Wowie Zahawie

[NYer]

Sorry everyone, but Iraq DID go uranium shopping (http://www.slate.com/id/2139609/) in Niger.

Christopher Hitchens connects a few dots ...

In February 1999, Zahawie left his Vatican office for a few days and paid an official visit to Niger, a country known for absolutely nothing except its vast deposits of uranium ore. It was from Niger that Iraq had originally acquired uranium in 1981, as confirmed in the Duelfer Report. In order to take the Joseph Wilson view of this Baathist ambassadorial initiative, you have to be able to believe that Saddam Hussein's long-term main man on nuclear issues was in Niger to talk about something other than the obvious. Italian intelligence (which first noticed the Zahawie trip from Rome) found it difficult to take this view and alerted French intelligence (which has better contacts in West Africa and a stronger interest in nuclear questions). In due time, the French tipped off the British, who in their cousinly way conveyed the suggestive information to Washington. As everyone now knows, the disclosure appeared in watered-down and secondhand form in the president's State of the Union address in January 2003.

Of course, there's more ... read the whole thing.

[Simon666]

Actually it just says this guy went to Niger. Apparently if Iraqis go to a foreign country, it must be by definition to go to the nearest tax free uranium and plutonium shop. :rolleyes: Zahawi claims not to even have known Niger produced uranium and went to ask them to break sanctions. In order to prove someone went to purchase uranium, it takes more than a travel ticket. :rolleyes:

[Simon666]

Profile: Wissam al-Zahawie (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=wissam_al-zahawie)

Positions that Wissam al-Zahawie has held:

Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican

Wissam al-Zahawie actively participated in the following events:
February 1999 Wissam al-Zahawie, Iraq’s ambassador to the Vatican, sets off on a trip to several African countries as part of an effort to convince African heads of state to visit Iraq. Saddam Hussein hopes that these visits will help break the embargo on flights to Iraq, and undermine the UN sanctions regime. Zahawie’s first stop is Niger, where he meets with the country’s president, President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, for one hour. Mainassara promises that he will visit Baghdad the following April (He is assasinated before he has an opportunity to do this). [New Yorker, 11/27/2003; Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 8/13/2003; Time, 11/2/2003; Independent, 9/10/2003 Sources: Wissam al-Zahawie, Charles O. Cecil] In early 2002, the Italian military intelligence service, SISMI, will allege in a report (see February 5, 2002) sent to the US that the motive behind the visit is to discuss the future purchase of uranium oxide, also known as “yellowcake” (see October 15, 2001). [New Yorker, 11/27/2003 Sources: Wissam al-Zahawie, Unnamed US intelligence sources] However, no one at this time suggests that the trip’s motives have anything to do with acquiring uranium. Zahawie’s trip is reported in the local newspaper as well as by a French news agency. The US and British governments are aware of the trip and show no concern about Niger, which is actively seeking economic assistance from the United States. [New Yorker, 11/27/2003 Sources: Wissam al-Zahawie, Charles O. Cecil]
People and organizations involved: Wissam al-Zahawie, Ibrahim Bare Mainassara

[NYer]

Circumstantial but not circumspect ...

"In February 1999, Zahawie left his Vatican office for a few days and paid an official visit to Niger, a country known for absolutely nothing except its vast deposits of uranium ore. It was from Niger that Iraq had originally acquired uranium in 1981, as confirmed in the Duelfer Report. In order to take the Joseph Wilson view of this Baathist ambassadorial initiative, You have to be able to believe that Saddam Hussein's long-term main man on nuclear issues was in Niger to talk about something other than the obvious.

"The Duelfer Report also cites "a second contact between Iraq and Niger," which occurred in 2001, when a Niger minister visited Baghdad "to request assistance in obtaining petroleum products to alleviate Niger's economic problems." According to the deposition of Ja'far Diya' Ja'far (the head of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear weapons program), these negotiations involved no offer of uranium ore but only "cash in exchange for petroleum." West Africa is awash in petroleum, and Niger is poor in cash. Iraq in 2001 was cash-rich through the oil-for-food racket, but you may if you wish choose to believe that a near-bankrupt African delegation from a uranium-based country traveled across a continent and a half with nothing on its mind but shopping for oil."

http://www.slate.com/id/2139609/

[Simon666]

So hints and insinuations without any REAL evidence. Almost reminds me of the "intelligence" BEFORE the war.

