi militia members on the U.S. government's headquarters in Najaf on Sunday was repulsed not by the U.S. military, but by eight commandos from a private security firm, according to sources familiar with the incident.

Before U.S. reinforcements could arrive, the firm, Blackwater Security Consulting, sent in its own helicopters amid an intense firefight to resupply its commandos with ammunition and to ferry out a wounded Marine, the sources said.

The role of Blackwater's commandos in Sunday's fighting in Najaf illuminates the gray zone between their formal role as bodyguards and the realities of operating in an active war zone. Thousands of armed private security contractors are operating in Iraq in a wide variety of missions and exchanging fire with Iraqis every day, according to informal after-action reports from several companies.

In Sunday's fighting, Shiite militia forces barraged the Blackwater commandos, four MPs and a Marine gunner with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 fire for hours before U.S. Special Forces troops arrived. A sniper on a nearby roof apparently wounded three men. U.S. troops faced heavy fighting in several Iraqi cities that day.

The Blackwater commandos, most of whom are former Special Forces troops, are on contract to provide security for the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Najaf.

With their ammunition nearly gone, a wounded and badly bleeding Marine on the rooftop, and no reinforcement by the U.S. military in the immediate offing, the company sent in helicopters to drop ammunition and pick up the Marine.
Be sure and click through the link and look at the picture of Blackwater "civilians" on a roof in Najaf fighting alongside Marines.
During the defense of the authority headquarters, thousands of rounds were fired and hundreds of 40mm grenades shot. Sources who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of Blackwater's work in Iraq reported an unspecified number of casualties among Iraqis.

A spokesman for Blackwater confirmed that the company has a contract to provide security to the CPA but would not describe the incident that unfolded Sunday.
So, can we stop calling them "civilians" now?

UPDATE: Phil Carter at INTEL DUMP reacts to this WashPo article:

Analysis: Whoa... so these guys work for the U.S. government, but not for the CPA and CJTF chain of command? That's not just odd, that's dangerous. Even if the Blackwater guys are the best in the world, I'm a little reticent to support the idea of armed contractors running around on their own without command, control and coordination with American and allied units on the ground. It worked this time, but it seems like a fratricide formula in the future.

Moreover, there is a certain "WTF" factor here, to quote a friend of mine. What are these contractors doing that they have this much firepower, and a friggin' helicopter of their own? And what kind of command system does CPA and CJTF have that they had zero visibility of this incident until presumably the Washington Post reported on it? Blackwater's employees exhibited a great degree of heroism on Sunday in Najaf, and they should be commended for their initiative and personal courage. However, it may be wise to reconsider the system of command and control that lets these guys run around Iraq with this much firepower and no accountability to U.S. government agencies.

Suffice to say, actions like this clearly support my argument that the Blackwater contractors in Fallujah were not entitled to protection as non-combatants under the 4th Geneva Convention. And unfortunately, because they fight outside the U.S. command structure, don't wear uniforms, and don't always carry their arms openly, they're likely not combatants under the 3rd Geneva Convention either. Thus, they fall in the gray area between the two categories. Ironically, the unlawful combatants we have detained at Gitmo fall into the same gray area. I don't think it's necessarily the best idea to contract out combat functions like these to private military contractors, and I think we're assuming a great deal of risk because of the legal issues in play.

http://www.antiwar.com/blog/comments.php?id=A688_0_1_0_C

[keith]

CMI to Vet Those Going to Iraq

The Monitor (Kampala)
NEWS
May 14, 2006
Posted to the web May 15, 2006

By Frank Nyakairu
Kampala

There is great concern in government circles of a possible terrorism backlash as hundreds of Ugandan flock to Iraq to work, especially as armed guards. A top source in government has told Sunday Monitor that there is fear of that "terror tactics and techniques could be copied [in Iraq] and used here". As a mitigation measure, the government has quickly instituted a vetting system and sent undercover security operatives to spy on Ugandans in Iraq.

The fact that some companies were secretly and illegally recruiting hundreds of Ugandans for security jobs in Iraq worsened this fear recently. "We are concerned that the people who have ended up in Iraq could be recruited by wrong people there," a top official in the Labour, Gender and Social Development ministry told Sunday Monitor on Friday.

The ministry cleared eight companies to recruit Ugandans to take over jobs formerly done by Iraqis and Georgians. But recently government was allegedly shocked that M/s All Sec Uganda Limited, a local private security company, had illegally recruited and sent hundreds of Ugandans to Iraq.

"So what we have decided is to stop all illegal recruitment and have everyone going to Iraq first [get] vetted by the CMI and ISO, and also send intelligence personnel to monitor activities of Ugandans there" said the source.

All Sec Uganda Limited was said by sources, last Tuesday, to be linked to President Museveni's son-in-law, Mr Odrek Rwaboogo. The latter however issued a rebuttal last Wednesday, distancing himself from the said company.

Officially, 422 Ugandans have in the recent past been cleared to go and work as security guards in the war-torn Iraq. Another 200 are due to follow.

Militant groups in Iraqi opposed to US presence have over the past months targeted most US installations and personnel, using suicide bombers, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and roadside ambushes.

But the Minister of State for Gender Labour and Social Development, Ms Zoe Bakoko Bakoru, on Friday denied knowledge of government's fears about imminent terrorist attacks. "We have not received such reports, but for security reasons we called the security agencies to ensure that wrong people do not end up in Iraq," she said.

She added that out of the 422 Ugandans sent to Iraq, "11 have been deported for laziness and theft." Army spokesman Maj. Felix Kulayigye also said that clearance of the Iraq bound Ugandans was "normal procedure." He said: "What I know, under normal circumstances, any person going for a security job may have to be cleared by security agencies."

Kulayigye who denied that an undercover team had been sent to the volatile country, added: "It is not that we are worried, but we have always been terror-alert, and we are not taking any chances."

An intelligence team, which is based at Entebbe International Airport, recently arrested 16 UPDF soldiers who were among 275 Iraq-destined Ugandans. The soldiers are due to be charged with desertion.

Ugandans in Iraq are in charge of the inner security of Camp Victory, at Al Asad, Baghdad, Fallujah, Tikrit, and other large US bases in that country. They are contract workers for the EOD Technology, a Tennessee-based company that specialises in unexploded ordnance clean-up and security services for the US military.

Putting them on guard duty frees American soldiers for missions outside their bases. The Ugandans' initial contract is for six months, and attracts a pay of about $1,000 per month for each employee.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2006 The Monitor. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com).

[keith]

For Water Truck 103, a Perilous Path to the End
Ambush Greets Convoy At Site Near Baghdad

By Nelson Hernandez
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, May 16, 2006; A01

WITH CONVOY 77, Iraq -- A few miles west of Baghdad, a brand-new water truck backed gingerly off a flatbed truck and down a makeshift dirt ramp, completing its 7,000-mile journey from a factory in Texas to a government ministry in Iraq.

Considering the enormous effort the United States had made to get it to its destination, there was not much celebration among the small crowd of Iraqis who looked on as the truck was driven away. Nor was there any particular joy among the guards and drivers who had delivered the truck.

For them, it was just another job that had brought them up the highway from the Persian Gulf, through the austere desert of southern Iraq and the fertile farmlands between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Along the way, they had seen flocks of sheep and camels, escorted by ancient-looking men in red checked kaffiyahs and white dishdashas; barefoot children running up to the side of the road and waving for something to eat; crude mud houses that looked as timeless as the land itself. What they did not see were the men with fingers wrapped around the triggers of assault rifles.

Since the 2003 invasion, the U.S. government has allocated more than $20 billion to rebuild Iraq. The massive program, which ultimately benefits both the people with nothing and the people with nothing but guns, is actually a huge number of smaller tasks that begin with a decision by leaders in Washington. With the signing of an executive order, a complex chain of events is set in motion that, if all goes as planned, brings things from America to Iraq.

First, taxpayer dollars are transformed into trucks, toolboxes, building supplies, arms, ammunition, boots and uniforms, X-ray machines and hospital beds that are carried to Iraq mostly by an army of civilians -- inventory managers, stevedores, truck drivers and private security contractors -- whose largely unseen role in the war can be as dangerous as a soldier's.

This is the story of a tiny piece of that effort -- the 400-mile journey of a brand-new water truck from Umm Qasr, Iraq's main seaport on the Persian Gulf, to the Baghdad Water Directorate west of the capital. It was there that the men with guns were waiting.

Umm Qasr

The dusty white Klein K-250SS water truck with "103" written in red marker on its windshield sat on the back of a red flatbed truck in a yard in Umm Qasr, tied down with chains for the final leg of its journey.

Truck 103 began its life in Jacksonville, Tex., at the manufacturing plant of Klein Products Inc. It is valued at $120,707 and carries about 2,500 gallons of water, a useful purpose in a country where drinkable water can be scarce.

The truck wended its way by ship to the port of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, where it was loaded with 26 other water trucks onto another long, black ship called the Strong American. From there, it moved up the Persian Gulf and through a short, artificial channel into the port of Umm Qasr, where it arrived on Feb. 25.

Umm Qasr, a charmless place with a skyline dominated by gray, blue and yellow cranes and rusting warehouses, is controlled by Shiite Muslims, the dominant sectarian group in southern Iraq. Many of the steel containers stacked around the port bear the logo IRISL -- Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.

"God knows what they're bringing in here," Lt. Col. Jose Velazquez said of the country's Iranian neighbors as he drove around the port on a 108-degree afternoon. "There's no doubt in my mind that we have people with bad intentions in the port. But in the time I've been here, we haven't had any major issues."

American items coming into Umm Qasr move through a web of government agencies, contractors and subcontractors. At the top is Velazquez, with the Army Corps of Engineers' Gulf Region Division Project and Contracting Office, which is responsible for overseeing reconstruction efforts in Iraq. It contracts out the delivery of goods to a Kuwaiti company called PWC Logistics. PWC in turn coordinates among local ship captains and truck drivers who ultimately carry and deliver the items, and the private security contractors who protect them.

Umm Qasr is one of the main entry points for reconstruction items. It and the nearby port of Zubayr received more than 10,000 vehicles -- police cars, firetrucks, cement mixers, bulldozers and tractors -- in 2005 alone. All of the equipment eventually winds up in Iraqi hands.

"That's our main effort here: to push equipment out," Velazquez said. "There are people who have died doing this, but we are in a war. So we have to continue working to accomplish our mission."

With that, he signed off on the departure of Convoy 77: 12 water trucks, bound for the Baghdad Water Directorate and escorted by the 22 men of Team 7 of ArmorGroup International.

On the Road

The convoy rolled out on May 9 at 8:15 a.m. It consisted of 12 flatbed trucks and two spare cabs, escorted by four armored Ford F-350 pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in back, as well as an unarmed pickup that would drive ahead to discreetly scout out the route.

From here, Mark Jones was in command. His team consisted of 18 Iraqi employees and three British expatriates with a combined 42 years of military experience. Jones had served in the British army for 11 years before joining ArmorGroup, a company that protects many of the reconstruction convoys.

Though he has gone private and no longer wears a uniform -- except for a Union Jack patch and a small pin with the Welsh flag on his body armor -- he runs his team like a military unit.

"If it comes to small-arms fire, we keep on driving," Jones said in a rapid-fire briefing outlining the route. "If someone is injured, we're not going to stop inside the killing zone. If one of the vehicles is taken out, we'll do a crossover drill," in which one car comes up alongside the crippled vehicle, removes the passengers and continues the mission.

"If we have to stand and fight, we'll stand and fight."

Jones emphasized the possibility of violence -- "contact," in the military euphemism -- because the slow-moving convoys are often hit by bombs planted in the road or small-arms fire. The trucks can take plenty of punishment from rifle and machine-gun bullets and shrug off smaller bombs. But rocket-propelled grenades, RPGs, are a bigger threat. A direct hit can punch through even the armor of the pickups and incinerate everyone inside.

From the moment the convoy left the port, the team was on alert. As they traveled Main Supply Route Tampa, each truck's radio squawked with sights to look out for, whether debris, other traffic or suspicious "pax" -- a military word for people or passengers.

"Left side, vehicle, black, pax on telephone." Could he be calling insurgents?

"Two vehicles parked on left side, doors open." Gunmen?

"Static vehicle, right side." A car bomb?

"Bridge ahead." Any overpass is an ideal spot for an ambush.

"Two men with guns, right side! One has an RPG!"

"Eyes on!" Jones cried, and for a moment everyone expected an assault. But it was apparently just two U.S. soldiers on foot patrol outside Camp Cedar.

"Your mind moves quickly," Jones said. "You're not physically tired, you're mentally tired at the end of a run."

For all that wariness, the worst thing that happened to the convoy on the first day of its journey was a truck breakdown, a problem quickly solved by using the two spare trucks in the convoy to tow the cargo and the broken-down truck.

After six hours and 280 miles, the trucks pulled into Convoy Support Center Scania, a U.S.-run refueling base about 125 miles south of Baghdad.

"What a journey," Jones said. "That was one of the better ones."

Camp Scania

The Iraqi truck drivers, sweaty and tired, emerged from their trucks to get water and something to eat. Like most of his fellow drivers, Wahid Abid, the driver of the flatbed carrying Truck 103, was wearing white cotton pants and a white T-shirt. He was a Shiite from Basra and had been a truck driver since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.

"Yes, certainly it's dangerous," he said before settling down with a meal and climbing into the cab of his truck, where he would spend the night. "I've been forced to work, because we need to earn money to live. We have no jobs, just this work."

Jones and his three British teammates slept on bunk beds in a large tent inside the camp and ate at the American mess hall, a well-stocked place serving Cornish hen, french fries, fruit smoothies and Baskin-Robbins ice cream. But they were still in Iraq.

Unlike the American soldiers sitting around them, the four Britons said, they weren't in Iraq to serve their country, bring democracy to Iraq, win respect at home or even rebuild the country. They were motivated, they said, by the same thing as the Iraqi truck drivers.

"I done my time in the army," Jones mused in the mess hall. "I enjoyed it. But I asked myself, 'How much money am I making?' I can secure my future 20 times faster than I would in the British army. It's money. Nothing else. Money."

"And anyone who tells you different is a liability," added Leon Hart, his teammate.

Baghdad

After the broken truck was fixed, the convoy wound out of the concrete barriers of Camp Scania under an overcast sky at 7:25 a.m. the next day. They traveled north through the towns of Iskandariyah, Latifiyah and Mahmudiyah -- some of the most violent in Iraq -- but it was all quiet as the convoy arrived in the capital and pulled through the Baghdad Water Directorate's white gate into a large, walled compound.

After setting his gun trucks into defensive positions, Jones walked over to the manager's small office, dropped a bulky envelope on his desk and handed him the paperwork to sign for shipment No. 10,687.

"There are the keys for the trucks," Jones said.

Outside, Truck 103 was being unloaded. There was no ramp to back the trucks off the flatbeds, so an Iraqi bulldozer operator made one out of dirt. After several minutes of work, they had one that was sturdy enough for the truck to slowly back down to the ground. Mission accomplished. A little piece of America had been delivered to Iraq.

Jones walked back to his gun trucks, waiting for the rest of the cargo to be unloaded. It was slow work; more than an hour and a half passed. Iraqis from town came and went. The men of Team 7 relaxed and chatted.

It was at this moment that the men with guns chose to strike.

A rocket-propelled grenade streaked in from the north, exploding nearby with a deep crump. After a half-second of frozen inactivity, one of the guards screamed, "Get in the truck!" Seconds later, a group of seven to 15 men opened fire with assault rifles from buildings overlooking the compound about 100 yards away.

The usual order of things would have been to drive to the nearest American base, but the iron gate to the compound was closed, too thick to ram through, and the men were under fire. They had to stand and fight.

The trucks' machine guns returned fire, spraying the buildings with bullets, as Jones and two teammates took aimed shots from cover. The shooting from the other side died down.

Jones, waving his hands, shouted at his excited gunners to stop firing. He whipped out his phone and paced around behind his truck, calling for military support. All the Iraqi truck drivers from the convoy had vanished, as had the employees of the water directorate. An Iraqi guard who had been shooting at the attackers got into Hart's pickup truck, breathing heavily and shaking.

As he closed the door, gunfire broke out again -- first the pop, pop, pop of rifles, then the rapid thumping of the machine guns atop the pickup trucks. Once again, Jones and the men outside shot back.

"Jay, get in your wagon! Get in your wagon, Jay, we're moving!" Hart yelled at his teammate James Stevens, who then ran out to the gate to open it so the trucks could escape.

As the team laid down a few more shots, the pickup trucks raced out of the compound, turning right on the road and getting onto the main highway east, toward the U.S. base at Abu Ghraib. Across the road, the insurgents took a few parting shots at the convoy. A man with an RPG scrambled for cover as the gunners in the trucks fired at him.

The reports came in over the radio as they reached safety: They had killed two insurgents. The convoy had scattered to the winds; three or four of the Iraqi truck drivers were kidnapped before they could make it back to Umm Qasr. Everybody in the security team was alive, nobody hurt. And a water truck had made it to Baghdad.

© 2006 The Washington Post Company

[keith]

The enforcer

Colonel Tim Spicer is effectively in charge of the second largest military force in Iraq - some 20,000 private soldiers. Just don't call him a mercenary

Stephen Armstrong
Saturday May 20, 2006
The Guardian


Colonel Tim Spicer is the future of warfare. Immaculately dressed, effortlessly charming, a keen Eric Clapton fan with tickets for most of Slowhand's gigs over the summer, he is also effectively in charge of the second largest military force in Iraq: the estimated 20,000 private security personnel who outnumber the British army by almost three to one. Spicer's company Aegis has a contract with the Pentagon worth almost $300m to oversee the 16 private security companies providing personnel, security, military training and reconstruction. As Bush's poll ratings fall, it looks as if these private soldiers will only increase.

Estimates of their numbers vary and Spicer isn't convinced by the figure of 20,000. "I'd say there's no more than 8,000 if you define it as expat Brits or Americans," he says. "If you include Iraqi security companies and third country nationals like Gurkhas, Fijians and others, you could be getting up to 20,000. The oil protection force used to be run by a private security company and it had upwards of 10,000 people in it, but that's now been nationalised under the ministry of oil."

No matter how many there are, the strategic advantage for the Pentagon in working so closely with the likes of Aegis is clear. Iraq's increasing unpopularity in America is mainly fuelled by rising troop casualties - now approaching 2,500 - while private security deaths go unrecorded. The American broadcaster PBS estimated that 18 "private warriors" were killed in two weeks last June, but there are no official figures.

"The impact of casualties is much more significant if they're sovereign forces as opposed to contractors," Spicer says. "However, it is the sovereign forces that do the fighting. Aegis's casualty figures are incredibly light - we've lost three in two years; two to suicide bombs and one to a road accident. I couldn't tell you about the other companies."

As Bush and Blair face pressure to set deadlines for troop withdrawal and the violence continues, there's every chance these private companies could take up the security slack. Their numbers have mushroomed since 9/11. In the 1990s there were probably a handful at most, today there are 25 in the UK, about 30 in the US and a few in France and Germany. And they are becoming ambitious.

In April, a US private security company called Blackwater declared itself ready and able to resolve the situation in Darfur. "We're low cost and fast," said its vice chairman. "The question is, who's going to let us play on their team?" Aegis's Iraq contract makes it the largest British player in the "security bubble". Should the troops withdraw, they'd effectively be in charge of the western presence in Iraq.

"I don't think any of the coalition nations are going to cut and run," says Spicer. "But if they did go, that would not mean the end of the insurgency. I don't subscribe to the view that there is a civil war going on, but if the coalition left it could very easily disintegrate into one. The Iraqi security forces are not ready to take control. And therefore there would be a very significant increased role for private security - protecting critical infrastructure like oil, power station and water supplies, otherwise the insurgents will blow them up."

We're walking through the galleries of the Imperial War Museum and come to rest in front of the sleek, black motorbike Lawrence of Arabia was riding when he died. Spicer is fascinated by Lawrence as the man who organised the first modern Middle Eastern insurgency against an imperial power. Despite leaving his public school early to sprawl on the grass at the Isle of Wight festival and manage American rock bands, it was his interest in history that finally drew him back into the family tradition of army service.

The museum is one of his favourite places. Initially he and his son came to see the planes and tanks in the bright main hall but, as the boy got older, he took him to the fake first world war trenches to get a sense of what life is like under fire. I wonder aloud why a soldier with Falklands experience would return to combat in the private sector after leaving the army in 1995.

"I did go and work in the City," he smiles, "but if you've trained to do certain things for 20 years and you're halfway competent and ... and you enjoy it, because that is the difference between the conscript and the volunteer, you probably miss it, if the truth be known. Why leave the army and join a private security company? Certainly there's an element of financial reward. But most people who work for me feel they are doing a valuable job. It's not just a bunch of hard men in it for the money."

That, however, is an accusation thrown at him in the past. He vigorously defended two of his soldiers convicted of murder in Northern Ireland and, after his stint in the City, set up Sandline - a private security company implicated in scandals in both Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea.

"I've always said that in Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone there was nothing wrong with what Sandline was doing because we were there at the request of the democratically elected governments," he argues. "But it attracted a lot of attention and played into the hands of people who felt that this was not a good way of doing things. The idea was well before its time. There was a huge amount of suspicion, mistrust and poor connotation attached to the security business at that time."

In a world where everything is contracted out, however, big security contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq mean the private security sector is bidding for respectability. Certainly the City sees the potential. Spicer is fending off calls from investors almost every day. Earlier this year, the British Association of Private Security Companies was set up, a lobbying body keen to promote self-regulation. The word mercenary is frowned upon. Although Spicer was happy to use it in its literal sense five years ago, it now makes him uncomfortable. "It's a pejorative term," he shrugs. "Mercenaries are bad."

Which is why he set up Aegis in September 2002. "I wanted to make sure that Aegis was a completely different animal." The company now has 1,200 employees. Three divisions provide intelligence, security operations and technical support. Many of the ground staff are ex-military, but the board has a number of merchant bankers and there's a sprinkling of journalists, police, former UN staffers and aid workers. There are offices in London, Washington, Kabul, Saudi Arabia and Nepal, but the company's largest presence is in Iraq.

It's not been a good week out there, but Spicer is an optimist. "It's not going to happen tomorrow, but if this government is formed and is balanced and the militias that support political parties can be kept in check - which is touch and go - then you'll see significant progress." Even so, there's an insurgency and a great deal of chaos. Would he join the calls from US generals for the head of Donald Rumsfeld? He speaks carefully: "There was a feeling that once the Ba'ath party had been removed there would be a natural desire to break away from 30 years of oppression and develop the country. There was a lack of realisation that there would be dissenters. Maybe someone should have thought 'how are we going to deal with this?' But I don't believe there was no plan for reconstruction - it may have been better organised, but it is taking place."

As for the idea that governments would try to avoid troop deaths by employing Aegis in Darfur, "The industry will resist," he believes. "It's not appropriate." Looking past Lawrence's bike and into the future, he says: "Maybe in 10 years' time it could develop into that ... but there will always be national sovereign forces working for national governments. It's just that the private sector will be there to assist and support them."

Career in brief

1974 Joined army, 21 SAS

1976 Sandhurst, Scots Guards

1982 Falklands. Becomes major in 1985

1986-87 Company commander in Northern Ireland

1990 Joint planning group Desert Storm

1991 Military assistant to Gen Peter de la Billière

1991-93 Special Forces

1994 MA for Gen Sir Michael Rose in Sarajevo

1996 Leaves army. Sets up Sandline

2002 Chief executive, Aegis

[keith]

Utahn gets 'rush' as bodyguard

. . . brandishing assault rifle, riding in armored car in Iraq, Afghanistan

By Doug Robinson
Deseret Morning News

Like most students, Dale McIntosh, a business major at Westminster College, works his way through school to pay for his education. He will be among the millions of students who will find a job this summer, but the similarities end there. Unlike his peers, he won't flip hamburgers, mow lawns or wait tables. He'll brandish an M-4 assault rifle and carry a Glock pistol on his hip while working as a bodyguard in the most dangerous place on Earth.

McIntosh is one of a growing number of privately contracted bodyguards — many of them ex-soldiers — hired by the U.S. government to protect its officials in Baghdad and other Middle East hot spots. McIntosh spent a year and a half in Iraq and Afghanistan protecting government employees assigned to work there, as well as those passing through on official business — among them, Sen. Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Sen. John McCain, Treasury Secretary John Snow, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (now ambassador to Iraq).

The work is highly dangerous. Four of McIntosh's comrades were killed last summer, two weeks after he returned to the states.

It's also highly lucrative. McIntosh can earn a lot of money quickly — he has made as much as $25,000 a month. At 29, he owns a house and other investment properties in Hawaii, a condo in Salt Lake City and drives a new Denali. He lives off his investments while he attends school.

"My family would prefer I didn't go over there," he says, "but it's such a good opportunity financially."

There is something besides money that drives McIntosh to risk life and limbs: adrenaline and the kind of camaraderie that athletes share as members of an elite team. He has survived a dozen firefights and ambushes, not to mention enough high-speed car chases and crashes to film another "Bourne Identity."

"It's addicting because you do get an adrenaline rush, and it gives you a new appreciation for life," he says.

Because of defense budget cuts, the United States relies heavily on private security contractors for protection. According to a recent article in The Australian Magazine, some 50 foreign security companies are licensed to operate in Iraq.

"In Iraq the subcontracting of war has happened on an unprecedented scale," writes Jon Swain. "In the first Gulf War there was one private contractor serving on the ground for every 50 American solders; now it is estimated that there is one for fewer than 10 servicemen."

These soldiers of fortune weigh the benefits — they can earn as much as $1,300 a day and $40,000 per month — against the risks — more than 300 private contractors have been killed, as they dodge exploding cars, road mines, rocket-propelled grenades, snipers, mortars, suicide bombers and military-grade assault rifles.

"The majority of the guys over there have wives and kids," says McIntosh. "They had come out of the military without much to show for it. It is a way to improve their lives."

McIntosh doesn't have a wife, but he does have a father, Tony, and four older brothers, Keith, Tony Jr., Robert and Blake. (His mother passed away.) They are no strangers to military life. Tony served in the Army for 30 years, including a stint in Vietnam, before settling the family in Star Valley, Wyo., about 20 years ago.

Keith is a former Army veteran who patrolled the DMZ in South Korea. Robert is an Army doctor based in San Diego whose work consists largely of the treatment of soldiers who were injured in Iraq. Eventually, he will serve in Afghanistan or Iraq.

"It was scary having (Dale) over there," says Tony. "I didn't want him to go. But he's a grown man. People do what they feel they need to do. I worried all the time and prayed for him and was concerned and was just glad when he was back here safe."

After graduating from high school, McIntosh attended Utah State University briefly before signing up for the National Guard, which assigned him active duty for 18 months. Shortly after leaving the Guard, he joined the Marines and eventually earned an invitation to special ops training.

He was assigned to the U.S. Marines 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company. They trained abroad for several missions, working closely with their international counterparts. They did mountain training in the Alps with the Slovenians, jumped out of planes with the Tunisians, performed ship-to-land insertions with the Turks, practiced sniper shooting out of a helicopter with the Greeks, performed desert operations in Djibouti with the French Foreign Legion.

They were sent to Djibouti to prepare for action in Afghanistan; they waited on a Navy ship in the Adriatic Sea during the Bosnian conflict for a mission to seize dictator Slobodan Milosevic; they waited on a ship off the coast of Iran for another mission to seize Osama bin Laden's brother.

They never saw action. McIntosh and his platoon felt like the athlete who gets stuck on the sideline for the big game.

"Regardless of what people say, you want to go do what you've practiced," says McIntosh.

After five years in the Marines, much of it during the post-9/11 era, he returned to civilian life, as did other frustrated members of his platoon. "We thought, if we're not going to do anything now, when things are like they are, what's the point," says McIntosh.

McIntosh, 26 at the time, attended classes at Salt Lake Community College and worked as a personal trainer. Meanwhile, he was taking out student loans and going into debt. After meeting with an ex-Marine pal who was serving as a bodyguard for the Afghanistan president, McIntosh decided to quit school and join him.

Needing money and craving action, he was on a plane 10 days later bound for three weeks of training and evaluation with a private contractor based in Tennessee. He was trained in self-defense, close-quarter combat and defensive and offensive driving — how to spin a car, how to reverse direction, how to take corners at high speeds, how to ram another car, how to push a car to its limits.

McIntosh passed the evaluation and was sent overseas. He spent six months in Afghanistan, five months in Iraq, two months in Bosnia and then another two months in Iraq last summer before returning to Utah and school last fall. He struggled to adjust to civilization.

"I started going to the shooting range and shopping for a bullet bike — something to get the blood pumping," says McIntosh, who sleeps with a pistol by his bed. For the first few weeks he jumped when he heard loud sounds.

The truth is, part of McIntosh's job in Iraq is also tedious and austere. He and the other private security guards live in trailers inside a walled compound and almost never venture beyond those walls when they aren't working.

"When you left the compound, you wore body armor and you were armed to the teeth," he says. "We drove through the city with guns hanging out the windows and each of us was assigned to scan a sector."

Much of his job consisted of whisking clients through Baghdad at 80 miles per hour in armored Suburbans and Land Cruisers. Insurgents use a variety of tactics to slow them — i.e. rocks in the road, ramming their vehicle, parking a car loaded with explosives by the road, staging accidents.

"If you get into an accident, you don't stop," says McIntosh. "If there's a traffic jam or a car in the way, you pull into the oncoming lane of traffic or just push the car through and keep going. Speed is security for us. Anywhere we went, we went fast. A car bomb is harder to time for a fast-moving car. If someone is catching up to you, you know they're a threat."

(At least one client, Hillary Clinton, complained to a companion in the back seat that they were going too fast for her to see the sights.)

On one occasion, McIntosh was riding in the third car on a one-way street when their three-car motorcade was ambushed. As McIntosh tells it, "We saw a couple of guys walking up from the left and knew something was going on. You can sense it. One of them reached into a car and grabbed an AK. Someone inside the car handed the other guy a Glock. They started shooting at the limo (middle car). The first round hit the engine. The engine does not have armor, so the electronics went out, and the car went to idle. We swerved toward the shooters to try to hit them or mitigate their threat, and they turned their fire on us. Then we rammed the limo from behind and pushed it to our destination through traffic and stoplights."

Before their clients leave a secure area, the security guards gather information from native and American military sources and then make a recon drive as an advance team, plotting routes (rarely the same one twice) and checking out the destination ahead of time. They escort their clients from the vehicle to the building and then set up an armed perimeter.

"You precede them into every room," says McIntosh. "Some of the political people don't like it; they think it's embarrassing. We form a circle around them and don't let anyone inside the ring except people we know or he knows. We would be his bad guys for him so he could be the nice guy and let them in."

Much of the guards' effectiveness is based on deterrence through intimidation. Many of them are built like linebackers — McIntosh is 6-foot-3, 240 pounds. They lift weights and exercise in their spare time. McIntosh grew a woolly beard to add to his menacing aura (hence, his call sign of "Chewy"). They keep their weapons visible.

"The whole mentality when you're guarding someone is to avoid confrontation, to take a defensive posture," says McIntosh. "We didn't want a firefight. If someone shoots at us while we're driving, we run away and protect our client and get him out of harm's way. It's against everything instilled in a military man."

Notwithstanding, private contractors are controversial in the Middle East because they operate under virtually no law. They can and do shoot to kill anyone who is carrying a weapon, for instance, with impunity.

"I can't tell you some of the things we did over there," he says. "When we got there, contractors were legally in a gray area. We didn't fall under military law or Iraqi law. To do our job, we can't afford to be diplomatic — if someone won't listen, we act. If a car comes up behind us and won't back off on our order, we get aggressive. We stick a gun out the window, and if that doesn't work, we point it at them. At that point, if we felt threatened, we shot the engine block or even them. If they're not backing off, they could have a bomb."

That said, McIntosh adds, "When we first went over there, it didn't matter that we weren't under any law because we were all professionals and no one was taking advantage of that freedom."

He believes that is no longer the case. The reputation of private contractors has suffered with the increased demand for security and the resulting decline in quality guards. McIntosh notes that when he first trained for security work in Iraq, the selection progress was "rigorous." The firm that hired him considered only highly skilled and experienced former special ops soldiers. It was like a tryout for a professional football team. They stayed in a hotel together and dreaded a phone call that meant they would be sent home the next morning. McIntosh laments that such rigorous standards are no longer required.

from that first group," says McIntosh. "We were one of the first companies to go in there, and within a couple of months we saw the quality drop off. Now it seems like the only requirement to get into the contracting business is you have to get past Level Six on the Delta Force video game."

McIntosh realized how far the standards had fallen one day when he walked into a U.S. military base PX and saw one of the new private contractors. He was wearing a full-length black leather coat in the middle of the Iraqi summer, with a pony tail, screw-you sunglasses and two revolvers placed backward in holsters on his hips.

"First of all, no professional would dress like that," says McIntosh. "He just wanted to look cool. There are efficient ways to draw a weapon. He'd have to throw open his jacket, cross draw two revolvers that may have had only six to eight rounds. Those are the people who get into trouble and make a bad name for everyone."

McIntosh and other security contractors work and live with their lives almost constantly on the line. For a time, there was a $100,000 bounty on their heads during his assignment in Afghanistan. ("In a weird way, we were flattered," he says.) Driving through the streets, he could see people videotaping their motorcade "gathering intell."

During his stay in Iraq, McIntosh had to ride in unarmored cars. "Bullets went through the door like cheese," he says. During one ambush, a bullet passed through the door, struck one guard in the femoral artery and then struck a guard sitting next to him in the leg.

"He almost died," says McIntosh of the first man. "He lost so much blood he passed out. He stopped breathing just before we reached the hospital. The Suburban was covered in blood."

It is such moments as these that keep the McIntosh family glued to the TV while one of their own is working there. "Money's not everything," says Tony. "I feel he's made some money, and he's back home safe. Stay home now. He was blessed the times he was over there. There's a time he won't go back there anyway. . . . It's now as far as I'm concerned."

There is another kind of subtler wound that Tony, the Vietnam vet, fears for his son, as well. "The things people see in a combat zone . . . sometimes it's hard to get over it," says Tony. "Sometimes they never get over it. A lot of these homeless people are vets. They just couldn't handle it mentally."

Dale McIntosh has seen those things already. He owns a collection of videotapes of the ambushes recorded by cameras mounted on the dashboard, as well as a collection of photos that chronicle the carnage. There are photos of men with the tops of their heads shot off, and photos of skeletons in the street that have been picked almost clean by packs of dogs.

The McIntosh family hears and sees news of the latest violence in Iraq and stews until they hear that he is safe. Older brother Keith sends an instant message on the Internet every time there is an incident to contact his brother.

"I tried to talk him out of going over there," says Keith. "It's not something I would do. He's really good at it and seems to pick up the leadership roles quickly over there. When I heard things happen on the news, I would instant message him on the Internet and he would tell me he was all right. It's a risk most people wouldn't take for that money."

Looking back, McIntosh explains the allure of such a dangerous job: "I did it because of the money and because it gave us the opportunity to do the fun stuff we wanted to do in the military without a lot of the B.S. that came with dealing with officers. We had a purpose over there.

"In the military we weren't getting into the game. I was in five years and didn't real feel like my life was in danger, and I don't mean that the way it sounds. It's just kind of a rush, an appreciation of life when you've been in that situation, and I wanted to experience that. People were shooting at us, and we were shooting back. That was a rush you wouldn't come down from all day. Those are the moments that cause you to reflect on life. Even now, I don't get upset at petty things. The whole experience gave me a new perspective on life."

Ultimately, the risk contributed to his decision to return to the United States last summer. "You feel like you have a deck of cards you throw out there, and if you keep throwing them out there eventually your card will come up. I had benefited enough. I didn't want to start a family with one arm."

That said, McIntosh recently began the paperwork process for more security work. He plans to return to Iraq soon.

[keith]

In the Black(water)
by JEREMY SCAHILL
The Nation
June 5, 2006

Tens of thousands of Hurricane Katrina victims remain without homes. The environment is devastated. People are disenfranchised. Financial resources, desperate residents are told, are scarce. But at least New Orleans has a Wal-Mart parking lot serving as a FEMA Disaster Recovery Center with perhaps the tightest security of any parking lot in the world. That's thanks to the more than $30 million Washington has shelled out to the Blackwater USA security firm since its men deployed after Katrina hit. Under contract with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service, Blackwater's men are ostensibly protecting federal reconstruction projects for FEMA. Documents show that the government paid Blackwater $950 a day for each of its guards in the area. Interviewed by The Nation last September, several of the company's guards stationed in New Orleans said they were being paid $350 a day. That would have left Blackwater with $600 per man, per day to cover lodging, ammo, other overhead -- and profits.

Shortly after the hurricane hit, Blackwater "launched a helicopter and crew with no contract, no one paying us, that went down to New Orleans," says company vice chairman Cofer Black. "We saved some 150 people that otherwise wouldn't have been saved. And, as a result of that, we've had a very positive experience." Indeed. It was only days after the company arrived that it started reeling in lucrative deals.

According to Blackwater's government contracts, obtained by The Nation, from September 8 to September 30, 2005, Blackwater was paid $409,000 for providing fourteen guards and four vehicles to "protect the temporary morgue in Baton Rouge, LA." That contract kicked off a hurricane boon for Blackwater. From September to the end of December 2005, the government paid Blackwater at least $33.3 million -- well surpassing the amount of Blackwater's contract to guard Ambassador Paul Bremer when he was head of the US occupation of Iraq. And the company has likely raked in much more in the hurricane zone. Exactly how much is unclear, as attempts to get information on Blackwater's current contracts in New Orleans have been unsuccessful.

"We saw the costs, in terms of accountability and dollars, for this practice in Iraq, and now we are seeing it in New Orleans," says Illinois Democrat Jan Schakowsky, who has been one of Blackwater's few critics in Congress. "They have again given a sweetheart contract -- without an open bidding process -- to a company with close ties to the Administration."

After The Nation exposed Blackwater's operations in New Orleans this past fall [see "Blackwater Down," October 10, 2005], Schakowsky and a handful of other Congress members raised questions about the scandal. They entered the report into the Congressional Record during hearings on Katrina and cited it in letters to DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner, who then began an inquiry. In letters to Congressional offices in February, Skinner defended the Blackwater deal, asserting that it was "appropriate" for the government to contract with the company. Skinner admitted that "the ongoing cost of the contract ... is clearly very high" and then quietly dropped a bombshell: "It is expected that FEMA will require guard services on a relatively long-term basis (two to five years)." Two to five years? Already most of the 330 federally contracted private guards in the hurricane zone are working for Blackwater, according to the Washington Post. Another firm, DynCorp, is also trying to grab more of the action, offering its security services for less than $700 per day per guard.

The hurricane's aftermath has ushered in the homecoming of the "war on terror," a contract bonanza whereby companies can reap massive Iraq-like profits without leaving the country and at a minuscule fraction of the risk. To critics of the government's handling of the hurricane, the message is clear.

"That's what happens when the victims are black folks vilified before and after the storm -- instead of aid, they get contained," says Chris Kromm, executive director of the Institute for Southern Studies and an editor of Gulf Coast Reconstruction Watch. "If officials really cared about protecting the people of New Orleans, they wouldn't be giving millions to scandal-ridden contractors. They would have given the city money to rebuild their levees to withstand more than a Category 2 Hurricane. They still haven't done that -- and hurricane season is upon us."

Kromm alleges that vital projects that have "gotten zero or little money" in New Orleans include: job creation, hospital and school reconstruction, affordable housing and wetlands restoration. Even in this context, DHS continues to defend the Blackwater contract. In a March 1 memo to FEMA, Matt Jadacki, the DHS Special Inspector General for Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery, wrote that the Federal Protective Service considered Blackwater "the best value to the government."

While companies like Halliburton may have raked in more profits since George W. Bush took office, few have seen growth as dramatic as Blackwater's. The firm has been at the front of the line at the domestic and international taxpayer-funded feeding troughs and has recently hired some high-profile former government officials, like Cofer Black, former chief of CIA counterterrorism, and former Pentagon Inspector General Joseph Schmitz. In March Black represented Blackwater at a conference in Jordan, announcing that the company was seeking to broaden its role in even more conflict zones. Blackwater is rapidly expanding its operations, creating a new surveillance-blimp division, launching new training facilities in California and the Philippines, and increasingly setting its sights on the lucrative world of DHS contracts. It is clamoring to get into Darfur and has also hired Chilean troops trained under the brutal rule of Augusto Pinochet. "We scour the ends of the earth to find professionals," company president Gary Jackson told the Guardian. "The Chilean commandos are very, very professional, and they fit within the Blackwater system." The business magazine Fast Company recently named Jackson one of its "Fast 50," predicting that the company and its president are in for "a very strong (and long) decade."

