Intelligence News in the War on Terror

[al-Canine]

Spy Agencies Fear Some Applicants Are Terrorists

By Bob Drogin
Times Staff Writer

March 8, 2005

WASHINGTON — U.S. counterintelligence officials are increasingly concerned that Al Qaeda sympathizers or operatives may have tried to get jobs at the CIA and other U.S. agencies in an effort to spy on American counterterrorist efforts.

So far, about 40 Americans who sought positions at U.S. intelligence agencies have been red-flagged and turned away for possible ties to terrorist groups, the officials said. Several such applicants have been detected at the CIA.

"We think terrorist organizations have tried to insinuate people into our hiring pools," said Barry Royden, a 39-year CIA veteran who is a counterintelligence instructor at the agency.

Also, three senior counterintelligence officials said they feared terrorist groups may be trying to place an "insider" in America's fast-growing counterterrorist planning and operational networks as part of a long-term strategy to compromise U.S. intelligence efforts.

But unlike Royden, the officials added that it was still unclear if anyone had been assigned to infiltrate U.S. intelligence to commit espionage for a terrorist group. No one has been arrested, and no one has been linked to any new "sleeper cell" of suspected terrorists in America.


Royden's remarks came at a national conference on counterintelligence held over the weekend at Texas A&M University. Other counterintelligence officials were interviewed separately.

The officials said that those who had come under suspicion were filtered out during the application process for providing false information, failing lie detector tests, applying to multiple spy services or flunking other parts of the application procedure.

But fear of possible penetration has grown because of what one official called "an intense competition" among America's intelligence, military and contractor organizations.

They are seeking to hire thousands of skilled linguists, trained analysts and clandestine operatives who can blend into overseas communities to collect intelligence and to recruit foreign agents inside terrorist cells.

In some cases, the officials said, those most qualified for such sensitive jobs — naturalized Americans who grew up in the Middle East or South Asia, for example, and who are native speakers of Arabic, Farsi, Dari, Urdu and other crucial languages — have proved the most difficult to vet during background checks.

In addition, because of restrictions imposed by U.S. privacy laws, authorities at one spy service may not know that someone they had rejected later found a job at another agency or at a defense contractor working on classified systems.

"We're looking at that very carefully," said one counterintelligence official.

Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network has used sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance techniques in the past. Operatives have tested security systems at embassies and airports, taken photographs or sketched diagrams of potential targets, and used encrypted communications and computer programs to frustrate U.S. spying.

The FBI has assigned counterintelligence officers at its 56 field offices since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, said Timothy D. Bereznay, a senior FBI official. The effort is less intensive than in the mid-1980s, the height of the Cold War, when the bureau assigned a fourth of its agents to spy-hunting efforts.

Despite the deployment during that era, CIA officer Aldrich H. Ames, FBI agent Robert P. Hanssen and other American moles compromised hundreds of secret agents and intelligence projects, causing far more damage to national security than any spy sent by Moscow or its allies.

The Sept. 11 commission and several congressional investigations have sharply criticized the CIA and other intelligence agencies for hiring too few linguists who are fluent in Arabic or other target languages. They also have cited the CIA's failure to recruit or plant any agents inside Al Qaeda who could provide reliable intelligence.

With vast increases in funding from Congress after the 2001 attacks, the 15 U.S. intelligence agencies launched sweeping recruitment programs. Most have been deluged with thousands of resumes and job applications, forcing several spy services to contract background checks to private firms.

The CIA director, Porter J. Goss, last month gave the White House plans to increase by 50% the number of CIA clandestine officers and analysts in an effort to improve intelligence on terrorist groups and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. During his Senate confirmation hearings in September, Goss said the agency would need years to train and deploy enough case officers to meet the current challenge.

"The great bulk of what we need is more than five years out there," he said at the time.

The National Security Agency, the spy service that eavesdrops on communications to collect intelligence, announced plans last fall to hire 7,500 employees over the next five years to push the total NSA payroll to about 35,000. Among those being sought are linguists in Arabic and Chinese, regional analysts, communications signals intelligence specialists and computer experts.

The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency also has taken its job search public, running ads for human intelligence officers for the first time in the Economist and other publications. The little-known DIA hired TMP Worldwide, a New York-based advertising and communications firm, to improve its name recognition and attract more candidates.