:add09:

[NYer]

So hints and insinuations without any REAL evidence. Almost reminds me of the "intelligence" BEFORE the war.

:add09:

Hope you've been following the Saddam tapes thread ...

[NYer]

Sixteen words, again. (http://www.nationalreview.com/ledeen/ledeen.asp)

But Linzer and Gellman are wrong, indeed so clearly wrong that it takes one’s breath away. The British government did indeed have information about Iraqi efforts to purchase uranium in Africa, and it wasn’t connected to the forgeries. And the definitive British parliamentary inquiry — the Butler Commission Report of July, 2004 — not only did not deliver "a scathing critique," but totally endorsed the position of British intelligence.

The key paragraph in the Butler Report is this:

We conclude that...the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government’s dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension we conclude also that the statement in President Bush’s State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that: "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was well-founded. (Page 123, Paragraph 499)

The British Intelligence Service, MI6, still stands by that story, as does the French service, the DGSE. And the two agencies did not base their assessments on the phony documents (indeed, the DGSE knew all about those documents, which were peddled and probably drafted by one or two Italian agents of theirs). According to London Sunday Times reporter Mick Smith — an outspoken critic of the American/British use of intelligence to justify the war, and an outspoken critic of Bush — the Franco/British analysis is based in part on a letter from Iraq’s Ambassador to the Vatican, that specifically discussed uranium from Niger. Smith also adds the delicious tidbit that the pile of forgeries actually contained an accurate document about the visit of Saddam’s man in the Vatican to Niger in 1999.

[Simon666]

The British Intelligence Service, MI6, still stands by that story, as does the French service, the DGSE. And the two agencies did not base their assessments on the phony documents (indeed, the DGSE knew all about those documents, which were peddled and probably drafted by one or two Italian agents of theirs). According to London Sunday Times reporter Mick Smith — an outspoken critic of the American/British use of intelligence to justify the war, and an outspoken critic of Bush — the Franco/British analysis is based in part on a letter from Iraq’s Ambassador to the Vatican, that specifically discussed uranium from Niger. Smith also adds the delicious tidbit that the pile of forgeries actually contained an accurate document about the visit of Saddam’s man in the Vatican to Niger in 1999.[/I]
Well, problem is the authentic document they're referring to only refers to his visit to Niger and doesn't mention uranium, while the one that DOES refer to uranium is a FORGERY. So again, the only "evidence" is a letter about a trip to - among other countries - Niger, which we know he made anyway. The rest is insinuation and speculation.


The first document (possibly authentic) is a letter, dated February 1, 1999, from the Niger embassy in Rome to Adamou Chekou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Niger, announcing Zahawie’s trip. It does not mention uranium. (Note that the SISMI report does not mention Al-Zahawi’s trip, it only states that uranium negotations between the two countries began by at least 1999.) The second document is a letter dated July 30, 1999 from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs to his ambassador in Rome requesting that he contact Zahawie, concerning an agreement signed June 28, 2000 to sell uranium to Iraq. The letter is an obvious forgery because it refers to an alleged event that is described as taking place 11 months later. [Unknown, n.d.]

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?id=1521846767-3684

[Alli]

So hints and insinuations without any REAL evidence. Almost reminds me of the "intelligence" BEFORE the war.

:add09:
Funny, it remeinds me of statements made by the dem's over the past few years too.

[Simon666]

Funny, it remeinds me of statements made by the dem's over the past few years too.
You think I like democrats? They're a lesser evil.

[NYer]

Well, problem is the authentic document they're referring to only refers to his visit to Niger and doesn't mention uranium

I suppose, like Rick in Casablanca, he went there for the waters. And like Rick, the Butler Commission was "misinformed."

[Simon666]

I suppose, like Rick in Casablanca, he went there for the waters. And like Rick, the Butler Commission was "misinformed."
He visited several African countries and Niger was but one of them. The Butler commission merely concluded that the forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery did not undermine the assessment. Also according to the Butler Commission, Saddam Hussein’s government claimed that a 1999 mission to Niger by Iraq’s ambassador to the Vatican was for the purpose of conveying an invitation to the Nigerian president to visit Iraq. No evidence for the contrary has EVER been shown. Or at least no evidence that wasn't forged. :D

[NYer]

From Butler ...