It's hard to imagine that the cronyism that has marked the Bush Administration is not at play in Blackwater's success. Blackwater founder Erik Prince shares Bush's fundamentalist Christian views. He comes from a powerful Michigan Republican family and social circle, and his father, Edgar, helped Gary Bauer start the Family Research Council. According to a report prepared for The Nation by the Center for Responsive Politics, in all of Erik Prince's political funding generosity since 1989, he has never given a penny to a Democrat running for national office. Company president Jackson has also given money to Republican candidates. For his part, Joseph Schmitz -- the former Pentagon Inspector General turned general counsel to Blackwater's parent, The Prince Group -- lists on his résumé membership in the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, a Christian militia formed before the First Crusade. Like Prince, he comes from a right-wing family; his father, former Congressman John Schmitz, was an ultraconservative John Birch Society director who later ran for President. Joseph Schmitz was once in charge of investigating private contractors like Blackwater, but he resigned amid allegations of stonewalling investigations conducted by his department. He now represents one of the most successful of those contractors.

Schakowsky charges that the Administration has written Blackwater "blank checks," saying that the internal DHS review of the company "leaves us with more questions than answers." She points out that the report fails to address the major issues stemming from deploying private forces on US streets. In her testimony this past September, Schakowsky said, "Ask any American if they want thugs from a private, for-profit company with no official law-enforcement training roaming the streets of their neighborhoods. The answer will be a resounding NO."

Blackwater's ascent comes in the midst of a major rebranding campaign aimed at shaking its mercenary image. The company is at the forefront of the trade association of mercenary firms, the International Peace Operations Association, which lobbies for even greater privatization of military operations. Blackwater and its cause have clearly found serious backing in the Bush Administration. Hiring Blackwater, says Schakowsky, "may be legal, but it is not a good deal for taxpayers and Gulf region residents in particular." Blackwater's sweetheart deals, both domestic and international, are representative of how business has been done under Bush. They are a troubling indicator of a trend toward less accountability and transparency and greater privatization of critical government functions. It's time that more members of Congress ask tough questions about Blackwater and its rapid, profitable rise.

This article was reprinted with permission from The Nation.

[keith]

Don't jump ship, Iraq guards told
Sunday May 21, 2006


A Fiji recruiting agent for the London-based private security firm Control Risk Group has warned Fijian guards in Iraq not to jump ship when approached by other security firms who promise more money.

This comes after an increase in civilian Fijian deaths in Iraq in the past month with talks of sending more former soldiers to act as security guards for private companies in the war-torn country.

Four Fijian guards were killed in Iraq on April 19 after their convoy was ambushed by the Iraqi resistance.

Their families were not given compensation because they "jumped ship" from Control Risk to a Kuwait-based International Security Company that did not have compensation clause in its contract with the four guards.

Risk Control (Fiji) Limited recruiter Jonetani Kaukimoce confirmed today that 110 more former soldiers will be going to Iraq and they have been "fully briefed on the consequences of jumping ship".

Kaukimoce said the problem of "jumping ship" is that the Fijian guards are not aware of the resource limitations of the new security companies they are joining.

He said there are unscrupulous security companies that are forming by the minute in Iraq to take advantage of the security situation and the valuable tenders offered by firms that require armed protection from the Iraqi resistance.

Kaukimoce said he has been informed of instances where guards have been lured by these newly-formed security companies and they find themselves working with bad and faulty equipment.

"When they jump ship from one company to another, they do not know what they are jumping into," he said.

"When they jump into a new company, they (Fijian guards) don't know if the new company has say, armoured vehicles.

"There are five new companies in Iraq that are luring our guards and we have briefed our recruits about them and their capabilities."

Kaukimoce said that the guards coming back should tell their relatives who want to go to Iraq all about these ill-equipped security companies whose only goal is to win the lucrative contracts and tenders.

His company is well established and provides guards with latest equipment. He added the guards were well informed and understood the risks involved while working in Iraq.

"Most have been in Lebanon, they have served in Sinai and some have already served in Iraq as security guards, so they are fully aware of the risks involved," Kaukimoce said.

Ten civilian Fijian guards have died in Iraq to date. A separate figure of 12 Fijians serving in the British Army have also lost their lives with the latest being Private Joseva Lewaicei, serving with the Royal Anglian Regiment, who was killed by a roadside bomb.

[keith]

Ted Koppel: Time for U.S. to Form an "Army of Mercenaries"?

By E&P Staff

Published: May 21, 2006 12:05 AM ET

NEW YORK Little known to the American public, there are some 50,000 private contractors in Iraq, providing support for the U.S. military, among other activities. So why not go all the way, hints Ted Koppel in a New York Times op-ed on Monday, and form a real "mercenary army"?

Such a move involving what he calls "latter-day Hessians" would represent, he writes, "the inevitable response of a market economy to a host of seemingly intractable public policy and security problems."

The issue is raised by our "over-extended military" and inability of the United Nations to form adequate peace forces. Meanwhile, Americans business interests grow ever more active abroad in dangerous spots.

"Just as the all-volunteer military relieved the government of much of the political pressure that had accompanied the draft, so a rent-a-force, harnessing the privilege of every putative warrior to hire himself out for more than he could ever make in the direct service of Uncle Sam, might relieve us of an array of current political pressures," Koppel explains, tongue possibly in cheek.

"So, if there are personnel shortages in the military (and with units in their second and third rotations into Iraq and Afghanistan, there are), then what's wrong with having civilian contractors? Expense is a possible issue; but a resumption of the draft would be significantly more controversial....

"So, what about the inevitable next step — a defensive military force paid for directly by the corporations that would most benefit from its protection? If, for example, an insurrection in Nigeria threatens that nation's ability to export oil (and it does), why not have Chevron or Exxon Mobil underwrite the dispatch of a battalion or two of mercenaries?"

Koppel notes that Cofer Black, formerly a high-ranking C.I.A. officer and now a senior executive with Blackwater USA, "has publicly said that his company would be prepared to take on the Darfur account."

He concludes: "The United States may not be about to subcontract out the actual fighting in the war on terrorism, but the growing role of security companies on behalf of a wide range of corporate interests is a harbinger of things to come."

[keith]

South Africa : SA's draft anti-mercenary bill 'flawed'
May 23, 2006

By Andnetwork .com

An association of private security companies claims that South Africa's draft anti-mercenary bill has critical flaws, and that it will undermine international peace operations and severely harm South Africa’s international image if it is passed as law.

The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) told parliament on Tuesday that while it supports the general aims of the Prohibition of Mercenary Activity and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an area of Armed Conflict Bill, the bill has critical flaws that would undermine international peace operations and severely harm South Africa’s international image.

The organisation's president, Doug Brooks, was briefing parliament's defence portfolio committee on the second day of submissions on South Africa's draft anti-mercenary bill.

IPOA is a trade association of companies advocating the usage of private sector security services in support of international peace and stability operations. Member companies provide services such as demining, logistics and security in conflict and post-conflict environments.

According to the organisation's website, South Africa is at the forefront of international peace efforts, especially on the African continent.

"The country has a tremendous reputation in the international community and is a recognised leader in committing personnel to international peace and stability operations."

The organisation's member companies have provided security services in Afghanistan, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, among other countries.

Brooks said private security companies are important to the reconstruction of countries such as Iraq, and generally catered for three general categories - logistics and support, private security companies hired "to protect the noun" and reform and development companies which supported long-term change.

An estimated 800 South Africans are presently employed at private security companies in Iraq, with more involved in logistics and de-mining operations.

IPOA claims that South Africans bring crucial skills and capabilities, the knowledge of how best to mitigate humanitarian suffering in conflict and post conflict
environments, and a tough readiness to serve in the most austere living conditions, making them invaluable components in successful international
peace and stability operations.

"We firmly believe that the South African government can formulate legislation that would create a more open and legal process for South African citizens to provide their valuable services, while ensuring that excesses and humanitarian crimes are addressed in appropriate legal venues.

"The bill must be improved to allow South African citizens to openly and legally participate in support of international peace and stability operations without impeding upon the republic’s ability to appropriately prosecute egregious humanitarian crimes. The South African government can ensure appropriate transparency and legitimacy of the peace and stability industry by engaging with South African companies and citizens."

IPOA previously proposed the formation of an inclusive South African panel of experts composed of representatives from the government, parliament, academia, human rights organizations and the industry. Such a panel would set an example to the world in terms of transparency while ensuring that the private sector works in partnership and accord with government policies to enhance international peace operations.

The panel of experts would promote openness, legality, proper ethics and international co-operation.

Improving the Bill

IPOA believes the Bill could become viable and useful legislation with some significant modifications such as the acceptance of the reality that many private sector services fundamentally assist in making international peace and stability operations successful.

Also, that if South Africa’s leadership role in international peace and stability operations is to be maintained, it is important that South African law be harmonised with the laws and regulations of other states and international organisations that host or utilise companies in the peace and stability industry.

The organisation also wants the South African government’s designations of "areas of conflict" to be be based "on clear rather than arbitrary criteria".

Johannesburg Bureau

http://www.andnetwork.com/index?service=direct/0/Home/top.fullStory&sp=l35836

[keith]

U.S. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers
The reliance on security firms to interrogate and transport suspected terrorists has created 'rule-free zones,' says Amnesty International.
By Peter Spiegel, Times Staff Writer
May 24, 2006


WASHINGTON — The U.S. government's use of private military contractors to conduct interrogations in Iraq and to transport suspected terrorists creates "rule-free zones" and allows abuses to go unpunished, Amnesty International charged Tuesday.

There are 20 known cases of civilian contractors suspected of committing criminal acts while handling detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan, but only one has been prosecuted thus far, said Larry Cox, Amnesty's U.S. executive director.

"Amnesty International is not opposed to the use of private contractors," Cox said at a news conference to release the group's annual report on human rights. "But the reliance of the United States government on private military contractors has helped create virtually rule-free zones sanctioned with the American flag and firepower."

The human rights organization said its research also showed that at least 25 American companies appeared to have been hired by the U.S. government to transport suspected terrorists to countries known for human rights violations, a practice that might make them "complicit in the U.S. government's practice of outsourcing torture."

The CIA has come under intense international criticism for the practice of "extraordinary rendition," in which it captures terrorism suspects in one country and moves them to another for interrogation and detention. Less attention has been paid, however, to private companies whose airplanes and other transportation services have been used in the CIA's program.

Private military contractors based in the United States and other countries have been a controversial presence in Iraq. Their role has come under greater scrutiny after four employees of Blackwater USA, a North Carolina-based security firm, were killed and two of their corpses hung from a bridge in Fallouja in March 2004.

An estimated 25,000 private security workers are employed in Iraq, costing nearly $50 billion since the start of the war. Estimates based on government reports indicate that more than 200 have been killed.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has repeatedly defended the Pentagon's use of private contractors, saying it is an effective way to free up military personnel and other government employees working in combat zones.

In December, Rumsfeld acknowledged that such contractors were not covered by military law, but he argued that Iraqi laws as well as U.S. civilian laws govern the behavior of Americans working in Iraq.

President Bush, who was asked about the legal status of contractors in Iraq at a town hall session last month, said he delegated such policy decisions to the Pentagon.

"I don't mean to be dodging the question, although it's kind of convenient in this case," Bush joked after a talk to graduate students in Washington. "I'm going to call the secretary [Rumsfeld] and say you brought up a very valid question, and what are we doing about it?"

In January, the Justice Department acknowledged that it was looking into 11 allegations of detainee abuse by civilians from the Pentagon, as well as those involving nine civilians from "another agency," believed to be the CIA.

Other than the case against former CIA contractor David Passaro, in which assault charges were filed two years ago in connection with the June 2003 beating death of a detainee in Afghanistan, all of the others have been referred to a task force set up in the U.S. attorney's office in the Eastern District of Virginia, the Justice Department said. No other charges have been filed in any of the cases. Passaro is awaiting trial.

Amnesty officials said despite allegations of abuses, there were signs that the industry was beginning to establish self-regulating guidelines that could help prevent such problems in the future.

Laura Dickinson, a University of Connecticut law school expert on military contractors who has worked with Amnesty International on the issue, said she had been in contact with the International Peace Operations Assn., a newly formed trade group for private military groups, about ways to change contracts and regulations governing the companies.

Dickinson said she had studied 60 publicly available contracts of private companies working for the U.S. government in Iraq and found that none of them required employees to obey international human rights and humanitarian laws, provisions that could easily be added to government contracts.

She said many domestic government contracts, such as those for companies running state prisons, routinely included provisions for such laws, as well as an accreditation process that prevented companies from winning such deals without the approval of national trade associations.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-contractors24may24,1,6995503.story?coll=la-headlines-world&ctrack=1&cset=true

[keith]

SA mercenaries 'highly prized in hot spots'

May 23 2006 at 03:49PM

Removing South Africans employed at private security companies contracted to do work in international hotspots could prove "disastrous", members of Parliament heard on Tuesday.

"Many international efforts will be at risk... (Some) will have to close their operations if they can't rely on South Africans," said Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association.

Brooks was briefing Parliament's defence portfolio committee on the second day of submissions on South Africa's draft anti-mercenary bill.

Also speaking on behalf of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq, Brooks said South Africa currently set the ethical standards for peace-keeping operations, providing more personnel (2000) than for example, America.

'We don't have a secret ninja team that can go and whack violators'
"South Africans are more robust, able to live under more austere conditions, have increased flexibility and can adapt to changing conditions," Brooks told Sapa of the reasons why South Africans were so highly regarded.

He said the proposed legislation would undermine peace-keeping operations, from Darfur in Sudan to Haiti and Iraq, because the "costs of peace" would increase significantly.

Brooks said private security companies were vital to the reconstruction of countries such as Iraq, and generally catered for three general categories - logistics and support, private security companies hired "to protect the noun" and reform and development companies which supported long-term change.

An estimated 800 South Africans were presently employed at private security companies in Iraq, with more involved in logistics and de-mining operations.

The department of foreign affairs said that a total of 23 South Africans had been killed in Iraq while providing security-related services.

Brooks said the peace and stability industry was critical to international operations, and supported efforts to enhance transparency and accountability.

He said there was a concern in industry that the anti-mercenary bill was counter-productive and ran contrary to democratic ideals.

Quoting from the United Nation's special rapporteur on mercenaries, Dr Shaista Shameem, Brooks said that companies not engaged in violations of human rights and impeding the right of people's to self-determination were "not a problem".

He said the UN itself made use of the private sector to provide security of UN operations, as well as logistics and support in areas such as refugee camps.

Brooks said it seemed as if the worlds' poorest countries were trying to deal with the most difficult peace-keeping operations imaginable, and a key point was that the "West is abrogating its responsibility to support these operations".

Asked by committee members about violations and the monitoring thereof, Brooks said the association had a code of conduct and tried to be proactive, but conceded this was limited.

"We don't have a secret ninja team that can go and whack violators."

Brooks said the worst the trade association could do was debar errant private companies, adding: "We can't shoot them, that's the job of states."

He said a complaint emanating from companies working in Iraq was that there was insufficient oversight of their work, which could impact on future contracts.

Brooks said in discussions with South Africans on the ground in troubled areas, the concerns raised in relation to the bill was that it would be interpreted too broadly and "will make criminals of them".

Brooks supported a system which allowed serving members of the South African National Defence Force to apply for leave, serve overseas in a private company, and return to the SANDF.

However, committee chair, Thandi Tobias, questioned this, saying that this was not okay and needed to be controlled. - Sapa

[keith]

Fuelling Africa's turmoil

The continent is awash in firearms. With young fighters going from conflict to conflict, eradicating the demand may be more difficult than eliminating the supply, one expert tells Olivia Ward The continent is awash in firearms. With young fighters going from conflict to conflict, Arms dealers are Africa's birds of prey, picking the bones of countries already destitute from years of murderous violence.

But an African security expert says the burgeoning trade in small arms — those which can be carried by individuals — has also created a dangerous new scenario in which battle-hardened young gunmen infiltrate borders across the continent, providing ready firepower for conflicts that migrate to new territory even as peace deals are signed.

The career fighters, he says, are part of a broad-based gun culture that makes the demand for weapons a steadily increasing factor in Africa's destructive arms trade — and decreases the hope for peace in such conflict-ridden areas as Darfur.

"Youth unemployment is horrific in most of Africa," said Eboe Hutchful, chair of the African Security Sector Network, an umbrella group of politicians, security experts and academics working for security sector reform. "There are many young men who see no alternative to offering their services to whoever wants to hire them to fight. They may not start conflicts, but they're available to anyone who is ready for a war."

The "hired guns" take their weapons with them, but sometimes barter them for cash along the way, said Hutchful. In Africa's huge arms bazaar, there are many opportunities to rearm.

"(Demobilized fighters) may be offered $300 in Liberia, but $900 in Ivory Coast. They'll take the money and move on somewhere else," Hutchful said.

According to the London-based International Action Network on Small Arms, there are 8 million firearms in the West Africa alone, and millions of people have been killed by them in Central and East Africa, in spite of regional accords meant to halt the flow of weapons.

Hutchful, a Ghanaian political scientist and University of Toronto grad, heads the Ghana-based African Security Dialogue and Research, and is professor of African Studies at Wayne State University in Detroit.

In Africa, he says, demand is catching up with supply as a fundamental factor in the floodtide of arms sweeping the continent.

"Eradicating the demand may be even more difficult than getting rid of the supply," Hutchful said in a telephone interview during a recent visit to Ottawa.

"In some African countries guns are now part of the culture. You have to have a personal weapon," he said.

Once acquired, small arms — defined as deadly weapons that can be carried by individual combatants — flow easily across Africa's porous borders, Hutchful said. "Many African countries aren't in a good position to address the problem. There are initiatives, but they're difficult to enforce. Small arms are simply out of control."

The multi-million-dollar international arms trade is responsible for many of the weapons that plague Africa today, despite tracking efforts and arms embargoes.

Reports show that guns are invading territory where they were once almost unknown, such as western Kenya, where an influx of automatic weapons has turned cattle theft among the impoverished Pokot tribe into civil war.

However, Hutchful says, foreign-made arms are only part of the problem. Africa's black market weapons manufacturers are now taking a cue from importers. "In West Africa, there are a number of producers of small arms. But there's a sense of denial about locally manufactured weapons — (governments) don't want to admit that they themselves might be proliferators."

Many of the producers, Hutchful says, are ordinary blacksmiths looking to boost their small incomes: "They produce routine agricultural implements and guns for hunting. But the guns end up in the hands of criminals. In Ghana and Nigeria there is a lot of armed robbery done with locally made weapons."

Some local producers are trying to "go legitimate" by declaring their businesses and operating under government rules. But Hutchful says, "there are huge amounts of dirt-cheap arms already circulating. It may not be worth their while."

As long as arms are cheap and available, experts say, there is scant hope of solving the deep and deadly problems that beset Africa, from the brain drain of its most capable people to the huge death toll from HIV-AIDS, which is at its worst in conflict zones.

International organizations and aid agencies stress development can only go hand in hand with disarmament, Hutchful says. But without investment that creates jobs for millions of armed and hungry young men, countries recovering from wars can too easily slip back into conflict.

"If there are no jobs, how can demobilized fighters reintegrate (as civilians)? Only a few can get jobs in private security companies. There is money available for demobilization and disarmament, but once it's exhausted, what do you do then?"

The connection between economic despair and violence was highlighted by a tragic-comic incident in Ghana shortly after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

"In the port city of Sekondi-Takoradi, somebody (in a radio station) played an April fool's trick, announcing that anybody interested in fighting in Iraq should go to the football stadium. Thousands of young people turned up and waited all day. It was a bad joke, but there was a deadly significance to it. It showed that there was a huge number of people ready to fight, because that was their livelihood," Hutchful said.

The failure of many disarmament programs also points to the underlying problem of poverty and underdevelopment: a situation made worse by attempts at Western-style "shock therapy" economic reform.

"It's a systemic problem. But Western countries often see it only as a breakdown in security. Many Africans would say it was a breakdown in the type of development (that has been applied there). People suffered economically and that aggravated the situation."

In countries that have managed to embrace democracy, Hutchful said, the odds on reducing violence are better. In northern Mali, a bitter five-year conflict between the settled population and the nomadic Tuareg ended in 1995, followed by integration of Tuareg fighters into the regular army. Mali's military dictatorship was ousted and democratic elections held in 2002.

But as a sign of how difficult it is to quell armed conflicts once they have begun, Tuareg attacks on two northeastern towns have left several people dead, and a group of Tuareg army deserters made off with a cache of government weapons and ammunition.

Nevertheless, says Hutchful, "Mali has had real success in disarmament after its Tuareg conflict, because it did democratize. It's poor, but in spite of its difficulties it's a transformed society and people have more hope."

But Hutchful warns the failure of democracy in many African countries has also compounded the problem of violence — and complicates peace efforts in hotspots like Darfur in Sudan.

"You need regional co-operation if you're going to stop the flow of arms. That means transparency and accountability.

"But there's no real trust in regional relationships where you have rogue governments existing side by side with more democratic ones. When trouble ignites, it also migrates — just as weapons do."

[keith]

Not sure of the credibility of this story.

UK security guards in Iraq call for more pay

date: 27 05, 2006


London, May. 27 (BNA) Hundreds of British security guards in Iraq are being urged to resign en masse next month over a pay dispute that could cripple operations at diplomatic missions and put the safety of officials at risk.
The unprecedented industrial action by staff at Control Risks raises questions about the use of private security companies for tasks such as guarding embassies and convoys and acting as bodyguards for diplomats and aid workers in conflict zones.

http://english.bna.bh/?ID=45381

[keith]

Think Again: Mercenaries
by Deborah Avant

NPR.org, May 26, 2006 · This article appeared in the July/August 2004 issue of Foreign Policy magazine.

"How is it in our nation's interest," asked U.S. Sen. Carl Levin recently, "to have civilian contractors, rather than military personnel, performing vital national security functions … in a war zone?" The answer lies in humanity's long history of contracting force and the changing role of today's private security firms. Even as governments debate how to hold them accountable, these hired guns are rapidly becoming indispensable to national militaries, private corporations, and nongovernmental groups across the globe.

"Private Security Companies Are Mercenaries"

No. The term "mercenary" describes a wide variety of military activities, many of which bear little resemblance to those of today's private security companies. The mercenary activity associated with entities such as the British East India Company came about when nation-states chartered companies to establish colonies and engage in long-distance trade. Mercenary units that fought in the American Revolution were effectively leased to the British Army by the Hessians. The soldiers of fortune that ran riot over the African continent in the 1960s were individuals or small ex-military groups that operated in the shadows.

Modern contractors most resemble the military enterprisers of the late Middle Ages. Before the rise of the nation-state, nearly all force was contracted. From the 12th century through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, military contractors often employed soldiers trained within feudal structures, sending them to whomever could pay, from Italian city-states to the Vatican. Fighting wars, maintaining order, and collecting taxes were among the various political tasks filled by these military enterprises. Some historians link the rise of contracted forces in the late Middle Ages to the inability of the feudal system to address the increasingly complex needs of a modernizing society, such as the protection of trade routes for merchants. Similar reasons exist today: The market pressures, technology, and social change of a globalized world create multiple demands that national militaries have difficulty meeting.

Today's private security companies are corporate endeavors that perform logistics support, training, security, intelligence work, risk analysis, and much more. They operate in an open market, work for many employers at once, and boast of their professionalism. These companies staff their projects not with permanent employees, but with individuals drawn from vast databases of ex-military and former law enforcement personnel. These databases list individuals by experience and specialty, so contractors can custom-fit each job with qualified employees. Individuals may appear in several databases, move easily from one contract (and company) to the next, and freelance when not under contract. Although many of these individuals are quite honorable, the industry's structure allows ample opportunity for some who bear disturbing similarities to the 1960s-style soldiers of fortune to enter the corporate mix.

"The Bush Administration Has Dramatically Expanded Use of Military Contractors"

Wrong. The United States ramped up military outsourcing during the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War brought reductions in force size, and numerous ethnic and regional conflicts emerged requiring intervention. During the first Gulf War in 1991, the United States deployed about one contractor for every 50 active-duty personnel. Ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid-1990s and Kosovo in 1999 saw that ratio increase to about 1 to 10, roughly equal to that of the recent war in Iraq.

Since U.S. President George W. Bush announced the end of "major combat operations" in Iraq in May 2003, however, security contractors have flooded the country. The unstable environment has stretched coalition forces thin, and the absence of a U.N. mandate has made tools such as U.N. peacekeepers and international civilian police unavailable, drawing private security companies closer to combat as the Iraqi insurgency continues. Media attention on contractors in Iraq, such as the Americans who allegedly abused Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison, has also raised public awareness of security contractors to a higher degree than in previous conflicts.

"Contractors Don't Engage in Combat or Other Essential Military Tasks"

False. Although U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the Pentagon would outsource all but core military tasks, these tasks are changing, and military contractors perform many of them. Contractors have the technical expertise to support increasingly complex weapons systems, such as the United States' B-2 bomber and Apache helicopter. Contractors often provide key services in peacekeeping and governance-building missions, from staffing civilian police to training fledgling military and police forces. The war on terrorism also increases the importance of intelligence services, which contractors provide readily -- even including, as we now know, prison interrogation. As the Iraq conflict demonstrates, many military duties that may not technically be considered core tasks nonetheless become so in the midst of war. Truck driving may not sound like an integral military responsibility, but if a driver delivering fuel to troops passes through combat zones, the truck driver may have a more intense military experience than anticipated. Similarly, language interpretation may sound mundane, but two of the four contractors implicated in the Taguba report on the Abu Ghraib abuses were hired as interpreters or translators.

"Military Contractors Are Cheaper than Regular Soldiers"

Prove it. Numerous studies on privatization and outsourcing suggest that two conditions must be present for the private sector to deliver services more efficiently than the government: a competitive market and contractor flexibility in fulfilling their obligations.

But governments frequently curtail competition to preserve reliability and continuity. For instance, military contractor Kellogg, Brown & Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton) won a no-bid contract to rebuild Iraqi oil fields in 2003 because the Pentagon determined it was the only company with the size and security clearances to do the job. Moreover, governments often impose conditions that reduce contractors' flexibility. For example, when the U.S. Army outsourced ROTC training in 1997, a long list of requirements for trainers resulted in a higher estimated cost than that of the previous program. A 2000 report on logistics support in the Balkans by the U.S. government's investigative arm, the General Accounting Office (GAO), faulted the military for poor budgetary oversight.

Perhaps most telling, cost-effectiveness is not one of the three reasons for outsourcing listed in a 2003 GAO report on military contracting. (The reasons: to gain specialized technical skills, bypass limits on military personnel that can be deployed to certain regions, and ensure that scarce resources are available for other assignments.)

News reports on the war in Iraq have noted the relatively high salaries of contractors -- some $20,000 per month, triple or more what active-duty soldiers earn -- but such figures fail to explain whether contractors are indeed cost-effective. Some analysts argue that contractors are ultimately cheaper because they allow the military to avoid the expense of recruiting, training, and deploying personnel. However, most contractors are recruited and trained by governments at some point in their careers. In addition, U.S. military leaders have voiced concern that the lure of corporate contractors undermines Army personnel retention -- a worry shared by military leaders from Britain to Chile.

"Contractors Are Accountable to No One"

An exaggeration. Many governments regulate security contractors to greater or lesser degrees. In the United States, for example, the Federal Acquisition Regulations and additional Department of Defense rules govern contracts with private security firms. The fact that contractors can be fired makes them at least minimally accountable for their actions. For instance, former Sierra Leone dictator Valentine Strasser fired U.K.-based Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) for refusing to provide security for army training facilities in 1995.

That said, market accountability differs from accountability in well-run military organizations. Military forces are beholden only to their governments, which can use several methods, from withholding funds to personnel discipline, to hold an organization or individual to account. Contractors are accountable to a range of employers and respond most effectively to market incentives. When deciding how to respond to a request, for example, contractors consider how that request might affect their other customers, broader market reputation, and, ultimately, their earnings. GSG managers reportedly worried that training Sierra Leone's troops would give the company a mercenary reputation that might endanger future contracts. Given its work with employers such as the British government, this concern made good business sense.

The use of contractors to avoid governmental accountability is more worrisome. In the United States, for instance, the executive branch hires contractors. Although the U.S. Congress approves the military budget, its access to information about contracts is often limited. The president can use this advantage to evade restrictions on U.S. actions, effectively limiting congressional checks on foreign policy.

Furthermore, contractors can facilitate foreign policy by proxy, allowing the government (or parts of it) to change events on the ground, but at a distance that allows for plausible deniability. In 1994, the United States licensed U.S. company Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) to provide advice and training to the Croatian government. The country's president, Franjo Tudjman, received the advantages of U.S. military assistance, but through a private entity. The British government has encouraged similar contracts with states in which British firms have commercial interests. For example, in 1986 the British government loaned money to Mozambique's government to hire British security firm Defense Systems Limited, which in turn trained soldiers to protect a British company's tea and sugar estates from rebels.

"Contractors Value Profits More than Peace"

Not always. Although many critics argue that military contractors have an economic interest in prolonging conflict rather than reducing it, employees of private military companies rarely have been accused of aggravating conflict intentionally to keep profits flowing. Indeed, many human rights advocates regard such organizations as a way to hasten interventions that Western powers might otherwise avoid, such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Yet contractors sometimes worsen the conditions for long-term stability. In 1995, when British security firm Executive Outcomes (EO) helped Sierra Leone's army defend its capital from rebels, the contractors found the army undependable in retaking the country's diamond mines. The mines were key to EO's payment, and the mining companies employed EO subsidiaries. Because EO's stake in the mines was so high, the firm turned instead to local militias, inadvertently strengthening a parallel force. Tensions between the local army and the militias contributed to a coup, and the militias spoiled several iterations of peace negotiations that followed. Although EO helped with short-term security, its activities did not enhance the conditions for long-term peace. This example also demonstrates how countries with natural resources or wealthy nonstate actors are privileged in the security market.

"Contractors Operate Outside the Law"

Frequently. The legal status of contractors varies considerably. Sometimes they are subject to the laws of the territory in which they operate and other times to those of their home territory, but too often the distinction is unclear. Last March, Zimbabwe arrested some 70 employees associated with British private security firm Logo Logistics, who were accused of plotting to depose President Téodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea. Their legal status remains a matter of dispute.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.-led entity charged with governing Iraq through June 2004, stipulated that contractors are subject to the laws of their parent country, not Iraqi law. Even U.S. legislation created to address this issue (the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000) lacks specifics and entrusts the U.S. secretary of defense with initiating prosecutions. Countries that opposed the war may have a particularly hard time prosecuting contractors for crimes committed in Iraq. That is especially true of countries such as South Africa that claim contractors from their country are exporting services without the government's permission.

The status of contractors is even more contentious under international law. Most security company activity falls outside the purview of the 1989 U.N. Convention on Mercenaries, which governs only such egregious soldier-of-fortune activities as overthrowing a government. Human rights law generally binds only states, reducing the formal legal responsibilities of contractors. For example, when personnel from the U.S. outsourcing firm DynCorp (hired by the United States to train police officers in the Balkans) were implicated in sex-trade schemes, neither the contractors nor the U.S. government was subject to international legal action. These legal muddles can also restrict the rights of private security personnel. Long concerned about the status of contractors on the battlefield, the U.S. military worries that even as contractors become more involved in the use of lethal force, they are also less likely to receive prisoner-of-war (POW) status if captured by enemy forces. Yet, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group took three U.S. military contractors hostage in 2003 and granted them POW status, the U.S. government still officially designated the contractors as kidnapees.

"Only Governments Hire Private Security Companies"

Wrong. Security contractors work for governments, transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Oil, diamond, and other extractive industries hire contractors to guard (or to train locals to guard) their facilities, and the United Nations and NGOs employ convoy guards. In Iraq, nearly every foreign entity -- from the CPA to Bechtel to ABC News -- requires private security. Therefore, contractor presence is not dependent on the U.S. military or the CPA.

The private financing of security (whether via contractors, militias, or rebels) diffuses control over the use of force, creating many problematic side effects. Mistakes and confusion can increase when contractors work for states as well as commercial parties in the same territory, potentially under different rules of engagement. Security contractors' reliance on local employees to cut costs and gain local knowledge is also problematic.

Dozens of private security firms working in Iraq have actively recruited Iraqis -- one of the largest operations in Iraq, the Steele Foundation, reports that two thirds of its employees are Iraqi -- sometimes joining with fledgling Iraqi security companies that reportedly hire ex-Republican Guards. The CPA never had clear control of these forces; how a new Iraqi government will regulate and oversee them is unknown.

"The United Nations Should Outsource Peacekeeping to Private Contractors"

No. Those who advocate that the United Nations hire private contractors are not looking to replace U.N. peacekeeping forces. Rather, they hope to make them more flexible and easier to use. For instance, a 2003 proposal by U.S.-based advocacy group International Peace Operations Association to provide private forces for Democratic Republic of the Congo suggested teaming military contractors with local forces. That is a bad idea: Without firm government control, the local forces trained by military contractors could destabilize the environment after the contractors leave.

Outsourced peacekeeping is also unlikely. The U.N. Security Council and General Assembly have been reluctant to consider it because of weak governments' concern that private security forces could be used against them. Additionally, national militaries that participate in peacekeeping missions (which greatly influence their respective government's policies) see contractors as competition. Peacekeeping operations give these militaries money and prestige and sometimes keep them afloat.

That said, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations -- or "Brahimi Report" -- released in August 2000 lists several ways in which U.N. forces could work together more effectively. Military contractors could train them for greater flexibility and capacity. However, the report lists major stumbling blocks to effective peacekeeping operations (such as insufficient member state support and lack of clear mandates) that are unlikely to be solved through privatization.

"Private Military Contractors Undermine State Power"

Not always. Military contractors can enhance the power of individual states, as when failed states like Sierra Leone essentially buy an army. Contractors are also quite useful to powerful nations such as the United States, which is managing the chaos in Iraq with fewer troops than many believed necessary by increasing its personnel pool. States that embrace private security have a flexible new foreign-policy tool partly because private forces ease the political restraints typical among democracies. Those states that do not tap into the market lose relative power.

Ultimately, however, contractors undermine states' collective monopoly on violence. The fact that the United States, Britain, Australia, and the United Nations hire private security makes it hard for nations that oppose military contracting to restrict security firms based in their country. Africa's civil wars have led extractive companies and NGOs to hire security. This practice can reduce state control over national territories, further complicating conflict resolution. Indeed, private security creates overlapping claims to authority, potentially feeding the problems that prompted demand for private security in the first place.

Deborah Avant is associate professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and author of a forthcoming book on private security and political change.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5433934

[keith]

British Security Guards Threaten to Boycott Work over Pay Crisis


/5/
London, May 27, (Petra) Hundred of British security guards in Iraq are being urged to resign en masse next month over a pay dispute that could cripple operations at diplomatic missions and put the safety of officials at risk, the British daily "The Times reported Saturday.

It added that the unprecedented industrial action by staff at the security company Control Risks raises questions about the use of private security companies for tasks such as guarding embassies and convoys and acting as bodyguards for diplomats and aid workers in conflict zones. "Since the US-led invasion of Iraq, dozens of private security companies have made hundreds of millions of pounds from dangerous jobs. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office spent £110 million on private security in the first 2½ years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein". The daily said
But with less money being spent on reconstruction and more security firms competing for the work, the contracts have become more competitive. Control Risks, whose 450 employees in Iraq provide close protection for British diplomats and aid workers, had its contract renewed by the Foreign Office, but only after it reduced charges by cutting salaries to some frontline staff by 19 to 37 per cent.

//Petra// Injadat


27/05/2006 11:36:08

http://www.petra.gov.jo/nepras/2006/May/27/15.htm

[keith]

Private security staff plan strike over pay cuts

IAN BRUCE May 29 2006

The first strike by military mercenaries is planned in Iraq next month in a pay dispute which could leave diplomats without bodyguards and supply convoys without armed escorts.
Hundreds of British employees of Control Risks Group (CRG), one of the scores of private security companies in the country, are being urged to resign en masse in protest against pay cuts of between 19% and 37% for frontline staff.
Between 15,000 and 20,000 former soldiers from the UK, the US, South Africa, Nepal, Fiji, France, Germany and the Balkans are operating as mercenaries on government contracts which free regular coalition troops for other duties.
The Foreign Office spent £110m on security in the first three years of the occupation. It is trying to cut costs and has renewed CRG's contract only by forcing the firm to agree to reduced terms. This cut has been passed on to its 450 ex-military close-protection staff.
Team leaders' rates have been slashed from £340 a day to £275. Their deputies are being asked to take a 33% cut to £172 a day.
A spokesman for the employees said: "We have approached our people in Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk and can confidently expect a 75% response to the call for mass resignation.
"In Baghdad, CRG no longer stands for Control Risks Group. It now reads Cheap Rate Guys. Given the dangers we face on a daily basis, pay cuts are unacceptable."

http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/62900-print.shtml

[keith]

Darfur solution: Send in the mercenaries
By Max Boot
Special to the Los Angeles Times



So the United States has brokered a cease-fire among the warring factions in Darfur, and the U.N. Security Council has authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force. To anyone blissfully unfamiliar with history, this sounds like a decisive step that will finally end the violence that has left at least 200,000 dead and 2 million homeless.

Alas, this is not the first cease-fire agreement in Darfur. An accord was reached in 2004 and was immediately violated. There is no reason to think that the current treaty will fare any better, especially because one of the main Darfur rebel groups has refused to sign it.

Pieces of paper, no matter how promising, require power in order to be enforced. The question is: Who will provide that power in Darfur? The African Union force deployed in 2004 has proven woefully inadequate. Its 7,000 soldiers lack the numbers, training and equipment to patrol an undeveloped region the size of France. They don't even have a mandate to stop ethnic cleansing; they are only supposed to monitor the situation.

If you listen to the bloviators at Turtle Bay, salvation will come from the deployment of a larger corps of blue helmets. If only. What is there in the history of United Nations peacekeepers that gives anyone any confidence that they can stop a determined adversary?

The odds are much greater that U.N. representatives will instead be taken as hostages by bloodthirsty thugs, as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and in Sierra Leone five years later. Or that, rather than protecting the people, the peacekeepers will prey on them -- as allegedly has happened in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Congo, all places where blue helmets have been accused of a horrifying litany of sexual abuses, including pedophilia, rape and prostitution.

Even if these worst-case scenarios don't come to pass, the U.N. is likely to prove ineffectual in the face of determined opposition. Look at what is happening in East Timor, where, after seven years of U.N. stewardship, the capital has been paralyzed by fighting among armed gangs. The situation is even worse in Haiti, where a Brazilian-led U.N. force has done little to stem growing chaos. It is worse still in Somalia -- the most lawless country on Earth -- where a U.N. deployment failed in the early 1990s.

And to think that some self-described realists had the temerity to suggest that everything would have worked out in Iraq if only the lead role had been turned over to the U.N.! East Timor and Haiti are much smaller and more isolated, but the U.N. hasn't worked its multilateral magic in either place.

My point here isn't to indulge in U.N.-bashing for its own sake but simply to suggest that we should temper our expectations for the peacekeeping force that is due to arrive in Darfur in six to nine months' time. The drawn-out timetable itself suggests how ineffectual the U.N. is. Even under the best of circumstances, the "Janjaweed" militia will enjoy another half-year of rapine without serious interference.

If the so-called civilization nations of the world were serious about ending what the U.S. government has described as genocide, they would not fob off the job on the U.N. They would send their own troops. But of course they're not serious. At least not that serious.

But perhaps there is a way to stop the killing even without sending an American or European army. Send a private army. A number of commercial security companies such as Blackwater USA are willing, for the right price, to send their own forces, made up in large part of veterans of Western militaries, to stop the genocide.

We know from experience that such private units would be far more effective than any U.N. peacekeepers. In the 1990s, the South African company Executive Outcomes and the British company Sandline made quick work of rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone. Critics complain that these mercenaries offered only a temporary respite from the violence, but that was all they were hired to do. Presumably longer-term contracts could create longer-term security, and at a fraction of the cost of a U.N. mission.

Yet this solution is deemed unacceptable by the moral giants who run the United Nations. They claim that it is objectionable to employ -- sniff -- mercenaries. More objectionable, it seems, than passing empty resolutions, sending ineffectual peacekeeping forces and letting genocide continue.

Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_3888548

[keith]

Come home, Iraq workers warned
Brendan Nicholson
June 10, 2006


THE violent death of an Australian security contractor in Iraq has triggered a Government warning to dozens of former soldiers lured there by lucrative contracts to come home.

The 34-year-old former soldier from Queensland, whose name had not been released last night, was one of four security contractors killed by a roadside bomb about 300 kilometres north of Baghdad.

The other three men were Fijians, bringing to 10 the number of security contractors from that country killed in Iraq since mid-April. The men's vehicle was destroyed by a bomb hidden in a culvert as they escorted a convoy.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said their deaths underlined the dangers for people going to Iraq. "I know a lot of people working for security firms there make a great deal of money and are prepared to take the risk, but this death illustrates how dangerous work is in Iraq," he said. "We continue to advise Australians not to go to Iraq, or those Australians in Iraq to leave."

Mr Downer said dozens of Australians were working as private security contractors in Iraq, and that was surprising. "The fact is, although it is very dangerous work, they can earn an enormous amount of money, and they don't have to spend many months in Iraq to accumulate substantial amounts of money.

"We try to discourage them, but it's a free world. If they want to go, they don't have to take our advice," he said.

The advice is significantly different to that Mr Downer offered in April 2003, when he said: "But I don't have any doubt there will be plenty of work for Australian companies."

And Prime Minister John Howard, in December 2004: "I think Australia, particularly in the area of construction and perhaps … in the resource sector, there may be some real opportunities."

And Trade Minister Mark Vaile, in March 2003: "We will be arguing the case for the interests of Australian businesses and exporters in the whole process post-conflict."

On April 30 another contractor, from Victoria, was injured in a roadside bomb explosion, which killed three former soldiers from Fiji.

The men worked for the UK-based security company ArmorGroup International, which provides security guards for civilian contractors.

Apart from Australian Defence Force personnel, there are 63 Australians registered with the Australian embassy in Iraq, but the true number in the country is believed to be more than 250, because many contractors fly in and out without letting the embassy know. They include aid workers, security guards, truck drivers and bureaucrats working in local ministries.

Most are there for the money, and some for experience in a war zone. Former soldiers in Iraq are highly paid as bodyguards and escorts for civilian convoys. They can be paid up to $1000 a day, depending on where they are working. In all there are about 40,000 foreign contractors in Iraq.

http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/come-home-iraq-workers-warned/2006/06/09/1149815316608.html

[keith]

Three more die in Iraq
Saturday, June 10, 2006

THREE Fijian security guards died in a bomb blast in Iraq yesterday morning, it has been revealed.

It takes to 11 the number of private security guards killed in Iraq in the past two months.

The three latest victims of the bomb blast are employed by Armour Group, a London-based security company.

Armour Group Fiji branch spokesman Savenaca Damuni was last night preparing to visit the families of the dead men to traditionally inform them of the tragedy.

Observing protocol, he said the names of the men could not be released before the families were informed.

It is understood that one of the men was from the Western Division and two from the Central Division.

It is also understood that two of the men were married while one was single.

The 11 Fijian security guards who died over the past two months after bomb blasts were all employed by the same company.

It is believed the latest deaths happened when a convoy on its way to Baghdad hit an improvised explosive device which was hidden in a culvert.

The three Fijians died instantly along with an Australian security guard.

It is unclear as yet when the men's bodies will be flown home for burial.

Mr Damuni said that his London headquarters had contacted him earlier in the day to confirm the deaths.

"I was waiting for the headquarters in London to inform me of the details about the three deceased," Mr Damuni said.

"As soon as I received that, a team of officials started visiting the families to inform them about the tragic news."

Mr Damuni refused to comment further referring all queries to the London headquarters.

Attempts to contact Armour Group chief administrative officer Christopher Beese were unsuccessful last night.

The deaths come as the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre called on the Government to move quickly in setting up an effective regulatory framework for recruitment conditions for the guards.

Centre official Ema Tagicakibau said the death of another three Fijian security guards should be a wake-up call for the Government.

"With competing agencies luring Fijian guards, there must be a system in place to protect the security of the guards and their families' best interests," she said.

"These are such issues as the registration of private recruiting companies, code of conduct, work and pay conditions, medical and insurance cover for disability or death.

"These must form the basis of a national policy or legislation on the regulation of the private security industry."

Mrs Tagicakibau said this was to prevent the Fijian men from being exploited as cheap labour, mercenaries or human shields.

Labour Minister Krishna Datt said the employment contracts of the security guards were checked by his officers.

http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=42984

[keith]

Halliburton's KBR Figures Prominently in Unusual Iraq Documentary

Friday , June 30, 2006

By Catherine Donaldson-Evans

"The War Tapes," a slice-of-life, on-the-front-lines film shot by National Guard soldiers stationed in Iraq just as the insurgency was beginning to swell in 2004, goes to wide release on Friday. But the film has already won fans and accolades in limited release.

The project, crowned best documentary at the Tribeca Film Festival in May, depicts what it's like to be a soldier at war and captures all the mixed emotions that go along with the job.

But unlike other documentaries about war, this one offers a fly-on-the-wall view of the experience — primarily from three of the soldiers' and their families' perspective — before, during and after their deployment.

Director Deborah Scranton, who was asked to embed with the New Hampshire National Guard as a filmmaker, said she instead decided to "virtually embed," putting the civilian servicemen behind the cameras and directing them from New Hampshire over e-mail and instant messaging.

"I was really interested in getting as close to the experience of war as possible, to climb inside of it, to feel it all around," Scranton said in a telephone interview. "It was a very conscious decision [for me not to go to Iraq]. I felt it would diminish what the soldiers were creating."

Scranton and the producers say their intention was not to politicize the war in Iraq or take a pro- or anti-war stance in the documentary, but to let those with the cameras show all sides of being stationed in a combat zone: the frequent action, violence and attacks; the mundane moments and duties; the interactions with the Iraqi people; their complicated array of emotions and moods; and their differing opinions about the mission in Iraq and their role in it.

The three featured soldiers are Specialist Mike Moriarty, 34, Sgt. Zack Bazzi, 24, and Sgt. Steve Pink, 24, who filmed during the entire year they were in Iraq. Two other squad members had cameras and were responsible for some of the filming. In total, 10 from the unit had volunteered to participate.

"'The War Tapes' is not a political film in the usual sense, but in honestly bearing witness to these soldiers' experience, it reveals their politics and opinions candidly, whether they support or oppose their mission," Scranton says in a statement posted on "The War Tapes" Web site.

Co-producer Steve James adds that the filmmakers didn't want to cut out any of those points of view, but rather "embrace them."

"In many ways, Mike, Zack and Steve each embody a lot of the contradictions and conflicts that America struggles with about this war, with one important difference: they're fighting it too," James says on the site.

Not surprisingly, however, "The War Tapes" has captured the attention of groups of various political stripes, some of which have attempted to use it to bolster their own sentiments and agendas. Organizations of all shades have screened the film, including left-leaning think tank The Center for American Progress and pro-military Web site Military.com, among others.

The unit featured in "The War Tapes" — the Charlie Company 3rd of the 172nd Mountain Infantry — is assigned to provide security for the extensive convoys of KBR trucks that ship supplies to locations around Iraq. Military contractor KBR is at the heart of not only what the film's soldiers are doing but what their lives are like there.

In that vein, a prominent focus of the documentary is the love-hate relationship the men have with KBR, a Halliburton subsidiary. On the one hand, they're benefiting from the services the contractor is providing for them on the base, and their job revolves around protecting the company so it can continue its work. On the other, they're frustrated and cynical about the industry giant, which they see as a money-making machine that often errs more on the side of profit and frivolity than on the side of safety.

The military cameramen give a rare behind-the-scenes look not only at the violence in Iraq faced by soldiers and Iraqi citizens every day but also at what KBR and other contractors are doing.

"Our primary mission is convoy security," explains Moriarty in the documentary. "We go out every day to the KBR/Halliburton truck yard, we escort their convoy to wherever ... and we take one back."

"The stuff that KBR is driving is logistical stuff," adds one squad member who did some filming, Spec. Brandon Wilkins (the fifth is Sgt. Duncan Domey). "We're moving cheese. Cheese, food, soda, paper, supplies and fuel too."

Most of the commentary about KBR and other aspects of deployment in "The War Tapes" gravitates toward cynicism, an attitude frequently verbalized by the subjects of the film.

"KBR annoys me. I don't want to talk politics, but man, they got it good," says the squad leader, Kevin Shangraw. "Take every store in your town, every gas station, police department, fire department, and let it all be run by one company. I mean, that's basically what they do. They have their hand in anything you can think of. KBR runs all our chow halls."

While he's speaking, a snaking line of trucks rolls by onscreen. The camera pans around grocery store aisles, a mess hall, a post office and a barbershop, all on a military base. Later are shots of Burger King and Pizza Hut.

"Everybody there stands to make money the longer we're there," says Wilkins. "So that's why we refer to it as 'The War for Cheese.'"

But those feelings are counterbalanced by pro-war remarks, some of which relate to economic motives.

"We’re in Iraq for money and oil. Look at any other war in the history of the world and tell me it’s not about money," Pink says in the film. "This better be about money and if we don’t get that oil and that money, then all the lives that are gone right now … They’re all in vain. You don’t put 150,000 troops from all over the country in there and say we’re there to create democracy. We’re there to create money, you know?"

He can't help but finish his monologue with a critical comment about the Bush administration, however.

"Somebody other than Dick Cheney better be getting their hands on it pretty soon,” says Pink.

Cheney ran Halliburton from 1995 to 2000, just before he was elected vice president. He divested himself of his stake in the company after he was elected, though he still gets deferred compensation from the company. His unexercised stock options all go to charity.

Though Moriarty — who says he went to Iraq because he wanted to help avenge the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in this country — takes issue with what he sees as KBR's motive of profit over safety, he said in a phone interview that he doesn't "jump onto 'the war is for oil and money' bandwagon."

"I don't have this conspiracy theory that someone is handing Dick Cheney a check in his back pocket or there's a secret ship coming to the United States with oil," he said. "I support the war. I don't think it's for money. I don't think it's for oil. I think it probably should be for oil."

He said he also believes that KBR is the best candidate for the job they're doing.

"I don't have a problem with KBR being there — a contractor has to do it because we don't have enough troops there," Moriarty said in the interview. "And what other contractor could do it?"

But he admitted that the company's tactics frustrate him. Case in point: the time KBR sent him to guard one of their trucks full of cheesecake, in spite of the danger of attacks by insurgents. That annoyance hasn't changed in the year-plus since he has been back from Iraq.

"What I have a problem with is, is anyone watching the books?" he said in the interview. "While I believe in the war, I believe that KBR's profit motivation, in addition to our own screw-ups as a government, have created such a needy situation."

KBR's abundant spending is "abusive," Moriarty said, adding that he witnessed a lot of wasted resources during his year of deployment.

"All I see is money being spent. I think KBR is going to be the last one to stand up and say, hey, we're spending too much of your money. They're going to keep going. They're a business and making money is their No. 1 priority," he said.

KBR has frequently made headlines since U.S. troops went to Iraq in 2003 to oust dictator Saddam Hussein. Most of those news stories have been about the Halliburton subsidiary's spending, which Pentagon auditors and some politicians have found questionable and excessive, especially in light of Cheney's ties to the private company.

Supporters of KBR — a rare type of global contractor that has worked in the Middle East for years — have defended the financial practices, saying KBR is operating under urgent time constraints in a violent environment. They also say KBR is the only firm of its kind with an established track record that can provide the wide range of services it does in a war zone.

"I don't think there's any other contracting firm that could execute the kind of missions KBR is contracting," said Col. Gerry Schumacher, who served with the Army's Special Forces and wrote the recently published "A Bloody Business" about wartime contractors. "They seem to be the only act in town that can do it reasonably well."

Whatever the economic motives of the Iraq war may or may not be, Schumacher said he believes the accusations of overspending and manipulating finances by Halliburton and others is unfair hype.

"I don't think contractors like KBR are cooking the books. They're just trying to keep track of the books," he said, adding that KBR and other similar contracting companies face life-threatening situations every day and are dealing with constant chaos, which makes it difficult to keep good records of expenses or regularly stick to a budget.

"It's incredible the danger they put themselves in," said Schumacher. "The exaggerations about over-billing are grossly taken out of context. So often, trucks are blown up on the road, the Army calls and says we need another truck. This repeats itself dozens and dozens of times a day, to the point where we're trying to track the money — who does what, where. It's not designed the way an accounting job would be in the United States."

In an e-mail interview with FOXNews.com, Halliburton officials defended its spending practices and said the company has cooperated fully with government audits.

"KBR will continue to work with our customers and with the appropriate government agencies to demonstrate, once and for all, that KBR has delivered vital services for U.S. and coalition troops and the Iraqi people at a fair and reasonable cost, given the circumstances," the firm wrote.

According to Halliburton's representatives, KBR has prepared almost 375 million meals, provided more than 4 billion gallons of water, transported more than 570 million gallons of military fuel and delivered nearly 190 million pounds of mail. More than 650 trucks are on the road daily, and they have logged more than 100 million miles transporting military supplies and equipment.

"By all accounts, KBR's logistical achievements in support of the troops in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan have been nothing short of spectacular," the e-mail states.

KBR is just one of several central threads of "The War Tapes," which also captures missile attacks, car bombings, house-to-house searches, Iraqi police training and more ho-hum duties — like guarding human waste.

"My team has been tasked out to provide security for septic waste trucks," Bazzi says in one segment. "Whoever said being a soldier is all blood and glory obviously forgot about the sh—. ... We are bringing democracy and good vegetation to Iraq."

Those who made the documentary say it wasn't easy paring down 1,000 hours of footage to 97 minutes.

"For me, the subjects of your film are always the most important," James, one of the producers, wrote on the Web site. "The film needs to tell their personal stories set against the larger backdrop, not the other way around. ... We spent an entire year editing ... challenging each other's assumptions, arguing passionately, rearranging sequences, trying different openings and endings."

Scranton, for her part, says "The War Tapes" is "the story of the flawed hero" and was intended to give the soldiers on missions in Iraq a voice. The result is that they have many voices expressing many sentiments, depending on the day, the mood and the situation at hand.

"It's political in the truest sense of the word, as far as [its inclusion of] stimulating dialogue," she said of her documentary. "I made this whole film to let them speak for themselves. This is how soldiers talk. ... Soldiers think. They philosophize.

"I have a profound respect for soldiers."

http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,201644,00.html

[keith]

Armed and ready: private soldiers in Iraq
Nick McKenzie
July 1, 2006

A LONELY stretch on the world's most dangerous road. Some idle chatter. Then all hell breaks loose. Amid bursts of machine-gun fire, Chris Ahmelman, 34, screams as a bullet pierces his leg. "F---ing hell I'm hit." Seconds later, an insurgent's bullet strikes the former Australian army soldier in the head. As his private security company colleagues scramble to return fire, a passenger in Ahmelman's car screams his nickname. "Camel! Camel! Camel!" The Moree-born Ahmelman doesn't respond.

A small camera on the dashboard of Ahmelman's car filmed the April 2005 ambush on the Edinburgh Risk private security convoy that was travelling on "route Irish", the road to the Baghdad International Airport.

Positioned behind the camera, Ahmelman is not visible on the video recording. What is visible is what security experts describe as the amateur response and poor safety measures employed by Ahmelman's three-car convoy. Only one of the vehicles was armoured, leaving Ahmelman in a "soft-skinned" car. His covert convoy was stalled in a security "tactical halt", blowing its supposed civilian cover. The convoy was stationary for more than 10 minutes, leaving it exposed. And, when the insurgents attacked, several of Ahmelman's colleagues tumbled out of their cars on the same side from which they were being fired upon, instead of driving away. After the insurgents had fled, Ahmelman, along with two other employees of the British-based security company, were found fatally wounded.

Iraq is a war zone, and the death of a private security guard rates little mention. Yet private companies employing former soldiers and police officers to protect government officials and corporate heads has become a phenomenon of this conflict, leading to questions about not only their safety, but how well they are vetted and controlled. They are a private army, and more than 60 companies, employing at least 25,000 security guards, now work in Iraq protecting government, non-government organisations and private contractors. US and British companies have received much of this work, during which hundreds of private contractors have reportedly been killed. Most agree that private contractors are essential for Iraq to operate — US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last year that "any idea that we shouldn't have them I think would be unwise".

The US is pushing for greater regulation of the industry, but the Federal Government, publicly at least, wishes Australians were not involved. But they are.

Between 200 and 300 former Australian military, police and security officers ignore Canberra's advice to come home and instead head to the "sand-pit", as Iraq is known, to earn between $US300 and $US700 ($A410 and $960) a day. Two Australian-managed companies, the Perth-based OAM and Unity Resources Group, have employed hundreds of Australians in Iraq. Two Australian security guards have been killed and several more injured. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade says it does not know how many Australians are there because many don't bother to register with them. Nor does the department claim to have any role in regulating or monitoring their activities.

DFAT baulked at an approach by Unity for help establishing itself in Iraq. The group's founder and chief executive, Gordon Conroy, says the Dubai-based company is more "global" than Australian, although more than half his 160 staff are Australians or New Zealanders.

Conroy, a former SAS commander, started Unity as a risk management consultancy in 2000, although it took the September 11 attacks for work to begin flowing in. When the Iraq war began, Conroy sensed an opportunity to expand his provision of "boutique personal protection" and headed to neighbouring Kuwait to wait for the war to end. His gamble has, according to industry insiders, paid off, with the company's Iraqi contracts boosting its yearly turn-over to about $50 million.

Conroy says Unity's success reflects an industry that stands to grow as pressure increases for troops to be withdrawn from Iraq.

"We have got private companies coming up because military resources are very stretched and when a marine gets killed, it is not a good look politically, when one of us are killed, well, we are contractors it is not as bad," he says.

He describes as "simplistic" the Federal Government's call for his employees to come home and says a "mature approach" would involve increased regulation and monitoring of the stream of Australians bound for Iraq.

"The Australians that are working in Iraq, especially for our company, are the unsung heroes. They get very little recognition but without us, projects going on in Iraq could not take place." He refers to an incident last year when the Federal Government was investigating rumours about the kidnap of two Australian security contractors.

"We were the only organisation in the country that had our fingers on the pulse and knew where every Australian security guy was, including working for other companies and not just our own — the Australian embassy should have known this."

Rules compiled by the Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq before being replaced by the local government, set out when private security contractors could open fire and to whom they were accountable. They have immunity from local laws for acts performed as part of their contracts and the nature of security work means that, unless it sparks a public outcry, sloppy or illegal conduct is dealt with by self-regulation and sometimes not at all.

While Conroy denies having to internally discipline his staff, The Age understands several Unity employees have been reprimanded for unintentional weapons discharges, including an incident in which a local Iraqi guard was accidentally shot and injured. But this, according to industry sources, is a good indicator that Unity takes self-regulation seriously.

In March, Australian contractors were again in the headlines when an employee of Unity opened fire on a car whose driver failed to heed repeated warnings to stop. The suspected suicide bomber was, in fact, 72-year-old agriculture professor Kays Juma. The Iraqi-born Australian resident had left his teaching post in Queensland to return, with his Australian-born wife Barbara, to a teaching post at the agriculture department of Baghdad University. Coalition authorities have accepted Unity's internal investigation into the shooting, which cleared it of any wrongdoing.

Even its detractors acknowledge that Unity is well-run and professional. Still, one of the guns used to fire upon the ageing professor was a "crew-served" (multi-operator) heavy machine-gun, a class of weapon private security companies were briefly banned from using because they lack accuracy and, if used improperly, are more likely to kill civilians. Conroy says his employees acted sensibly. "We went through our normal procedure for graduated response (flashing lights and warning shots) and his car just kept on coming towards the check point." Three months after the shooting, calls from Australia's embassy in Iraq for an independent assessment of the incident have not been met.

This unfulfilled demand is not unusual, according to a source aware of the shooting who notes that Juma's body was just one of about 90 that piled up at Baghdad morgues that day. The source says the question of whether a crew-served machine-gun fired the fatal bullet may never be known. As for the question of whether Unity was justified in using the heavy machine-gun, the source says that even when they were banned every private security company used them because heavy machine-guns were one of the insurgent's weapons of choice.

The Australian Government continues to insist that private security guards should return home. But when they have arrived back, some have found that they are barred from their old jobs. The Age has learned that several long-serving federal and state police officers, who resigned or took leave-without-pay to work in Iraq, have been refused employment in Australia on the basis that their activities in Iraq could not be verified. This is prompting anger among Iraq returnees, who say their experience in Iraq should be valued, not punished.

"Mick", who declined to be identified, is considering his second stint providing personal protection for US State Department staff. The long-serving special forces soldier is angered by claims that resigning to work in Iraq makes him a "mercenary" or a "gun-for-hire".

"Our job in Iraq is not to fight, it is to run. We can only open fire to defend our clients or our own lives." Mick says that if his motivation was danger-money, he would work down a mine: "The only difference with the money is it is tax-free in Iraq."

In his first stint, Mick braved insurgent attacks, drove past the bloated bodies of other private security contractors, was run off the road by over-zealous US troops, and endured the boredom of the relatively safe "green-zone." Part of his role for Unity Resources Group was recruiting. It sometimes meant uncovering the frauds — the numerous Australians who lied about their military backgrounds.

"I would get all these CVs from people claiming to be special forces. But they were sending CVs to the wrong guy. After 22 years in the special forces, I know everyone. I was just going, 'nup, never was (special forces), no,' and I was right 99 per cent of the time."

Concerns have been raised before the US Government that the screening of foreigners entering Iraq's private sector is flawed. There are worries that even criminals might be working for some companies; some vetting procedures now include a check for visible tattoos. Mick says Unity's intense vetting includes a three-week induction — during which "the pretenders" are sorted out with a "horrific" power-point presentation of dead security contractors. He claims the company's commitment to safety has helped it become a sought-after employer. But where in Iraq did the Australians who lied on their CVs, as well as those not good enough to make the Unity cut, end up? "Hmmm. Good question," Mick says.

The Victorian Coroner's July 2005 report into Chris Ahmelman's death barely fills a page. Coroner Graeme Johnstone noted that "the issue of the use of armoured vehicles in this type of operation would need to be examined" but that an investigation into the safety measures used by the company was not within his brief.

Mick is more forthcoming. "All the cars (in Ahmelman's convoy) should have been fully armoured because if the single-armoured car with the client is disabled, how are you going to get out of there?" After Ahmelman's death, Edinburgh Risks said the failure to provide armoured cars was due to the inability in Iraq to armour-plate the BMWs in the convoy.

The company has denied that poor equipment, training or leadership are to blame for the deaths, although its report said that lessons could be learnt from the incident. Mick is less charitable.

"It is a money-saving thing. I saw it with Edinburgh Risk, Armourgroup and a number of other security companies. Armourgroup had Nepalese contractors sitting sideways, exposed and ready to fight. I am going 'Jesus Christ!' The insurance policy for the Nepalese … is nothing (for the company). I saw these cars with no doors on them and Fijians and Nepalese, poor buggers, sitting sideways and I have just gone, 'bugger that'."

In June, after The Age interviewed Mick for this article, an Armourgroup convoy driving from Basra in southern Iraq to the country's north was struck by an airborne insurgent-fired projectile. Three Fijians along with former Australian air force and police officer, Wayne Schulz, were killed.

Armourgroup's Chief Administrative Officer, Christopher Beese, says the company never scrimped on safety and that an internal investigation concluded that the deaths were unavoidable. He says the company's decision to hire Fijian and Nepalese former soldiers was because they are happy to be paid less than Westerners. He also said it was company policy not to release the number of his employees killed in Iraq. After Schulz's death, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that the government was aware that "a lot of people working for security firms there (in Iraq) make a great deal of money and are prepared to take the risk, but this death illustrates how dangerous work is in Iraq. We continue to advise Australians not to go to Iraq or those Australians in Iraq to leave."

The skyscrapers and footpaths of New York are a world away from Iraq. But nearly every day, Will Hough is reminded of his time in the sand-pit. Several times a week, the former Marine and semi-professional athlete leaves his New York apartment to undergo rehabilitation sessions for injuries sustained during an insurgent attack while working for Custer Battles, a US private security firm, in late 2004.

For about US$4,000 a week, Hough travelled in private security convoys ferrying people and arms throughout Iraq. As the weeks ticked passed, there was mutterings from Custer's employees about unfulfilled promises to supply armoured cars, communications and safety equipment. But according to Hough, there was no shortage of arms. Custer had a reputation as a "cowboy" outfit. According to Hough, this sometimes had a literal translation; some Custer employees strapped pearl-handled pistols and hunting knives to their sides. But more broadly, says Hough, cowboy refers to a company prepared to make as much money as possible, whatever the cost to their employees, coalition military forces and local Iraqis.

Hough, along with three other Custer employees, last year alleged on US television that were part of heavily armed convoys that fired on pedestrians and, in one incident, crushed children seated in a back of a car with a truck.

"When things like that happen, you get numb to it and just keep on going. The sad thing is it is all about money," Hough told The Age."If a bunch of wild cowboys come blasting down the street and randomly shoot at people, run cars off the road and do things that are hostile, that will have the effect of turning the local population to the insurgency."

What drove Hough back to New York was an incident in which his convoy was ambushed and a Kurdish colleague sitting close enough for Hough to see "the dirt in his ears" was hit with a mortar in the neck and killed.

"I was attacked six times but the last one was a wake-up call. Without legs and arms you are nothing."

Claims of industry cowboys hit the headlines again last year, when a video showing what appeared to be a private security guard firing indiscriminately at cars was made public. The British security firm allegedly involved, Aegis, is yet to release the results of its own investigation into the shootings, although any negative publicity sparked by the vision hasn't impeded expansion of its already significant Iraqi presence. Aegis' manager, former British Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer, was at loggerheads with the Australian military in 1997?, when his company Sandline accepted a $36-million contract to bring in a private army to suppress independence rebels in Papua New Guinea. Relations, though, may be improving — several former Australian soldiers have been employed by Aegis in Iraq.

Business hasn't been so good for Custer Battles. After it was accused of fraud by the military and successfully sued by some of its former employees for over-charging the US government, it was banned from receiving any new contracts in Iraq. But that it picked up lucrative contracts in the first place, like the job to protect the Baghdad International Airport, is an indicator of the US Government's decision to award key Iraqi contracts to US firms.

Last month, the US Government Accountability Office recommended changes to Iraq's private security industry, including minimum qualifications for private contractors, improved criminal background screening of employees and better monitoring and regulation of companies. And last month, just a week before Australian troops killed a local security guard protecting Iraq's trade minister, the Americans recommended the military receive training on how to interact with the growing army of security guards or risk more friendly fire incidents. This week, the US Defence Department said it would support the proposal.

The Federal Opposition says heavily armed Australian citizens on the streets of Iraq are Australia's responsibility. Labor's acting foreign affairs spokesman, Arch Bevis, says the Government must register or screen Australians bound for Iraq and use our presence among coalition forces to pressure for more industry regulation. It is a call supported by Chris Ahmelman's father, Alan, who concedes that while his son was all too aware of the risks, Australia can't keep ignoring the stream of former police and soldiers bound for Iraq.

"You can be promised the bloody world by a company but if you don't know what is going on, you are only going on hearsay," he says.

Unity's Gordon Conroy says if Australia isn't prepared to change its "come home" attitude, he says it should not also shun Australians returning from the sand-pit.

"I know there is some sort of unwritten law that they won't let these guys back in (to the military or police) and I really think it is unfair of organisations because they enhance their own knowledge by the training these guys have over here. What you could do in a year in Iraq would take a lifetime in a lot of other forces to achieve. Most of those we have got have served a full career and for their country to now say they are turncoats is totally unfair."

http://www.theage.com.au/news/in-depth/armed-and-ready-private-soldiers-in-iraq/2006/06/30/1151174393936.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap2

[NYer]

The Supreme Court decision in Hamdan leads Chester to suggest the following: (http://www.theadventuresofchester.com/MT/mt-tb.cgi/877)

Today's Supreme Court ruling seems to me a remarkable point in the development of a kind of quasi-sovereignty for non-state organizations.

Were there to develop an Anti-Qaeda force, a private military to pursue Al Qaeda and win the war on its own terms, then their members would also have the Geneva Conventions apply to them, were they ever to be apprehended or detained by the US, yes? In other words, if the Geneva Convention now applies to a non-state that is a non-signatory in the eyes of the US, does it not then apply to ALL non-states that are non-signatories?

This is quite a large new degree of sovereignty that has been granted to non-state organizations. How will the concept of citizenship evolve with decisions like these?

If protections that normally accrue to states after debate and ratification can now be given over to non-states which have no mechanism for ratification, let alone debate, one can easily imagine a scenario in which non-state organizations form themselves and immediately possess the rights of a state, with no corresponding need to adhere to any laws in their own activities.

If this is the case, then we have the answer to the war: it will be privatized, and its ultimate victories won by uninhibited private military actors, not the hamstrung citizen militaries of nation-states.

[keith]

The mercenaries or the corsairs of the XXI Century?

The 25 000 private security contractors presently working in Iraq constitute, after the United States Army, the largest force of occupation well before the British Army. These private security companies with over 420 deaths and some 4 000 injured, according to the USA Department of Labor, also yield the highest number of casualties with the exception of the US Army which has already reached over 2 500 deaths and more than 18 000 injuries.

According to a report emanating from the USA Government Accountability Office, contracts for over $ 766 million have been awarded to private security companies in Iraq. Criticisms have been raised pointing out that, on the basis of such contracts, unethical mercenaries are being recruited complicating the reconstruction undertaken by the Coalition and receiving sometimes salaries up to several thousand dollars daily. In addition, these companies are accused of fraud and of overt confrontations with the US Army under which they should operate.

With the globalisation of the economy, the use of force has become another business to be privatized. The privatized military and security industry which was estimated, in 1990, at $ 33 billion, reached in 2006 some $ 100 billion and will reach probably over $ 200 billion in 2010. During the first Gulf War, in the 1990's, one out of every 100 soldiers was a private contractor. A few years later, during the former Yugoslavia's wars the rate was one of every 50 and presently it is one out of every ten. The armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Angola, Colombia and Sierra Leone, among others, have favoured the expansion of such private companies. But it has been the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the instability that followed in the post war period in those two countries which has been the driving force in the extension and multiplication of the private military and security industry. It is also in those two countries where the limits of the grey zone, where these companies operate, which very easily becomes blurred: security activities and human rights violations are often inextricably linked.

The thousands of armed contractors operating in Iraq represent one of the major problems in the reconstruction of the country for they carry out their activities without any control or accountability. Their behaviour is often similar to those of the employees of CACI and Titan working in the prison of Abu Ghraib. These two USA private security companies have been allegedly implicated in the 2004 human rights violations. The report of USA General Antonio Taguba indicates that two CACI employees were directly or indirectly implicated in the use of dogs on prisoners, forced sexual abuses and other types of violations perpetrated on prisoners. Another report suggests that one of the 27 employees of CACI working for the USA Army in Iraq knew pertinently that the instructions he was giving to the soldiers interrogating the prisoners was a form of torture. CACI sources argue that their personnel were at all times performing under military instructions. According to Titan their employees are translators and interpreters working for the USA Army and they were not implicated in the tortures committed on prisoners. The inquiries carried out to establish the implication of both of these two companies in the crimes committed in Abu Ghraib has not prevented the USA Government from renewing their contracts: one of some $ 15 million to CACI under which it will provide interrogating services with a view to obtaining information in Iraq and the other of $ 400 million to Titan to recruit more translators.

At the time of the incidents in Abu Ghraib, the United States Government as Occupying Power had jurisdiction in Iraq. The fact that the human rights violations were allegedly perpetrated by employees of private security companies, such as CACI and Titan, does not exempt the USA Government of its obligations according to international human rights and international humanitarian law. However, contrary to the comments made by the US authorities to United Nations affirming that "contract personnel of the US are under the direction of the Coalition and are subject to criminal jurisdiction in US Federal Courts", not one single civil employee allegedly implicated in the abuses perpetrated in Abu Ghraib has been investigated impartially by a US Federal Court or has been legally sanctioned.

In the presentation of the 2006 Amnesty International report in Washington, the USA Director emphasized that United States were creating the equivalent of Guantanamo "- a virtual rule free zone in which perpetrators are not likely to be held accountable for breaking the law". He said that "business outsourcing may increase efficiency, but war outsourcing may facilitate impunity". He added that "illegal behavior of contractors and of those who designed and carried out U.S. torture policies and the reluctance of the government to bring perpetrators to justice are tarnishing the reputation of the United States, hurting the image of American troops and contributing to anti-American sentiment". According to Amnesty International, out of 20 known cases of civilians suspected of criminal acts, there has only been the indictment of one contractor on assault charges in connection with the death of a detainee in Afghanistan: there has not been a single prosecution of a private military contractor in Iraq.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, in view of the growth of these private military and security companies, has decided to examine the activities of these non state actors and how to relate with them in a more systematic approach, focusing on the companies operating in situations of armed conflict or those which provide training and advice to armed forces. In addition, the Committee maintains a dialogue with the authority which contracts the company and with the state of origin.

Alarm has also been voiced by the Council of Europe. In view of the growing concern in Member States in the increase and use of private security services which in a number of states exceeds the number of police forces, in 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation entitled "Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states". This recommendation underlines that "from being rather limited in scope and action, private security services are increasingly moving into areas which traditionally have been reserved for the public police". It also draws attention that "ensuring security in society through the rule of law is a fundamental mission of public authorities". And while recognizing that security services may make a useful contribution "the lack of public control over these services, the scope of their activities and the professional conduct of their staff might well endanger the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms". The recommendation also underlines that "national regulations developed by member states on this issue vary greatly and in some member states such regulation is non-existent".

The mass media is increasingly interested in the activities of these private security companies particularly those operating in Iraq. The Suisse Romande TV disseminated, in March 2004, a program in which private contractors are seen actively participating in direct combat. CNN, on 13 June 2006, also devoted a program on the activities of those companies. It reproduced a video in which someone was filming from the interior of an armed vehicle going through the streets of Baghdad. From the vehicle a rifle is shooting at another vehicle, a Mercedes, behind it. The impacts of the bullets hit the Mercedes which bumps into a taxi parked on one side of the street. People come out from the taxi but nobody from the Mercedes indicating that the persons in that car have been injured or killed. According to CNN the persons traveling in the armed vehicle worked for a private security company named Aegis. It is well known to everybody that the personnel in the vehicles of those companies, when they travel through the streets of Baghdad or any other Iraqi city, being afraid of being attacked, shoot indiscriminately right and left to avoid any car approaching them.

It seems that Aegis carried out an investigation about the incident but its conclusions are confidential. A USA Army inquiry says that probably it would not be indication of a crime having been committed. CNN tried a number of times to interview without success the person who created Aegis, Tim Spicer, who told the channel that he "had not the intention of responding but that wished to inform that the contract to Aegis had been extended for a consecutive third year". The contract to which he referred totals some $293 million and is considered one of the most important awarded by the Pentagon to a private security company. Tim Spicer, former Colonel of the British Scots Guards, is the same person that survived allegations involving him in several international scandals. In 1997, he was contracted by the Government of Papua New Guinea in order to recapture the Island of Bougainville in the hands of separatists. And in 1998, in Sierra Leone in a scandal of illicit arms being exported to both parties in the conflict breaking the UN embargo, a scandal which endangered the survival of the then British Foreign Office Secretary.

Aegis is one of the many private security companies which present themselves as peace and security builders and which forms part of the International Peace Operations Association (IOPA), a very active lobby in Washington which strives to obtain respectability and legitimacy at the international level.

The use of mercenaries has been a historical constant till almost the end of the XX Century, when their activities were criminalized by the international community. Parallel to that phenomenon, governments authorized, since the XIII Century, two other forms of non state violence: the corsairs and the merchant companies such as the East India Company or the Hudson Bay Company. What is the difference between the private security companies and the mercenaries? In the same way as the corsairs differentiated themselves from the pirates because the former were authorized by the governments and the latter not, for they only pursued their own interests, the private security companies, by the fact of being registered and paying an annual tax to the government, cease to be considered mercenaries. When they contract these private military and security companies, the USA and British governments, among others, avoid parliamentary controls and at the same time can be present in armed conflicts where they have interests or wish to intervene deploying private companies as auxiliaries. These companies thus constitute an element of their foreign policy.

Some of the activities of the private military and security companies, with President's Bush doctrine of preventive war, constitute another weakening factor of the collective security system established in 1945 with the adoption of the UN Charter. This Organization, in the framework of its Human Rights Commission which in 2006, after the adoption by the General Assembly, has become the Human Rights Council, an organ with more prerogatives, has drawn the attention of Member States to the activities of these private military and security companies operating at the international level through the reports of the Special Rapporteur or the now Working Group on Mercenaries. Reports that unfortunately up to present have had little impact in Western countries, from where these companies mainly operate. It is to be hoped that Member States will soon consider seriously to what extent the use of force can be privatized.

------------

- Jose L. Gomez del Prado is a member of the United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=10510

[keith]

Contractor's rise shows blurred government, industry lines
By Shane Harris, National Journal


What do designing computers for spies, disposing of nuclear waste, running a TV news channel, monitoring employees who download porn from the Internet, psychic experiments, and helping run the government of Iraq have in common? They're all jobs that the Science Applications International Corp. has done for the U.S. government.

SAIC may be one of the biggest companies most people never heard of. Its executives shy away from media attention. A notable exception, which also proved the point, was when a spokesman told the publication Business 2.0, "We are a stealth company." SAIC's silence has a lot to do with its secrecy-loving clients, which include the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Pentagon.


The San Diego-based firm does some work for commercial clients and for state and local governments, but almost 90 percent of SAIC's revenue comes from contracts with Uncle Sam; last year those contracts, according to company records, numbered 10,000 and paid out more than $6 billion. Almost half of SAIC's estimated 43,000 employees have security clearances, and about a third work in Washington-area offices. The company is, effectively, an extension of the government workforce.


SAIC has ranked among the top 10 government contractors, based on revenue, for the past five years and has reportedly posted continuous profits in its nearly 40-year history. Much of that success is owed to the sweet spot that SAIC has found among military and intelligence agencies.

The company's single biggest customer is the NSA, which paid SAIC more than $1 billion to build a computerized information system to analyze and store the torrent of phone calls, e-mails, and other electronic data the agency collects every day. The outgoing second-in-command at NSA is a former SAIC executive, and the company is so stocked with ex-employees of the agency that insiders call it "NSA West."


But the NSA, which is at the center of a national debate over domestic eavesdropping, is just one SAIC customer, and building computers is but one task that SAIC has taken on over the years. Indeed, if you were to ask five people who work with the company, "What is SAIC, and what does it do?" you'd probably get five different answers.

One day it's designing databases, the next it's working to dispose of hazardous nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain or hiring Iraqi exiles to set up ministries in a new government. If you were to ask an SAIC executive what the company does, he might respond, "What would you like us to do?" (SAIC officials declined to be interviewed for this story.)


It seems that SAIC is everywhere, all the time. Its ubiquity "is a joke" among government contractors, said one former federal official now in private industry. "They're going to go anywhere and do anything that will get them a new market. It doesn't matter what the job is."


So how did SAIC get so big? You might say it was an accident.

Kentucky Fried Consulting


SAIC was born in 1969, when Robert Beyster, a former research scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, set up shop with a few colleagues in a small office in La Jolla, Calif. Beyster had worked for another California defense contractor, General Atomics, for 12 years before launching his own firm with the goal of winning research contracts.

The first two he got were for Los Alamos and Brookhaven national laboratories. For most of SAIC's existence, the company earned accolades by "applying science," as the name attests, to the government's most challenging technological and engineering problems.


Beyster stayed at the helm until his retirement in 2004, and his entrepreneurial spirit remains, said former employees and historians who have studied the company. "They're into so many areas because the initial [business] model was, nothing was ruled out," said David Kay, a former vice president, who worked at SAIC from 1993 until 2002. "We used to joke that it really was Kentucky Fried Chicken consulting."


In the spirit of Harlan Sanders, a 40-year-old gas station owner who started selling fried chicken to motorists and spawned a multibillion-dollar global enterprise, Beyster encouraged any employee with an idea that could make money to give it a shot. "The decentralized entrepreneurial idea was that if you had an idea, you could become a vice president," said Kay, who left SAIC to head the Iraq Survey Group, which searched for weapons of mass destruction after the U.S. invasion.