The need to vastly improve counterintelligence efforts dominated the weekend Texas conference, which drew scores of current and former intelligence officials. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, which Congress created in 2002 to coordinate counterintelligence efforts across the government, cosponsored the conclave, which was open to the media.

Michelle Van Cleave, director of the office, said the Bush administration had adopted a strategy that called for more pre-emptive action against foreign intelligence services and others viewed as threats to national security. She and other officials described the United States as the principal target for intelligence services from up to 90 countries around the world.

Paul Redmond, a longtime CIA officer who works for the counterintelligence office, called it an "actuarial certainty" that spies have infiltrated U.S. security agencies. He warned that, because of efforts since Sept. 11 to more widely share critical intelligence as part of broader reforms, the danger of espionage was growing.

"I think we're worse off than we've ever been," he said.

R. James Woolsey, who served as CIA director from 1993 to 1995, urged the agency to step up protections against spying by adherents of Wahabism and other extreme forms of militant Islam, which he compared to the threat from Soviet-era Communism.

"The Wahabis are not just a religious movement," he said.

Lisa Bronson, the undersecretary of Defense in charge of vetting exports of defense-related materials, said China has "2,000 to 3,000 front companies" working in America to obtain so-called dual-use civilian equipment or information that could be used to help Beijing's military.

Retired Navy Adm. William O. Studeman, a former NSA director who now sits on a panel that is reviewing U.S. intelligence efforts for the White House, said that "advertent and inadvertent leaks have now rivaled espionage" to compromise classified information.

Several speakers said that hacking of classified U.S. computer systems could pose the most dangerous threat. Spies who once needed to patiently photograph page after page of secret documents now, in theory, can quickly transmit millions of computerized pages into cyberspace or onto tiny devices holding gigabytes of data.

Former President George H.W. Bush, whose presidential library is at Texas A&M, opened the weekend conference with a fervent defense of the CIA. He headed the agency from November 1975 to January 1977.

Bush said it "burns me up to see the agency under fire" for flawed intelligence on prewar Iraq. He compared recent criticism to the Watergate-era congressional probes of domestic spying, assassination plots and other illegal CIA operations.

Congress "unleashed a bunch of untutored little jerks out there" to investigate the CIA then, Bush said. The inquiries, led by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), led Congress to create the first intelligence oversight committees and to pass numerous laws to prevent further abuses.

Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-intel8mar08,0,431533.story?coll=la-home-headlines

[al-Canine]

U.S. Intelligence Reforms Seen Posing New Dangers

By REUTERS

COLLEGE STATION, Texas (Reuters) - Sharing information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies -- changes recommended after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks -- could backfire and make the United States more vulnerable to al Qaeda and other enemies, former intelligence officials say.

As the Senate prepares for confirmation of a new director of national intelligence, former officials said the broad U.S. intelligence and law enforcement establishment has likely been penetrated by foreign intelligence services, both through human agents and high-tech information-gathering devices.

"It's an absolute certainty that there are spies now in the national intelligence establishment,'' former CIA agent Paul Redmond told a counterintelligence conference at Texas A&M University that ended this weekend.

There could be operatives tied to foreign nations or followers of al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden in Islam's fundamentalist Wahhabi movement among an estimated 900,000 people with U.S. security clearance, and this would be particularly dangerous in an era of reform-minded information-sharing, officials said.

"I really have been disturbed at the broad use of the term 'information sharing','' said former CIA Director James Woolsey.

"It's good not to be too enthusiastic about how well it could go if everybody in large bureaucracies knew everything. One of them's going to be a Wahhabi or a Chinese,'' he said.

Greater information sharing between the CIA, FBI and other agencies was a cornerstone of reforms recommended by the bipartisan commission that investigated the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington.

Advocates -- including top Bush administration officials -- view the enhanced flow of national security data as a means of overcoming bureaucratic barriers that critics say helped facilitate the Sept. 11 attacks that killed 3,000 people.

But Woolsey and other former intelligence officials worry that broad information-sharing from the White House to local police could expose clandestine sources and methods to foreign operatives and compromise intelligence capabilities.

GIVING FEW PEOPLE SENSITIVE MATERIAL

Retired Adm. William Studeman, former central intelligence deputy director who sits on the presidential commission now investigating intelligence on weapons of mass destruction, said it may be necessary to protect very sensitive information by adopting ultra secret methods used during World War II.

"That would put highly sensitive material in the hands of a very few people,'' he said.