...the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government’s dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension we conclude also that the statement in President Bush’s State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that: "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was well-founded. (Page 123, Paragraph 499)

No matter ... Hope you keep following the Saddam tapes thread.

[Simon666]

http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf

From Butler:

The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.

That's why it was well founded. Doesn't make them any less of a forgery. :rolleyes:

[NYer]

We agree on the fact that there were forgeries ... and apparently also on the conclusion of the Butler commission. Happy Easter, Simon.

[NYer]

Butler report, Revisited. (http://powerlineblog.com/archives/013803.php)

[Simon666]

Only holocaust revisionism beats your ridiculousness and the ridiculiousness of your political kind.

[NYer]

Only holocaust revisionism beats your ridiculousness and the ridiculiousness of your political kind.

Parthian shot from the Galloway school no doubt ...

"494. There was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this case, there was some evidence that by 2002 an agreement for a sale had been reached.

503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:

a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.

b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence was credible.

c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.

d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it."

Excerpts from Butler Commission report ...
Res ipsa loquitur.

[Simon666]

Res ipsa loquitur.
Indeed, the facts are supposed to speak for themselves, only insinuation is provided, plus the whitewashing of the "16 words" by acknowledging that it wasn't known yet that the documents were false and forged. Doesn't say that the claim of the British government is true, only that it was justified to make it at the time. :rolleyes:

[NYer]

Mike Smith writes in The Sunday Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2125630_2,00.html), buried on Page 2:


Some time in 2002, however, they ( The French) obtained another apparently incriminating document, the source said. This was a letter purporting to be from al-Zahawie relating to a visit to Niger in 1999 to discuss the possible supply of uranium. This did not constitute evidence that Niger had agreed to supply yellowcake but it did indicate Saddam was trying to obtain it.

The letter, deemed “credible” by the Butler inquiry into Iraq intelligence, appears to be the evidence that led to Bush’s claim in January 2003 that the British had “learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

Neither Mike Smith nor French Intel are friends of the Bush Administration so there was and is no ulterior motive for this story. From Il Foglio: (http://www.ilfoglio.it/uploads/camillo/sundaytimesnigergate.html) ( and please feel free to correct the translation)

The Sunday Times, citing Nato sources close to the official Nigergate investigation, has for the first time revealed the existence of a letter dating back to the year 2000, obtained by the French in 2002 but not from Rocco Martino or the authors of the false dossier, which explicitly details the visit to Niger of Saddam’s envoy charged precisely with the scope of obtaining uranium. This letter – and only this letter, not the false dossier so dear to La Repubblica – is at the origin of the famous 16 words pronounced by George W. Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address.

In 2000 the French came into possession of both the real documents and false documents regarding the attempts by the Iraqis to procure uranium in Niger. After September 11, and in the months proceeding the invasion of Iraq, the French passed the real document to the British but allowed one of their agents, Rocco Martino, to disseminate an obviously false dossier which, if discovered, would have raised doubts in regards to Iraq’s real attempts to procure uranium, this operation would, in addition, carry Italian ‘fingerprints’ and not French ones. Panorama didn’t fall for it but other media organisations did.

[Simon666]

The Sunday Times story is from Michael Smith. A detailed analysis refuting his story as completely bunk can be found here (http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/006195.php). It's a long read but quite detailed. The conclusions:



In this post I analyzed a recent report by Michael Smith in the London Times that states that the "other evidence" that the British Government has been holding back all these years to justify their uranium from Africa claim is traceable to the French intelligence agency, DGSE. The report also states, among other things, that the French did not (initially) reveal this intelligence to the CIA, and that both the French and the British stand by this claim even today.

I have demonstrated systematically that this story (offered by Smith's sources) is completely bunk and contradicts many of the facts on record in multiple parliamentary/congressional reports (SSCI Report, Taylor Report, Butler Report) based on sworn testimony by U.S. and British Government officials.

Let me recap the main findings in this post.