That doesn't mean that SAIC's methods were erratic. "If you look at the legacy, it has a scientific bent. Very advanced kind of academic thinking; very practical application of that advanced thinking," said Ray Bjorklund, the senior vice president of FedSources, a research firm in McLean, Va. "But they really weren't built to do solutions or major implementations," designing the hardware and software for large systems and offering experts to run them. SAIC's traditional niche was where it began: research.


But in the mid-1990s, the company's focus changed. Government departments and agencies began looking for "body shops," Kay said, companies that provide them with personnel to augment their own workforce, usually because the government is shorthanded or lacks the skills for a particular job.

In the late 1990s, SAIC acquired other firms that opened the door to the "professional services" market, an ambiguous label that usually implies that a company is offering to run the physical product it sells. SAIC began eyeing big contracts with the potential for enormous revenue. "As long as you could make money ... no one said, 'No, you can't do it,' " Kay said.


As the company's revenues grew, so did its employee roster. SAIC is wholly owned by its employees, who trade shares of company stock internally. Ownership has proved to be a powerful incentive to stay with the firm. Last year, SAIC announced an initial public stock offering, which executives hoped would total $1.7 billion. That's only $100 million less than Google's IPO two years ago.


Perhaps knowing that SAIC could make them very rich, scores of former high-ranking government officials have landed there after retiring from public service. Many, but not all, hail from the intelligence agencies. The former chief information officer for the Social Security Administration, a former deputy administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and a former Defense official in charge of health affairs brought their Rolodexes to SAIC, which does business with all of those agencies.


The number and complexity of tasks for which the government uses contractors has increased in recent years, said Robert Kipps, the managing director of the aerospace, defense, and government group at Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, an international investment bank that represents SAIC. Former government officials can lead companies toward business with their old employers.

Working for an intelligence agency, in particular, requires an intimate understanding of the work that agency does. "The best place to get that is having been in those shoes before," Kipps said. And once a contractor gets a foothold inside an agency, it's hard for a competitor to kick that contractor out.


Perhaps that expertise is what led SAIC to its biggest customer of all, the one that may also be its biggest liability.

Getting Big


In 1997, William Black, a decorated NSA manager who spent almost 40 years at the agency, retired and became a vice president at SAIC. According to Black's official NSA biography, his expertise lay in "building new organizations and creating new ways of doing business."

In the late 1990s, that's just what SAIC was hoping to do. The company hired Black "for the sole purpose of soliciting NSA business," said Matthew Aid, an intelligence historian who is writing a three-volume history of the agency.


In March 1999, Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden became the NSA's director. Almost immediately, talk began circulating publicly about a massive contract to outsource the agency's data centers, personal computers, telecommunications, and other administrative systems under a program known as "Groundbreaker." SAIC didn't plan to compete for a lead spot in the contract but indicated that it would pursue subcontracting opportunities.


The company would not stay in supporting roles for long, however. Amid the first hints of Groundbreaker, the NSA began another program, called "Trailblazer," to manage its enormous daily catch of intelligence. In 2000, Hayden called Black back to the agency to be his second-in-command.

Two years later SAIC won the Trailblazer contract; Black was in charge of managing the program. "SAIC had made its living acting as a subcontractor on a lot of NSA contracts," Aid said. "Then, under Bill Black, they got promoted to the big leagues."


Work for the federal government has been largely responsible for SAIC's growth, eclipsing the company's private sector contracts. From 1998 to 2002, the company won several lucrative contracts, including a $1.2 billion deal to manage computer systems for the Immigration and Naturalization Service and others potentially worth billions to provide a huge array of professional services to different agencies.

SAIC's revenues also moved up. According to information that SAIC provided to the government and that was compiled by Government Executive magazine, in fiscal 2000, the company took in $2.5 billion in federal work. By fiscal 2002, revenue was up to $3.5 billion, and it jumped almost 35 percent to $4.7 billion the following year.

Those figures only include contracts for which SAIC was the lead, and it omits work for intelligence agencies, so the actual increase is larger. Today, total government revenues exceed $6 billion.


Just as SAIC grew by winning larger contracts, it also expanded by buying other companies, particularly small firms with expertise in specific areas. "All were fairly well run," Aid said. But SAIC "went out in great haste, and with minimal due diligence, and bought a whole bunch of companies in wide business areas.... There was no sense how they were all going to fit together."

SAIC started "buying for the sake of buying," Aid said. "They took a page from the impatient corporate raiders of the 1980s: Why actually spend time building something when you can buy it?"


To some extent, the strategy was driven by necessity. Particularly in the intelligence field, SAIC needed a supply of employees with clearances to access classified information, sometimes even targeted to specific programs. In the intelligence business, "you're either in or you're out," Kipps said, and often the ticket in is a security clearance. "You will never get in without buying" companies that have cleared employees, he said. That's what SAIC did, and it quickly rose to the top of the ranks.


The former government official who became a contractor said that SAIC's strategy has been to ensconce itself in as many areas as possible without becoming too rooted in any one of them. "They want to touch a piece of everything, yet never be the masters of all of it," he said.

The approach stems from those early, entrepreneurial days, when Beyster encouraged employees to try anything that might work, without centrally controlling the business and forcing people to focus. "That has provided breadth at the expense of depth," the former official said.


For big projects like the NSA's Trailblazer, a company needs to have depth of experience in managing many different pieces of business and integrating them into a whole. If that was something SAIC truly lacked, it would show.

In Too Deep


Trailblazer was an abysmal failure. After more than $1.2 billion in development costs, the agency and SAIC have practically nothing to show for their efforts and have effectively abandoned years of work. The effort "has resulted in little more than detailed schematic drawings filling almost an entire wall," according to The Baltimore Sun, which published an exhaustive account of the Trailblazer fiasco, and SAIC's role in it, in January.


Ultimately, the entrepreneurial idea shop appears to have gotten in over its head. SAIC "did not provide enough people with the technical or management skills to produce such a sophisticated system" and "did not say no when the NSA made unrealistic demands," The Sun reported, citing numerous intelligence and industry officials.


Trailblazer was not SAIC's only setback. It tried in vain to build an electronic case-management system, known as the "Virtual Case File," for the FBI. After what observers and participants described as frequent management failures and a lack of organization -- at the bureau and at the company -- the program was scrapped last year. The FBI had spent more than $100 million.


SAIC was also tapped in 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, to set up a U.S.-friendly television network in Baghdad, which officials hoped to use for messages and stories about reconstruction. SAIC was supposed to train local journalists and set up a newspaper, but the work fell apart amid criticism that the company was producing an amateurish product that did little to get word of U.S. efforts to the Iraqi public.


The Pentagon replaced SAIC in January 2004 with another contractor. "They were clueless as to how to run a media network," Kay said. "It was horribly directed. It shouldn't have been done."


All large companies eventually hit obstacles, some of which are more spectacular than others. But when contractors fail, it's usually not because of a lack of experience in a given area. SAIC's case is troubling, observers say, because it arguably shouldn't have gotten some jobs in the first place.


When agencies decide to award contracts, "one of the things they look for is core competency," Aid said. "This company doesn't have it, because there is no core." SAIC's business model "is a model of models," the former government official said. "They are different things depending on the customer."


In that sense, SAIC is a prime example of the blurring lines between government, which traditionally has run itself, and private industry, which is taking over some of government's tasks.


Looking at the increasing privatization of once-core national security and intelligence functions, Aid asks, "Is the United States government capable of running these operations anymore?" Often, the answer is no. Dependence on contractors has never been higher or more evident. Outside firms build critical computer systems; private-sector employees work alongside government intelligence analysts; outside companies have even provided interrogators to work with U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.


"I think the process has crept up on us, and it's not ever been announced or specifically authorized," said Rep. David Price, D-N.C. "I question it."

Price has authored legislation requiring the director of national intelligence to submit a report to the congressional Intelligence committees detailing how contracts are regulated. The report, not all of which would be public, would include the minimum standards for hiring and training contractors, and the procedures for preventing waste, fraud, and abuse.


And for contracts worth more than $1 million, individual agencies would have to disclose the number of people they hired for a particular project, as well as a description of how those employees were trained and the work they do. The DNI would also have to recommend ways to improve hiring and training of government employees.


"One has to ask about ... the extent to which the legitimate organs of government, over which we exercise funding control and oversight, are really in charge," Price said. "The contractors in some areas may have become the tail that wags the dog." Price's proposal is included in the pending 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act.


SAIC may also face oversight of a different kind should it decide to go public. Wall Street analysts could judge the company harshly if it botches more high-profile contracts, even though the vast majority of SAIC's work presumably goes smoothly.


"If SAIC stumbles, which could happen again, then the market sentiment may just drag down the valuation of their stock," said Bjorklund, the research firm executive.


In the meantime, SAIC has set its sights even higher. Its chief executive, Kenneth Dahlberg, has said he wants revenues to hit $12 billion by 2008. It's a lofty goal, but if SAIC attains it, talk of contract failures, inexperience, and government oversight will fade into the background. Ultimately, one measure stands above the rest, the former government official said. "You can't argue with revenue."



This document is located at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0706/070706nj1.htm

http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=34483&printerfriendlyVers=1&

[keith]

July Wednesday 12th 2006 (03h57) :

Nationalize The US Defense Industry. Public Good Should Trump Private Greed

http://www.baltimorechronicle.com/2...
Nationalize The US Defense Industry Public Good Should Trump Private Greed By John Stanton July 11, 2006

In 1969 John Kenneth Galbraith penned a piece for the New York Times titled "The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should be Nationalized," arguing, among other things, that it was folly for defense contractors to claim that they were private corporations. Such claims made a mockery of free enterprise.

Nearly 40 years hence, Charlie Cray and Lee Drutman have resurrected and energized Galbraith’s argument in their work titled "Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance" (Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Winter 2005). They make an exceptionally compelling case for putting the defense industrial base (DIB) into the direct service of the American public through a form of nationalization: federal chartering. They wrote:

“Converting the companies to publicly-controlled, nonprofit status would introduce a key change: it would reduce the entities’ impetus for aggressive lobbying and campaign contributions. Chartering the defense contractors at the federal level would in effect allow Congress to ban such activities outright, thereby controlling an industry that is now a driving force rather than a servant of foreign policy objectives. As public firms, they would certainly continue to participate in the policy fora designed to determine the nation’s national security and defense technology needs, but the profit-driven impetus to control the process in order to best serve corporate shareholders would be eliminated. Thus, by turning defense and security firms into full public corporations, we would replace the criteria by which their performance is judged from quarterly earnings targets to criteria that is more consistent with the national interest.”

If Cray and Drutman’s notion seems radical, it’s only thanks to a fanciful story-telling by those who move back and forth through the revolving, and always open, doors of the national security apparatus that link the Department of Defense, the US Congress, and the players who dot the DIB landscape. Apologists for the DIB have always distorted the importance of the defense industry to the nation’s security, particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union. They really believe that their industry should get special recognition for producing the goods and services used to wage war. To sell that concept, they’ve made sure that the difference between contractor and uniformed government employee is completely blurred. With that, it’s impossible to know who is protecting the balance sheet and who is protecting the US Constitution. In short, they’ve sold the public good.

There’s a lot of evidence to show that the DIB is not functioning in the nation’s best interest. Two interesting studies stand out. An April 2005 report by the Government Accounting Office titled "Defense Logistics" took a hard look at the system that supplies U.S. troops in Iraq and concluded that it needed repair. The pipeline failed to deliver basic supplies, such as MRE rations, in a timely manner. Another from the National Defense University (see below) indicated that defense isn’t reaping broad benefits from information technology. That does not bode well for the push to network-centric warfare.

The inability of the Pentagon to account for billions in missing funds here at home and in Iraq, ongoing criminal investigations spread across the entire national security landscape, and sensational resignations, arrests and convictions are unprecedented in US history. There is more here than just a few “bad apples.” It is a systemic problem made worse by the absence of leadership at the highest levels. There is self-interest, to be sure, but that is different from leadership. The American public is rapidly discovering that those running the show in the national security machinery aren’t necessarily interested in what’s best for them or the USA.

Fierce Competition? Show Me The Data!

According to a formula that measures market concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the DIB is not a competitive industry. At a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies panel discussion on the DIB, one participant warned that the myth of competition in the DIB might be exposed. “Some federal agencies use this index [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] to establish guidelines for when you have to start worrying about the absence of competition. Competition is supposed to be a hallmark of the acquisition system that we’ve had since the end of World War II, but with only two big firms--which is the case for some categories of military equipment provided by our industrial base--there is little competition in the traditional sense. In fact, this situation-two firms that divide market share-has a name: duopoly. Not monopoly, but duopoly-and it’s pretty tough to brand duopoly circumstances fierce competition.”

The American public is led to believe that the DIB is unmatched in the broad applications of information technology. Not quite. An astonishing report by the National Defense University titled "Bringing Defense into the Information Economy" (David Gompert and Paul Bracken--March 2006) indicates that the Pentagon and its minions are still trying to figure out how to get into the information age. “One thing is clear [that] the phenomenon of increasing capability at declining cost now common in retail, financial services, telecommunications and other sectors remains uncommon in defense.” To that, DIB apologists retort that the defense industry is different. But Gompert and Bracken will not buy into the party line:

“Defense is different is a self-fulfilling excuse that perpetuates poor price-performance and deprives national defense of the benefits of larger, faster, more dynamic, and more inventive IT markets. It condones expensive adaptation and integration services. Moreover, by exaggerating the difficulty of applying IT to defense, this hypothesis legitimizes the ceding of government responsibility. It implies that the challenge of managing, adapting, and integrating IT into military capabilities is so daunting for DOD that it must be left to defense contractors...” Profiles In Protecting The Status Quo: The Voice Of The DIB "Misconceptions About the Defense Industry" (National Defense-July 2006), authored by Larry Farrell, president of the National Defense Industrial Association, is representative of defense industry’s world-view. Farrell, a retired USAF Lieutenant General, doesn’t believe the American people understand the importance of his industry to national security. He thinks that the defense industry needs to get out there and tell its story because “...it will be critically important with the coming resource crunch, when the Defense Department will have to justify acquisitions and force structure costs against calls for reallocation of resources to other national needs.” OK, fair enough. But what kind of story will the American public get?

Farrell divines that the first thoughts that come to the public mind when asked about the DIB are $600 toilet seats, $400 hammers (actually they were $450 apiece), war profiteering, Eisenhower’s oft-cited military-industrial complex thesis, scandals, and reports critical of the DIB. Naturally, Farrell blames the media for faulty reporting on the $600 toilet seat part and the $450 hammers.

The NDIA president takes the reader back to World War I and proclaims that “the only things we took to war [WWI] that were truly American-made were the Springfield rifles and our fighting spirits.” Huh?

It is true that US artillery pieces appeared late in the conflict and that the U.S. had to buy aircraft and other weaponry from the British and French. The U.S. Navy fought in WWI, at least according to the US Army and Navy historical offices. In 1916, American-made Navy destroyers, six of them, were escorting British cargo ships to protect the Brits from German submarine attacks. A U.S. Navy Admiral, William Sims, convinced the British Admiralty to change its ship formations to a convoy pattern. In the end, 37 US destroyers participated in the effort, significantly reducing cargo losses to the German U-Boats.

American made ships--one produced by Newport News Shipbuilding, the USS Fanning (DD 37)-and the the other by William Cramp & Sons, the USS Nicholson (DD 52), sank a U-Boat in 1917. And, in quite a feat of industrial production, 1200 American-made M1917 Browning machine guns were used late in WWI.

It’s worth noting an event that was putting some strain on the US Army in 1916. The US Army had its attention focused on the Mexican border. The American public was more concerned about securing the Mexican border from the likes of Pancho Villa (his attack on Columbus, NM killed 25 Americans) than war in Europe. At the height of the Mexican Campaign, some 150,000 national guard troops were deployed along the border between the U.S. and Mexico with another 8,000 US Army infantry led by General John Pershing.

In the editorial, Farrell attempts mightily to challenge the stigma of "war profiteer," but his argument about the tough “allocation of resources” ends in language that is precisely that of a war profiteer hunting for profits in the midst of resource scarcity. This argument-focused as it is on the corporate interest, ignores the lifetime-care costs for some 18,356 U.S. wounded in Afghanistan and Iraq (and, one supposes, hundreds more wounded during Special Operations and intelligence activities all over the globe). The pay raises and increases in housing allowances and medical benefits over the past few years, for those in the military that matter most, are paltry compared with the bonuses, stock options and salary increases received by DIB leaders and their partners throughout the national security machinery.

Finally, the American public doesn’t hear too much about the Lockheed Martin contracts to upgrade Chinese air traffic control systems. “We Never Forget Who We Work For,” says Lockheed. Boeing recently deployed the Sea Based X-Band radar system that’s floating off the coast of Hawaii. The platform for that technological marvel was built by Vyborg Shipping, a Russian firm. Is it really North Korea the Missile Defense people are interested in, or is it the Russian arsenal?

Will the story the defense industry provides be the complete or redacted version?

Full Spectrum Corruption

According to Cray and Drutman:

“The growth of private military firms and corporate intelligence contractors in the past decade has created additional profit-making pressures on national security policymaking processes. Interlocking relationships exist between the largest defense contractors and the Pentagon-including corporate representation on key defense planning boards, and the regular passage of Pentagon and industry personnel through the proverbial revolving door; that is, to the private sector companies that they formerly oversaw.

"The result is a steady stream of abusive contracting practices and a potentially dangerous distortion of American national security objectives. Another result of defense contractors’ influence over Congress and defense policy boards is a long-term commitment to the development of high-tech weapons systems that only specific contractors are able to produce. These weapons systems arguably have little to do with preventing acts of terrorism-one of the nation’s current greatest security concerns.”

The interlocking relationships referred to by Cray and Lutman have led to spectacular levels of corruption. Convictions, resignations, investigations and ethically challenged actions plague the national security machinery. More bad news from the expanding Randy “Duke” Cunningham investigation is likely to further rock the decrepit system.

Some of the more troubling public cases include William H. Swanson, Chairman and CEO of Raytheon, who lifted major portions of his book Unwritten Rules from another author. He was censured and had his paycheck cut by the Raytheon Board of Directors. Randy “Duke” Cunningham, former U.S. Congressman and Chair of the U.S. House Intelligence Subcommittee, is serving an 8.4 year sentence in federal prison for fraud and taking bribes. Jerry Lewis, the Chair of the US House Appropriation Committee, is under investigation by the FBI. Porter Goss, former US Congressman and CIA Director is also the subject of an FBI investigation. In May 2006, Reuters reported that the FBI was investigating allegations that four-star USAF Generals Michael Moseley and John Jumper helped to steer a Thunderbird contract (the USAF equivalent of the U.S. Navy’s Blue Angels stunt flying team) to a friend, retired USAF General Hal Hornburg, who once commanded the Thunderbirds.

“One of Raytheon’s more secretive subsidiaries is E-Systems, whose major clients have historically been the CIA and other spy agencies like the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. An unnamed Congressional aide told the Washington Post once that the company was ’virtually indistinguishable’ from the agencies it serves. Congress will ask for a briefing from E- Systems and the (CIA) program manager shows up, the aide is quoted as saying. ’Sometimes he gives the briefing. They’re interchangeable.’’

What Is The US Military? What Is Being Defended?

Ultimately, the entire national security apparatus is going to have to make some decisions. Is it country before agency? Is it profit before country? Is it the U.S. Congress saying “No” to campaign contributions? P.W. Singer, who monitors the DIB for the Brookings Institution, put the issue into perspective:

“The final dilemma raised by the extensive use of private contractors involves the future of the military itself. The armed services have long seen themselves as engaged in a unique profession, set apart from the rest of civilian society, which they are entrusted with securing. The introduction of private military firms, and their recruiting from within the military itself, challenges that uniqueness and the military professional identity. Its monopoly on certain activities is being encroached on by the regular civilian marketplace.”

On Singer’s latter point, the civilian and active-duty U.S. military leadership is aggressively encouraging the commercial marketplace to take on more military functions. That tactic is being pursued not just for cost savings (dubious as those might be), but also to avoid public oversight and the fallout that would come from being accountable for improprieties ranging from over-billing to the developing of torture techniques.

And what about the status of the USA, its people and its infrastructure that the national security apparatus is supposed to be defending? A day may come when there is not much worth fighting for.. The FBI reports that violent crime increased in 2005 to its highest rate in 15 years. The American Society of Civil Engineers says it’ll take almost $2 trillion to repair water systems, roads, schools and electrical grids. Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz says the total costs of the current Iraq War will cost another $2 trillion. The Catholic Conference for Human Development indicates that 37 million Americans live in poverty. The US Census Bureau reports that 45 million Americans can’t afford health insurance. On top of that, add a trillion dollars to fully repair hurricane-damaged New Orleans, Louisiana, and cover the costs of neighboring state governments as they absorb hundreds of thousands of displaced Americans from New Orleans. Federal debt, and personal debt is at record levels. The home-front is decaying.

Public good, and the ideals it is based on, must trump private greed. If not, what’s the point of this Republic?


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Stanton is a Virginia-based writer specializing in political and national security matters. His latest book is titled A Power But Not Super. Reach him at cioran123@yahoo.com.

http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=12526

[keith]

On the front line

Hootie Wilkins lost the Citrus County sheriff's race in 1996. Since then, he's trained police in Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Now he plans to build toll roads and an airport complex in Iraq.

By KRIS HUNDLEY, Times Staff Writer
Published July 24, 2006

Henry E. "Hootie" Wilkins, whose WSI Group Inc. has offices in Homosassa, Kabul and Baghdad, recently made Iraqi officials a couple of offers they couldn't refuse.

One is to build a $300-million airport in the holy Shiite city of Najaf. The other is to ensure safe passage to travelers on more than 300 miles of highways into Baghdad from Syria and Jordan.

The deals are noteworthy, and not just because Wilkins, once a criminal investigator and candidate for sheriff in Citrus County, has only been working in the international arena for a decade.

Unlike most Iraqi reconstruction projects, WSI's contracts don't rely on money from the Iraqi or U.S. governments. Instead, Wilkins, 48, and his Iraqi partners say they will put up the cash to get the developments rolling, then tap user fees and tolls for payback and to perpetuate the projects. Provincial and Iraqi national governments will share in the profits. About 5,500 Iraqis will be hired to build and run both developments.

"I don't know any other companies that will put their money in upfront, especially in a war zone," Wilkins said during a recent interview from his Washington, D.C. office. "The benefit is, everybody wins. We think employment equals peace."

Wilkins, who goes by "Hootie" among family and friends in Citrus County, is relentlessly optimistic about business prospects in a nation steeped in sectarian violence. He speaks of millions of dollars in revenue from religious pilgrims who will fly jumbo jets into Najaf, visiting airport shops, restaurants and hotels on their way. He talks about cars and trucks zipping into Baghdad along secure toll roads from Syria and Jordan, getting security updates on their car radios and protection from a WSI-trained force of 1,500 Iraqis.

"We're calling it the 'Highway to the Future,' " Wilkins said of his planned network of toll roads through the desert. "We met with seven sheiks about two months ago in Jordan and they're on board. They want to show Iraqis can pull this together themselves."

Wilkins' approach is so unusual it has foreign policy experts torn between skepticism and hopefulness.

"My hat's off to anybody who is trying to make a difference to the positive in Iraq," said Michael E. O'Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "But I do worry the arrangement could be misperceived. Iraqis are already suspicious that we're there to get their oil."

Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., said Wilkins' proposals are undoubtedly risky. "But I have a certain kind of reflexive faith in the wisdom of the market," he said. "And if this man convinced someone to fund his venture, I presume they vetted it."

Wilkins, a 6-foot-tall, self-described "portly gentleman" with a salt and pepper beard, arrived at a career in international development by an unlikely route. After losing the Republican primary for Citrus County sheriff in 1996 by 400 votes - the same week his wife asked for a divorce - Wilkins got a call from a friend at the U.S. State Department. Was he interested in training police officers in Sarajevo?

"I didn't even know where Bosnia was on the map," Wilkins said.

He took the contract position, training officers in Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo. After Sept. 11, 2001, Wilkins, by then a State Department employee, was sent to Afghanistan, where he trained officers in the fledgling Afghan security forces.

When he saw private companies providing the same services for higher pay, Wilkins decided to follow suit, in 2003 creating World Strategic Initiatives. The company has its administrative offices and one employee in Homosassa, where Wilkins keeps a 20-foot Mako fishing boat.

In Kabul, Wilkins learned the United Nations needed 80 female security guards during the election, so his WSI Group provided them. Dyncorp, a Texas company with a U.S. State Department grant, needed six police facilities; WSI built four of them. Demand for armored cars and construction materials was skyrocketing in the country, so Wilkins opened warehouses in Kabul that make armored cars, do car repairs and sell everything from lumber to lighting materials.

"It's like the Home Depot of Kabul," Wilkins said with a laugh.

WSI has about 1,300 employees in Afghanistan, with 80 percent of them working in security and 80 percent of the security force comprised of Afghanis. Wilkins said his workers have prevented nearly 60 criminal offenses with no injuries. Among the company's clients are construction sites, Afghan national army bases and counternarcotics facilities.

Despite most of his employees working in security, Wilkins said construction projects were the biggest contributor to WSI's revenues of $11.5-million last year. He predicted the company's two planned projects in Iraq would boost WSI's income to $215-million next year, with 70 percent derived from user fees from the airport in Najaf and toll roads into Baghdad.

"It's just basic business," Wilkins said of the Iraqi projects, which he said are being paid for by internal cash and a line of credit from a bank in the United Arab Emirates. He is trying to raise $20-million in a private placement to pay for the toll road project.

"We're not competing with anybody," he said. "We're just trying to bring about a new niche market, which we think is the best way to go."

In Najaf, WSI and its Iraqi partner, Sahel Al-Jazeera Group, will initially invest $7-million to construct runways, a terminal and a tower. Over the 10-year term of the contract, the partners expect to spend about $300-million to create a complex of airport, hotels and shops in the city, which is about 100 miles south of Baghdad. The project is expected to provide 1,000 jobs for Iraqis during construction and 3,000 once it is complete. Revenues from fuel and passenger fees will be divided, with half going to the provincial government and half to the developers.

Wilkins said the first planes full of travelers, bound for religious sites in Najaf and nearby Karbala, could be landing within four months.

Despite recent suicide bombings in the area, Wilkins said Najaf has relatively few security problems. "The only problem will be getting the vehicles, trucks and batch plants up there," said Wilkins, who has made about 10 trips to Iraq in the past year. "But once we're there, we'll put our fortress up and get to work."

For the toll road project, WSI is working with Al-Fursan Security Co., an Iraqi firm solely owned by WSI, and Iraq's Ministry of Transportation. WSI's initial investment of $1.8-million for police stations, security training and uniforms will be recouped in the first three months of operation, Wilkins said. Through the remaining five years of the contract, the partners will split half the proceeds, with the other half going to the Iraqi government. After five years, the toll roads will become government property.

Wilkins said the roads into Baghdad, one from Tirbil in Jordan and three from Syria, will be collecting tolls by the end of July and will employ about 1,500 Iraqis.

"Iraqis are going to be protecting Iraqis," he said, adding that workers will be trained in ethics and self-defense. "People are going to be held accountable. If there are problems, there will be a review board and salaries withheld. The people involved know going in this is a business proposition and they've got to hold up their end of the bargain."

Under Wilkins' plan, cars will pay about $2 to travel into Baghdad, while trucks will pay $4, plus $2 per ton of goods carried. Now, guides can charge thousands of dollars to guarantee safety on the roads, impeding travel and adding to the price of goods once they arrive in Baghdad.

"We know these people will not go by the wayside easily," he said of the freelancers who control the roads today. "But they'll either have to get on board and do things the right way or be pushed off the highway."

People who have worked with Wilkins are not surprised he is undaunted by the prospect of building a business in the midst of chaos. Ali Jalali was the minister of the interior in Afghanistan from 2003 until resigning in September. Wilkins was his senior police advisor, involved in everything from coordinating police reform efforts to helping to design new uniforms.

"He was very effective in Afghanistan," said Jalali, who is teaching in Washington, D.C. "And while the challenges in Iraq are enormous, knowing Henry, I think he has a great chance of making some achievements."

Charlie Dean, the former Citrus County sheriff who is a Florida state representative, has similar feelings about Wilkins.

Asked if he thought Wilkins could pull off his projects in Iraq, Dean said, "Shoot, yeah. And Hootie will have them working 15 percent harder and laughing 90 percent more than anybody else. He's super-smart. And he doesn't stand around and beat his gums."

Wilkins said his police training taught him how to negotiate with people and remain optimistic in the face of disaster.

"I saw kids in Bosnia after the war going to school carrying the same Scooby Doo lunchboxes they carry in the States," Wilkins said. "Human nature is the same no matter where you go."

Times researcher Angie Drobnic Holan contributed to this report. Kris Hundley can be reached at hundley@sptimes.com or (727) 892-2996.

About WSI Group Inc.
President, CEO: Henry E. "Hootie" Wilkins

Previous experience: U.S. State Depart-ment, Citrus County Sheriff's Office

Offices: Homosassa, Washington, D.C., Dubai, Kabul, Baghdad, Amman, Budapest

Founded: August 2003

2005 Revenues: $11.5-million

Employees: 1,350

What it has done: Police training, security services and construction of four police facilities in Afghanistan; armored car production in Afghanistan; air cargo service from Dubai to Baghdad

Pending contracts: Construct and operate more than 300 miles of toll roads in Iraq and airport complex in Najaf

Iraqi partners: Sahel al-Jazeera Group Najaf airport project; Al-Fursan (toll road project)

About the Iraq projects

WSI Group will operate more than 300 miles of toll roads on highways between the Syrian and Jordanian borders and Baghdad. It is building an airport complex in Najaf.

http://www.sptimes.com/2006/07/24/Business/On_the_front_line.shtml

[keith]

Q&A: Blackwater's founder on the record

Erik Prince

The Virginian-Pilot
© July 24, 2006



Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater USA, is famously media-shy. But the former Navy SEAL agreed to an e-mail interview with The Virginian-Pilot. Here’s the complete text:

Q. Can you tell me a little about your personal history? I know you were a SEAL. When was that? Is that what brought you to the Hampton Roads area? How long did you live in Virginia Beach?

A. I was raised in Holland, Mich. My dad was a very successful entrepreneur. From scratch he started a company that first produced high pressure die-cast machines and grew into a world-class automotive parts supplier in west Michigan. They developed and patented the first lighted car sun visor, developed the car digital compass/thermometer and the programmable garage door opener.

Not all their ideas were winners. Things like a sock-drawer light, an automated ham de-boning machine and a propeller driven snowmobile didn’t work out so well for the company. My dad used them as examples of the need for perseverance and determination.

I earned my pilot’s license at 17 and entered the Naval Academy after high school intending to be a Navy pilot. I didn’t like the academy but loved the Navy. This is where I was first exposed to the SEAL teams. I resigned after three semesters at the academy and attended Hillsdale College in Michigan, where I graduated in 1992. I re-entered the Navy through Officer Candidate School and was commissioned a naval officer. I then joined the SEALs, where I served as an officer at SEAL Team 8. I deployed to Haiti, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, including Bosnia.

As I trained all over the world, I realized how difficult it was for units to get the cutting-edge training they needed to ensure success. In a letter home while I was deployed, I outlined the vision that is today Blackwater.

I lived in Virginia Beach for about five years.

Q. Can you tell me a little about the genesis of Blackwater? What was your motivation in starting the company? Did you have any inkling that it would come so far so fast?

A. Just prior to a deployment, my dad unexpectedly died. My family’s business had grown to great success and I left the Navy earlier than I had intended to assist with family matters. I wanted to stay connected to the military so I built a facility to provide a world-class venue for U. S. and friendly foreign military, law enforcement, commercial, and government organizations to prepare to go into harm’s way. Many special operations guys I know had the same thoughts about the need for private advanced training facilities. A few of them joined me when I formed Blackwater. I was in the unusual position after the sale of the family business to self-fund this endeavor.

Q. How do you account for the phenomenal growth of Blackwater and the private security industry? Do you expect this growth to continue?

A. Blackwater's growth is due to a few simple, but important facts: We have always delivered our services complete, correct, and on time, and we continue to attract committed professionals who value service over self and who want to have an immediate positive impact for our customers.

Growth in this industry is not restricted to Iraq alone. Because of the demand, the companies who have continually invested for the long-term will be the companies who are looked at to provide services whenever they are needed. As I said before, when Blackwater got started there was little focus on training and readiness in individual skills.

We have a very long-term view to our work. We see ourselves assisting in the transformation of the DoD into a faster more nimble organization. The private sector has always led innovation in our country. If the government sees some of the things we are doing, and chooses to utilize us or to adopt and adapt some of our innovations in the defense of the nation, then all the better.

Q. Can you discuss the role played by Blackwater and other contractors in the Pentagon’s “total force,” as referenced in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review? What is its significance for Blackwater?

A. The "total force" refers to all resources available to be used in the nation's defense. Blackwater considers itself a partner to the DoD and all government agencies, and we stand ready to provide surge capacity, training, security and operational services in various areas at their request. We are honored to contribute in some small way.

American history details the contributions of private contractors in the development of our Nation. Examples include the Jamestown, Plymouth, and Massachusetts Bay colonies; all started as private investment endeavors whose security was provided by PMCs. Across the street from the White House is Lafayette Park; on its four corners stand statues of Lafayette, Von Steuben, Rochambeau, and Kosciusko. All were foreign professional military officers that came here to help build and develop the capacity of the Continental Army. The base of one of the statues bears the inscription: “He gave military training and discipline to the citizen soldiers who achieved the independence of the United States.” Lewis and Clark’s expedition to explore the American West consisted of some active duty soldiers but their “Corps of Discovery” crew also consisted of what would now be considered contractors.

Q. What are the economics of this industry? How is it cost-effective for the government to outsource these functions?

A. Blackwater and the private sector are able rapidly to tailor a custom solution to solve the customer’s problem. Our ability to quickly react with a right-sized solution whose entire cost is only associated with the duration of the contract is cost-effective because there are no subsequent carrying costs like salary, medical care, retirement, etc.

My family’s business was automotive supply, one of the most efficient and globally competitive in the world. You wake up in the morning having to drive efficiency throughout the organization or you will be driven under. We strive for that level efficiency in what we do today. In very competitive industries, the purchasing/contract officers understand your business as well as you do. The government can ensure good value for the taxpayer by pushing that level of competence and accountability to its purchasing agents and contracting officers too.

Q. There have been calls for more regulation of this industry. Do you agree that any further regulation is needed? If so, what could you support?

A. Given the sensational tone of the media coverage our industry receives, it is understandable that there are calls for more regulation. We certainly agree that our industry should be accountable and transparent, but we should carefully analyze the domestic and international regulations that already exist so that further conversations can be had from a common foundation of accurate information. There are already many tools at the disposal of purchasing agents, government contracting officers and law enforcement officials to ensure proper behavior of PMC’s. For example, early privateers (the forbearers of the U.S. Navy) would post a significant performance bond to receive their Letter of Marque. We fully support high standards with high enforcement that drive unethical, immoral players from our industry.

Q. Some contractors have been involved in financial or abuse scandals. How can that kind of thing be avoided?

A. Those companies or individuals who disregard the moral, ethical, and legal high ground are not long for this industry. Closely working together with contracting agencies, contracting officers, and policy makers can only reduce the opportunities for financial and other abuses. The key to success is leadership and balance; strong corporate governance, and operational and "field” leadership at all levels carries the day always. We want to reduce opportunities for abuse without constraining the flexibility that makes our industry so valuable.

http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=107985&ran=89575

[keith]

DISCLOSURE REQUEST: Security contractor names to stay secret, judge rules

THE NEWS TRIBUNE
Published: July 27th, 2006 01:00 AM




WASHINGTON – The U.S. government can keep secret the names of private security contractors involved in serious shooting incidents in Iraq, a federal judge has ruled, rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Los Angeles Times.
U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper in Los Angeles said she deferred to the judgment of Army officers who said the disclosure of the names could “provide an advantage to insurgents” and aid them in targeting contractors who are providing protection at job sites.

Many private security contractors have been attacked by insurgents, and they have been accused at times of recklessly using deadly force against Iraqis.

Times reporter T. Christian Miller, who is reporting on the contractors, said the government appeared to give more protection to private companies than to U.S. soldiers.

“They can tell you a soldier’s name and his company’s name when they are involved in a shooting incident. I didn’t understand why they couldn’t tell us the names of the companies involved in the shooting incidents,” Miller said.

Los Angeles Times

http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/nationworld/story/5982836p-5259640c.html

[keith]

The layered look: On multi-level contracts, everyone gets a cut
By BILL SIZEMORE, The Virginian-Pilot
© July 28, 2006
Last updated: 9:36 PM


Inside America's
Private Army


Tracing the privatization of today’s American military operations is a bit like peeling an onion. Often there are multiple layers of contractors and subcontractors – each one, presumably, earning a profit.

Few of the contracts are publicly available. But a lawsuit stemming from the deaths of four Blackwater USA contractors in Iraq in 2004 has shed some light on the process.

According to contracts that have become part of the court record, Blackwater paid its security operatives $600 a day and charged its client, Regency Hotel & Hospital Co., $945 a day per man – a 58 percent markup.

In addition, Blackwater’s $11 million contract required Regency to provide room and board, heavy weapons, vehicles, laptop computers and satellite phones for its contractors.

And that’s just the first two layers.

Regency, a Kuwaiti company, was a subcontractor to ESS Support Services Worldwide, a Cypriot company. ESS, in turn, was a subcontractor to Houston-based Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton Inc.

Halliburton, Vice President Dick Cheney’s previous employer, is the biggest U.S. contractor in Iraq. Pentagon accountants have disputed $1.8 billion of its charges to the government.

There are no public documents to show how much Regency charged ESS for the security services provided by Blackwater – or how much ESS charged Kellogg Brown & Root, or how much Kellogg Brown & Root charged the government.

Spokesmen for the private military industry insist the taxpayers are getting a good deal.

“Yes, there’s a profit at each level, but ultimately it ends up being a lot cheaper than the military can do it itself,” said Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, a trade group for private military companies.

“Militaries are smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War. … So if anybody wants to do anything, essentially they have to go to the private sector now. And what they’re finding is that it’s faster, better, cheaper. Militaries are incredibly capable organizations, but they’re not designed to be cost-effective.”

Chris Taylor, a Blackwater vice president, said the company’s profit margin on the Regency contract was less than 10 percent.

The key to private military companies’ efficiency is “surge capacity,” Taylor said. Unlike the Pentagon, which maintains a permanent workforce, private companies employ independent contractors for short-term assignments.

“When that contract is over,” he said, “they go home,” sparing the government the cost of health care, retirement, housing, education and other benefits provided to uniformed soldiers.

Not so fast, counters Peter Singer, an industry expert at the Brookings Institution: “That something is done privately does not necessarily make it better, quicker or cheaper.” He says any savings are dependent on open competition and strict government oversight.




© 2006 HamptonRoads.com/PilotOnline.com

http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108246&ran=151588

[keith]

In his own words: ''The guys who do this are not money-hungry pigs''
The Virginian-Pilot
© July 28, 2006
Last updated: 9:35 PM


Kelly Capeheart


Inside America's
Private Army


Kelly Capeheart was part of the Blackwater security team that helped keep Ambassador John Negroponte alive in Iraq. Capeheart was in the war zone for seven months in 2004-05. He lives in Atlanta and works for a company that supplies orthopedic devices.

Capeheart, 37, says the public has the wrong perception of his old profession.

Some of his thoughts and observations:

“Everyone has the idea that we went looking for trouble. That couldn’t be further from the truth. I don’t care what anyone tells you. No one wants to get shot.”

“The guys who do this are not money-hungry pigs. They’re not gun-toting cowboys, or guys who shoot first and ask questions later. Believe me, if a Blackwater guy shoots somebody, he’s going to answer to somebody.”

“We were bigger than life to a

lot of the military guys. You could see it in their eyes when they looked at us – or whispered about us. A lot of them were very jealous. They felt like they were doing the same job but getting paid a lot less.

“People complaining about the pay are usually sitting at home, pointing at the TV.”

“I can’t see why someone would point a finger at me and say I’m a bad guy for what I did. They do, though. I’ve had some very heated conversations ...”

“You see these pictures in the media of Blackwater guys loaded to the hilt with pistols and M-4s and their hand out grabbing the camera. There’s a reason for that. I don’t want my face on Al-Jazeera. Sorry.”

“We had prices on our heads over there. We all knew it.”

“Every day I consider going back. But I have a job here now, and it pays more. And nobody’s after me. But you know what? I’d still go back if it wasn’t for my family. I’d go back in a heartbeat.”