The concerns surface as John Negroponte, President Bush's nominee for director of national intelligence, heads for Senate confirmation proceedings next month. Congressional officials view Negroponte's expected confirmation as a starting gun for the implementation of reforms enacted last year.

Former CIA Director Robert Gates, now Texas A&M president, said the 2004 reforms backed by Bush could inhibit meaningful change because they do not give the new intelligence director vital powers to fire uncooperative officials.

"To reorganize intelligence in the middle of a war, and in the middle of a presidential election campaign, struck me as dangerous in the extreme,'' said Gates, who was offered the intelligence czar's job by the White House but turned it down.

The Bush administration recently adopted a new counterintelligence strategy that calls for preemptive action against foreign intelligence services viewed as national security threats.

The initiative faces a daunting task, according to intelligence officials who estimate that China alone has 2,000 to 3,000 front companies in the United States that are seeking to exploit U.S. technology.

Copyright 2005 Reuters Ltd.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/politics/politics-security-reforms.html

[Casey]

Spy Agencies Fear Some Applicants Are Terrorists

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-intel8mar08,0,431533.story?coll=la-home-headlines
I would hope that this isn't just being considered now.

There were some very strong messages that came out last year.

The one, I think, should have had the biggest impact was statement #5 and the audio's and video's that come out around the time of the statement.

The operation of the invisible hand ( 5 ) (http://www.afghanistanwar.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15151)
I do realize factually this message was, for the most part, discredited by some but possibly there is a deeper message here.

Archived thread:
http://www.afghanistanwar.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15151


From Analysis & Theory


Osama running war from his cave
18/09/2003 09:28 - (SA)

Dubai - Osama bin Laden is running the terror war against the United States from a cave, a press report said on Thursday, quoting a source it said was the chief of training for the Al-Qaeda network.

"Al-Qaeda is everywhere around the world and in strength," claimed Abu Mohamed al-Ablaj in an e-mail interview published by Al-Majallah, a Saudi-owned weekly.

"Bin Laden is leading it from a cave, the same cave from where the orders went out to destroy the citadel of the Pentagon and which the Pentagon has not been able to destroy," he said.

Satan's Black House

"Abu Abdullah (bin Laden) enjoys full freedom of movement. He directs the fighting against the evil administration in Satan's Black House from his cave.

"He swears to die fighting for God. Like any mujahedeen, he cannot imagine dying in his bed," added al-Ablaj, a nom de guerrre.

The world's most wanted man popped up on the Qatari television station al-Jazeera on the eve of the second anniversary of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

In a video believed to have been recorded last April or May, bin Laden and his top lieutenant Ayman Zawahiri, both looking aged and thin, were shown walking through a rocky valley, probably in Afghanistan, carrying Kalashnikov rifles.

"When Abu Abdullah disappears the whole world wonders about it, when he reappears the world is stunned," Al-Ablaj told the newspaper, which has run several previous interviews with the same man.

"His sudden reappearances are a war in themselves, it's a blow struck at the head of the American media cobra."

A hidden hand in the US

Al-Ablaj warned that "all those who are hand in hand with America in its war against Islam are targets," adding that Al-Qaeda had people or "a hidden hand" in the United States.

"The great strike promised" against the United States was "inevitable".

Every American, every Jew

"All those who trade with America and Israel are targets. The American economy is targeted everywhere in the world. Its leaders, ambassadors, every American and every Jew is a target."

The terror network has been blamed for a series of bloody attacks around the world since September 11, 2001.

Al-Qaeda "is now co-operating" with Afghan warlord and ex-prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a sworn enemy of US-backed President Hamid Karzai, he said, "and with former Afghan leaders who have repented."

The May 12 suicide attacks on expatriate housing compounds in Riyadh had the support of many Saudis, al-Ablaj claimed.

"If there was freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia, millions of people would have come out on to the streets to celebrate."

http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1418008,00.html

The operation of the invisible hand ( 5 ) (http://www.afghanistanwar.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15151)

the Americans hell in Afghanistan and Iraq with he talked to him to the sheikh Osama (http://www.afghanistanwar.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15200&perpage=15&pagenumber=3)

A new and great vision a seriousness round sheikh Osama hit to America a destructive great hit ! (http://www.geocities.com/casey_britton/1202/great_hit.htm)
02-12-2002

http://www.afghanistanwar.com/showthread.php?p=594439&highlight=hidden+hand#post594439

[Casey]

A very interesting article from Asia Times Online:
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/GC08Aa01.html

Counter-terrorism revisited
By B Raman

It is saying that terrorism is no longer a territorial issue such as Palestine, but anger at the US for their pursuit of "the war on terror" which is not being fought on their own lands.

snips


For the new breed of jihadi terrorists volunteering for suicide missions in Iraq in increasing numbers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Yemen and other Muslim countries, the objective is no longer freedom for the Palestinian people, but to avenge the humiliation inflicted on a proud Arab people and the desecration of their culture by the US-led coalition.