1. It is unclear whether Smith intended this or not, but his article clearly gives the impression that the allegation linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 Niger visit to uranium only came from the French and that the CIA was unaware of it until the French told them about it in late November 2002. In fact, the CIA was very much aware of the (false) allegation that Wissam Al-Zahawi's 1999 trip was connected to uranium, no later than February 2002 - because the Italians (SISMI) conveyed this charge to them on or before Feb 5, 2002. Moreover:

The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002 that they had some reporting from 1999 that Wissam Al-Zahawi visited Niger in 1999
The CIA acknowledged on Feb 5, 2002, that SISMI's second report was essentially linking Wissam Al-Zahawi's Feb 1999 visit to Niger to Saddam's seeking uranium from Africa. (The CIA had acknowledged receiving the allegation that Iraq had been seeking uranium from Niger since "at least early 1999" in their very first intel report on October 15, 2001).
So, whether or not the French passed on their information to the CIA directly is mostly irrelevant because the CIA heard similar allegations from SISMI (more on this in Section 5) and were also provided access to the British claims based on the French intel (more on this in Section 6). Not to mention, according to Smith's article, the CIA did receive the French intel in question on Nov 22, 2002.
2. The Butler Report claims that "British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium". In contrast, Smith's article says that the British found only the French intelligence reporting on this to be "credible" and "conclusive". If Smith's article is accurate, this would mean that the Butler Report was misleading readers about the number of supposedly credible sources for the British claim. (Of course, I have previously shown that the Butler Report was indeed deliberately misleading on this very point).

3. The Butler Report asserts that the basis of the British assessment of the credibility of the uranium claim was the fact that Niger's major export was uranium. That was deliberately misleading in itself (as discussed in Section 3), but Smith's article suggests that the British based their assessment of the credibility of the Zahawi/uranium link on the fact that "both MI6 and the DGSE had been expecting Saddam to test the sanctions regime". This is a new justification. If true, it actually undercuts the credibility of their claim because Saddam was always intent on breaking the sanctions regime (after all that was the background of the Zahawi visit to the multiple African nations in 1999, three of whom were not uranium producers). Just because he was intent on breaking the back of the U.N. sanctions does not credibly prove that he was seeking uranium from Africa. (It is like saying that Saddam had nuclear weapons because we know that he was intent on breaking sanctions to pursue nuclear weapons). Stated differently, the only credible proof for Saddam seeking uranium in Africa would be reports that actually showed him seeking uranium from Africa. [In short: Using a specific motive to assess guilt could be considered reasonable only if credible alternative motives did not exist, which was not the case here.]

4. Smith's article captures some observations regarding the findings of Joseph Wilson that reflect the position of some in the Bush administration. However, the narrative offered is incomplete and is contradicted by the facts surrounding Wilson's trip.

5. There are serious problems with the assertions by DGSE that they stand by their 1999 intel even today, and that this intel is separate from what was contained in the Niger forgeries. Both of these assertions contradict the facts reported in the Senate (SSCI) Report. (NOTE: As of now, I am not even introducing into the discussion the fact that the former Vice-Director of DGSE, Alain Choulet has claimed categorically to the Italian newspaper La Repubblica that the French in fact even alerted the U.S. about the bogus nature of the Niger documents in summer 2002). Moreover, even if we assume hypothetically that the intel shared by the French was "new" to the CIA (it wasn't, as I showed in Section 2), the fact remains that the CIA did not stand by their uranium claim in their National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] despite being informed of the French "intel" (see this post for a discussion on that) and did not consider the British claim trustworthy either (see Section 6.2).

6. The claims from Smith's British Government sources that:
(a) information from the French (DGSE) linking the 1999 Al-Zahawi visit to uranium came to the British in 1999 and this was the basis of their Saddam/uranium claim, and
(b) the claim in the British Dossier is still valid because the French DGSE report is credible and was not (initially) shared with the CIA

...are both shown to be categorically false based on the facts established by the British Taylor and Butler Reports and the U.S. SSCI Report, as well as additional information in the public record.

[NYer]

The author goes after more than simply Smith, who clearly has not been a Bush supporter ... Butler was deliberately misleading?

Also, there's that Congo business... it seems ultimately, this matter will be in the purview of historians rather than pundits.

[NYer]

Just got a communication from Mike Smith -
He's standing by his sources and promises more to follow ...