© 2006 HamptonRoads.com/PilotOnline.com

http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108247&ran=84205

[Atlas]

600 a day?

Pretty good pay 200+K a year. Tax free

[keith]

600 a day?

Pretty good pay 200+K a year. Tax free

It's only tax deductible for the first 80k, pending you spend 330 days outside the US. The problem only comes if you get hurt, because most of the companies will leave out to dry, and you're not eligible for many of the social net stuff because you are a contractor.

[keith]

Rush to redraft contentious mercenary bill
Jonathan Katzenellenbogen

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


International Affairs Editor

PARLIAMENT’s defence committee is to reconsider the tough new mercenary prohibition bill when MPs return from a recess next week.


Government has been extensively lobbied on the bill by security companies, foreign governments and nongovernmental organisations since the first draft of the bill was released last year.


But the extent to which government may have backed down on the contentious provisions in the original bill will be clear only when the department tables amendments.

However, the defence committee has been told the bill should be redrafted by the end of next week, signalling urgency on the part of government.


The bill is called the Prohibition of Mercenary Activity and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an area of Armed Conflict Bill, 2005.

Its main source of controversy has been the element of extraterritorial reach, which would allow Pretoria to prosecute security companies and nongovernmental organisations that employ South Africans in conflict areas without government permission.

Its first draft even made it illegal for South Africans to work for United Nations agencies, including in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and nongovernmental organisations that operated in conflict areas without permission.


Another controversial provision allowed Pretoria to decide which organisations qualified to be “liberation movements” for which South Africans could volunteer.


There was also concern that, in the absence of detailed guidelines, particularly on the definition of a conflict area, the bill was giving the defence minister a large degree of discretion.


Government was concerned about how to handle the issue of South Africans working for international security companies in areas such as VIP protection in Iraq, particularly as the armed forces continued to lose members to higher-paying jobs.


The head of a Washington-based body representing private security companies had warned that the bill in its original form would hamper peace support operations throughout the world, where private security companies played a crucial role.

http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A241711

[Atlas]

It's only tax deductible for the first 80k, pending you spend 330 days outside the US. The problem only comes if you get hurt, because most of the companies will leave out to dry, and you're not eligible for many of the social net stuff because you are a contractor.

but blackwater, kbr,dyncorp and the like buy you a disability policy, no?

[keith]

Blackwater: New Horizons
The Virginian-Pilot
© July 28, 2006
Last updated: 1:52 AM

Thomas Pogue will soon be on his way to somewhere dangerous – most likely Iraq. Of the 19 young men who entered the latest Blackwater Academy, Pogue is among the nine who made it all the way through.

In fact, Pogue, 25, a former Navy SEAL from Chesapeake, won the academy’s “Honor Man,” an award given to the top all-around student in the class.

After graduation, Pogue said he was anxious about what he’ll encounter overseas.

“I’m sure it’ll be a lot like what I’m used to,” he said, “but at the same time, really different.”

Pogue pointed out that contractor teams have limited time to train together. They don’t have a massive force of men and machines at their back when things go wrong. They aren’t necessarily privy to military intelligence. And their defensive role, he says, places them at a disadvantage.

“The enemy comes to you,” he said. “You wait to be attacked.”

He’s counting on Blackwater to even things up.

“You just hope the experience of the guys you’re with makes up for all the rest. I’m really relying on the company to make the right hires and choose the right contracts.”

The cutthroat “mercenary” image of private contractors, Pogue said, “is a product of ignorance. We’re the same people you have in the military. We just got out.”

Money is a big reason, Pogue said: “This country does not pay its soldiers enough for the work they do. This industry is one way to level the field.”

He sees a big future for the private military business. “These forces can be employed without a lot of publicity – and that’s a very useful characteristic for any government. It’s politically easier, and there is less red tape.”

The ultimate reason Pogue believes his profession will stick around:

“We’re expendable. If 10 contractors die, it’s not the same as if 10 soldiers die. Because people will say that we were in it for the money. And that has a completely different connotation with the American public.”


One day, Pogue could find himself among the men Blackwater marshals for what is perhaps its most controversial plan ever: the creation of a brigade-size armed force – about 1,700 troops – that could be deployed on “peacekeeping” or “stability” missions in world trouble spots, such as the Darfur region of Sudan.

Speaking at a special-operations conference in Amman in March, Blackwater Vice Chairman Cofer Black said the company has approached the United Nations and several African countries with the idea.

“I do believe there are situations where it is viable to use the commercial contractor option,” he said, arguing that a small private force would be a flexible, low-cost alternative to U.N. troops.

The idea found support in some quarters and raised alarm in others.

After interviewing Blackwater officials this spring, veteran news commentator Ted Koppel suggested that private military companies shoulder more of war.

In a May column in The New York Times, Koppel wrote that a “rent-a-force, harnessing the privilege of every putative warrior to hire himself out for more than he could ever make in the direct service of Uncle Sam, might relieve us of an array of current political pressures.”

Others worry where companies like Blackwater will draw the line. Peter Singer, a scholar at the Brookings Institution think tank, said that in the past, private military companies “have been hired to do everything from defending facilities and escorting convoys to protecting drug cartels and overthrowing governments.”

Indeed, there are no laws that dictate who Blackwater can work for, as long as the client isn’t involved in criminal activity or at war with the United States.

But Taylor said his company would only hire out for missions approved by the American government.

“If we went against the wishes of our government, we’d be blackballed,” he said. “We’d never get another U.S. contract.”

Taylor said Black’s remarks have been misunderstood: “We’ve never said we’ll be an army for hire to go fight somebody’s battles. We have never said that we would provide an offensive combat capability. It would be only defensive.”

That distinction is difficult, if not impossible, to draw, Singer countered.

“It’s not analytically honest,” he said. “No one in the military is defined as to whether they’re offensive or defensive. No weapon is offensive or defensive. The saying is, a weapon is offensive or defensive depending on which side of the gun barrel you’re facing.”

Singer offered an example. If a convoy bristling with machine guns came rumbling through the streets of Norfolk, he said, local residents would likely view it as offensive – regardless of the troops’ stated intentions.

“Often these companies will say, 'We only do defensive work, so that means that we’re somehow good,’” Singer said. “Basically what they’re trying to do is put a moral imprimatur on a business. Companies aren’t good or bad. They’re just companies. It’s how they operate that determines their moral standing.”

Unsavory activities by private warriors have prompted legislative action in several countries, most notably South Africa, where memories of the nation’s apartheid-era security forces are still fresh. Hearings were held by Parliament this spring on a tough new anti-mercenary bill that would prohibit South Africans from participating in armed conflict areas without the permission of their government.

Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, a Washington-based trade group of private military companies including Blackwater, flew to Johannesburg to speak against the bill, arguing that it would hobble peacekeeping operations around the world.

Several thousand South Africans are estimated to be working for security companies in Iraq.

“They don’t want to be considered criminals when they go home,” Brooks said.

Taylor distanced Blackwater from the kind of overt combat missions undertaken by companies like Executive Outcomes, a South African firm that was hired to put down insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.

“I don’t think you’ll ever see that again,” Taylor said. “The first thing we want to be is a tremendous deterrent. Our first goal is not to actively engage in live-fire exchanges.”

On the other hand, he added, “You can’t ask people to defend something and then penalize them for defending it well.”


There have never been easy answers in war. Questions about motives, money and morality litter battlefields, while people caught up in life-and-death struggles make split-second decisions.

Blackwater says it’s only filling a niche others can’t or choose not to. So, while the country wrestles with this new twist on an old way to wage war, Blackwater will keep plugging away – engaging critics, courting customers and hatching plans.

Every day brings a new challenge.

“We have a very long-term view to our work,” company founder Prince said in an e-mail interview. He said Blackwater wants to help transform the Defense Department into “a faster, more nimble organization.”

Company President Gary Jackson put it this way: “We have a dynamic business plan that is 20 years long, and it starts every day at zero-745” – 7:45 a.m. military time, when Blackwater’s daily staff meeting begins.

“We’re not going anywhere. Anybody that builds a 65,000-square-foot headquarters in the middle of the Dismal Swamp does not have an exit strategy.”


Reach Joanne Kimberlin at (757) 446-2338 or joanne.kimberlin@pilotonline.com.


Reach Bill Sizemore at (757) 446-2276 or bill.sizemore@pilotonline.com.


© 2006 HamptonRoads.com/PilotOnline.com

http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=108243&ran=48993

[Atlas]

IS Thomas "Pogue" a nom de guerre?:add09:

[keith]

IS Thomas "Pogue" a nom de guerre?:add09:

Any other company, and I would say yes, but this company loves attention. That's why most of the articles in this thread relate to Blackwater. They are a media whore, whereas many of the other companies are quite low profile. That's some of the criticism about them, everyone knows who they are, whereas other companies try and blend in and not be as conspicuous.

[keith]

We must fight our instinctive distaste for mercenaries

The Iraq bubble has burst but the need for private security companies will not go away. They should be regulated by the state

Max Hastings
Wednesday August 2, 2006
The Guardian


A recession is looming in a sector of the economy you may be barely conscious of, PSCs. Since 2003 private security companies have been a great British success story. Worldwide, but notably in Iraq, businesses founded by and employing ex-soldiers have coined it by providing armed protection.
An established company, Control Risks, saw its turnover soar fifteenfold after 2003 amid the huge demand for bodyguards. A host of new entrants, often set up overnight by a handful of old army mates, joined the market. Contractors charged around £600 per man per day, paid each SAS or Para veteran £400, and pocketed the difference. The British Foreign Office, American companies and foreign visitors were happy to write whatever cheques were demanded for experienced "close protection" types. Fortunes have been made.

Yet now the bubble is bursting. Pay rates are being slashed, and Iraqi ministries and businesses are seeking to give the work to their own nationals rather than foreigners. American contractors display increasing reluctance to employ British ex-soldiers rather than their own. Everybody agrees that times are getting harder. Some companies will soon go bust, and many people are being laid off.
I sense that many readers will have little sympathy for hired guns who make huge sums of money from stricken societies. Arming men to kill and be killed is among the most sensitive prerogatives of the state. To subcontract such functions to commercial enterprises seems inherently dangerous and pernicious. When these people hit the headlines, like Mark Thatcher's merry band who sought to stage a coup in Equatorial Guinea, it is usually because they have been caught doing ugly and reckless things.

Yet there is a growing belief in western governments that PSCs - and private military companies, which offer combat services - have a role to play that needs to be formalised.

Most national armies, including those of Britain and the US, are undermanned and overcommitted. A wide range of national interests overseas demand attention and protection that uniformed soldiers are not available to provide. The holes will increasingly be filled, believe some senior service officers and diplomats, by the private sector.

The big companies in Britain are making a heavy pitch for respectability and have formed the British Association of Private Security Companies. One of its members, Colonel Tim Spicer's Aegis, has just sponsored a pamphlet published by the Royal United Services Institute, setting out the trade's stall for the future. They are seeking government regulation, because they believe that only by formally accepting supervision can they break through the barrier of political and public scepticism.

"Private security operates in the gap between state will and state capability," declares the pamphlet, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies after Iraq, written by Aegis's Dominick Donald. He argues that such companies can operate in war zones with more freedom than national forces, partly because their casualties are less politically sensitive.

Unlike some American rivals, they do not currently seek to offer full combat services, but believe they can enter new fields such as intelligence collection and analysis; protection provision for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction; military training for the forces of governments Britain wishes to assist; and the provision of humanitarian assistance in areas where it is too dangerous for unarmed organisations such as Oxfam or Save the Children to operate.

It is hard to see an acceptable intelligence role for businesses. It seems far too risky to give non-government employees access to databases, or indeed to engage them at all in these sensitive activities. And my hair stood on end when I read of the US vice-president of the Blackwater Corporation telling a conference in Jordan this year that his firm is ready to market private armies for low-intensity conflicts, up to brigade strength.

But it seems almost inevitable that PSCs will become increasingly involved in the other functions mentioned above, because there is no one else to fulfil them. There are significant areas of the world where the staff of humanitarian NGOs dare not go. It is surely better for food and medical supplies to be delivered by PSCs than by nobody.

The media in Iraq and Afghanistan would be almost unable to function without personal protection. In my days as a foreign correspondent, in places such as Vietnam we despised colleagues who chose to carry weapons.

If I was working in Iraq today I still would not go armed, but I would not travel unless escorted by someone who was. Media coverage of that country, unsatisfactory as it is, would be almost impossible without PSC support. So many journalists are being killed in war zones that it would be foolish not to recognise that they, like NGO staff, need protection of a kind that national armies are often unwilling or unable to provide.

The government remains fearful of introducing the regulation of PSCs. Any notion of legitimising mercenaries is bound to cause trouble on the floor of the Commons, and once any company possesses a seal of approval from government the responsible Whitehall department will have to take the rap if it does something ghastly. It is tricky enough for the Ministry of Defence to explain the activities of erring soldiers without also becoming responsible for bands of armed civilian desperadoes.

There, I have lapsed into hostile cliche, which shows how deep the instinctive distaste for mercenaries runs in most of us. Yet I believe regulation must come, because the alternative is worse. For ministers to keep the private security companies at arm's length, to ignore them, is ridiculous when the US and British governments are paying them tens of millions of pounds a year for their services.

Since PSCs will continue to play a substantial role around the world even now that the Iraq gold seam is getting mined out, it seems far preferable to monitor and control their activities than to play ostriches. Britain's beloved Gurkhas, after all, are no more than mercenaries, as was every man of the old Indian Army.

It does not seem too hard to set parameters for security companies: protection and logistical support, humanitarian aid in war zones, training of Whitehall-approved overseas forces - yes. Active combat roles, intelligence and African coups - no. On those terms, we should recognise the uses of an ugly business.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1835067,00.html

[keith]

Pentagon watchdog favors civilian contracting corps
By Kristin Roberts
Wed Aug 2, 12:20 AM ET



The United States should create a reserve force of civilian contractors to be deployed for relief and rebuilding operations as needed, the government's independent inspector for Iraq reconstruction recommended on Wednesday.

In a report to Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen also said contractors with expertise in special reconstruction areas should be prequalified, to make the contracting process more effective.

The "Lessons Learned" report, the second of three such reports on U.S. reconstruction in Iraq, found early U.S. efforts involved many government agencies with overlapping jurisdictions.

"These agencies applied a variety of approaches to similar contracting and procurement requirements, resulting in methodologies and outcomes that occasionally came into conflict," the report said.

Bowen was expected to discuss the report's finding before a congressional panel on Wednesday morning.

The report detailed problems throughout phases of Iraq's reconstruction and within various groups charged with leading contracting and reconstruction efforts. That included the lack of qualified personnel based in Iraq, insufficient staffing within procurement offices and heavy rotation of personnel.

For example, the Disaster Assistance Response Team, part of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, included 65 people in the region, waiting to move into Iraq. But the team could not develop requirements for relief and reconstruction because it lacked information about the situation on the ground in Iraq, the report said.

"As this report reveals, the U.S. government was not systemically well-poised to provide the kind of contracting and procurement support needed at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq," the special inspector said.

The report recommended the government set up a deployable corps of contracting personnel, coordinated by the State Department as part of its civilian ready reserve corps. That group, trained in contracting standards, would "maximize contracting efficiency in a contingency environment," the special inspector said.

The U.S. government's contracting decisions have been repeatedly criticized and previous reports have uncovered many problems with procurement.

Deteriorating security in Iraq also complicated the contracting process by increasing costs and making it difficult for contractors to travel to work sites.

Democrat Sen. Joseph Lieberman (news, bio, voting record) of Connecticut, the top Democrat on the committee set to hear from the special inspector on Wednesday, said the report was "emblematic of the administration's mismanagement of the whole reconstruction effort."

"It did not plan for the reconstruction. It was slow to get contracting teams in place. And its oversight has been so lax that billions of dollars have been wasted through mismanagement or outright fraud," Lieberman said.

But the report said contracting and procurement efforts in Iraq had "substantially improved" over the course of the reconstruction program.




Copyright © 2006 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon.


Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060802/pl_nm/iraq_usa_contracts_dc_2

[keith]

It appears the marketplace maybe driving a parity between public and private.


SAS get 50% pay rise to halt quitters


DEFENCE chiefs have increased the pay of the SAS and other special forces by 50% in an attempt to cut defections to private military companies, writes Michael Smith.
The increases, recommended earlier this year by the armed forces pay review body, were seen as crucial when the special forces are stretched by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Security firms operating in Iraq and elsewhere are prepared to pay up to £100,000 a year for soldiers who have served in the Special Air Service or the SBS, its marine equivalent.

The increases have seen an SAS trooper’s salary rise from about £25,000 to just under £40,000, while a sergeant’s pay climbs from £32,000 to £50,000 and a major’s from £50,000 to £70,000.

Members of the SAS and SBS who have finished their 22 years’ service and would normally have to retire are being offered short-term contracts to stay on, one source said.

The new contracts to keep the “older, wiser heads” or bring them back, range from one to five years.

“A number of the guys who had left at the end of their 22 years have signed back on,” the source said. “They’re mainly senior NCOs and warrant officers whose experience is frankly invaluable.”

However, the increases may result in calls for pay parity for other frontline units such as the Parachute Regiment which are also seen as part of the elite.

The Ministry of Defence refused to comment, but one official confirmed that the special forces had been given significant pay increases as a result of the latest pay review.

He insisted that “their activities continue to be a strong draw for exceptional people”.


http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2300774,00.html

[keith]

More Locals Bound for Iraq
By fijivillage
Aug 7, 2006, 08:50


As Iraq stands on the verge of a civil war, we could soon see more Fiji citizens heading to the war torn region to work as security guards for private companies.

Speaking to Village News, Global Risk Strategies local agent, Sakiusa Raivoce, revealed that their company has put in a bid to secure more contracts as the demand for Fiji security guards increases.

Raivoce added that locals could also be heading to work in Lebanon as private security guards, as violence escalates in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, military spokesperson, Major Neumi Leweni, has confirmed that they are putting together all the logistics to ensure the RFMF is in a position to lend a hand if the United Nations seeks its assistance.

http://www.fijivillage.com/artman/publish/article_31615.shtml

[keith]

Australian injured in Iraq blast
August 07, 2006 04:38pm
Article from: Font size: + -
Send this article: Print Email
AN Australian security contractor has been seriously wounded in a bomb blast in Iraq.

The 34-year-old Queensland man was injured when a roadside bomb exploded early on August 3, about 45km northeast of Baghdad, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) said.

"He's been quite badly injured in a roadside blast," Mr Downer said on Sky News.

The man's name is yet to be released.

The Department of Foreign Affairs said earlier today the 34-year-old man had been evacuated from Iraq after being injured in the roadside blast about 45km north-east of Baghdad on August 3.

"His situation is very serious," Mr Downer said.

"Two other people were killed at the same time, he's been very badly burnt.

"He comes originally from Melbourne, has been living in Townsville and he's been working for a security contractor in Iraq."

Two Iraqi citizens were killed in the same blast, a DFAT spokesman said.

"Consular officials in Australia are providing assistance to the man's family and embassy officials are working closely with the man's employer," the spokesman said.

The injured man had been evacuated from Iraq for medical treatment, the DFAT spokesman said.

The man's condition was still listed as serious, he said.

The department would not yet say which company the man was working for or where he was being treated for his injuries.

It was unclear how many Australians were working in Iraq as private security guards as most did not register with the Australian embassy there, a spokeswoman said.

But other counts have estimated that there are more than 20,000 - and possibly up to 30,000 - currently employed there, reportedly making private contractors the second largest security force in Iraq, behind the US deployment.

The contractors are mostly former military personnel, working for dozens of companies operating in Iraq, who are rewarded with lucrative contracts for the heightened danger they face there.

Attacks against them are common. One count said more than 340 had been killed and many more injured, but precise figures were difficult to ascertain.

In June, Wayne Schultz, another Queenslander working as a contractor in Iraq, was killed in a roadside bomb attack north of Baghdad.

- with AAP

http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,20042695-421,00.html

[keith]

Leon accuses ANC of sabotage
11/08/2006 15:26 - (SA)

ANC told to 'come clean'

ANC turns on fat-cat comrades

Zuma slams ANC infighting

Mbeki: ANC failing SA

'SACP must quit ANC'

Cape Town - Democratic Alliance leader Tony Leon on Friday accused the ANC of deliberate sabotage of the parliamentary process, resulting in President Thabo Mbeki's Africa policy being undermined.

Writing in his weekly newsletter on the DA website, Leon said National Assembly defence committee chair Thandi Tobias had orchestrated the passage of the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill through her committee.

While nobody wanted mercenary activity to be tolerated, this legislation was so obviously flawed that it even drew criticism from Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota himself when tabled last year.

Lekota went so far as to urge the committee to help the defence department produce a law in keeping with the Constitution.

"While an amended and somewhat improved version of the bill was put before the... committee during the course of last week, the process which was to follow was nothing more than a carefully orchestrated sham led by committee chair Thandi Tobias," Leon said.

Make criminals of law-abiding citizen

She had allowed members to make extensive inputs on the bill, including DA MP Roy Jankielsohn, who suggested a series of important amendments that would have tightened a number of vague definitions and made the legislation comply with the Constitution and accepted international law.

"At every turn Tobias gave the impression that a number of these amendments were agreed to and that they would be reflected in the revised version of the bill."

However, after a week of discussion and input, many of the proposed amendments and suggestions, including those from Jankielsohn and outside experts, were simply ignored - bar some selective tinkering with the bill.

"The end result of the ANC's deliberate sabotage of the parliamentary process is that we are now left with a piece of legislation which is not only possibly unconstitutional, but could also lead to a number of perverse consequences," Leon said.

When tabling the bill, Lekota admitted it was motivated by government's desire to stop South Africans working in places such as Iraq.

However, in his desire to achieve this outcome, it appeared Lekota and his ANC colleagues had thrown the baby out with the bathwater.

The bill would essentially criminalise South Africans' ability to earn a living, negatively impact on peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, and therefore ultimately undermine President Thabo Mbeki's Africa policy.

Furthermore, by in effect making criminals of law-abiding citizens, government would force the return of thousands of highly-trained military personnel - people who would have every reason to feel disenchanted with the treatment afforded them by their government.

This could pose a very real security threat to the nation.

The bill also placed too much authority and discretionary power in the hands of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and its chairman, Provincial and Local Government Minister Sydney Mufamadi.

It required individuals wanting to serve in foreign armed forces, or private security companies to seek authorisation from the NCACC.

http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_1981404,00.html

[keith]

New Security Company is Born

The New Times (Kigali)
NEWS
August 13, 2006
Posted to the web August 14, 2006

By Dan Ngabonziza
Kigali

A new security company, Top Sec International, has sprung into existence, joining several others already established in the market. This makes the total of the major security companies operating in Rwanda seven. Briefing the new guards who were fresh from a month's training, the company's board chairman, Colonel (rtd) Twahirwa Louis Dodo, cautioned on high level discipline, without which he said the image of the new company would be at stake.

"You are the pioneers of this company and therefore you are expected to be exemplary. You should set precedence for those who will come after you. You should take working ethics seriously working," he said.

The first group was composed of 45 guards, four of whom are female. Clad in their new cream full security uniforms and black jungle boots, the guards listened attentively as their boss lectured them on the significance of discipline -- especially when it comes to the security sector.

"Most of you have a military background; you served with the RDF at one time or another. You all know very well how disciplined and vigilant the RDF is. We want you to emulate them and, like them, we shall be called upon at one time to serve in Darfur, Iraq or even Lebanon. Why not?" Dodo said.

He told them that they were going to work for an international company and they should be ready to go for service beyond Rwandan borders.

"Rwandans are naturally brilliant and diligent. When Rwandans were still living in exile, they used to be good performers at school. Among the top three students in every school, there used to be at least two Rwandans," Dodo said, but cautioned that once a brilliant person goes astray, he goes to the extreme. "When a doctor becomes a drunkard, he drinks until he becomes hopeless, forgetting his profession," he said, cautioning the new guards to desist from such indiscipline tendencies like getting drunk on the job.

The retired colonel also informed the new guards that there was neck-tight competition in the market, but told them that it was upon them to win for themselves a portion of the market, if not a bigger portion.

"If your performance wins you credibility from the clients, which will mean that our guards will be more popular than the rest in the market. It will not be to the benefit to the company alone but also yourselves because you will get more money and manage to look after your families," Dodo said. He told them that they will have to undergo refresher courses every after 6 months to keep them updated and in good shape.

According to the new company's Managing Director, Didace Gahigi, the guards have undergone sophisticated and rigorous training in various aspects of security. Hinting that the guards were the best on the market, he said that the company's criterion for recruiting guards was unique and foolproof, which would make them prevail in the private security market.

"To be recruited by us as a guard, first of all you have to be Rwandan, physically and mentally on form, have at least O-level education, be able to speak English or French fluently, and be between 21 and 39 years old," Gahigi explained, adding that the aspiring guards should also have a certificate of good conduct from local authorities.

Among other things, the guards were trained in guarding and patrolling, observation and search techniques, explosives, bombs and firearms, terrorism and surveillance, basic fire fighting and prevention, and HIV/Aids awareness.

The company is a brainchild of Col. (rtd) Dodo and Fred Nyamurangwa, also a former RDF senior officer who is now a renowned evangelist.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2006 The New Times. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com).

http://allafrica.com/stories/200608140543.html

[keith]

Eye on the war zone
It takes a person grounded in business and family to help keep military unmanned drones flying.
BY CHRIS FLORES
247-4738
August 15, 2006

NEWPORT NEWS -- Like many retired military members in Hampton Roads, Bob Fitzgerald took plenty of experience into the private sector when he left the military.

But the only business experience the 22-year Air Force veteran had was some theory he picked up in classes he took when he obtained a master's degree in information systems.

"Like most people getting out of the Air Force, I had the deer-in-the-headlights look," said Fitzgerald, who finished his career at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton.

He also had knowledge of how the Air Force operates unmanned planes that gather intelligence in war zones. It only took a couple of years in the private sector before he put together UAV Communications, a niche defense contractor that now has 25 employees.

UAV, which stands for unmanned aerial vehicle, helps set up and maintain the system the Air Force uses to transmit UAV data. The company works largely at Langley and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, two main locations that are used to fly the UAVs and analyze the data they collect.

Fitzgerald attributes the firm's success to finding a niche and benefiting from good mentors and smart employees. He also said it was key to have frank discussions with his family about going from the comfort of a guaranteed paycheck to the risk of ownership.

"The idea of not having a job is very daunting," Fitzgerald said of the constant possibility of losing contracts.

But UAV has found plenty of work since its founding in 2003. The company won a $3 million contract last week with the California Air National Guard to help it set up a UAV system. About half of UAV's work is contracting, and the other half is subcontracting from larger firms.

Because Fitzgerald served in the military, UAV is certified by the federal Small Business Administration as an 8(a) veteran-owned company. The government requires that a certain amount of contracts go to these companies, which can get so-called sole-source defense contracts more easily than large firms.

"It's a faster streamlined process," said Fitzgerald. "We've gotten a couple of large contracts that way."

Fitzgerald said he is lucky that his first post-military employer helped him get started. The company allowed Fitzgerald to start his own business as a subcontractor to them with a promise he could have his old job back if it didn't work out.

But the timing was perfect. UAV helped the military make a key shift in 2003, when the armed forces shifted pilots from the ground in Iraq to air bases in the United States. The pictures collected from the plane must be sent instantly to the United States and back to the front lines.

The intelligence officers at Langley have been involved in warning troops in Iraq that a roadside bomb or insurgents are nearby. UAV plays a key role in making sure the security, picture clarity and speed of transmission of the reconnaissance signal is as perfect as possible.

UAV has branched out to do government computer and wireless system networking jobs other than the unmanned planes, but still does all of its work under government contracts. Fitzgerald said he isn't worried that defense work will dry up, leaving the firm vulnerable.

"Unmanned aerial vehicles is one of the last growth industries in the Department of Defense," said Fitzgerald.

http://www.dailypress.com/business/local/dp-00338sy0aug15,0,5441672.story?coll=dp-business-localheads

[keith]

CIA contractor guilty in Afghan prisoner beating


A former CIA contractor was found guilty on Thursday of assaulting an Afghan prisoner who later died in a case that raised questions about the treatment of detainees by U.S. interrogators.

David Passaro, a former Special Forces medic, was convicted on one felony charge of assault causing serious injury, and three misdemeanor charges of simple assault. He was the first civilian to be charged with abusing a detainee in the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060817/ts_nm/afghan_usa_cia_dc_1

[keith]

S.Africa mercenary ban spurs security fears
Thu 17 Aug 2006 5:09 AM ET
By Gordon Bell

CAPE TOWN, Aug 17 (Reuters) - South Africa is pressing ahead with a law to ban mercenaries, clouding the prospects of thousands of South Africans now fighting for foreign armies or working for security companies in Iraq.

The government wants to stop civilians and former soldiers from fighting or offering security in armed conflicts after South Africans were involved in several attempted coups and conflicts in African states.

But critics say the draft law will have far-reaching consequences for South African soldiers fighting for legitimate foreign forces as well as for ex-soldiers providing security services in conflict areas such as Iraq.

The International Peace Operations Association, a Washington D.C.-based group which represents private security companies, has gone so far as to call the proposed legislation "a threat to the peace and stability industry worldwide."

The bill, passed by the African National Congress-dominated parliamentary defence committee this week, outlaws mercenary activity and allows the government to declare certain conflicts prohibited to all South African citizens.

It is expected to pass easily through parliament, where the ANC holds a two-thirds majority.

Military analysts say the proposed law could put a quick end to most South African involvement in overseas conflicts.

"No military will employ someone who can't be deployed in an armed conflict," said Len le Roux, analyst at South Africa's Institute for Security Studies. "In my mind it is a de facto way of saying no military must employ this person."

South Africans will need permission to serve in foreign armies or lose their South African citizenship, and may not be sent into combat, he said.

It will also become illegal for South Africans to work in countries like Iraq should the government declare the region a regulated area.



HIGH PAID SECURITY

About 2,000 South Africans, many trained as soldiers in the apartheid-era military force, are believed to be working in the security sector in Iraq.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has estimated that at least 4,000 South Africans are employed in conflict areas around the world, but the actual number may be closer to 20,000.

Paul Boateng, Britain's High Commissioner to South Africa, appealed to lawmakers to amend provisions that would impact on about 800 South African ex-soldiers who have joined the British military.

The final version of the bill deletes a contentious phrase which would have allowed South Africans to fight in "liberation struggles", but some opposition parties say the bill remains discriminatory and may be unconstitutional.

"Nobody can follow a career under circumstances such as these," Freedom Front MP Pieter Groenewald said.

Rights group Amnesty International has argued an outright ban on South African involvement in foreign wars could be counterproductive.

"South Africans bring crucial skills and capabilities, the knowledge of how best to mitigate human suffering in conflict and post-conflict environments ... making them invaluable components in successful international peace and stability operations," the group said in its submission on the bill.





© Reuters 2006. All Rights Reserved.

http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L16396423

[keith]

GAO: Security contracts don't violate ban on quasi-military forces
By Jenny Mandel
jmandel@govexec.com

The Government Accountability Office ruled last week that two Army solicitations for cargo transportation and security services in Iraq do not run afoul of governmentwide restrictions on the use of quasi-military armed forces for hire.


The agency denied bid protests filed in response to two Army requests for proposals issued in May and June. One required the contractor to provide security escorts for cargo convoys, with specifications for the number of armed escort vehicles to be provided per truck escorted.


The other asked the contractor to propose labor, weapons and equipment for internal security operations at the Victory Base Complex in Iraq, including providing armed escorts for Iraqi laborers. It also specified that the contractor would "repel and control" destructive activity targeting the base.


The protests were brought by Brian Scott, an individual who said he could have provided the specified services if the contested portions of the RFPs were not included. Scott argued that some aspects of the proposal requests would require contractor personnel to engage in combat operations, and would thus violate the 1892 Anti-Pinkerton Act and Defense Department regulations.


The Anti-Pinkerton Act was passed against a backdrop of labor protests, when various entities were hiring companies such as the Pinkerton Detective Agency to disrupt or harass labor organizers. It prevents the federal government from using those tactics by legislating that "an individual employed by the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar organization, may not be employed by the government of the United States."


GAO wrote that in 1978, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to mean that an organization was similar to the Pinkerton Detective Agency if it offered for hire the services of "mercenary, quasi-military forces as strikebreakers and armed guards."


The court declined to define the term "quasi-military forces," GAO noted in a 1978 memo to federal agency heads on the decision. But, GAO wrote, "it seems clear that a company which provides guard or protective services does not thereby become a 'quasi-military armed force.'"


In the recent cases, the protester proposed to define that term as "private sector contractors that are hired by the U.S. government to engage in or be prepared to engage in offensive or defensive combat." But GAO rejected that proposal as unrelated to any statutory or regulatory definition.


Noting that provisions in the statements of work would require the contractor to summon support in case of any attack, and that the base security contract explicitly bars the contractor from involvement in offensive operations, GAO concluded that the contracts did not require offering "quasi-military forces as strikebreakers" and thus would not violate the act.


With respect to Defense Department regulations, GAO rejected the protester's argument. It cited a passage in Instruction 3020, on contractor personnel accompanying the U.S. armed forces, which specifies that contractors operating near major combat operations can be authorized to guard military supply routes, facilities, personnel or property.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0806/082306m1.htm

[keith]

A corporate takeover of American borders

By Robert Koulish
August 21, 2006


Borders are a key element of national identity. When borders are violated, the result is often crisis and war. Look no further than this summer's conflict in the Middle East, set off by a cross-border kidnapping of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah militants. Protection and defense of borders is, for most nations, a high priority.

Thus, it is troubling to see our government intent upon passing control over its borders to private companies.

Immigration control is a fundamental exercise of sovereignty, and sovereign powers are considered almost inviolable. As a legacy of its plenary powers over immigration, Congress has enacted some of this country's most racist and arbitrary policies, which the Supreme Court has never struck down. Examples include Chinese exclusion, national origins restrictions and expedited removals.

Turning over immigration powers to private companies further endangers democracy. Immigration policy, programs and current proposals are replete with references to privatization - enforcement, detention, inspections and services - that would place the fate of potential immigrants in the hands of private mercenaries and military contractors.

The Customs and Border Protection's Expedited Removal Program has contracted with Halliburton to oversee the expansion of the federal government's capacity to detain immigrants. Rep. Mike Pence, an Indiana Republican, has proposed deploying private "Ellis Island Centers" in foreign countries for the purpose of recruiting and managing guest workers.

Privatization, a neoliberal trend begun in the 1970s, means policy is driven by profit-seeking. During the early 1980s, the federal government began experimenting with incarcerating people for profit, using immigrant detention as its canary in the coal mine. In 1984, the Corrections Corporation of America, the private-incarceration leader, cut its first deal with the federal government to operate Immigration and Naturalization Service detention centers in Houston and Laredo, Texas. Since then, private incarceration has become a boom industry as well as a lightning rod for credible human-rights abuse litigation.

U.S.-Mexico border control is also being privatized. After more than a decade of border militarization with "Operation Gatekeeper" and "Operation Hold the Line," the deployment of the National Guard and plans for 700 miles of fencing, in May the government solicited bids from military contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Ericsson and Northrop Grumman for a multibillion-dollar contract to build a "virtual fence" of unmanned aerial vehicles, ground surveillance satellites and motion-detection video equipment along the border. With final awarding of the Secure Border Initiative Network set for September, the arrival of military contractors at the border is imminent.

Add Blackwater Inc., a private security firm that has run mercenaries in Iraq and New Orleans, and is negotiating a contract to train U.S. Border Patrol officers, and you get a virtual fence that has guns for hire welcoming newcomers at ports of entry.

Military contractors and private mercenaries as immigration policymakers represent a foreboding prospect for any democracy.

Another issue is the use of technologies of power to help manage a cheap postindustrial labor force. Guest worker proposals are helping to frame immigration within a neoliberal trade context, which opens another door to privatized control.

For example, Mode 4 of the recent proposed General Agreement on Trade in Services, negotiated in the World Trade Organization, would accomplish what the North American Free Trade Agreement couldn't achieve, reducing migrant workers to the status of commodities.

Mode 4 would hasten the demise of Human-rights protections for border crossers, while the Senate's guest-worker provision would help make Mode 4 binding on domestic policy. As an outcome, guest-worker provisions would expedite the movement of temporary workers, secure private "bantustans" for border crossers in northern Mexico, and control guest-worker populations in this country while further marginalizing efforts by NGOs to hold the process accountable.

Finally, guest-worker policies would provide additional opportunities for the security-industrial complex at the border. With CCA, Blackwater, Lockheed Martin and others as gatekeepers, guest workers would come face to face with law-and-order activities twice removed from public scrutiny.

The looming presence of "virtual" technologies, mercenaries and military contractors as front-line defenders for U.S. sovereignty is cause for alarm well beyond the potential for individual human rights violations. It suggests this country's "deciders" are less interested in physical border fences that would harm trade and impede the flow of cheap labor than in securing a system of "virtual fence" and paramilitary strategies that would facilitate wholesale control over migrants in the name of profit.



Robert Koulish is a political scientist and France-Merrick professor of service learning at Goucher College. His e-mail is rkoulish@goucher.edu.
Copyright © 2006, The Baltimore Sun | Get Sun home delivery

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http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.borders21aug21,0,1798499.story?coll=bal-oped-headlines

[keith]

SOUTH AFRICA: Anti-mercenary bill will hamper humanitarian work
24 Aug 2006 17:55:19 GMT
Source: IRIN

JOHANNESBURG , 24 August (IRIN) - South Africa is poised to toughen already stringent laws against citizens serving as mercenaries in foreign wars and conflicts, but critics say the new legislation cuts too deeply and will hamper legitimate humanitarian operations.

The Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill will ban South Africans not serving in the domestic armed forces from participating in foreign wars in any capacity, whether they serve as soldiers or work for private companies as pilots or security personnel.

If ratified, the bill drafted by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party could affect the thousands of South Africans working in security across Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq.

While few dispute the propriety of banning mercenary activity, critics of the new laws, including rights group Amnesty International, say the government has failed to make some important distinctions.

"The bill's definitions of 'assistance' and 'service' are vague and could limit legitimate security operations, or the activities of operations like the Red Cross or even our own operations," said Olajobi Makinwa, executive director of Amnesty International in South Africa.

"We welcome anything that will make mercenary activity accountable, but South Africans can bring crucial skills to people suffering in conflict regions where peacekeeping and stability services are needed and necessary," she said.

South Africa's long history of border wars and apartheid and post-apartheid violence has left it with an abundance of competent soldiers, most trained in the use of advanced weaponry. Many have quit the military, some leaving elite units, to seek their fortunes with private security firms.

Military analysts estimate about 700 South Africans are serving with the British armed forces, and anywhere from 2,000 to 4,000 are believed to be employed by private firms based in Iraq, where they use their soldiering and technical skills to protect lives and property.

In 1998 parliament passed the Foreign Military Assistance Act, banning citizens or South African residents from serving in foreign conflicts unless they were involved in humanitarian operations. The law aimed to bury the country's embarrassing reputation of sending hired guns to places like Angola, Sudan, the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

But the fallout from the failed 2004 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, in which dozens of South Africans were implicated alongside the son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, prompted lawmakers to get even tougher with mercenaries.

The new law passing through parliament would force South Africans to give up their citizenship if they wished to serve with a foreign military.

Len Le Roux, an analyst at South Africa's Institute for Security Studies (ISS), says the new legislation fails to clearly distinguish between "mercenary activities" and "security activities".

"We fully support the main intent of the bill to ban mercenaries, but it includes certain activities, such as private security and South Africans serving in foreign armed forces. We ask, 'Why are these activities mixed into this bill?'" le Roux said. "Is a South African serving in the British army a mercenary? One wouldn't ordinarily think so. The bill is prohibiting legal activities, and that is why we think it has gone too far."

Even Britain has appealed to South Africa to soften the legislation to allow the hundreds of South Africans serving with its armed forces to continue to do so, and an American think-tank has warned of the potential dangers the bill poses to other African governments.

"The main impact of the draft legislation ... Will hit governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian interventions in Africa, in which South Africans bring unique skill sets and advantages," said Stratfor, an American think-tank that analyses international affairs, on its website. "Banning South African military activity in these cases (counterinsurgency, specialised training and helicopter piloting) effectively harms the legitimate security interests of African governments."

The anti-mercenary bill has already passed through a parliamentary sub-committee on defence and is awaiting approval by parliament, which is dominated by the ANC party, and is expected to pass easily.