The root cause of the continuing jihadi terrorism is no longer just any territorial issue, such as an independent Palestine, but it is the widely perceived humiliation of the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular by the US-led coalition in the name of the "war against terrorism". The counter-terrorism techniques followed by the US, with its heavy reliance on the air force and heavy armor, which have been killing more civilians than terrorists, have become the real root cause of terrorism, relegating Palestine and other issues to the background.


India and other countries that have been fighting jihadi terrorism for many years even before September 11, 2001, always keep in mind the fact that many of the terrorists are their own nationals. When one is fighting against one's own nationals in one's own territory, one observes considerable restraint in the techniques and arms used. Even though thousands of Indians have been killed by jihadi terrorists since 1989, when terrorism broke out in Jammu and Kashmir, India has never used its air force and heavy armor against the terrorists, choosing to fight them mainly with small arms and ammunition, even at the risk of its security forces incurring heavy casualties in the process.

As against this, the US is fighting its "war against terrorism" in foreign territories and against foreign nationals - mainly Muslims, and Arabs in particular. The kind of restraint one would normally follow in one's own territory and against one's own people is not followed in foreign territories against foreign people of a different culture.

Which leads to my question for some time.

Are we or will we be fighting our own nationials by virtue of birth or immigration, then citizenship, on our own lands??

[The 801]

Casey

Great Thread Casey,

Sorry for the opinion here, but I came to the same question. And the answer will be yes, I believe.

First, answer this question. Do you believe, from all that has been gathered here, that there are "sleeper cells" here in north America?
Do you think that Hezbollah or AQ have organization here in North America? Do you believe the FBI/RCMP have a full handle on these organizations?
Do you believe that Islamic Militancy is now a street movement, among the unemployed, in Europe?
Do you believe that this militancy has support at some level of government?

Do you believe that once we are "completed" in Iraq, that these folks will just go home? Do you believe that the more the US confronts Iran and Lebanon and Syria, that there will not be an Islamic backlash against the US? Do you think that Hezbollah is ready to defend the revolution against the Great Satan?

I believe that these folks are on us now.

And we have only just begun....

The generally not pessimistic 801.

Please check out Lightening out of Lebanon, Hezbollah in the US by Diaz and Newman.

[Casey]

Please opine here, this is what the discussion area is for.



First, answer this question. Do you believe, from all that has been gathered here, that there are "sleeper cells" here in north America?
Do you think that Hezbollah or AQ have organization here in North America? Do you believe the FBI/RCMP have a full handle on these organizations?
Do you believe that Islamic Militancy is now a street movement, among the unemployed, in Europe?
Do you believe that this militancy has support at some level of government?
I answer yes to several of your questions.


Do you believe the FBI/RCMP have a full handle on these organizations?
I still feel a fast forward is needed. And not to blame any agency in particular, I believe it is the drawn out way "order of buisness" is handled.
And possibly some small mindedness as to what is considered and how it is considered. It appears things get overlooked.


Do you believe that this militancy has support at some level of government?
I'm still out on this concept with regard to N. America. However the idea should not be put on the shelf but considered very carefully.

I'm of the mind the Saudi, Pakistan, even the newest Iraq government has support for militancy, among others, why should we think it hasn't or won't be attempted here?

[Casey]

Al-Qaeda flourishing on internet, intelligence officials warn
Last Updated Tue, 08 Mar 2005 09:34:55 EST
CBC News
OTTAWA - Radical groups such as al-Qaeda have developed a strong command of the internet, using it for everything from fundraising to recruiting, according to the head of Canada's security service.

Jim Judd, who was appointed director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in November, says Osama bin Laden's network has compensated for the loss of its training camps in Afghanistan by using the internet to run lucrative credit-card fraud schemes, publish training manuals and recruit new fighters.

"Followers are recruited around the world, including in our own country," Judd told a Senate committee reviewing Canada's Anti-terrorism Act.

He said CSIS keeps tabs on more than 100 people it suspects have links to terrorist groups. Increasingly, the names on the watch list belong to young Muslim men, many of them born in Canada as well as Europe and the United States.

The number of adherents to terrorism has grown since al-Qaeda's attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, Judd said.

"We are encountering here and elsewhere individuals who are native born in their country showing up as associates or members of terrorist groups," he said.

Nearly 4,000 known Islamist websites

That trend is encouraged by nearly 4,000 Islamist websites and chat rooms that can be found online at any given time. They post everything from video clips of sermons by radical imams to bomb-making manuals, intelligence officials say.

Last year, al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi even managed to publish 23 issues of a sophisticated 40-page online magazine called Al Battah.

Rita Katz, head of an American institute that searches for websites related to militant groups such as al-Qaeda, says Islamic extremists have acquired highly trained experts with a sophisticated knowledge of the internet.

"We have cases of people with PhDs in computers, people who were employed by internet security companies, people who are extremely familiar with the network," she said.

"When you have a U.S. passport [or] a Canadian passport, you can move freely and no one will arrest you."

http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2005/03/08/terrorist-internet050308.html

[Casey]

DHS Reports Major Successes in 2004
By Jim Kouri, CPP
MichNews.com
Mar 9, 2005

Striking Terrorists Before They Strike US Their Stated Goal

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, is charged with preventing acts of terrorism by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist organizations. In this preventive mission, ICE draws on a diverse set of investigative functions and legal authorities for fighting a wide range of crimes related to immigration, money laundering, smuggling, trafficking, trade violations, and cyber security.

To put it simply, it’s often difficult to prosecute terrorism cases in the absence of an overt act of terrorism. But waiting for terrorists to act could cost lives. That's why ICE uses every legal tool at their disposal to arrest terrorist suspects on related criminal charges. By drawing on their investigative expertise and law enforcement authorities as counter-terrorism tools, ICE seeks to strike the terrorists before they can strike at the United States.

Recently, ICE released information on major cases investigated in 2004:

Accused Operator of “Terror” Websites Arrested; Seized Documents Outline Targeting of US Naval Battle Group in Middle East - On August 5, 2004, British authorities arrested Babar Ahmad, a 30-year-old British citizen, in London on an arrest warrant and complaint issued out of the District of Connecticut. The arrest resulted from a three-year investigation led by ICE agents in New Haven, Conn., in conjunction with several other federal law enforcement agencies.

The US complaint charges Ahmad with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; conspiracy to launder money; conspiracy to support the Taliban; and solicitation to commit a crime of physical violence. The complaint alleges that, between 1997 and 2003, Ahmad operated a series of jihadist websites, www.azzam.com and www.qoqaz.net, via Internet Service Providers in the United States. Among other things, the websites provided explicit instructions on how to raise and illegally move funds to the Taliban. The site also instructed individuals on how to obtain visas to travel to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. In addition, an ICE affidavit filed in the case reveals that British authorities found classified documents in the London home of Ahmad’s parents that tracked the movement of a US Navy battle group in the Middle East and described ways in which the ships might be attacked, including via small craft with rocket propelled grenades.

Court documents further allege that Ahmad was in electronic communications with a US Navy enlistee on board a US destroyer who was sympathetic to his cause. The documents also allege that Ahmad was in touch with several individuals in the United States. The investigation continues. US authorities have requested that the British government extradite Ahmad to the United States to answer the charges.


Muslim Leader Admits Role in Plot to Assassinate Ruler of Saudi Arabia and Pleads Guilty to Three Criminal Violations - On July 30, 2004, Abdurahman Alamoudi, a prominent Muslim leader in the United States, pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia to three criminal violations and admitted his role in a Libya-sponsored plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

The founder of the American Muslim Foundation and the American Muslim Council, Alamoudi pleaded guilty to conducting prohibited financial transactions with Libya; making false statements in his application for US citizenship; and violating US tax laws by concealing his foreign bank accounts, concealing his transactions with Libya, and omitting information from tax returns filed by his charities. Alamoudi also agreed that he should be sentenced under the terrorism provision of the federal sentencing guidelines as a result of his participation in a plot by Libyan government officials to kill the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia. According to the statement of facts agreed upon by Alamoudi, he helped recruit Saudi dissidents in London for the assassination plot and facilitated the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars from Libya to those dissidents to help finance the plot. The arrest and subsequent indictment of Alamoudi were the result of a long-term investigation by ICE, in conjunction with the FBI and the IRS. Alamoudi faces a potential 23-year prison sentence, seven years supervised release, and revocation of his US citizenship.