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/490abf3eeedad5e31f92b059a68f4caf.htm

[keith]

UN Probes Honduran Militia in Iraq

Tegucigalpa, Aug 25 (Prensa Latina) The UN Human Rights Commission launched a probe on alleged government consent in training and sending hundreds of Honduran mercenaries to Iraq.


Private security companies like Your Solutions enrolled these men in several Central American countries for the alleged reconstruction and guarding of government and civilian installations in Iraq.



The UNHRC is striving to establish official involvement in the enlisting and training of Hondurans sent to Iraq in 2005.



UNHRC Team Chief Amanda Benavides termed these activities a threat for peace and security in developing countries.



Benavides added that private military and security companies like Your Solutions also operate in developed countries with a 25,000 member troop that stands as the second occupation force in Iraq.



The US Treasury revealed that these companies have landed 766 million dollars plus contracts since 2003 to ruthlessly recruit mercenaries with thousands of dollars in daily salaries.



These firms are also blamed with fraud and clashes with US occupation forces.



sus/emw/alc/mf

http://www.plenglish.com/article.asp?ID=%7B0E31D214-830A-4FD2-95ED-DB9C8201403D%7D)&language=EN

[keith]

The 10 Most Brazen War Profiteers

By Charlie Cray, AlterNet. Posted September 5, 2006.


The history of American war profiteering is rife with egregious examples of incompetence, fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement, bribery and misconduct. As war historian Stuart Brandes has suggested, each new war is infected with new forms of war profiteering. Iraq is no exception. From criminal mismanagement of Iraq's oil revenues to armed private security contractors operating with virtual impunity, this war has created opportunities for an appalling amount of corruption. What follows is a list of some of the worst Iraq war profiteers who have bilked American taxpayers and undermined the military's mission.

No. 1 and No. 2: CACI and Titan

In early 2005 CIA officials told the Washington Post that at least 50 percent of its estimated $40 billion budget for that year would go to private contractors, an astonishing figure that suggests that concerns raised about outsourcing intelligence have barely registered at the policymaking levels.

In 2004 the Orlando Sentinel reported on a case that illustrates what can go wrong: Titan employee Ahmed Fathy Mehalba, an Egyptian translator, was arrested for possessing classified information from the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.

Critics say that the abuses at Abu Ghraib are another example of how the lines can get blurred when contractors are involved in intelligence work. CACI provided a total of 36 interrogators in Iraq, including up to 10 at Abu Ghraib at any one time, according to the company. Although neither CACI, Titan or their employees have yet been charged with a crime, a leaked Army investigation implicated CACI employee Stephen Stefanowicz in the abuse of prisoners.

CACI and Titan's role at Abu Ghraib led the Center for Constitutional Rights to pursue companies and their employees in U.S. courts.

"We believe that CACI and Titan engaged in a conspiracy to torture and abuse detainees, and did so to make more money," says Susan Burke, an attorney hired by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), whose lawsuit against the companies is proceeding into discovery before the Federal Court for the District of Columbia.

The private suits seem to have already had some effect: In September 2005 CACI announced that it would no longer do interrogation work in Iraq.

Titan, on the other hand, has so far escaped any serious consequences for its problems (in early 2005, it pleaded guilty to three felony international bribery charges and agreed to pay a record $28.5 million Foreign Corrupt Practices Act penalty). The company's contract with the Army has been extended numerous times and is currently worth over $1 billion. Last year L-3 Communications bought Titan as part of its emergence as the largest corporate intelligence conglomerate in the world.

No. 3: Bechtel: precast profits

The San Francisco-based construction and engineering giant received one of the largest no-bid contracts -- worth $2.4 billion -- to help coordinate and rebuild a large part of Iraq's infrastructure. But the company's reconstruction failures range from shoddy school repairs to failing to finish a large hospital in Basra on time and within budget.

Recall that USAID chief Andrew Natsios originally touted the reconstruction as a Middle Eastern "Marshall Plan." Natsios should have known that all would not go smoothly with Bechtel in the lead: Prior to joining the Bush administration, he was chief executive of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, where he oversaw the Big Dig -- whose costs exploded from $2.6 billion to $14.6 billion under Bechtel's lead.

In July, the company's reputation for getting things done unexpectedly plummeted like a 12-ton slab of concrete when Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), released an audit of the Basra Children's Hospital Project, which was $70 million to $90 million over budget, and a year and half behind schedule. Bechtel's contract to coordinate the project was immediately cancelled.

Now that the money is running out, American officials are beginning to blame Iraqis for mismanaging their own infrastructure. But as Bowen warns, contractors like Bechtel, the CPA and other contracting agencies will only have themselves to blame for failing to train Iraqi engineers to operate these facilities (esp. water, sewage and electricity) when they leave.

No. 4: Aegis Defense Services

The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates 48,000 private security and military contractors (PMCs) are stationed in Iraq. The Pentagon's insistence on keeping a lid on military force requirements (thereby avoiding the need for a draft) is one reason for that astronomical growth, which has boosted the fortunes of the "corporate warriors" so much that observers project the industry will be a $200 billion per year business by 2010.

Yet the introduction of PMCs has put "both the military and security providers at a greater risk for injury," the General Accounting Office says, because PMCs fall outside the chain of command and do not operate under the Code of Military Justice.

George Washington University professor Deborah Avant, author of Market for Force and an expert on the industry, says that while established PMCs may act professionally, the government's willingness to contract with a few cowboy companies like Aegis -- a U.K.-based firm whose infamous founder and CEO Tim Spicer was implicated for breaking an arms embargo in Sierra Leone -- only reinforces the fear that U.S. foreign policy is being outsourced to corporate "mercenaries."

An industry insider told Avant that the $293 million contract was given despite the fact that American competitors had submitted lower bids, suggesting the government wanted to hire the foreign company to shield both sides of the transaction from accountability for any "dirty tricks."

Industry critics, including Rep. Jan Schakowsky, D-Ill., say that, at a minimum, Spicer's contract suggests that government agencies have failed to conduct adequate background checks. While it's hard to say how often PMCs have committed human rights violations in Iraq, the Charlotte News-Observer reported in March that security contractors regularly shoot into civilian cars. The problem was largely ignored until a "trophy video" of security guards firing with automatic rifles at civilian cars was posted on a web site traced back to Aegis.

Although the Army's Criminal Investigation Division says no charges will be filed against Aegis or its employees, critics say that only proves how unaccountable contractors are under current laws. Since the war on terror began, just one civilian, CIA contract interrogator David A. Passaro, has been convicted for felony assault associated with interrogation tactics.

Even The International Peace Operations Association, a fledgling industry trade association that insists the industry abides by stringent codes of conduct has rejected Aegis' bid to join its ranks.

No. 5: Custer Battles

In March, Custer Battles became the first Iraq occupation contractor to be found guilty of fraud. A jury ordered the company to pay more than $10 million in damages for 37 counts of fraud, including false billing. In August, however, the judge in the case dismissed most of the charges on a technicality, ruling that since the Coalition Provisional Authority was not strictly part of the U.S. government, there is no basis for the claim under U.S. law. Custer Battles' attorney Robert Rhoad says the company's owners were "ecstatic" about the decision, adding that "there simply was no evidence of fraud or an intent to defraud."

In fact the judge's ruling stated that the company had submitted "false and fraudulently inflated invoices." He also allowed the jury's verdict to stand against the company for retaliating against the whistleblowers that originally brought the case under the False Claims Act, the law that allows citizens to initiate a private right of action to recover money on taxpayers' behalf. During the trial, retired Brig. Gen. Hugh Tant III testified that the fraud "was probably the worst I've ever seen in my 30 years in the Army."

When Tant confronted Mike Battles, one of the company's owners, with the fact that 34 of 36 trucks supplied by the firm didn't work, he responded: "You asked for trucks and we complied with our contract and it is immaterial whether the trucks were operational."

The Custer Battles case is being watched closely by the contracting community, since many other fraud cases could hinge on the outcome. A backlog of 70 fraud cases is pending against various contractors. Who they are is anyone's guess (one case was recently settled against Halliburton subcontractor EGL for $4 million), since cases filed under the False Claims Act are sealed and prevented from moving forward until the government decides whether or not it will join the case. The means some companies accused of fraud have yet to be publicly identified, which makes it difficult for federal contracting officers to suspend or debar them from any new contracts. The U.S. Air Force moved to suspend Custer Battles from new contracts in September 2004, after the alleged fraud was revealed.

In May, however, the Wall Street Journal reported that attempts were made to bypass the suspension order by two former top Navy officials who had formed a company that purchased the remnants of Custer Battles. Meanwhile, Alan Grayson, the attorney who filed the Custer Battles case, says that because of orders passed by the CPA, Iraqis have no chance of recovering any of the $20 billion in Iraqi money used to pay U.S. contractors. The CPA effectively created a "free fraud zone," Grayson says.

No. 6: General Dynamics

Most of the big defense contractors have done well as a result of the war on terror. The five-year chart for Lockheed Martin, for instance, reveals that the company's stock has doubled in value since 2001.

Yet The Washington Post reported in July that industry analysts agree that of the large defense contractors, the one that has received the most direct benefit from the war in Iraq is General Dynamics. Much of that has to do with the fact that the company has focused its large combat systems business on supplying the Army with everything from bullets to tank shells to Stryker vehicles, which made their debut during the 2003 invasion.

In July, the Post reported that the company's profits have tripled since 9/11. That should make some people happy, including David K Heebner, a former top aide to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, who was hired by General Dynamics in 1999, a year before the Stryker contract was sealed. According to Defense watchdogs at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), General Dynamics formally announced it was hiring Heebner on November 20, 1999, just one month after Shinseki announced a new "vision" to transform the Army by moving away from tracked armored vehicles toward wheeled light-armored vehicles, and more than a month prior to Heebner's official retirement date of Dec. 31, 1999.

Less than a year and a half later, Heebner was present for the rollout of the first Stryker in Alabama, where he was recognized by Shinseki for his work in the Army on the Stryker project.

Although the Pentagon's inspector general concluded from a preliminary investigation that Heebner had properly recused himself from any involvement in projects involving his prospective employer once he had been offered the job, critics say the current ethics rules are too weak.

"It's clear that the Army was leaning toward handing a multibillion-dollar contract to General Dynamics at the very time Heebner may have been in negotiations with the company for a high-paying executive position," says Jeffrey St. Clair, author of Grand Theft Pentagon, a sweeping review of war-profiteering during the "war on terror."

Heebner's case is similar to Boeing's infamous courtship of Darlene Druyan, the Air Force acquisition officer who was eventually sentenced to nine months in prison and seven months in a halfway house for arranging a $250,000 a year job for herself on the other side of the revolving door while negotiating contracts for the Air Force that were favorable to Boeing.

This March, Heebner reported owning 33,500 shares in the company, worth over $ 4 million, along with 21,050 options.

Not everyone has been happy with the outcome of the Stryker contract. Tom Christie, the Pentagon's director of operational testing and evaluation, sent a classified letter to Donald Rumsfeld before it was deployed in Iraq, warning that the $3 million vehicle was not ready for heavy fire. Meanwhile, the GAO warned of serious deficiencies in vehicle training provided, a concern that turned serious when soldiers accidentally drove the Stryker into the Tigris rivers. Despite public praise from top Army officials, an internal Army report leaked to the Post in March 2005 revealed that the vehicles deployed in Iraq have been plagued with inoperable gear and maintenance problems that are "getting worse not better."

Perhaps as insurance against any flap, General Dynamics has added former Attorney General John Ashcroft to its stable of high-powered lobbyists. Working the account are Juleanna Glover Weiss, Vice President Dick Cheney's former press secretary, Lori Day Sharp, Ashcroft's former assistant, and Willie Gaynor, a former Commerce Department official who also worked for the 2004 Bush-Cheney reelection campaign.

No. 7: Nour USA Ltd.

Incorporated shortly after the war began, Nour has received $400 million in Iraq contracts, including an $80 million contract to provide oil pipeline security that critics say came through the assistance of Ahmed Chalabi, Iraq's No. 1 opportunist, who was influential in dragging the United States into the current quagmire with misleading assertions about WMDs. Chalabi has denied reports that he received a $2 million finder's fee, but other bidders on the contract point out that Nour had no prior related experience and that its bid on the oil security contract was too low to be credible. Another company consultant who hasn't denied getting paid to help out is William Cohen, the former defense secretary under President Clinton. Many Iraqis now believe that Chalabi is America's hand-picked choice to rule Iraq, despite being a wanted fugitive from justice in Jordan and despite being accused of passing classified information along to Iran. Iyad Allawi, a potential rival for power in Iraq, has publicly criticized Chalabi for creating contracts for work that he says should be the responsibility of the state.

No. 8, No. 9 and No. 10: Chevron, ExxonMobil and the Petro-imperialists

Three years into the occupation, after an evolving series of deft legal maneuvers and manipulative political appointments, the oil giants' takeover of Iraq's oil is nearly complete.

A key milestone in the process occurred in September 2004, when U.S.-appointed Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi preempted Iraq's January 2005 elections (and the subsequent drafting of the Constitution) by writing guidelines intended to form the basis of a new petroleum law. Allawi's policy would effectively exclude the government from any future involvement in oil production, while promising to privatize the Iraqi National Oil Co. Although Allawi is no longer in power, his plans heavily influenced future thinking on oil policy.

Helping the process move along are the economic hit men at BearingPoint, the consultants whose latest contract calls for "private-sector involvement in strategic sectors, including privatization, asset sales, concessions, leases and management contracts, especially those in the oil and supporting industries."

For their part, the oil industry giants have kept a relatively low profile throughout the process, lending just a few senior statesmen to the CPA, including Philip Carroll (Shell U.S., Fluor), Rob McKee (ConocoPhillips and Halliburton) and Norm Szydlowski (ChevronTexaco), the CPA's liaison to the fledgling Iraqi Oil Ministry. Greg Muttitt of U.K. nonprofit Platform says Chevron, Shell and ConocoPhillips are among the most ambitious of all the major oil companies in Iraq. Shell and Chevron have already signed agreements with the Iraqi government and begun to train Iraqi staff and conduct studies -- arrangements that give the companies vital access to Oil Ministry officials and geological data.

Although Iraqi Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani said in August that the final competition for developing Iraq's oil fields will be wide open, the preliminary arrangements will give the oil giants a distinct advantage when it comes time to bid. The relative level of interest by the big oil companies depends on their appetite for risk, and their need for reserves. Shell, for example, has performed worse than most of its peers in finding new reserves in recent years -- a fact underscored by a 2004 scandal in which the company was caught lying to its investors. At this point the key challenge to multinationals is whether they can convince the Iraqi parliament to pass a new petroleum law by the end of this year.

A key provision in the new law is a commitment to using production sharing agreements (PSAs), which will lock the government into a long-term commitment (up to 50 years) to sharing oil revenues, and restrict its right to introduce any new laws that might affect the companies' profitability. Greg Muttitt of Platform says the PSAs are designed to favor private companies at the expense of exporting governments, which is why none of the top oil producing countries in the Middle East use them. Under the new petroleum law, all new fields and some existing fields would be opened up to private companies through the use of PSAs. Since less than 20 of Iraq's 80 known oil fields have already been developed, if Iraq's government commits to signing the PSAs, it could cost the country up to nearly $200 billion in lost revenues according to Muttitt, lead researcher for "Crude Designs: the Rip-Off of Iraq's Oil Wealth."

Meanwhile, in a kind of pincer movement, the parliament has begun to feel pressured from the IMF to adopt the new oil law by the end of the year as part of "conditionalities" imposed under a new debt relief agreement. Of course pressuring a country as volatile as Iraq to agree to any kind of arrangement without first allowing for legitimate parliamentary debate is fraught with peril. It is a risky way to nurture democracy in a country that already appears to be entering into a civil war.

"If misjudged -- either by denying a fair share to the regions in which oil is located, or by giving regions too much autonomy at the expense of national cohesion -- these oil decisions could fracture, and ultimately break apart, the country," Muttitt suggests.

Charlie Cray is director of the Center for Corporate Policy in Washington, D.C.

http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/41083/

[keith]

Six Questions for Robert Young Pelton
Posted on Thursday, September 7, 2006. By Ken Silverstein.

SourcesRobert Young Pelton is a writer and filmmaker who has worked in war zones, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Liberia. He is the author of the bestselling World's Most Dangerous Places and the newly released License to Kill, about the growing use of private contractors by the armed forces of the United States and other nations. Pelton estimates that there are currently about 70,000 hired guns in Iraq alone (about half Iraqi and half expatriates) and that private military contracting is now a $100 billion industry. I recently asked him a series of questions about the origins of the industry, where it's headed, and how contractors have performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What accounts for the rapid growth in the government's use of private military contractors?

The post–Cold War trend to outsource military responsibility to the private sector began in 1992 when then–Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney hired Brown and Root (now KBR) to demonstrate how private industry could allow an expeditionary military to downsize. In this scenario, civilian contractors were unarmed, did not wear military uniforms, and were protected by the military. In the days after 9/11, the CIA started pulling people out of retirement, “sheep dipping” active special operations soldiers, and hiring civilian contractors—just like they did in the bad old days of the secret war in Laos, in Nicaragua during the 1980s, and elsewhere. The opening of the war on terror in Afghanistan essentially opened the market for these types of services on a more widespread scale, and then after Iraq the industry just exploded. At every step, the U.S. government's increasing employment of hired guns has been necessary in order to buy the manpower required to advance the U.S. agenda. However, it should not be forgotten that outsourcing to civilians also allows the type of deniable, opaque, and unaccountable activities that led to a number of abuses outlined in the Church-Pike reports.

Have contractors generally performed support and infrastructure work, or have they been moving into more sensitive areas like interrogations and “black ops” for American intelligence agencies?

The bulk of the private security business is mundane, such as protecting personnel and facilities. There simply aren’t enough troops in Iraq to protect all the contractors involved in the reconstruction. Much of the “black” work done by private contractors is simple site and personnel security for the CIA and other agencies. But we have begun to privatize PsyOps, occupation work, intelligence, the interrogation process, and PR and media work. The problem with contractors performing these sensitive tasks is that the corporations who perform these functions are not accountable to the American public. Not surprisingly, no one knows for sure how often contractors are used for black ops. Blackwater has said that about 15% of its business is “black” or classified.

Have private contractors committed extensive abuses in Iraq or Afghanistan or are there just isolated incidents? In cases where abuses have been committed, have contractors been held accountable?

The entire concept that we must hire American and foreigners to “do our dirty work” by replacing the military with “neo-mercenaries” has engendered negative feelings among Iraqis and Afghans. It has not helped that the hard-rolling, guns-up, aggressive style of security convoys in Iraq have instilled a real sense of fear and resentment. The military operations usually are concentrated in expected areas, but an Iraqi might just be going to work and have the misfortune of driving too close to a security convoy. I don't think it's unreasonable to estimate that accidental shootings happen on a daily basis. I have personally witnessed numerous questionable incidents similar to those in the infamous AEGIS PSD trophy video in my ride-alongs with various companies. David Passaro, the CIA contractor in Afghanistan who was convicted of beating to death a detainee, is thus far the only contractor who has been held accountable for violent crimes. The Bush Administration's intentional perpetuation of an environment of legal permissiveness with regard to security contractor-rendered violence is one of the most morally offensive dirty secrets of this war.

Have private firms been able to win contracts through political connections, as often happens in Washington, or is politics kept out of the contracting process?

Industry members have told me that the company that wins a given contract is often determined by the writing of the contract and the specifications for the contract. If the CIA creates an “urgent and compelling” need, a multi-million dollar contract can be handed to a crony without bid. Not surprisingly the PMC world is a right-wing, pro-military, pro-Republican environment.

Will the use of contractors continue to grow and is it likely that they will become more commonly used in direct, offensive military operations?

There is no indication that the military and intelligence community has any incentive to reduce their reliance on the private sector. Erik Prince of Blackwater has already announced his 1,740 man private army. It comes complete with gun ships, fighter-bombers, armored vehicles, and intelligence. He calls it “Relief with Teeth” and is hoping that the United States or the United Nations will hire his army to buttress or even replace intervention and stability operations. Prince’s biggest customer is the U.S. government, and he is careful not to jeopardize that relationship, but the war on terror has created a massive labor pool of combat-hardened professionals who have a much higher monetary value in the private sector with guns in their hands. There have been examples—like the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea—in which investors, contractors, and mercenaries tried to effect “regime change” with naked self-interest in mind. So if an investor or world leader wants to hire his own proxy army, this new, informal and massive “old boys network” can provide them the capability.

Can private contractors sometimes be a good option?

It is my opinion that the enemy we are fighting is in essence a privatized military organization, and it makes perfect sense to rethink how we fight war. Under ideal conditions, including proper oversight, private contractors are a perfect short-term disposable resource because they come with training and experience, and do not create a long-term burden on taxpayers. Security contractors earn $350 to $1,200 a day for their services, but there is no long-term housing for their families, or pensions, or health care. Most Western personnel in Iraq and even 700 members of the Iraqi government require security contractors just to stay alive, so they are not a “good” option—they are mandatory. The one place that private contractors could be an especially good option is as a replacement for the currently broken UN peacekeeping machinery. Competing national interests always paralyze the deployment of peacekeepers. If the United Nations had contracts for a rapid-reaction force to be ready to deploy within weeks of a Security Council vote, a privatized force could act as an immediate stabilizer—assuming amenable local political conditions—and stay in place until the UN could form a more extensive force for a long-term operation. This, of course, could never happen until after exhaustive debate about the legal jurisdiction such a force would fall under, the standards they would be held to, and the mandate of their operation.

* * *
http://harpers.org/sb-six-questions-robert-young-pelton-1157654152.html

[keith]

September 15, 2006 - 8:19 AM
Switzerland wants to regulate mercenaries

Gun for hire: mercenaries operate in a legal no-man's land (Keystone Archive)

Geneva is set to host an international conference in November tackling the thorny issue of private security companies operating in a legal no-man's-land.

Active in more than 100 countries, independent military contractors have an estimated annual turnover of $100 billion (SFr123 billion), which is expected to double by 2010.


The Swiss government, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has launched an initiative to establish a proper legal framework for one of the world's oldest professions.

"We've invited as many government experts as possible to the November meeting," said Christine Schraner, deputy head of the directorate of international law at the foreign ministry.

The conference is aiming to examine national and international regulations overseeing mercenary activities, to clarify states' international obligations in terms of humanitarian and human rights law, and to encourage states to share information.

Since 2004 the government has been looking much closer at the role and status of the burgeoning number of rent-a-cop businesses – private military contractors – working in conflict zones.

In Iraq alone, there are some 20,000-25,000 mercenaries employed by DynCorp, CACI International, Titan and Global Risks.

Swiss role

The government was initially keen to investigate whether any of these companies were based in Switzerland, as allegations of violations of humanitarian law against them might pose a threat to Swiss neutrality.

According to a government report published in December 2005, three companies based in canton Basel Country are active in war or conflict zones; two have their headquarters in Switzerland, while the other is based abroad, with just an office in Switzerland.

A report commissioned by canton Basel Country found that 12 other companies have expressed a wish to work in dangerous regions in the future.

The report also warned that private military firms might be tempted to set up their headquarters on Swiss territory to benefit from the country's positive image, in particular its policy of neutrality.

Swiss authorities admit however that they "sometimes have to rely on the services of private military contractors" when working abroad in conflict zones. Recently Meteoric Tactical Solutions, a controversial South African firm, provided security for the Swiss liaison office in Baghdad.

Legal vacuum

One major concern is that the growing demand for the services of mercenaries is happening while companies operate in a legal no-man's-land.

United States soldiers in Iraq found guilty of torture have received prison sentences, while CACI and Titan mercenaries guilty of the same crimes have avoided charges.

"We have been looking closely at this subject both in Switzerland and at the international level," said Schraner.

A meeting was organised by the foreign ministry in January 2006 together with nine other countries concerned by the activities of mercenaries.

"We're not giving them our backing; we're saying they can no longer be ignored," said Claude Voillat, the ICRC's head of relations with the private sector.

"Everyone uses these specialists, from multinationals to non-governmental organisations as well as journalists," said Voillat.

"Our job is to ensure that there is proper regulation so that there is a clear distinction between professional private military contractors that respect humanitarian law and the others."

swissinfo, Ian Hamel

MERCENARIES

An estimated two million Swiss mercenaries served in foreign armies between the 14th and 19th centuries.

Under Swiss law, mercenary duties were outlawed in 1927 (in addition to a ban according to the 1848 constitution), except for members of the Swiss Papal Guards.

About 800 Swiss citizens fought for the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War.

An estimated 40,000 Swiss have also served in the French Foreign Legion since 1831.



CONTEXT

CACI International was founded in the US state of Virginia in 1962. The company employs about 10,000 people. Its shares are floated on the stock market and turnover was $3 billion last year.

A member of a private army earns three to ten times more than a regular soldier. Total turnover in the sector is estimated at $100 billion annually.

The Swiss authorities have organised several meetings with foreign experts and government representatives over the past 12 months.

A first international conference on private armies is scheduled to take place in Geneva in November.



RELATED SITES

Government report on security firms and private military contractors (French) (http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2006/631.pdf#search=%22%22les%20entreprises%20de%20s%C3 %A9curit%C3%A9%20et%20les%20entreprises%20militair es%20priv%C3%A9es%C2%BB%20%22)
ICRC (http://www.cicr.org/)
Geneva Conventions (ICRC) (http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions )
Swiss foreign ministry (http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home.html)
Swiss foreign ministry - directorate of international law (http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home/dep/org/dipl.html)

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URL of this story: http://194.6.181.127/eng/swissinfo.html?siteSect=105&sid=7040534

[keith]

Spy shortage has U.S. relying on outside help

By Greg Miller
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — At the National Counterterrorism Center, the agency created two years ago to prevent another attack such as Sept. 11, more than half of the employees are not U.S. government analysts or terrorism experts. Instead, they are outside contractors.

At CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., senior officials say it is routine for career officers to look around the table during meetings on secret operations and be surrounded by so-called "green badgers" — nonagency employees who carry special-colored IDs.

Some of the work being outsourced is extremely sensitive. Abraxas, a private company in McLean, Va., founded by a group of CIA veterans, devises "covers," or false identities, for an elite group of overseas case officers, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the arrangement.

Contractors are also turning up in increasing numbers in clandestine facilities around the world. At the CIA station in Islamabad, Pakistan, as many as three-quarters of those on hand since the Sept. 11 attacks have been contractors. In Baghdad, Iraq, site of the agency's largest overseas presence, contractors at times have outnumbered full-time CIA employees, according to officials who have held senior positions in the station.

The post-Sept. 11 period has brought sweeping changes to the U.S. intelligence community. Spy budgets have swelled by more than $10 billion a year, and agencies have seen their roles and authorities altered by reform legislation.

Largely because of the demands of the war on terror and the drawn-out conflict in Iraq, U.S. spy agencies have turned to outside contractors in unprecedented numbers to perform jobs once the domain of government-employed analysts and secret agents.

Negroponte orders study

The proliferation of contractors has outstripped the intelligence community's ability to keep track of them.

Former intelligence officials said most U.S. spy agencies do not have even approximate counts of the numbers of contractors they are employing, although several officials said the number at the CIA has nearly doubled in the past five years and now surpasses the full-time work force of about 17,500. Often, the contract employees had previous ties to the agencies.

Concerned by the lack of data and direction, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte earlier this year ordered a comprehensive study of the use of contractors. Ronald Sanders, a senior intelligence official in charge of the examination, said that all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies have been instructed to turn over records on contractors, and that one focus of the study will be whether outsourcing highly sensitive jobs is appropriate.

"We have to come to some conclusion about what our core intelligence mission is and how many [full-time employees] it's going to take to accomplish that mission," Sanders said, adding that the growth in contracting over the past five years has been driven by necessity and was haphazard.

"I wish I could tell you it's by design," he said. "But I think it's been by default."

Senior U.S. intelligence officials said the reliance on contractors is so deep that agencies couldn't function without them.

"If you took away the contractor support, they'd have to put yellow tape around the building and close it down," said a former senior CIA official who was responsible for overseeing contracts before leaving the agency earlier this year.

This former official and more than a dozen other current and former U.S. intelligence officials interviewed for this story spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of intelligence contracting work.

The use of outside companies has enabled spy agencies to tap a deep reservoir of talent during a period of unprecedented demand. Many of the people hired have been retired case officers and analysts who were eager to contribute to the response to the Sept. 11 attacks and who have more expertise and operational experience than agency insiders. In fact, the CIA has created its own roster of retired case officers — known as the "cadre" — who are eligible to be hired as independent contractors for temporary assignments.

Concerns about security, costs

Even so, the trend has alarmed some intelligence professionals, who are concerned that using contractors to do spying work carries security risks and higher costs. They point to soaring profits being made by contracting companies, and to a parade of veteran officers who have left intelligence agencies only to return with green badges and higher salaries.

Even people quick to praise the contributions of contractors express discomfort with the mercenary aspect of modern intelligence work.

"There's a commercial side to it that I frankly don't like," said James Pavitt, who retired in 2004 as head of the CIA's clandestine service. "I would much prefer to see staff case officers who are in the chain of command, and making a day-in and day-out conscious decision as civil servants in the intelligence business."

The CIA declined to comment on specific contracts, but defended the use of contractors for intelligence work.

"Contractors give the agency enormous flexibility and are an important part of our work force," said Paul Gimigliano, a spokesman for the CIA. "As partners, they help us build or enhance specific capabilities we need for a finite period."

The trend toward hiring contractors is particularly pronounced at the CIA. Unlike other intelligence agencies that can take advantage of employees detailed to them from branches of the military, the CIA is more dependent on a civilian work force.

The CIA has been hiring at a record pace in recent years. But it takes years to train new case officers, let alone develop seasoned operatives capable of delicate missions in global hot spots. The agency also has turned to contractors to plug deep holes left by staff cuts and hiring freezes in the 1990s.

Fear of a "spy drain"

Despite restrictions that bar contractors from holding positions of authority over agency personnel, current and former U.S. intelligence officials said contractors function as de facto team leaders in many stations around the world, and routinely handle clandestine meetings with CIA sources.

In Baghdad, contractors "do everything, especially 'ops' work," a former CIA officer who has served extensively in Iraq said of the operations functions. "They're recruiting [informants], managing the major relationships we have with the military, handling agents in support of frontline combat units."

Contractors are subject to the same background checks and security-clearance requirements as full-time employees, officials said. But some of that clearance work itself has been outsourced, officials said, and even the screening done by the CIA hasn't been infallible.

In one well-known case, David Passaro was hired as a contractor with the CIA's paramilitary service even though he had a record of abusive behavior and had been fired by a Connecticut police department. Passaro was convicted of felony assault earlier this year in federal court in North Carolina for his role in the beating of a detainee who died in Afghanistan in 2004.

U.S. intelligence officials said Passaro's case was an aberration, and that security problems have not been more frequent among contractors than among career officers.

Some officials fear that the rapid growth in contracting is fueling a so-called "spy drain," in which talented officers are being lured to the private sector by companies offering pay raises of 50 percent or more.

At the CIA, poaching became such a problem that former Director Porter Goss had to warn several companies to stop recruiting employees in the agency cafeteria, according to former officials familiar with the matter.

Copyright © 2006 The Seattle Times Company

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003263561_intel18.html

[keith]

Iraq security firm reports lower profits

Ros Davidson
Tuesday September 19, 2006
Guardian Unlimited


Armor Group International, the security firm that makes most of its profits in Iraq, reported a drop in earnings for the first half of the year because of increased competition for business and the loss of a major training contract in Iraq.
The London-based company reported a 30% rise in sales to $134.4m in the six months to June 30. Armor generated more than half of its revenues from business in Iraq - $70.3m - although its non-Iraq business grew by 57%.

However, pre-tax profits slipped to $3.7m from $4.7m for the same period a year ago. Analysts had expected profits to be only 10% lower than last year's.
Armor is chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former Conservative foreign and defence secretary. It is one of the UK's leading providers of private security for reconstruction workers in Iraq.

"The group has achieved strong revenue growth over the first half, and we are encouraged by the significant growth outside Iraq," said Dave Seaton, the chief excecutive officer.

The main hit to sales was from the loss of a $7.8m contract with the United States for training staff at the ministry of justice in Iraq, the company told Reuters. "It was a one-off programme funded by the US," Mr Seaton said. "The Iraqi government does not have the funding for its own training needs."

Armor is diversifying and has new or extended contracts providing security at the World Bank headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan; clearing land mines in southern Sudan, and doing security work for oil and gas companies.

http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1876101,00.html

[keith]

ArmorGroup feels the squeeze from rivals
Evening Standard
19 September 2006

The ongoing terror and civil war in Iraq may have been good news for security business ArmorGroup International but an explosion in competition and me-too private protection armies is eating into its profit margins.


It today reported a 21% dive in pre-tax profits in the first half of the year to $3.7m (£2m) despite the company having never been busier, with revenues up 30% at $134m.


The group, chaired by former Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, said its biggest one-off hit had been the end of a key multimillion-dollar contract for the US government to train the Iraq Ministry of Justice's protection services to provide security for the country's judges.


However, the rich pickings in Iraq have led to unprecedented competition there and also in the wider world.


'The volume of business in Iraq has created a significant number of competitors who are now trying to expand into new markets,' said chief executive Dave Seaton.


'There are currently around 100 internationally owned private security companies in Iraq as well as approximately 70 local Iraqi ones.'


ArmorGroup is also being hit by increasing legal, insurance and consultancy costs. The period also saw rising spending in the Nigerian delta to handle security work for the oil industry there. The interim dividend is being held at 1¼p.

http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/investing-and-markets/article.html?in_article_id=412822&in_page_id=3

[keith]

Midday Business Report: Black & Veatch unit gains piece of Afghan contract

By DAVID HAYES
The Kansas City Star
A Black & Veatch unit is part of a joint venture that has won a $1.4 billion contract to rebuild roads, power lines and water supply systems in Afghanistan.

A joint venture between Overland Park-based Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. and New Jersey-based Louis Berger Group will rebuild infrastructure in the war-torn country.

The joint venture team was selected by the United States Agency for International Development for the five-year project.

“In working with USAID to make power and water supplies more reliable, and by improving the roads that allow effective trade, we can help create the conditions for stronger industry, commerce and economic independence in Afghanistan,” said Joe McGonagle, president of Black & Veatch Special Projects.

The team initially will work to rebuild power lines and power plants, and rebuild and extend roads. Later, the two companies said, work will focus on water and sewer projects and public building improvements.

The contract calls for the joint venture to bring in Afghan firms, working as mentors, said George Minter, a spokesman for Black & Veatch. The arrangement will allow companies in that country to oversee the infrastructure improvements long term.

It will be Black & Veatch’s first contract in Afghanistan. The company has infrastructure reconstruction contracts in Iraq.

The Louis Berger Group is finishing up a five-year Afghanistan project focused on road reconstruction and extension.

The new venture is a 50-50 partnership between the two engineering firms, Minter said.

Black & Veatch is privately held, and has more than 7,740 employees worldwide, including 3,340 in the Kansas City area.

http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/15556499.htm

[keith]

A Mercenary Force for Darfur
By MAX BOOT
October 25, 2006; Page A14

Mercenaries used to dominate warfare. The "Hessians" who served Britain in our War for Independence (many were actually from other German states) became notorious among the colonists, but foreigners formed a major part of every army in the world until the French Revolution. Their outlook was pithily expressed by a 17th-century soldier who said: "We serve our master honestly, it is no matter what master we serve."

And they did provide good service. It was thanks largely to "free lances" (the origin of that now common term) that absolute monarchs managed to consolidate their power in Europe and carve out vast overseas empires. Private entities like the Dutch and English East India Companies even marshaled their own armies and navies to defend their domains.

But with the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, soldiers of fortune fell into disfavor. The assumption became prevalent that it was honorable to fight for one's country, even if compelled to do so via a draft, but dishonorable to fight for a paycheck.

Yet mercenaries remain abundant. Some serve nation states -- for instance the Nepalese Gurkhas in the British and Indian armies. Many more are employed by companies such as DynCorp, Vinnell and Blackwater, all of whom vociferously resist the "mercenary" label; they prefer to be called security companies or private military firms.

Call them what you will, such outfits have grown in importance as the armed forces of the U.S. and other countries downsized after the end of the Cold War. Today, from Afghanistan to Iraq, much of the logistical support for American troops is provided by Halliburton subsidiary KBR.

Hired hands aren't just serving chow or cleaning latrines. They're also carrying guns to safeguard supply convoys, buildings and VIPs. Even many U.S. ambassadors are protected by private bodyguards. Our man in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, never leaves home without his heavily armed Blackwater detail.

Peter Singer, a fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of "Corporate Warriors," estimates that at least 20,000 private gunslingers have been employed in Iraq alone. Among foreign troop contingents, they are second in number -- and in casualties -- only to the U.S. military. Mr. Singer quips: "President George W. Bush's 'coalition of the willing' might thus be more aptly described as the 'coalition of the billing.'"

Many of these contractors, largely veterans of Western and Soviet bloc militaries, have performed bravely in trying circumstances. But they have also caused their share of problems. There have been numerous scandals over firms charging too much or not delivering what they promised. Even more pervasive have been complaints about guards running wild. In their black body armor and armored Chevy Suburbans, contractors are notorious for careening through traffic and firing wildly, not caring who gets hurt as long as they reach their destination.

Yet, for all their shortcomings, there is no way to end our reliance on privateers -- at least not without a big increase in military end-strength, which is needed but not likely. And they can actually perform valuable work that we won't send our own troops to do.

Case in point: Darfur. A force of 7,000 lightly armed African Union peacekeepers has been helpless to stop the genocide being carried out in this region of the Sudan. Odds are that a contingent of U.N. blue helmets, if and when they finally arrive, won't do much better. Why not turn to the private sector?

Mercenaries have committed their share of abuses in Africa. (See "The Wild Geese" and "The Dogs of War," both based on real events in the 1950s and 1960s, the heyday of "Mad" Mike Hoare, "Black" Jacques Schramme and other notorious swashbucklers). But they have also been effective in stopping human-rights abuses.

In 1995-96, Executive Outcomes, a South African firm working for the government of Sierra Leone, made short work of a savage rebel movement known as the Revolutionary United Front that was notorious for chopping off the limbs of its victims. As a result, Sierra Leone was able to hold its first free election in decades. The now-defunct Executive Outcomes also helped the Angolan government quell a long-running insurgency by Jonas Savimbi's Unita, leading to the signing of a peace accord in 1994. Another private firm, MPRI, helped to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia in 1995 by organizing the Croatian military offensive that stopped Serbian aggression.

Hired guns could be equally effective in stopping the campaign of rape, murder and ethnic cleansing carried out by the Sudanese government and the janjaweed militia in Darfur. In fact, several firms have already offered their services. They could be employed by an international organization like the U.N. or NATO, by an ad hoc group of concerned nations, or even by philanthropists like Bill Gates or George Soros.

Critics complain that mercenaries didn't provide long-term fixes. Sierra Leone, for instance, fell back into brutal warfare after Executive Outcomes left. But that's because the mercenaries were on short-term contracts; they might have created more lasting stability if they had been given longer-term employment.

Many also worry about abuses committed by mercenaries, who in some cases have tried to plunder or even take over small states. But the record of privateers compares favorably with that of U.N. peacekeeping forces, which have been distinguished more by their propensity for committing sex crimes than by any success in keeping the peace. To deal with potential abuses, private fighters could be hired under a contract that would hold them liable for war crimes in the International Criminal Court or some other jurisdiction. That would make them more accountable than U.N. forces, which operate with almost complete impunity.

Sending mercenaries to Africa isn't politically correct. But it would be a lot more useful than sending more aid money that will be wasted or passing ineffectual resolutions that will be ignored.

Mr. Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today," published last week by Gotham Books.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116173782126202804.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

[keith]

US guards train in 'close protection' work




The US Army has begun assigning troops in Iraq to work on close protection (CP) duties, a task typically performed by private security companies.

In a recent visit to a US training facility of private security company ArmorGroup in Virginia, Jane's observed members of the US National Guard practising CP drills with instructors.

The troops - from 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry of the Kentucky National Guard - were learning critical skills for their upcoming mission working on personal security details (PSDs) in Iraq. The National Guard was unable to provide further information as JDW went to press on whether additional units have received such training.

The US Army 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, in Iraq also employs military PSD teams to protect the unit's commanders.

It is unclear whether the PSD training is part of a comprehensive programme or an ad hoc response to security requirements. As JDW went to press, Multi-National Corps - Iraq had not responded to a Jane's enquiry about assignment of US troops in such roles.