Charity and Seven of its Leaders Charged With Providing Material Support to Hamas - On July 26, 2004, a federal grand jury in Dallas indicted the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and seven of its leaders on charges of providing material support to Hamas, a designated terrorist organization. The indictment was the result of a joint investigation by the FBI, ICE, and the IRS under the auspices of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Among other violations, the Holy Land Foundation and its members are accused of having illegally sent $12.4 million since 1995 to support Hamas and its goal of creating a Palestinian State by eliminating the state of Israel through violent jihad. During this period, the Holy Land Foundation represented itself as a legitimate tax-exempt organization that funded humanitarian causes in Palestine. The indictment also charges the defendants with engaging in prohibited financial transactions with terrorists, money laundering, conspiracy, and filing false tax returns.

Ohio Imam Convicted of Lying About Terror Ties to Obtain US Citizenship - On June 18, 2004, a federal jury in Akron, Ohio, convicted Fawaz Mohammed Damrah of unlawfully obtaining US citizenship through a false application in which he concealed from the US government his membership in or affiliation with 1) the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a.k.a. the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine; 2) the Afghan Refugees Services, Inc., a.k.a. Al-Kifah Refugee Center; and 3) the Islamic Committee for Palestine. The indictment further alleged that Damrah concealed the fact that he had, prior to his application for US citizenship, “incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution” of Jews and others by advocating violent terrorist attacks against Jews and others. The prosecution and guilty verdict followed an investigation by ICE, the FBI, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Ohio.

Somali Charged With Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda - On June 10, 2004, Nuradin M. Abdi, a Somali national living in Columbus, Ohio, was charged in a four-count indictment with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and to Al-Qaeda. Abdi was also charged with fraudulently obtaining and using US immigration and travel documents. The indictment charges that Abdi had fraudulently obtained a US immigration travel document after concealing his planned travels to Africa to obtain military training for violent jihad. Detention documents filed in the case also allege that Abdi conspired with a convicted Al-Qaeda operative to blow up a shopping mall in Columbus, Ohio. The Al-Qaeda operative, Lyman Faris, is currently serving a 20-year prison sentence for providing material support and conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda. ICE agents originally detained Abdi on administrative immigration violations on November 28, 2003. The indictment that ultimately resulted stemmed from an extensive investigation by ICE, FBI, and Southern Ohio Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Material Witness in 9/11 Probe Deported - On May 27, 2004, 26-year-old Mohdar Abdullah, a Yemeni national held as a material witness in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, arrived in Yemen after being deported by ICE officials. Abdullah was arrested shortly after 9/11 and was found to have helped two of the 9/11 hijackers obtain Social Security cards, driver's licenses, and information on flight schools. Abdullah was later convicted of visa fraud and, after serving his sentence, was ordered removed from the country.

Saudi with Ties to 9/11 Hijackers Arrested - On May 27, 2004, ICE agents in San Diego arrested 34-year-old Hasan Saddiq Faseh Alddin, a Saudi national and US legal permanent resident, on immigration charges resulting from two prior convictions for domestic violence. The arrest stemmed from a Joint Terrorism Task Force probe. In September 2001, Alddin roomed with a close friend of two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhamzi and Khalid al-Midhar. Alddin’s roommate departed the country the day before the 9/11 attacks. ICE placed Alddin in deportation proceedings. He has since departed the country.

Egyptian Charged with Lying About Ties to Hamas - In May 2004, Soliman S. Biheiri, a 52-year-old native of Egypt, was charged in a federal indictment in northern Virginia with lying to ICE agents about his business and personal connections with Mousa Abu Marzook, a leader of the terrorist group Hamas, and about his dealings with Sami al-Arian, a Florida college professor who has been charged with being a leader of the terrorist group Palestine Islamic Jihad. The charges against Biheiri, which also include allegations that he illegally possessed and used a US passport, resulted from an extensive investigation by ICE, the FBI, and the IRS. Last year in the Eastern District of Virginia, Bihieri was convicted of lying under oath on his application for US citizenship as a result of the joint investigation.

Suspected Terrorist Removed to Syria – On January 23, 2004, ICE officials removed 36-year-old Nabil Al-Marabh to Syria after an independent federal immigration judge ruled that Al-Marabh posed a threat to US national security and was associated with a known Jordanian terrorist. An Immigration Judge found that Al-Marabh was specifically linked to Raed Hijazi, a Jordanian who has been designated as a terrorist by the US government in connection with a bombing plot in Jordan. Al-Marabh had also trained and fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the judge ruled.


Sources: Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Association of Chiefs of Police

http://www.michnews.com/artman/publish/article_7176.shtml

[al-Canine]

US intelligence agencies make headway on reform

Despite concerns about turf wars, a new intelligence director and a rising number of analysts hint at change.

By Faye Bowers | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON - The Pentagon recently hosted a meeting of intelligence-community officials to address ways to combat IEDs - the improvised explosive devices that insurgents have used so effectively to kill and maim US forces in Iraq.

One speaker mentioned that the intelligence community could play a bigger role in aiding the military. In addition to gleaning information through penetrating groups and electronic eavesdropping, roles the CIA traditionally plays, he saw a need for good, old-fashioned law-enforcement work, such as the FBI would perform in this country. A tail could be placed on a bad guy, for instance, which could follow him from a warehouse to a mosque and to the culvert where he inserts an IED.

"The FBI is doing forensics, but forensics designed to look at patterns, how they get deployed. It's an interesting innovation," says Gregory Treverton, the intelligence expert from the RAND Corp. who attended the Pentagon meeting."If you want the FBI to become a prevention outfit, it's better to prevent abroad than at home, so the logic goes. Now you have the CIA, FBI, and Pentagon working together on [IEDs] right now."

This is one example of how the arms of the intelligence apparatus are breaking out of past patterns - secretive, compartmented work - to link together in a more inclusive, collaborative way. This is partly due, experts say, to the 9/11 attacks alone. But it is also because of the 9/11 commission's scathing report on intelligence failures, and the ensuing legislation signed into law last December by President Bush.

"You get a sense some progress is being made moving across the federal agencies," says Elaine Kamarck, an expert on intelligence reorganization at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in Cambridge, Mass.

To be sure, not all the federal government's moves have been successful. Problems persist in combining the various government agency watch lists into one comprehensive list, shared by all related government agencies. And some turf warfare continues. The Pentagon, for example, is taking on more covert operational activity, moving into the CIA's turf. And the FBI, in trying to thwart terror attacks on the homeland, is moving in on some of the CIA's overseas turf.

Still, these agency leaders point out that the United States is safer - no attacks have occurred on US soil since 9/11 - and structural reforms among the intelligence agencies have only begun to be implemented.
Steps in the new approach

One of the biggest reforms, of course, is the appointment of the first-ever director of national intelligence (DNI). Mr. Bush's nominee, John Negroponte, currently US ambassador to Iraq, is expected to return to the US and face Senate confirmation hearings in mid-April.

Meanwhile, a number of other changes, such as creation of the new National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and a refocusing of the FBI from law enforcement to intelligence, are well under way.

The NCTC began operations in early December. It subsumed the CIA's Terrorist Threat Integration Center, including its staff of about 350 and its director, John Brennan, who is currently acting director of the NCTC. The new law calls for the president to name the director of the NCTC, but it is believed that the president will wait for Mr. Negroponte to come on board and make a recommendation.

As the nation's premier front in fighting the war on terror, the NCTC has hired about 600 more people and expects to add another 1,000 or so. Still, ambiguity exists about the NCTC's operations within the new system. The law, for example, calls for the director to report to the president on operational matters, but to the DNI on all other issues.

"They are not meant to conduct operations, but they're meant to do strategic operational planning," says Dr. Treverton of RAND. "If you know what that means, you have a future as a consultant."

In addition to the NCTC, the FBI has beefed up its domestic intelligence capabilities. FBI Director Robert Mueller, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee last week, said the FBI has hired 476 intelligence analysts through February and plans to hire 880 by the end of the fiscal year.
Early appraisals

It's early into the implementation of the reforms to gauge their success, experts say, other than the absence of attacks on the US since 9/11. Still, many experts laud the examples of better cooperation, like that on the IEDs. But at the same time, they worry that the politicians focused their attention only on structural change at the top, rather than on changing the culture within the 15 intelligence agencies and setting up mechanisms for them to work with state and local law-enforcement agencies.