172 of 752 words

© 2006 Jane's Information Group

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw061023_2_n.shtml

[keith]

A U.S. Fortress Rises in Baghdad
by CorpWatch
Sunday Oct 22nd, 2006 8:53 PM
John Owen didn’t realize how different his job would be from his last 27 years in construction until he signed on with First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting in November 2005. Working as general foreman, he would be overseeing an army of workers building the largest, most expensive and heavily fortified US embassy in the world. Scheduled to open in 2007, the sprawling complex near the Tigris River will equal Vatican City in size.
A U.S. Fortress Rises in Baghdad

Asian Workers Trafficked to Build World's Largest Embassy
by David Phinney, Special to CorpWatch
October 17th, 2006


John Owen didn’t realize how different his job would be from his last 27 years in construction until he signed on with First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting in November 2005. Working as general foreman, he would be overseeing an army of workers building the largest, most expensive and heavily fortified US embassy in the world. Scheduled to open in 2007, the sprawling complex near the Tigris River will equal Vatican City in size.

Then seven months into the job, he quit.

Not one of the five different US embassy sites he had worked on around the world compared to the mess he describes. Armenia, Bulgaria, Angola, Cameroon and Cambodia all had their share of dictators, violence and economic disruption, but the companies building the embassies were always fair and professional, he says. The Kuwait-based company building the $592-million Baghdad project is the exception. Brutal and inhumane, he says “I’ve never seen a project more fucked up. Every US labor law was broken.”

In the resignation letter last June, Owen told First Kuwaiti and US State Department officials that his managers beat their construction workers, demonstrated little regard for worker safety, and routinely breached security.

And it was all happening smack in the middle of the US-controlled Green Zone -- right under the nose of the State Department that had quietly awarded the controversial embassy contract in July 2005.

He also complained of poor sanitation, squalid living conditions and medical malpractice in the labor camps where several thousand low-paid migrant workers lived. Those workers, recruited on the global labor market from the Philippines, India, Pakistan and other poor south Asian countries, earned as little as $10 to $30 a day.

As with many US-funded contractors, First Kuwaiti prefers importing labor because it views Iraqi workers as a security headache not worth the trouble.

No Questions Asked

By March 2005, First Kuwaiti’s operation began looking even sketchier to Owen as he boarded a nondescript white jet on his way back to Baghdad following some R&R in Kuwait city. He remembers being surrounded by about 50 First Kuwaiti laborers freshly hired from the Philippines and India. Everyone was holding boarding passes to Dubai – not to Baghdad.

“I thought there was some sort of mix up and I was getting on the wrong plane,” says the 48-year-old Floridian who once worked as a fisherman with his father before moving into the construction business.

He buttonholed a First Kuwaiti manager standing near by and asked what was going on. The manager waved his hand, looked around the terminal and whispered to keep quiet.

“‘If anyone hears we are going to Baghdad, they won’t let us on the plane,’” Owen recalls the manager saying.

The secrecy struck Owen as a little odd, but he grabbed his luggage and moved on. Everyone filed out to the private jet and flew directly to Baghdad. “I figured that they had visas for Kuwait and not Iraq,” Owen offers.

The deception had the appearance of smuggling workers into Iraq, but Owen didn’t know at the time that the Philippines, India, and other countries had banned or restricted their citizens from working in Iraq because of safety concerns and fading support for the war. After 2004, many passports were stamped “Not valid for Iraq.”

Nor did Owen know that both the US State Department and the Pentagon were quietly investigating contractors such as First Kuwaiti for labor trafficking and worker abuse. In fact, the international news media had accused First Kuwaiti repeatedly of coercing workers to take jobs in battle-torn Iraq once they had been lured with safer offers to Kuwait. The company has billed several billion dollars on US contracts since the war began in March 2003 and now has an estimated 7,500 laborers in the theater of war.

Despite numerous emails and phone calls about such allegations, neither First Kuwaiti general manager Wadih Al Absi nor his lawyer Angela Styles, the former top White House contract policy advisor, have responded. After a year of requests, State Department officials involved with the project also have ignored or rejected opportunities for comment.

Your Passports Please

That same March Owen returned to work in Baghdad, Rory Mayberry would witness similar events after he flew to Kuwait from his home in Myrtle Creek, Oregon.

The gravely voiced, easy-going Army veteran had previously worked in Iraq for Halliburton and the private security company, Danubia. Missing the action and the big paychecks US contractors draw Iraq, he snagged a $10,000 a month job with MSDS consulting Company.

MSDS is a two-person minority-owned consulting company that assists US State Department managers in Washington with procurement programming. Never before had the firm offered medical services or worked in Iraq, but First Kuwaiti hired MSDS on the recommendation of Jim Golden, the State Department contract official overseeing the embassy project. Within days, an agreement worth hundreds of thousands of dollars for medical care was signed.

The 45-year-old Mayberry, a former emergency medical technician in the Army who worked as a funeral director in Oregon, responded to a help wanted ad placed by MSDS. The plan was that he would work as a medic attending to the construction crews on the work site in Baghdad.

Mayberry sensed things weren’t right when he boarded a First Kuwaiti flight on March 15 to Baghdad – a different flight from Owen’s.

At the airport in Kuwait City, Mayberry said, he saw a person behind a counter hand First Kuwaiti managers a passenger manifest, an envelope of money and a stack of boarding passes to Dubai. The managers then handed out the boarding passes to Mayberry and 50 or so new First Kuwaiti laborers, mostly Filipinos.

"Everyone was told to tell customs and security that they were flying to Dubai," Mayberry explains. Once the group passed the guards, they went upstairs and waited by the McDonald's for First Kuwaiti staff to unlock a door -- Gate 26 -- that led to an unmarked, white 52-seat jet. It was "an antique piece of shit" Mayberry offers in a casual, blunt manner.

“All the workers had their passports taken away by First Kuwaiti,” Mayberry claims, and while he knew the plane was bound for Baghdad, he’s not so sure the others were aware of their destination. The Asian laborers began asking questions about why they were flying north and the jet wasn't flying east over the ocean, he says. "I think they thought they were going to work in Dubai."

One former First Kuwaiti supervisor acknowledges that the company holds passports of many workers in Iraq – a violation of US contracting.

“All of the passports are kept in the offices,” said one company insider who requested anonymity in fear of financial and personal retribution. As for distributing Dubai boarding passes for Baghdad flights, “It’s because of the travel bans,” he explained.

Mayberry believes that migrant workers from the Philippines, India and Nepal are especially vulnerable to employers like First Kuwaiti because their countries have little or no diplomatic presence in Iraq.

“If you don’t have your passport or an embassy to go to, what you do to get out of a bad situation?” he asks. “How can they go to the US State Department for help if First Kuwaiti is building their embassy?”

Deadly ‘Candy Store’ Medicine

Owen had already been working at the embassy site since late November when Mayberry arrived. The two never crossed paths, but both share similar complaints about management of the project and brutal treatment of the laborers that, at times, numbered as many as 2,500. Most are from the Philippines, India, and Pakistan. Others are from Egypt and Turkey.

The number of workers with injuries and ailments stunned Mayberry. He went to work immediately after and stayed busy around the clock for days.

Four days later, First Kuwaiti pulled him off the job after he requested an investigation of two patients who had died before he arrived from what he suspected was medical malpractice. Mayberry also recommended that the health clinics be shut down because of unsanitary conditions and mismanagement.

“There hadn’t been any follow up on medical care. People were walking around intoxicated on pain relievers with unwrapped wounds and there were a lot of infections,” he recalls. “The idea that there was any hygiene seemed ridiculous. I’m not sure they were even bathing.”

In reports made available to the US State Department, the US Army and First Kuwaiti, Mayberry listed dozens of concerns about the clinics, which he found lacking in hot water, disinfectant, hand washing stations, properly supplied ambulances, and communication equipment. Mayberry also complained that workers’ medical records were in total disarray or nonexistent, the beds were dirty, and the support staff hired by First Kuwaiti was poorly trained.

The handling of prescription drugs especially bothered him. Many of the drugs that originated from Iraq and Kuwait were unsecured, disorganized and unintelligibly labeled, he said in one memo. He found that the medical staff frequently misdiagnosed patients. Prescription pain killers were being handed out "like a candy store ... and then people were sent back to work.”

Mayberry warned that the practice could cause addiction and safety hazards. “Some were on the construction site climbing scaffolding 30 feet off the ground. I told First Kuwaiti that you don’t give painkillers to people who are running machinery and working on heavy construction and they said 'that's how we do it.’”

The sloppy handling of drugs may have led to the two deaths, Mayberry speculates. One worker, age 25, died in his room. The second, in his mid-30s, died at the clinic because of heart failure. Both deaths may be “medical homicide,” Mayberry says -- because the patients may have been negligently prescribed improper drug treatment.

If the State Department investigated, Mayberry knows nothing of the outcome. Two State Department officials with project oversight responsibilities did not return phone calls or emails inquiring about Mayberry's allegations. The reports may have been ignored, not because of his complaints, but because Mayberry is a terrible speller, a problem compounded by an Arabic translation program loaded on his computer, he says.

Accidents Happen

Owen’s account of his seven months on the job paints a similar picture to Mayberry’s. Health and safety measures were essentially non-existent, he says. Not once did he witness a safety meeting. Once an Egyptian worker fell and broke his back and was sent home. No one ever heard from him again. “The accident might not have happened if there was a safety program and he had known how to use a safety harness.”

Owen also says that managers regularly beat workers and that laborers were issued only one work uniform, making it difficult to go to the laundry. “You could never have it washed. Clothing got really bad – full of sweat and dirt.”

And while he often smuggled water to the work crews, medical care was a different issue. When he urged laborers to get medical treatment for rashes and sores, First Kuwaiti managers accused him of spoiling the laborers and allowing them simply to avoid work, he says.

State Department officials supervising the project are aware of many such events, but apparently do nothing, he said. Once when 17 workers climbed the wall of the construction site to escape, a State Department official helped round them up and put them in “virtual lockdown,” Owen said.

Just before he resigned, hundreds of Pakistani workers went on strike in June and beat up a Lebanese manager who they accused of harassing them. Owen estimates that 375 were then sent home.

‘Treated Like Animals’

Recent First Kuwaiti employees agree that the accounts shared by Owen and Mayberry are accurate. One longtime supervisor claims that 50 to 60 percent of the laborers regularly complain that First Kuwaiti “treats them like animals,” and routinely reduces their promised pay with confusing and unexplained deductions.

Another former First Kuwaiti manager, who declines to be named because of possible adverse consequences, says that Owen’s and Mayberry’s complaints only begin “to scratch the surface.”

But scratching the surface is the only view yet available of what may be the most lasting monument to the US liberation and occupation of Iraq. As of now only a handful of authorized State Department managers and contractors, along with First Kuwaiti workers and contractors, are officially allowed inside the project’s walls. No journalist has ever been allowed access to the sprawling 104-acre site with towering construction cranes raising their necks along the skyline.

Even this tight security is a charade, says on former high-level First Kuwaiti manager. First Kuwaiti managers living at the construction site regularly smuggle prostitutes in from the streets of Baghdad outside the Green Zone, he says.

Prostitutes, he explains are viewed as possible spies. “They are a big security risk.”

But the exposure that the US occupation forces and First Kuwaiti may fear most could begin with the contractor itself and the conditions workers are forced to endure at this most obvious symbol of the American democracy project in Iraq.

David Phinney is a journalist and broadcaster based in Washington, DC, whose work has appeared in The Los Angeles Times, New York Times and on ABC and PBS.


Pentagon Finds Worker Abuse and Trafficking in Iraq, but Penalizes No One

On April 4, 2006, the Pentagon issued a new contracting directive following a secret investigation that officially confirms what many South Asian laborers have been complaining about ever since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Some contractors, many working as subcontractors to Halliburton /KBR in Iraq, were found to be using deceptive, bait-and-switch hiring practices and charging recruiting fees that indebted low-paid migrant workers for many months or even years to their employers. Contractors were also accused of providing substandard, crowded sleeping quarters, serving poor food, and circumventing Iraqi immigration procedures.

While the Pentagon declines to specifically name those contractors found to be doing business in this way, it also acknowledged in an April 19 memorandum that it was a widespread practice among contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to take away workers passports. Holding onto employee passports -- a direct violation of US labor trafficking laws -- helped stop workers from leaving war-torn Iraq or taking better jobs with other contractors.

Contractors engaging in the practice, states the memo, must immediately "cease and deist."

"All passports will be returned to employees by 1 May 06. This requirement will be flowed down to each of your subcontractors performing work in this theater."

The Pentagon has yet to announce of any penalty for those found to be in violation of US labor trafficking laws or contract requirements.

Labor Trafficking Under US Funded Iraq Contracts

CNN: Probe into Iraq Trafficking Claims – May 5, 2004

The New York Times: Indian Contract Workers in Iraq Complain of Exploitation – May 7, 2004

The Washington Post: Underclass of Workers Created in Iraq – July 1, 2004


SOURCE: CorpWatch

http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2006/10/22/18322484.php

[keith]

Sunday, October 29, 2006 · Last updated 4:39 p.m. PT

Activists want mercenaries regulated

By DAVID STRINGER
ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

LONDON -- A humanitarian group called Monday for government regulation of private security companies in combat zones, saying "mercenaries" often operate with impunity in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The London-based War on Want delivered a list of recommended regulations for the private security industry to Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, calling for increased scrutiny of allegations of human rights abuses by private security staff.

The demand comes as a conference of British defense firms working in Iraq and Afghanistan was set to open Monday in London.

Both the British government and private security companies agree that regulation is needed. But the companies say an independent ombudsman - rather than government regulation - would be more effective.

In a report, War on Want called for details of government contracts with defense companies to be made public and proposed restrictions on lawmakers and civil servants taking jobs within the sector after leaving office.

"We want the revolving door between government and the private defense industry to slam shut," War on Want spokesman Paul Collins said.

Andy Bearpark, director general of the British Association of Private Security Companies, an industry-funded lobby group, said government regulation was unworkable.

He said his members would instead urge Beckett to appoint an independent ombudsman to oversee their operations.

"The way we work is across international boundaries, so regulation or prosecutions through national laws would be complex," Bearpark told The Associated Press in an interview.

He said security companies "support 100 percent" moves to regulate the industry.

Britain's Foreign Office said a review of options for regulating the industry had begun, but there was no timetable for putting proposals to parliament.

"There is an agreement that there should be some form of regulation," said a Foreign Office spokesman on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

Bearpark, former director of operations and infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, said British security contractors earned about $1.88 billion a year.

War on Want claims the total value of the industry worldwide topped $100 billion in 2004 and has estimated there are 48,000 private security contractors working in Iraq.

The U.S.-led coalition and private Western groups operating in Iraq have come to rely on contractors for many security duties, including guarding facilities and some highways.

At least 300 contractors are reported to have been killed in Iraq. Some Iraqis have complained that the private security workers have used excessive force.

Collins said his group recognized the need for private security, but believed the industry urgently required tighter regulation.

"What we want to see is the proper investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses being perpetrated by mercenaries," Collins said.

The War on Want report claims civilian contractors - including men named in U.S. military reports as having carried out abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison - have repeatedly escaped prosecution for crimes.

Two workers employed by private defense companies CACI International Inc. and Titan Corp. were "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib," a 2004 report by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba stated.

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1103AP_Britain_Private_Security.html

[keith]

October 31, 2006
Mercenaries Look Beyond Iraq

by Tom Griffin
As the position of the Coalition forces in Iraq looks increasingly untenable, it is not just the fate of the national military contingents that is in question.

Private military contractors, which make up the second largest Coalition contingent, are also considering their future following the end of the "Baghdad bubble," the boom in the industry spawned by lucrative U.S. government contracts.

Some of the beneficiaries of Pentagon largess are among the British firms that have recently formed their own industry body, the British Association of Private Security Companies, which is now holding its inaugural meeting [.pdf].

In a sign of the newfound respectability of these companies, the venue will be the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on London's Whitehall. Among those speaking will be high-profile mercenary Tim Spicer, who only a few years ago was persona non grata with the British government because of his role in the Arms-to-Africa affair.

Spicer's presence is likely to bring some unwanted attention to the conference in the shape of a "virtual protest" orchestrated by Irish human rights group the Pat Finucane Center (PFC). Details of the e-mail and phone protest were to be released on the center's Web site today.

The PFC has long criticized Spicer's role as a battalion commander in Belfast in 1992, when two of his soldiers shot dead 18-year-old Peter McBride. In spite of their murder conviction, Scots Guards Mark Wright and James Fisher were later allowed to remain in the army and serve in Iraq.

Spicer himself went on to a controversial mercenary career in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and later Iraq, where his company, Aegis Specialist Risk Management, holds one of the largest private security contracts.

Even Aegis, however, is now looking beyond Iraq. In a paper published by RUSI, Aegis analyst Dominick Donald argues that "the Iraqi private security market is clearly maturing: more discerning clients and a number of well-established providers mean lower bids and tighter margins. If these trends hold true, then security contracts are likely to be smaller and less worth the effort of larger, well-established PSCs [private security companies] with substantial overheads."

Donald's pamphlet "After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq" is remarkably candid about the options for the sector. One of its proposals is that private security companies should target humanitarian aid as an area of expansion.

"Humanitarian and development assistance will increasingly be more closely tied to government policy," Donald argues. "This is a natural political extension of the fact that GWOT [Global War on Terror] will increasingly involve the UK's targeted use of soft power, of which humanitarian and development assistance is a perfect example."

Donald believes this will eventually lead to a falling-out between aid agencies and the governments that provide much of their funding:

"The sector's insistence on retaining the perception of political neutrality and humanitarian impartiality means that it is extremely reluctant to be in any way associated with government activity. Many would therefore see participation in a planning process as jeopardizing their independent status.

"Yet none of this holds true for PSCs. Might there then be an opportunity for the private sector, which would be far readier to work to government's directions?"

Remarkably, the main thrust of Donald's argument is not that PSCs can operate in areas too dangerous for aid agencies. Instead, the key selling point of PSCs is precisely that they need not "deliver assistance impartially on the basis of need."

This is a suggestion so cynical that it is surprising to find it committed to paper. Clearly, if aid budgets are diverted to PSCs delivering programs driven by geopolitical considerations, the logical corollary is that real humanitarian priorities will go unmet.

If that agenda is realized, the rise of the mercenary industry may prove to be one more disastrous consequence of the Iraq war.

http://www.antiwar.com/orig/griffin.php?articleid=9940

[keith]

UK Iraq Mercenaries Outnumber Troops
by IOL (reposted)

Wednesday Nov 1st, 2006 6:10 AM
CAIRO — The UK military is "privatizing" the conflict in Iraq, contracting thousands of mercenaries from security companies to protect its personnel, while turning a blind eye to the macabre abuses by the hirelings, a report by a British charity has revealed.


"There are now as many as48 , 000mercenaries in Iraq, compared to7 , 200British soldiers – a ratio of over six to one," said the report posted Monday, October30 , on the website of the London-based War on Want charity.

It says Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have become a "normal" part of the UK military sector.

"The UK government has actively encouraged security firms in Iraq by giving them multimillion-pound contracts to take over duties which could have been performed by British forces," it goes on.

The government is public about the key role played by the mercenaries in protecting its soldiers and aid convoys.

"There are three British private security guards to every British soldier in Iraq," says the report says.

It says at least 181 private military and security companies are operating in Iraq.

The report coincided with the first annual conference of the British Association of Private Security Companies, which opened in London Monday.

Some 119 British troops, who are stationed in the south, have been killed in Iraq since the US-led invasion in2003 .

According to the BBC, the number of British soldiers deserting military service over the US-led occupation of Iraq has been on the rise with more than1 , 000personnel went absent without leave and failed to return since the beginning of the Iraq war in2003 .

Families of British soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan announced in August they were to form a political party aimed at unseating Prime Minister Tony Blair and his ministers.

"Privatized"

The report says the UK government and its US ally tend to "privatize" the war in Iraq as a part of exit strategy from a chaos-mired country that teeters on the verge of a civil war.

"Evidence which may otherwise be made available to the public under freedom of information legislation is impossible to obtain from private contractors," said the report.

More
http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2006-10/31/05.shtml

http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2006/11/01/18325401.php

[keith]

Defense contractors call for independent ombudsman to regulate multibillion dollar industry
The Associated Press

Published: October 29, 2006


LONDON An international development group called Monday for strict regulations of private security companies in combat zones, ahead of a conference of British defense firms who hold contracts worth more than 1 billion pounds (US$1.88 billion, €1.48 billion) a year in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Campaign group War on Want delivered a list of recommended regulations for the industry to Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, calling for increased scrutiny of allegations of human rights abuses by private security staff.

In a report, War on Want called for details of government contracts with defense companies to be made public and proposed restrictions on lawmakers and civil servants taking jobs within the sector after leaving office.

"We want the revolving door between government and the private defense industry to slam shut," War on Want spokesman Paul Collins said.

Andy Bearpark, director general of the British Association of Private Security Companies, an industry-funded lobby group, said government regulation was unworkable.

He said his members, who meet Monday in London for their first annual conference, would instead urge Beckett to appoint an independent ombudsman to oversee their operations.

"The way we work is across international boundaries, so regulation or prosecutions through national laws would be complex," Bearpark told the Association Press in an interview.

"Our members support 100 percent moves to regulate the industry and we are calling on the British government to appoint an independent ombudsman, who would carry out inquiries into alleged abuses."

Britain's Foreign Office said a review of options for regulating the industry had begun, but there was no timescale for putting proposals to parliament.

"There is an agreement that there should be some form of regulation," said a Foreign Office spokesman, on condition of anonymity under civil service restrictions.

Bearpark, former director of operations and infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, said British security contractors earned around 1 billion pounds per year.

War on Want claims the total value of the industry worldwide topped US$100 billion (€79 billion) in 2004 and has estimated there are 48,000 private security contractors working in Iraq

The U.S.-led coalition and private Western groups operating in Iraq have come to rely on contractors for many security duties, including guarding facilities and some highways.

At least 300 are reported to have been killed, while some Iraqis have complained that private workers have used excessive force.

War on Want spokesman Collins said his group recognized the need for private security, but believed the industry urgently required tighter regulation.

"What we want to see is the proper investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses being perpetrated by mercenaries," Collins said.

The report claims civilian contractors — including men named in U.S. military reports as having carried out abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison — have repeatedly escaped prosecution for crimes.

Two workers employed by private defense companies CACI International Inc. and Titan Corp. were "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib," a report by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba said.

The report also cites the case of a video distributed on the Internet which purported to show security contractors from London-based Aegis Defense Services Ltd. firing at Iraqi civilian vehicles.

Set to a soundtrack of Elvis Presley's song "Mystery Train," the film showed cars swerving to avoid the fire. At one point, a car crashes after being hit by bullets.

Collins said it is one of "hundreds of accounts of personnel from private military and security firms committing abuses in Iraq."

A U.S. military investigation cleared Aegis employees of any offense, Bearpark said. But he acknowledged the incident had tarnished the image of his sector.

"There is a definite image problem — the public perception of the industry is a world away from the reality. People tend to think we are constantly staging coups in small African states," Bearpark said.

He said his organization's two-day conference would be addressed by Lt. Gen. David Richards, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, and former British defense secretary Malcolm Rifkind.

LONDON An international development group called Monday for strict regulations of private security companies in combat zones, ahead of a conference of British defense firms who hold contracts worth more than 1 billion pounds (US$1.88 billion, €1.48 billion) a year in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Campaign group War on Want delivered a list of recommended regulations for the industry to Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, calling for increased scrutiny of allegations of human rights abuses by private security staff.

In a report, War on Want called for details of government contracts with defense companies to be made public and proposed restrictions on lawmakers and civil servants taking jobs within the sector after leaving office.

"We want the revolving door between government and the private defense industry to slam shut," War on Want spokesman Paul Collins said.

Andy Bearpark, director general of the British Association of Private Security Companies, an industry-funded lobby group, said government regulation was unworkable.

He said his members, who meet Monday in London for their first annual conference, would instead urge Beckett to appoint an independent ombudsman to oversee their operations.

"The way we work is across international boundaries, so regulation or prosecutions through national laws would be complex," Bearpark told the Association Press in an interview.

"Our members support 100 percent moves to regulate the industry and we are calling on the British government to appoint an independent ombudsman, who would carry out inquiries into alleged abuses."

Britain's Foreign Office said a review of options for regulating the industry had begun, but there was no timescale for putting proposals to parliament.

"There is an agreement that there should be some form of regulation," said a Foreign Office spokesman, on condition of anonymity under civil service restrictions.

Bearpark, former director of operations and infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, said British security contractors earned around 1 billion pounds per year.

War on Want claims the total value of the industry worldwide topped US$100 billion (€79 billion) in 2004 and has estimated there are 48,000 private security contractors working in Iraq

The U.S.-led coalition and private Western groups operating in Iraq have come to rely on contractors for many security duties, including guarding facilities and some highways.

At least 300 are reported to have been killed, while some Iraqis have complained that private workers have used excessive force.

War on Want spokesman Collins said his group recognized the need for private security, but believed the industry urgently required tighter regulation.

"What we want to see is the proper investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses being perpetrated by mercenaries," Collins said.

The report claims civilian contractors — including men named in U.S. military reports as having carried out abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison — have repeatedly escaped prosecution for crimes.

Two workers employed by private defense companies CACI International Inc. and Titan Corp. were "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib," a report by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba said.

The report also cites the case of a video distributed on the Internet which purported to show security contractors from London-based Aegis Defense Services Ltd. firing at Iraqi civilian vehicles.

Set to a soundtrack of Elvis Presley's song "Mystery Train," the film showed cars swerving to avoid the fire. At one point, a car crashes after being hit by bullets.

Collins said it is one of "hundreds of accounts of personnel from private military and security firms committing abuses in Iraq."

A U.S. military investigation cleared Aegis employees of any offense, Bearpark said. But he acknowledged the incident had tarnished the image of his sector.

"There is a definite image problem — the public perception of the industry is a world away from the reality. People tend to think we are constantly staging coups in small African states," Bearpark said.

He said his organization's two-day conference would be addressed by Lt. Gen. David Richards, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, and former British defense secretary Malcolm Rifkind.


http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/30/europe/EU_GEN_Britain_Private_Security.php

[keith]

Private Security Sector Seeks Regulatory Changes
Steve Mbogo | Bio | 01 Nov 2006
World Politics Watch Exclusive

NAIROBI, Kenya -- A global consensus is now emerging about the necessity for laws that will support and encourage, rather than stifle, the growing role of private, professional combatants and peace support personnel in conflict zones.

But in Africa and elsewhere, the growing role of such private forces has been met with caution and relative hostility.



In November, an international gathering will take place under the auspices of the Swiss government and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) to drum up international support for positive regulation of private military and security companies.

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, an ICRC legal advisor, says the one certain thing is that "the presence of private military players in conflict zones is likely to remain or even increase, and the time to start taking regulatory action is now."

The goal is to ensure that these companies respect international law.

Most of the existing laws and international conventions relating to non-state actors in conflict zones are hostile to professional forces and generally treat them as mercenaries. Under international law, for example, mercenaries cannot enjoy prisoner-of-war status.

Although international law defines the legal responsibilities of private military companies and the states that hire them, the ICRC says practical difficulties have arisen in bringing legal proceedings when violations have occurred.

Still, there is no international regulatory framework specifically focusing on the industry and its activities.

The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), a nongovernmental trade association of companies that provide international peace and stability operations forces, advocates for changes in international law that reflect the positive contribution of such companies.

IPOA President Doug Brooks points out that even the United Nations uses private security companies. The U.N. works with private forces in areas such as de-mining and logistical support, as well as in the protection of its staff and facilities.

But Brooks says his association would like to see the U.N. use private military forces in more "ideologically volatile" roles like peacekeeping missions.

Brooks said private security players could, for instance, be used in Sudan's troubled western region of Darfur for "defensive humanitarian security" for internally displaced people. This would allow the Africa Union peacekeeping force to better focus its efforts on enforcing the peace agreement.

Some nations, including many in Africa, see high-end private security providers as undermining state security forces and hence national sovereignty. In addition, Brooks points out, many academics and non-profit development groups are skeptical of or hostile to the idea that the private sector can play such an important role in peacekeeping operations.

"In some cases they simply do not like the private sector, in others they believe that the effectiveness and speed of the private sector simply challenge and undermine the desired international cooperation required to do peace operations," he said.

But "delays caused by ideological resistance end up costing many lives in peace operations," Brooks added.

IPOA, the only body of its kind in the world, is working with the U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries, the ICRC and the Swiss government to bring the issue of positive regulation to international attention.

Human rights activists are apprehensive about the drive to regulate the industry, saying the use of force should be left to governments who have the legal obligation and mechanisms to do so.

Priscilla Nyokabi of the Kenya section of the International Commission of Jurists says monitoring compliance with international law is difficult, and therefore any atrocities resulting from allowing private security players to participate in combat and peacekeeping operations may not be adequately addressed.

"Citizens need to hold accountable entities that are constitutionally obliged to protect them, those that collect taxes for that purpose," she said.

Retired Lt. Col Jaw Kitiku of the Security Research Information Centre, a Nairobi-based international security research group, said monitoring the enforcement of laws relating to private security firms would be especially difficult in Africa.

As examples of private security firms' poor record in Africa, he cites cases of private security companies becoming involved in African wars, such as the now-defunct South Africa-based Executive Outcomes, the U.S.- and U.K.-based Sandline International, and the shadowy 2005 plot, allegedly involving a former executive of Executive Outcomes, to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea using mercenaries.

"Peace building activities happen when an agreement is signed between nations or the U.N.," says Kitiku. "Having individual companies with that responsibility and without the mandate of nations involved may be dangerous."

But the high number of non-state security personnel currently in Iraq, contracted by the United States, the U.N. and international humanitarian agencies, has made calls to regulate the industry more urgent.

Members of special operations forces in militaries across the globe seek employment in private military firms. Militaries from Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and South Africa are among the top feeder armies for private security firms.

And the use of such contractors is appealing to governments because of their cost-effectiveness. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, is a strong proponent of outsourcing non-essential tasks to contractors.

British Defence Minister Lord Drayson told parliament earlier this month that the British government is considering using a private firm, Security Support Solutions Ltd., for helicopter transport missions in Afghanistan.

The South African government, which is considering passing a law regulating its citizens' participation in private security forces, recently said there are at least 5,000 South Africans working as private security personnel in Iraq.

The South African bill would bar South African citizens from participating as combatants "for private gain in an armed conflict" or from recruiting, using, training, supporting or financing a "combatant for private gain in an armed conflict" unless specifically authorized by the government. The bill has been criticized by industry advocates such as IPOA, who say it would undermine international peacekeeping operations.

Under the applicable international law, use of mercenaries is illegal only to the extent that it violates the norms protecting territorial sovereignty, political independence and non-interference.

International conventions that have come into force since 1977, beginning with Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, as well as subsequent regional legal instruments, generally treat private security forces as rogue, unaccountable mercenaries, rather than as a legitimate industry that has the potential to contribute to peace building.

Steve Mbogo is an investigative journalist based in Nairobi, Kenya. He writes on Africa's terrorism and security trends, socio-economics, international relations, politics and biotechnology.

http://worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=307#

[keith]

Kroll to sell Iraq and Afghan security unit
By Guy Dinmore in Washington and Rebecca Knight in Boston

Published: November 2 2006 01:51 | Last updated: November 2 2006 01:51

Kroll, one of the big US names in the bodyguard business, said on Wednesday it would “refocus its strategy” in security and was looking to sell its subsidiary that provides security services in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Simon Freakley, chief executive and president of Kroll, said the company planned to maintain its security consulting services to corporations and high net worth individuals as well as its training activities. But he said it would “start to work [its] way out of contract work for the government”.

Three members of Kroll staff serving as bodyguards were killed in Iraq in 2005, from some 350 employees and accredited subcontractors on the ground in the country, he said. The size of its work force in Afghanistan was not available.

According to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, an independent group, nearly 370 private contractors have been killed in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Many are security guards as well as truck drivers.

The thousands of armed expatriates who work for private military contractors represent the second-largest foreign force in Iraq after the US. Protection in Iraq has grown into a multi*billion dollar industry.

A mass pull-out by big companies would have a serious impact on the ability of the US military to focus resources on fighting the insurgency and hurt efforts to reconstruct the country.

It is not clear whether Kroll will set a trend. Dyncorp International, a large security group that has suffered many more casualties than Kroll, said it had no plans to pull out.

The US State Department did not return calls seeking comment.

“Security is still a meaningful part of what we do,” Mr Freakley said, adding that the company had no plans to pull out its bodyguard teams from Iraq and Afghanistan before it sold Kroll Security International.

Mr Freakley said Kroll would probably sell the unit in the next few months. “We’ve begun a sale process to dispose of the business to an appropriately qualified and resourced company that specialises in that area,” he said.

The White House on Wednesday scrambled to counter reports that Iraq was sliding into chaos.

Tony Snow, the spokesman, said since the end of the fasting month of Ramadan over a week ago there had been a “pretty dramatic reversal” in the number of attacks and sectarian violence in Baghdad. But this did not mean the US would “do a victory lap” either, he said.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2006.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/24fa237c-6a13-11db-952e-0000779e2340.html

[keith]

The profits of war
(AP)
An injured man uses his mobile phone at the site where two car bombs detonated in a central Baghdad residential neighborhood, killing at least six people. Printer Friendly | PDF | Email | digg
Kelly Carson, The Examiner
Read more by Kelly Carson
Nov 13, 2006 4:00 AM (16 hrs ago)
Current rank: # 216 of 8,689 articles

BALTIMORE - Death. It’s always there in Iraq. The danger doesn’t go away. More than 646 American civilians have been killed in Iraq since 2003, according to the U.S. Labor Department, 68 of them in the past three months. Another 196 U.S. government civilian employees have died in the country since 2003, eight of them in the past three months.


Roadside bombs, enemy ambush, helicopter crashes and heart failures have contributed to the death toll that has some in the business world second-guessing themselves and wondering if the profits are worth the price.

“We’re not going back to Baghdad. It’s just not practical,” said Paul Quinn, director of sales for Baltimore Dredge Enterprises LLC.

The company is under contract to provide a variety of dredging equipment to the Iraqi reconstruction effort — an effort that is getting more dangerous as the war wears on.

While in the Iraqi capital, Quinn’s movements were restricted by at least one bomb blast. It’s so dangerous there his business operations are now concentrated in the relatively safe northern region of Kurdistan.

The political rhetoric over America’s involvement is at a fever pitch, with voters this month sending a clear message to President Bush that change is needed. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is out. The new Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate is pledging investigations not only into the operation of the war, but of the rebuilding effort that is costing billions of dollars.

Increasingly, U.S. civilians who dare to venture into the war-torn country are being killed by insurgents hell-bent on the defeat of U.S. troops and coalition forces.

Despite the killings, the car bombings and the kidnappings, business goes on in the Persian Gulf region. Business as usual? Hardly. But business nonetheless — $18.4 billion worth.

“It’s tenuous,” Quinn said.

October, the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, was the deadliest month for Americans this year in Iraq. Eighty-seven American troops were killed, while five American civilians died, all the result of roadside bombs, according to data compiled by iCasulaties.org, an Internet database of death in Iraq funded by private donations. Twenty-three U.S. troops have died so far in the month of November.

Only one Maryland civilian, Rick A. Ulbright of Waldorf, has died as a result of the war, according to iCasualties. At least two Virginia residents working as civilians in Iraq have died. Records for the number of District of Columbia residents working as civilians in Iraq could not be found.

So far, 53 Marylanders, 83 Virginians and three District of Columbia residents serving in the military have died since the war began in March 2003. The military death total has climbed to almost 3,000. More than 20,000 have been wounded.

But with patience, guidance from government officials and courage, opportunity is abundant for business along the Baltimore-Washington corridor that can meet the growing demand for goods and services from both the Iraqi government and its civilian population.

As Quinn and other contractors have learned, doing business in Baghdad is most dangerous. And in the western reaches of Iraq, it’s not much better. Tribal Sunnis wreak havoc with coalition plans for reconciliation. In the south, ethnic Shiites threaten to destroy what progress coalitions forces have made. Kurdistan in the north, where ethnic Kurds have maintained a stable local government throughout the U.S.-led war, is the place to be.

“In part due to its semi-autonomous status since the early 1990s, the Kurdistan region boasts of a well-organized regional government and relatively stable economy, making it home to a host of early entrant investors, some of whom will be poised for expansion into central and southern Iraq once the security environment improves,” the U.S. Department of Commerce advises in its report, “Breaking Into Iraq’s Marketplace.”

More than 3,400 reconstruction-related projects have been started in the country, and more than 2,200 have been completed. Another 1,000-plus are under way through

the U.S.-funded Iraq reconstruction initiative, the Commerce Department reported.

A quarterly report to Congress released in October stated that Iraq reconstruction teams made up of soldiers, aid workers and diplomats face such a high risk of violence that they are having difficulty performing their duties in some regions of the country.

However, the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau said the report did not show the “significant progress” that has been made in the country, and added that the reconstruction teams’ presence in dangerous provinces “outweighs the risk,” The Associated Press reported.

“It’s still of interest to us, but it calls for more and more caution and awareness,” Quinn said of Baltimore Dredge’s presence in the country. The company has three contracts with different government agencies that call for more than 10 pieces of dredging equipment to be delivered through next year.

For other companies, however, the risk is too high.

New York-based security company Kroll, owned by Marsh & McLennan Companies Inc., withdrew its bodyguard teams from both Iraq and Afghanistan after it lost four workers in Iraq, the AP said. The withdrawal decision was made because the high-risk mission “had limited profitability,” the company told the AP.

On Nov. 6, Baltimore-Washington corridor player Bechtel Corp. said it was withdrawing employees because of security concerns, the Middle East Times reported. The company, which at one point employed 40,000 workers, mostly Iraqis, captured $2.3 billion in U.S.-funded reconstruction contracts. The company said 52 of its employees were killed working on Bechtel projects and another 49 were injured during off-work hours, Middle East North Africa Financial Network reported.

The San Francisco-based engineering company, which has offices in Frederick, said it would not seek any future contracts in Iraq after its final deal ended this month. The company and its construction project were hit in a series of attacks launched by insurgents on Oct. 20. Power plants built by Bechtel were damaged, cutting off Baghdad from the Bechtel power grid, the Chicago Sun-Times reported.

Still, other companies may find that rebuilding Iraq and supplying much-needed consumer goods is a profitable venture that is worth the risk.

U.S.-funded reconstruction activities are winding down in the country, the Commerce Department reported, with private contractors now negotiating with the Iraqi government for work. Private enterprise is stepping up to continue the process of bringing Iraq back onto the international playing field.

Even venerable Coca-Cola Co. is in the game, granting authority to an Iraqi business for distribution. A production facility isn’t far behind, the soft-drink giant told Retail News Middle East.

“The local distributor is setting up a complete distribution system with trucks and salesmen to reach as many consumers as possible,” a Coca-Cola spokesman told Retail News. “Currently our products are being imported from neighboring countries.”

A report from ITP, the largest business and consumer magazine publisher in the Middle East, found that Iraqis are starving for Western products and services.

Unilever, the international manufacturer of brand-name food, home care and personal care products, told ITP that Iraqis are “accepting the brands better than Unilever expected.”

“One of the main challenges is how can we tackle our business in Baghdad,” Unilever’s country manager for Iraq and Sudan, Yehi Saad, said in the ITP report. “It is totally prohibited to go to Baghdad according to Unilever rules because of security issues. We are handling the business just from the north area. We have some distributors in the main cities in Iraq, but right now the products are sent through the north area and then distributed to other cities.”

And that’s the tactic that the Commerce Department recommends for other vendors who want to sell their goods in Iraq. By establishing business partnerships and bringing goods into the country overland from U.S.-friendly countries such as Jordan and Kuwait, success is considered viable.

kcarson@baltimoreexaminer.com

http://www.examiner.com/a-395472~The_profits_of_war.html

[keith]

War dogs rebranded as `pussycats of peace'
Mercenaries | Boom times could be ending for second-largest military contingent in Iraq
Nov. 19, 2006. 12:14 AM
THE ECONOMIST



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mercenaries have been part of history since the dawn of warfare, from Xenophon's "ten thousand" Greeks hired to fight in Persia to the Swiss Guards who protect the Vatican today.

Indeed, the word "soldier" derives from solidus, the Roman gold coin — a soldier being one who fought for money.

In recent decades, mercenaries have been pushed to the wilder edges of global conflict: the "dogs of war" who fight nasty little campaigns in Africa.

But for a new kind of soldier of fortune, the fighting in Iraq has proved to be a pot of gold. Private security companies' hired guns have grown into the second-largest military contingent in Iraq, after U.S. forces.

Estimates of their number range from 10,000 to 30,000. They build and supply military camps, guard Baghdad's "Green Zone" enclave, protect convoys, gather information and provide bodyguards for officials, businessmen, aid workers and journalists.

The cannier of these mercenaries have become millionaires. But now, the gold rush could be ending.

Reconstruction projects are running down, and with them the contracts to protect the contractors. The market is saturated, meaning lower prices. It is uncertain how long the U.S. military will remain in Iraq and how much business the Iraqi government will transfer to local outfits.

At a conference of security firms in London last month, well-muscled ex-soldiers who have swapped their fatigues for pinstriped suits fretted about the future. Pickings in Afghanistan are thin and there seems little chance of Washington starting another big war, with the juicy contracts it brings.

The mercenaries forecast consolidation: big firms buying little ones, and more transatlantic tie-ups.

American firms depend heavily on Pentagon contracts, British ones specialize in risk consultancy and security services for private business, particularly oil and mining companies.

The industry by some estimates turns over $100 billion (U.S.) a year, though the definitions are contentious: what counts as a military company, and what is merely an engineering firm building barracks? Less contentious is the need to diversify.

The most lucrative business is not "guns on trucks" but less-glamorous jobs such as logistics and maintaining weapons systems.

Swaggering men with wrap-around dark glasses may catch the headlines — particularly when they are accused of shooting Iraqi civilians — but the real money is elsewhere.

The Pentagon has led the way in privatizing jobs once done by regular soldiers. The logistics provided by Brown & Root — now part of KBR, the engineering and military-services contractor unit of the Halliburton Co. — were central to the American deployment in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Halliburton's chief executive at the time, Dick Cheney, said: "The first person to greet our soldiers as they arrive in the Balkans and the last one to wave goodbye is one of our employees."

The Pentagon also has used private firms to train other countries' armies.

The nebulous aid provided to Croatia by one firm, Military Professional Resources Inc., is widely linked with that country's success in the final phase of Bosnia's war.

Using private contractors not only allows governments to conduct politically sensitive operations at arm's length, it also cuts the political cost of direct military operations. Dead contractors mean fewer protests than dead soldiers. Military casualties in Iraq are carefully recorded, but there are no firm figures for security contractors, though hundreds have died.

This year's Quadrennial Defense Review treats private contractors as an integral part of the "total force" at the Pentagon's disposal. But contractors have drawbacks. They are accused of profiteering, poaching experienced soldiers from regular military units and being less accountable than soldiers. Private contractors were involved in the torture scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, but only the military interrogators have been prosecuted.

Seeking new lines of business, security companies are looking at protecting the Olympics and other major events, bringing aid to places where humanitarian workers fear to go and providing services and expertise for the United Nations.

Security companies have already dabbled in these areas, but any real breakthrough will require them to clean up their reputations more convincingly.

"People always ask me about mercenaries and the dogs of war. I tell them we are actually the pussycats of peace," says Andrew Bearpark, director of the British Association of Private Security Companies.

(America's equivalent has an even cozier name: the International Peace Operations Association.)

Security firms say they want government regulation. But while critics see legislation as a means of restraining "corporate mercenaries," many security companies see it as a badge of respectability that would open up lucrative corporate, government and international contracts.

The firms face a dilemma: they may want to dispel any notion they are mercenaries, but they also trade on the warrior mystique. After all, who would use a pussycat as a guard dog?



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is an edited version of an unsigned article published in The Economist magazine.

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1163890210396&call_pageid=968332188854&col=968350060724

[keith]

Private Security in Iraq: Who Can You Trust?

04/12/2006
By Maad Fayad
London, Asharq Al Awsat - It would seem that private security in Iraq generally, and in Baghdad in particular, which emerged as a new phenomena over the past two years has transformed into what could be described as tribal security. The importance of tribal affiliation is evident in the selection process of security teams that are responsible for protecting various figures.

Today in Iraq, it is evident that there has been an irregular spread of private security convoys to the extent that one cannot distinguish between those carrying government officials, members of parliament or even a politician who heads a major- or small-scale political party.

The reality in Iraq is that personal bodyguards are no longer only used by political figures, as a large number of traders and businessmen rely on bodyguards to protect their own lives and guarantee the safety of their family members. Traffic is often disrupted by an armored vehicle that is followed and preceded by trucks carrying men who fire shots in various directions to warn others, including potential hostage-takers and assassins, of their presence.

The action of any security group depends on the identity of the person that they are protecting, which also dictates the approach that they adopt on the street. Furthermore, not all security groups are made up of Iraqis, as the country is encumbered by foreign companies that provide private protection for politicians and businessmen.

Last week, Reuters reported that the Iraqi Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani had stated that a specialized security committee would reach a deal with a South African security company to protect the Iraqi President and members of the Iraqi parliament. The statement was met by criticism from parliament members, who preferred that government authorities should be entitled with "protecting the people's representatives".

Media figure and spokesperson for Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Mohannad Abdul Jabbar, told Asharq Al Awsat, "The Iraqi Parliament Speaker announced the new security measure following a failed assassination attempt on his life. There are some technical security aspects that are unrelated to the parliament speaker and are left to the security commission which includes; the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense and Deputy Parliament Speaker Khalid al Attiyah." He pointed out that, "The parliament speaker and even members of parliament do not have detailed information on this subject."

Abdul Jabbar explained, "All that we know is that there are talks for an agreement with a foreign company from South Africa, exclusively to protect the parliamentary building. Concerned authorities are to be entitled with signing contracts and similar issues. "

Abdul Jabbar continued, "The protection of the Green Zone in general, which includes the parliament buildings, is the responsibility of security forces from various nationalities. Within the Green Zone, some areas are protected by Nepali, Indian, Romanian, or Ukrainian security companies." He pointed out that, "The entrances and exits of the building are currently protected by Nepalese forces; however protecting the building from inside is the responsibility of the Iraqi government."

Abdul Jabbar explained that the reason that foreign companies are assigned the task of protecting parliament is "to prevent any infiltration of terrorist elements or proponents of certain parties. The representatives of these companies deal with individuals equally in terms of the accuracy of inspections that are carried out and checking entry passes etc." He pointed out that, "If the task was assigned to an Iraqi body, it may be the case that representatives would be biased. Foreign companies are impartial and protect all parties."

Asharq Al Awsat spoke to the Commander of the Interior Ministry, Major General Mohammed Nema who said that, "The protection of state officials is the responsibility of the government. Either the state allocates a security team to protect every official or the official would choose the team himself. The state pays the salaries of these guards as long as the government is the sole decision-maker as to the number of guards assigned to each government official." He added, "The state allocates a number of individuals to protect any minister and the Ministry of Defense pays their salaries. If they wanted to appoint an additional number of guards, then it is the ministry's responsibility to provide funding. If a minister were to leave the ministry for any reason, the number allocated to protect him would be reduced."

Major General Nema elaborated, "Such matters are out of one’s control, especially with regard to the number of protection personnel. Concerning members of parliament, the government pays every member a monthly sum estimated at approximately 13 million Iraqi Dinars (US $9000). From this amount, the member of parliament is to allocate the monthly salary of his security team as well as the maintenance of cars allocated to him. He is free to give them the amount he decides as a monthly salary." He pointed out that there are some deputies or ministers who are financially supported by their parties, thus they appoint a larger security team for themselves. He adds, "I have a 12-member security team that accompanies me whenever I go out."

Major General Nema added, "It is assumed that the state would grant an armored and bullet-proof car for each minister, member of parliament, under secretary of state and even general manager. However, the financial capacities of the government would not allow for this high number of armored vehicles that cost at least US $15,000 each." Major General Nema confirmed that there are risks involved regarding the presence of foreign or Iraqi security companies. He said, "There are 36 foreign and Iraqi security companies that are officially licensed by the Interior Ministry. Conversely, there are over 200 unlicensed foreign and Iraqi companies, moreover a large part of the employees of these companies are involved in terrorist activities. To us, they are violators of the law as they are not licensed by the ministry. This is why the ministry has its set of procedures against these companies." Finally, Major General Nema stated, "The weapons that are allowed to be used by governmental or security personnel are light weapons; rifles and machine guns. They are not allowed to use PKC machine guns."

Asharq Al Awsat asked a number of members of parliament and the Minister of Human Rights about the sizes of their security teams.

Dr. Fouad Massoum, the head of the Kurdish parliamentary bloc, emphasized that the team appointed to protect him is made up of members of the Peshmerga forces, and that the Kurdish government is responsible for paying its salaries. He said, "There are some members that I had selected based on my personal knowledge and on recommendations made by close acquaintances. Some of the members were directly recruited from the Peshmerga forces. I completely trust them and I am confident that they are well-trained."

Dr Fouad Massoum explained that the members of his security team are paid between US $250 and $350 per month, and that members of the team are police officers. He also noted that the team is armed with licensed light weapons.

MP for the National Iraqi List, Iyad Jamaluddin, explained that he had personally selected his security men. He said, "The majority of them are relatives and acquaintances that I confide in. I trust them with my life." He added that he first chose his bodyguards then presented them to the Ministry of Defense to be appointed as staff of the ministry, from which they would directly receive their salaries.”

Jamaluddin stated however, “I provide the wages of a few members of the security team, as the figure given by the state is insufficient.” An MP from the Dulaim region, who spoke to Asharq Al Awsat on condition of anonymity, admitted that he had recruited all his guards from his own tribe. He said, “All of them are my cousins, and this is to ensure that nobody can infiltrate the team to endanger my life."

Iraqi Minister of Human Rights, Wijdan Salim, is the most committed official to the directives of the government. She said, "My security team is made up of 20 guards and they are paid by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Human Rights." She noted that she had personally appointed her own team as she knows some of them and others were recommended to her by close acquaintances. The criteria also depended upon the efficiency of combat skills.

Salim added, "This is all useless… Why is there all this focused interest in the protection of ministers? Everybody should be protected, with priority given to the citizens and then ministers, or else equally. What is the point of protecting a minister when citizens are exposed to terrorism?"

A member of the Iraq security authorities who was an adviser to the Interior Ministry summarized the policy employed to protect parties and leading figures saying, "Parties with armed militias are protected by these militias. For example, elements of the Badr Corps are given the responsibility of protecting the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Abdul Aziz al Hakim and his son Ammar. It also guards SCIRI’s headquarters and members of parliament from the political party. The same applies to members of the Sadr bloc, who are protected by elements of al Mahdi Army, who had been appointed in the Ministry of Defense. Members of the Iraqi Accord Front are protected by Sunni guards who were also appointed in the Ministry of Defense as officers and soldiers."

A former adviser in the Interior Ministry, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told Asharq Al Awsat, "The security team of the former Prime Minister Dr. Iyad Allawi, was made up of employees of the Ministry of Defense. The team consisted of Kurds, Arabs, Shia, Sunnis, Turkmen and Christians."

ArmorGroup is one of the western companies that play a significant role in protection in Iraq. On its official website, it says, “ArmorGroup’s core business across the Middle East is devising and implementing solutions to complex security and safety problems in the region’s more stable and modern countries as well as those which are the most hostile and chaotic.”

It states that the company, “offers advanced security and specialist unit training for the local Defense Ministry in Iraq and security management, protective security details and convoy security escorts to many of the logistics companies operating in support of the essential reconstruction and humanitarian re-supply efforts in Iraq.”

The official website adds that ArmorGroup has also played an important role in supporting reconstruction, development and humanitarian projects across the region, providing valuable mine action and local national training services from Lebanon to Iraq and Afghanistan.

http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=7242

[keith]

Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq
Civilian Number, Duties Are Issues

By Renae Merle
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, December 5, 2006; Page D01

There are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there, according to the military's first census of the growing population of civilians operating in the battlefield.

The survey finding, which includes Americans, Iraqis and third-party nationals hired by companies operating under U.S. government contracts, is significantly higher and wider in scope than the Pentagon's only previous estimate, which said there were 25,000 security contractors in the country.

It is also 10 times the estimated number of contractors that deployed during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, reflecting the Pentagon's growing post-Cold War reliance on contractors for such jobs as providing security, interrogating prisoners, cooking meals, fixing equipment and constructing bases that were once reserved for soldiers.

Official numbers are difficult to find, said Deborah D. Avant, author of the 2005 book "The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security," but an estimated 9,200 contractors deployed during the Gulf War, a far shorter conflict without reconstruction projects. "This is the largest deployment of U.S. contractors in a military operation," said Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University.

In addition to about 140,000 U.S. troops, Iraq is now filled with a hodgepodge of contractors. DynCorp International has about 1,500 employees in Iraq, including about 700 helping train the police force. Blackwater USA has more than 1,000 employees in the country, most of them providing private security. Kellogg, Brown and Root, one of the largest contractors in Iraq, said it does not delineate its workforce by country but that it has more than 50,000 employees and subcontractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. MPRI, a unit of L-3 Communications, has about 500 employees working on 12 contracts, including providing mentors to the Iraqi Defense Ministry for strategic planning, budgeting and establishing its public affairs office. Titan, another L-3 division, has 6,500 linguists in the country.

The Pentagon's latest estimate "further demonstrates the need for Congress to finally engage in responsible, serious and aggressive oversight over the questionable and growing U.S. practice of private military contracting," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), who has been critical of the military's reliance on contractors.

About 650 contractors have died in Iraq since 2003, according to Labor Department statistics.

Central Command, which conducted the census, said a breakdown by nationality or job description was not immediately available because the project is still in its early stages. "This is the first time we have initiated a census of this robustness," Lt. Col. Julie Wittkoff, chief of the contracting branch at Central Command, said in an interview. Those figures do not include subcontractors, which could substantially grow the figure.

In June, government agencies were asked to provide data about contractors working for them in Iraq, including their nationality, a description of their work and locations where they were working. The information was provided by more than a dozen entities within the Pentagon and a dozen outside agencies, including the departments of State and Interior, Wittkoff said. The count increased about 15 percent from about 87,000 since Central Command began keeping a tally this summer, she said, though the increase may reflect ongoing data collection efforts. The census will be updated quarterly, Wittkoff said.

Three years into the war, the headcount represents one of the Pentagon's most concrete efforts so far toward addressing the complexities and questions raised by the large numbers of civilians who have flooded into Iraq to work. With few industry standards, the military and contractors have sometimes lacked coordination, resulting in friendly fire incidents, according to a Government Accountability Office report last year.

"It takes a great deal of vigilance on the part of the military commander to ensure contractor compliance," said William L. Nash, a retired Army general and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "If you're trying to win hearts and minds and the contractor is driving 90 miles per hour through the streets and running over kids, that's not helping the image of the American army. The Iraqis aren't going to distinguish between a contractor and a soldier."

The census gives military commanders insight into the contractors operating in their region and the type of work they are doing, Wittkoff said. "It helps the combatant commanders have a better idea of . . . food and medical requirements they may need to provide to support the contractors," she said.

Staff writer Griff Witte contributed to this report.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401311.html

[keith]

NTSB faults Pentagon in '04 Afghan crash
Posted 12/4/2006 10:27 PM ET

By Alan Levin and Matt Kelley, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Poor Defense Department oversight of private companies that fly military missions in war zones was partially responsible for a 2004 crash that killed six people in Afghanistan, federal accident investigators said Monday.
The National Transportation Safety Board recommended that the Defense Department coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration to better monitor the charter flights increasingly being used to carry small numbers of troops and cargo in Iraq and Afghanistan.

An NTSB statement said the agency is "concerned that the unique risks presented by operations in remote overseas locations have not been adequately addressed for civilian contractors that provide air transportation services to the U.S. military."

The flight was operated by Presidential Airways of Melbourne, Fla., a part of the same company as Blackwater USA, a private security firm assisting private companies and the military in war zones.

Pilots on the CASA 212 twin-turboprop were flying over a remote mountainous region of Afghanistan on Nov. 27, 2004, when they entered a tight canyon ringed by peaks as high as 16,580 feet. They tried to climb over the mountains, but crashed at 14,650 feet, the NTSB said.

The pilots had not used oxygen, as is required when flying over 10,000 feet for prolonged periods, the NTSB said. Lack of oxygen at high altitudes can interfere with pilots' mental skills. The NTSB also noted the company's failure to require crews to fly specific routes and follow safety regulations.

For example, the military requires planes it charters to be equipped with a device that allows people on the ground to follow the flight's route. But the NTSB said it found no evidence that the military had tried to enforce the rule.

Without the device, searchers had difficulty locating the wreckage. Searchers did not find it for nearly 24 hours. The search was also slowed because the company did not discover that the plane was missing until nearly six hours after the crash.

Lt. Col. Todd Vician, a Defense Department spokesman, said the Pentagon will review the recommendations.

Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Blackwater, said that the NTSB report "fails to understand the realities of operations in a war zone."

The crash killed Lt. Col. Michael McMahon, 41; Chief Warrant Officer Travis W. Grogan, 31; Spc. Harley D. Miller, 21; pilot Noel English, 37; co-pilot Loren Hammer, 35; and mechanic Melvin Rowe, 43.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-12-04-ntsb-afghan-crash_x.htm

[keith]

Contractors mull post-occupation Iraq
By Jeremy Scott-Joynt
Business reporter, BBC News


The US needs to start working on intensive diplomacy to lay the groundwork to get US troops out of Iraq, a blue-ribbon group of eminent US politicians has suggested.

For some businesses operating in Iraq, coalition forces cannot get out soon enough.

"The departure of the coalition military would be very welcome, and the sooner it happens the better," David Horgan, managing director of Petrel Resources, told the BBC World Service's Business Daily programme.

"In terms of the local security environment, the coalition provides nothing to us in any area that we act in anyway."

Mr Horgan's firm, based in Ireland and active in Iraq since 1999, is developing two oilfields for the Iraqi oil ministry, as well as exploring other fields.

Petrel's operations are in the south and in the centre.

In the south, he said, it relied less on coalition troops than on local Shia militias and on the Iraqi government police "which are often hard to distinguish"; while in the centre security was non-existent.

'Contamination'

Mr Horgan was speaking ahead of the release of the report from the Iraq Study Group (ISG), led by ex-US Secretary of State James Baker.

He is in no doubt that his firm's operations get little benefit from the coalition presence.

"The biggest single hazard is that we are seen as westerners and thereby contaminated by association with the coalition military," he said.

The UK's Ministry of Defence, however, insists that coalition forces - among whom British troops number about 8,000 - are in Iraq because the Iraqi government continues to want them there, for security and training purposes.

Defence Secretary Des Browne said recently that the UK would stay until its job was complete.

"We will make sure that we do not ask a single extra soldier to remain in Iraq longer than is necessary," he said.

"In the end, of course, it must depend on conditions on the ground ¿ including the level of threat and the capacity of the Iraqis to deal with it."

Long-standing problem

Security problems are nothing new for Western firms operating in Iraq.

Since the invasion by US and other forces in March 2003, and throughout the subsequent operation, there have been a stream of incidents that have highlighted the threat to firms and individual contractors there.

Indeed, according to Economist Intelligence Unit analyst Neil Partrick, the result is that - in some ways - the most prominent presence by Western firms on the ground in Iraq is in the form of private military and security companies such as Blackwater, Armor Group, Aegis and Custer Battles.

There are also the much larger oil and construction firms such as Halliburton's KBR - which won billions of dollars worth of no-competition contracts from the US Department of Defense - and Bechtel.

Different sources

Bechtel has now announced it is pulling out.


It has completed all of its contracts, but said in November that the "heartbreaking" deterioration in the security situation was a key factor in its decision not to seek any more.

No more US money is forthcoming on top of the $18bn or so allotted to date. Much of that, in any case, was spent on security and - it is alleged - billions went to corrupt officials and local power brokers.

Still, according to Neil Partrick, more is still forthcoming - $3,5bn from Japan, as well as sizable contributions from Middle Eastern states and Europe.

'No difference'

Anyone wanting to bid for it, though, is going to have to contend with the security situation.

"Violence is increasing in scope and lethality," the ISG report warns.

The upsurge has been particularly marked in the past year, since Sunni militants bombed the iconic golden dome of a Shia shrine in Samarra in February 2006.

And although a sudden withdrawal of coalition forces might make things worse, a medium-term pull-out by coalition forces may not make much difference one way or the other.

"On the timescales suggested, reducing the presence of troops may reduce some of the tensions that encourage insurgents," Mr Partrick said.

"But it won't reduce the key sources of tension: the contest for power and wealth between, and even within, sectarian and ethnic groups.

"Whether or not troops are stationed in central Iraq, that will go on."

On the ground

Whether troops stay or not, it is crucial to rely on local subcontractors - as almost all foreign firms do, said Mr Partrick - and their local knowledge.

"The three Kurdish provinces in the north are relatively stable," Mr Partrick said.

"But if you're talking about operations in some of the most insecure parts of the country, the north and the west, then it's highly unlikely that even profound local knowledge is going to help you.


As for the Shia-dominated south, there are relatively well-established political structures, Mr Partrick said, but still huge challenges and endemic corruption.

And within Baghdad, the acute sectarian divides mean that up-to-date local knowledge is crucial - "and, frankly, money outside formal contracts".

Who you know...

What really matters, Mr Horgan said, is who you rely on.

"You have to closely associate yourself with the legitimate government," he said.

"We only work for the Ministry of Oil. For example, if the ministry says, 'Don't work in the Kurdish area', then you don't, and you don't use any contractor who does work in the Kurdish area."

And the ISG's call for diplomacy to bring Iran and Syria into the Iraqi situation finds an echo in business terms.

"If it's useful having close relations with the Iranian authorities it's a good idea to go to Tehran and introduce yourself to the Iranian Ministry of Energy, and the National Iranian Oil Corporation," Mr Horgan said.

On the ground, however, it can be difficult for companies to decide how safe it is to be in any given area.

"You have to listen with your middle ear to the local people - not someone who presents himself in London or Paris as an expert - but the people who actually have considerable influence on the ground, and ingratiate yourselves with them," Mr Horgan said.

But he maintained: "As long as you show proper courtesy and spend a little bit of money in the local area, you shouldn't have any serious problems."

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/6209736.stm

Published: 2006/12/06 16:17:46 GMT

© BBC MMVI
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6209736.stm

[keith]

Garda buys Kroll unit that provides Iraq security
Thu Dec 7, 2006 11:25 AM EST

TORONTO (Reuters) - Garda World Security Corp. <GW.TO> said on Thursday it has acquired Kroll Security International, a unit that provides private security in Iraq and Afghanistan, from a subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. <MMC.N>.

Kroll Security, headquartered in London, offers protection for corporate personnel in the Middle East and elsewhere, but Kroll officials said the work had recently become less profitable and more dangerous.

As part of the transaction, Kroll, the risk consulting business of Marsh, agreed to let Montreal-based Garda provide all its executive protection and kidnap and ransom services.

Garda did not provide the sale price, but said Kroll Security International had annual revenue of about $42 million. It said the combined global risk business units will operate under the name GardaWorld.

Garda has 21,000 employees and offices in Canada, the United States, Mexico and Europe.

Marsh had previously said it wanted to get out of the international security business, which Kroll Chief Executive Simon Freakley reiterated on Thursday at a Marsh investor day presentation in New York.

Kroll Security International, which has 350 employees in Iraq and 50 in Afghanistan, is largely focused on protection for corporations, Freakley said.

Freakley said revenues at the unit were good but profit margins were thin, and the work had become "more challenging." Two of its workers were killed in Iraq in January 2005.

http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=businessNews&storyID=2006-12-07T162552Z_01_N07234899_RTRIDST_0_BUSINESS-GARDA-MARSHMCLENNAN-COL.XML&archived=False

[keith]

DynCorp has big role, little oversight in war efforts

Exclusive: Contractor with Texas ties operates with secrecy, arouses suspicion

08:12 AM CST on Sunday, December 24, 2006
By TOD ROBBERSON / The Dallas Morning News

First of two parts.

DynCorp International runs its operational hub from a dark glass building bearing another firm's logo. The office complex, on the outskirts of Irving, gives no indication of the huge footprint the military services company is leaving around the world.

Using billions of taxpayer dollars, DynCorp is quietly doing the U.S. government's work in Iraq, Afghanistan and other world hot spots. Its paramilitary forces can kill or be killed in combat, but there's little public accounting of what DynCorp does or whether tax dollars are being well spent.

Many Americans probably think it's the government's job to train foreign security forces, eradicate drug crops or maintain Air Force One. But these and other sensitive Pentagon and State Department tasks are in the hands of a private company with such a secretive history that even members of Congress say they have a hard time getting information about it.

Those lawmakers, along with some military leaders, academics and human rights groups, are pressing to lift the cloak of confidentiality over DynCorp and other military contractors while asking whether their performance justifies the billions of dollars being spent for their services.

"Members of Congress have a hell of a time" getting information about DynCorp and other contractors, said Rep. Janice Schakowsky, an Illinois Democrat who has monitored DynCorp's activities for several years. "It's one of the biggest scandals – and least known – that we have."

Ms. Schakowsky complained that she has been repeatedly thwarted in efforts to review U.S. government audit reports of DynCorp's contracts because, according to the State Department, the need to protect DynCorp's commercial secrets supersedes the public's right to know.

There seems to be no real interest in overseeing or reporting or holding accountable any of these contractors. And we're talking about billions of dollars of taxpayer money," she said.

A company spokesman, Gregory Lagana, said DynCorp supports the idea of greater accountability and is trying to become more open. He said the company is not deliberately secretive but does seek a low profile to avoid upstaging its client – the federal government.

"We think we are accountable. That doesn't mean we think we've always done everything well, but where we've fallen down, we'll take responsibility for it," he said. "And where we haven't given what we should have delivered, we'll step up and make it right."

The company does argue against releasing government audit reports, Mr. Lagana added, because they can show cost-per-employee figures that, if obtained by DynCorp's competitors, could help them undercut the company in future contract bids.

The little information that has come to light about the company's performance appears to raise questions about DynCorp's effectiveness.

Last month, a joint Pentagon and State Department review found that after three years of training at a price of more than $1 billion, the Dyncorp-trained police force in Afghanistan is rife with corruption and largely incapable of assuming basic security duties. The report praised the dedication of DynCorp's staff but suggested the training program had fallen short of its goals.

In October, a U.S. government review of Iraqi police training concluded that there were no accurate means to verify the operational capabilities of more than 120,000 officers reported to have passed through DynCorp and U.S. Army classes.

Mr. Lagana said none of those reports or any others in recent years have sharply criticized DynCorp's performance.


'Outsourcing' debated

With more than 5,000 employees in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, DynCorp's paramilitary workforce deploys alongside the U.S. military, putting the company at the center of a global debate on the "outsourcing" of war zone jobs that once were the Pentagon's exclusive domain.

DynCorp is one of the dominant private military companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its active and pending federal contracts, if brought to fruition, have a current value of $5.7 billion. Taxpayers provide 97 percent of DynCorp's revenue.

Critics contend that if the U.S. government performed the work itself, officials would have to tell Congress exactly how taxpayer money is being spent and justify the expenditure. But when the same activities are delegated to DynCorp and other contractors, the public reporting requirements diminish significantly.

DynCorp must submit to constant government oversight and has 10 government auditors working full time in the company's Irving offices, Mr. Lagana said. But critics contend that only a tiny percentage of that information becomes available to the public.

Human rights groups have been particularly critical of the free license DynCorp and other security contractors seem to enjoy when their paramilitary units deploy in world trouble spots such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan or Colombia. Iraq's ambassador to Washington echoed those concerns in an interview, labeling such units "imported militias."

DynCorp says it abides by U.S. and international law, as well as the laws of its host countries. Only a small percentage of its employees carry weapons on the job, and a much smaller number have ever engaged in a firefight, the company says.

Still, its biggest contracts involve police training and drug-crop eradication in some of the world's most lawless environments, where armed confrontation is expected.

For Ms. Schakowsky and other critics, DynCorp has become an all-too-convenient alternative for getting the job done if the military or State Department wants to reduce its congressional reporting requirements. DynCorp personnel, many of whom are retired generals, colonels and former special-operations troops, are capable of conducting operations with military precision.

Since they operate beyond U.S. borders and frequently are employed by offshore subsidiaries, private military contractors are not necessarily bound by U.S. law. Although the company requires them to abide by domestic laws, the lawless nature of some countries where they operate typically means the chances of local enforcement are minimal.

Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution scholar and author of a 2003 book, Corporate Warriors, said the insertion of civilian paramilitary operators into combat zones has significantly muddled international conventions on the conduct of war.

"Civilians were once assumed to be noncombatants and thus immune from targeting wherever possible. This immunity, however, was predicated on their not being an inherent part of military operations. The digitized battlefield and the new 'surrogate warriors' places this immunity at risk," Mr. Singer wrote.

Col. Gerald Schumacher, a retired Special Forces officer who has researched private military companies in Iraq, said that the country's increasingly chaotic conditions have led to an almost cavalier attitude among many private military contractors toward international law.

"I don't know how anyone can function in that insurgent environment and have any regard for the laws of warfare and the Geneva Convention," he said. "It begins to beg the question: Should we be there at all if that's how we have to function?"


2nd-largest force in Iraq

Danger and death have been integral aspects of DynCorp's work dating to its founding at the end of World War II, and company officials defend DynCorp's work as an essential part of the nation's military and foreign policy agenda.

Because of Pentagon cutbacks, "we've got an armed forces in uniform that is incapable of carrying out the current national-security strategy," said retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a member of DynCorp's board of directors.

He noted that contractors currently rank as the second-largest foreign force, behind the U.S. military, serving in Iraq.

"They take hundreds of killed and wounded. They see themselves as part of the war effort," Gen. McCaffrey said. "Without them, our war effort collapses."

But contractors have not always behaved as ambassadors of good will. Convoys of heavily armed DynCorp security details, known as Shark Teams, routinely careen through the streets of Baghdad, halting motorists and aiming high-powered semi-automatic weapons at anyone who makes what they deem to be a threatening move.

The Iraqi ambassador to Washington, Samir Sumaidaie, complained that such security teams answer to no Iraqi authority. They are pushing the Iraqi government's patience to its limit, he added.

"They worry us. Most Iraqis don't like them. They are, to some extent, out of control and unaccountable, and that makes us very uncomfortable," the ambassador said.

The Iraqi government wants a formal agreement to regulate the behavior of foreign armies deployed in the country, Mr. Sumaidaie said. "That should take into account all of these irregular forces and 'imported militias' used for the security of foreign firms. They have to be regulated, and they have to be subjected to the authority of the sovereign Iraqi government."

In August, the Iraqi government ordered its DynCorp-trained police force to begin stopping civilian security teams and demanding to see permits for all weapons they carry. The order led to a few tense standoffs in the streets.

DynCorp managers interviewed in Baghdad laughed at the idea that their personnel should submit to Iraqi police authority, saying the police were too corrupt or religiously partisan to be trusted. Besides, they added, DynCorp would never allow a Shark convoy to halt on an Iraqi street, submit to a search and risk being exposed to attack.

"You never know, if you give up your weapon, who you're giving it to. They might turn right around and kill you with it," a senior company official in Baghdad said.

A heavily tattooed Shark Team gunner, who previously served in the Yugoslav special forces, refused to comply with the Iraqi order. "If they want my guns, they're going to have to fight for them. And they are not going to win."

But the company's conduct has led to some State Department rebukes. DynCorp lost an important diplomatic-security contract in Afghanistan last year, worth half a billion dollars, after the State Department fielded complaints about overzealous behavior and lack of discipline among DynCorp bodyguards there and in Iraq.

Witnesses described the security personnel, many recruited from the military's special-operations units, as brash and disrespectful.

"They swaggered and dressed like pirates and had all kinds of nicknames for each other. Nobody could tell them what to do," said a DynCorp official in Afghanistan.

"These were all guys at the lower end of the gene pool," said a U.S. Army colonel who tracked their exploits.

At a diplomatic reception in Kabul attended by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, DynCorp security officers required ambassadors to stand spread-eagle and submit to pat-down searches. Two embassies registered formal complaints, DynCorp employees said. In a separate incident, a DynCorp bodyguard seized a news photographer's camera and impaled it on a bayonet.

Such incidents brought increased scrutiny of DynCorp's performance within the State Department, according to current and former State Department officials.


Mixed results

Anne W. Patterson, the assistant secretary of state who oversees DynCorp's counter-narcotics and police-training duties, registered concern about the company's operations in meetings with top company officials this summer and fall. She declined an interview request, but company officials and others briefed about the meetings said she chided DynCorp executives over lax monitoring of subcontractors, whose poor performance led to serious construction delays and worsened living conditions for company employees.

The company said it had severed ties with the subcontractors and had taken measures to improve monitoring.

In Iraq, where DynCorp is finishing its original five-year, $1 billion contract to help train 160,000 police officers, some company managers spoke with frustration about the results of their training effort so far.

Rich Mackey, a regional supervisor based at a DynCorp compound near Baghdad's airport, said the company's training had yielded mixed results. Police trainees show high levels of dedication, he said, but corruption remains a serious problem among Iraqi commanders. Officers often must pay kickbacks to their superiors for supplies and good assignments.

"Bless their hearts for doing it," Mr. Mackey said. "They keep on coming. I don't know why, despite everything they're facing."

Tom Luce, another DynCorp supervisor, said police trainees also face heavy pressure from local Muslim clerics and leaders in their religious communities. Despite all of the training emphasis on the impartial enforcement of Iraq's laws, he said, officers still tend to obey the dictates of their local imams and tribal leaders while giving the Iraqi constitution a lower priority.

Mike Heidingsfield, who spent 14 months in Iraq as DynCorp's top civilian training commander, said it was difficult to tell whether DynCorp's expensive training program has been worth the money, time and human cost.

"I did have a mistaken notion before I deployed that we were going to enjoy a rebuilding success that could be measured by Western police standards. It quickly became clear that that was not going to be the case because of religion, history, culture, violence – all of it," Mr. Heidingsfield said.

He also told his police trainers to "manage their expectations" about transforming Iraq and said that progress would come in "baby steps."

By the end of his 14 months, Mr. Heidingsfield said, "incidental things told me that some good had been done." Among them: Iraqi police had learned to overcome their fears and begin doing street patrols, setting up checkpoints and "busting down doors."

When Mr. Heidingsfield left, he said of the Iraqi police, "Their resolve had clearly changed, but that's not an entirely scientific measurement" of whether that translated into money well spent.

DynCorp officials say their job is to carry out the government's instructions, not to question the merit of the mission. DynCorp does not set the policy or ask whether the result is worth the expenditure.

DynCorp's contracting teams – aided by retired military officers and former government contracting specialists – are adept at identifying outsourcing opportunities and winning high-priced contracts. Since the 9/11 attacks, DynCorp's annual revenues have climbed into the $2 billion range, up from a 1999 level of $1.4 billion.

That also has brought more rigorous accounting by the government, prompting questions about the effectiveness of some DynCorp practices.

Gen. McCaffrey said DynCorp probably needed to tighten its accounting and control procedures after it entered Iraq and Afghanistan.

"When you gin up for these massive contracts, with people you've brought in from all over the face of the earth, I'd be surprised if there wasn't during those start-up days some considerable confusion. ... In the confusion, you've got to be careful you don't have waste, fraud and abuse. And we've got to worry about that. The federal government is our client," he said.

In the start-up phase, the company had to move thousands of people, vehicles and equipment into the field, Gen. McCaffrey said. "I would be unsurprised at any allegation that there was loss of control of property, etcetera."


Financial irregularities

Although the State Department regularly audits DynCorp's government-funded operations, it deliberately limits public access to the auditors' findings – even when the contracts are unclassified. Some audits have uncovered significant evidence of over-billing or misspending of public funds.

Earlier this year, The Dallas Morning News requested copies of an unclassified 2005 State Department audit of a DynCorp counter-narcotics contract. Susan Pittman, a State Department press officer, turned down the request, saying, "We need permission from DynCorp to release this because it may contain proprietary information."

DynCorp ultimately allowed the State Department to release the audit report, which examined hazardous-duty pay and other disbursements to DynCorp employees in Peru and Colombia. The report found that DynCorp had over-billed the government by more than $1.8 million. DynCorp is contesting the findings.

Other government audits dating to the mid-1990s, some obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, revealed additional over-billing and faulty accounting by the company.

Despite the accounting problems, DynCorp officials remain confident that the State Department will continue its longstanding partnership with the company, in part, they say, because there are few other companies with DynCorp's capabilities and broad experience.

Deborah Avant, a George Washington University professor who specializes in private military contracting, said DynCorp clearly enjoys the incumbent's advantage, with years' more experience in police training and drug-crop eradication than any of its closest competitors.

Even if it misspent government funds, broke laws or behaved recklessly in Iraq or Colombia, she said, DynCorp is likely to remain the contractor of choice for what it does because the U.S. government has so few viable alternatives.

"A consequence of that is that the U.S. does not really have the institutional memory or capacity to judge what DynCorp is actually doing," Ms. Avant said. "That's one of the problematic consequences of privatization: It leaves the private sector in control of the expertise, rather than the government."

Col. Schumacher, the author and retired Special Forces officer, said a secret to DynCorp's success is its ability to do sensitive work for the government while ensuring the public knows as little as possible about it.

"If you do things quiet enough, you'll continue to get more business from the U.S. government. If you don't, you'll see fewer and fewer contracts," he said. "DynCorp has been one of the more effective organizations in attempting to keep their operations quiet."

E-mail trobberson@dallasnews.com

COMING MONDAY: Working for DynCorp is a betting man's game. Take a job in Afghanistan and the odds are very high of coming under attack before your contract runs out.

AT DYNCORP'S HELM

Short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, few directing bodies can boast a more star-studded and influential leadership group than does the DynCorp International board of directors. Drawing from the Pentagon's top echelon, the board has expertise in virtually every modern theater of war in the world, with a broad list of contacts that include presidents, prime ministers, kings and military commanders. Now they face the challenge of boosting DynCorp's stock, which opened in May at $15 a share and quickly slumped to $8.87 and only recently recovered. They also have had to guide the company through a major shake-up this summer and fall, which led to the ouster of DynCorp's chief executive officer and numerous other top executives amid concerns over management irregularities. The board includes Gen. Richard E. Hawley, retired head of the U.S. Air Combat Command and Adm. Leighton W. Smith, former chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe. Also:


GEN. BARRY McCAFFREY (retired 1996)

Background: Gen. McCaffrey retired as the U.S. Army's most highly decorated four-star general. As head of the U.S. Southern Command, he ordered U.S. forces to conduct military operations against Colombian guerrillas and drug lords. In 1996, he became White House drug czar, where he devised Plan Colombia, a multibillion-dollar counter-narcotics operation. It provided DynCorp with a major drug-crop eradication contract. DynCorp director since February 2005.



ADM. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER (retired 1999)

Background: Before retiring, Adm. Prueher was chief commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. He previously commanded Carrier Battle Group One, based in San Diego, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. After retiring, he became U.S. ambassador to China. Adm. Prueher serves on the boards of directors of Fluor Corp., Merrill Lynch, New York Life Insurance and Emerson Electric. DynCorp director since February 2005.



GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (retired 2000)

Background: In the U.S. Marine Corps, Gen. Zinni served as chief commander of the U.S. Central Command from 1997 to 2000. Before that, he was commanding general of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. In 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed him as senior adviser and U.S. envoy to the Middle East. DynCorp director since February 2005.


MARC GROSSMAN

Background: The former U.S. ambassador served as undersecretary of state for political affairs in the Clinton administration, where he supervised administration of Plan Colombia and the herbicide-spraying effort conducted by DynCorp International. He also is vice chairman of the Cohen Group, a Washington research firm headed by William Cohen, the former secretary of defense. DynCorp director since March 2006.


Dallas Morning News research

[keith]

DynCorp workers gamble with their lives


11:24 PM CST on Sunday, December 24, 2006
By TOD ROBBERSON / The Dallas Morning News

KABUL, Afghanistan – Whenever Marc Owens climbs into the front seat of an armored DynCorp International SUV, he leaves no question in the minds of passengers that his Dallas-area employer's business is deadly serious.

Mr. Owens, a bodyguard from Crowley, packs multiple weapons and ammunition clips in case of a street battle. He makes sure all of his passengers wear body armor even though they're already protected by 2-inch-thick bulletproof glass and heavy steel blast plates.

No matter how calm Kabul's streets might seem, Mr. Owens constantly scans the field, looking for any sign of potential attack. If he sees eve