"I don't get the sense that the feds are learning to cooperate with local and state law-enforcement agencies," says Ms. Kamarck of the Kennedy School. "If you look at several of the terrorists who've been apprehended the past couple of years, it's because of the local police: It's the cops who got the guys in London who were planning ricin attacks; it was the cops in Frankfurt who apprehended the alleged terrorists who were planning attacks in Iraq."

www.csmonitor.com

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0314/p02s02-uspo.htm

[al-Canine]

L.A. Is a Den of Iranian Intrigue and Ambition

U.S. agents tap an incongruous mix of exiles for intelligence on Tehran. The jockeying for influence is intense, as is the skepticism.

By Anne-Marie O'Connor, Greg Krikorian and H.G. Reza
Times Staff Writers | March 20, 2005

Roozbeh Farahanipour was jailed and beaten during student protests in Iran in 1999. Today, he sits in a cramped office above a Persian-language bookstore on Westwood Boulevard, speaking in low tones about the pro-Tehran "agents" he says still dog him.

Two years ago, after hostile men confronted his Iranian activist group at public forums, he walked down the bustling avenue — past Persian restaurants, Persian pop music vendors and the publisher of the 1,200-page Iranian Yellow Pages — to the FBI office a few blocks away.

There, he said, U.S. agents pressed him for details on espionage and provocateurs.

Such relationships are the political currency of the real-life Casablanca that is "Irangeles," the largest Iranian community outside Iran. Here, across miles of urban sprawl, from Encino to Beverly Hills to Westwood, intrigue over who might be spying on whom abounds.

Los Angeles has become a key location for gathering intelligence on Tehran. A CIA station here has spent a decade recruiting informants among Iranian expatriates and businessmen who travel to Iran. The local FBI field office is wooing Iranians as sources — and investigating others as potential terrorists or spies.

This activity is growing in intensity as the Bush administration tries to learn more about Iran's nuclear ambitions and possible Iranian-sponsored terrorism in this country.

A mix of political causes and personal ambitions fuels Irangeles. As the Iranian New Year dawns, Reza Pahlavi — the late Shah of Iran's heir to the Peacock Throne — is holding court in Beverly Hills. Exile activists from as far away as Paris are meeting in Woodland Hills to create a "coalition of liberation." Iranian intellectuals in the San Fernando Valley are debating pro-democracy petitions circulating half a world away in Tehran.

Faced with the sudden prospect of relevance, exile activists are jockeying for recognition from U.S. policymakers. They are touting contacts with the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA.

They boast of tete-a-tetes with members of Vice President Dick Cheney's staff, and drop the name "Elliott" — as in Elliott Abrams, Bush's deputy national security advisor. They prominently display Christmas cards from Kansas Republican Sen. Sam Brownback, an early backer of legislation that would provide financial support to the Iranian opposition. In Washington, they're making the rounds like actors looking for an agent.

Some Iranian exiles speculate that someone among them could emerge as the next Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi opposition leader who helped to spur the American invasion of Iraq with his now-discredited intelligence indicating that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed chemical and biological weapons.

It is precisely the specter of Chalabi that makes many U.S. officials cautious about appearing to endorse the Iranian exiles volunteering themselves now.
Gary Sick, who served on the National Security Council under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and was the principal White House expert on Iran during the hostage crisis, said he was skeptical that Los Angeles exiles could provide valuable intelligence.

"I just have very low regard for the quality of analysis and opinion coming out of the expatriate community in Los Angeles," said Sick, now a professor at Columbia University. "They despise the mullahs. They want to see them gone. And I think their wishful thinking overcomes rational analysis."

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA officer and Iran specialist, shares Sick's skepticism but said it is possible that the CIA will obtain valuable intelligence from its contacts in Los Angeles.

"A lot of interesting Iranians travel outside of the country," he said. "A lot of Iranians come to the United States. There is a definite flow, and some of them may have information that is valuable."

In the political salons of Irangeles, it can be difficult to distinguish fact from rumor, boast from reality.

Over glasses of strong tea in Westwood, some activists brag about recruiting people back home to gather information on internal opposition and the Islamic republic's nuclear program — information they say they hand over to the CIA.

Farahanipour, 33, who worked as a journalist in Iran, flies to Washington regularly to appear on panels and meet with U.S. officials.

He is among the Iranian exiles who say they have lobbied U.S. officials to deny a visa to Iranian dissident Mohsen Sazegara, a founder of Iran's Revolutionary Guards — and to grant a visa to a recent emigre who worked at a nuclear installation.

"We sent some e-mails to the administration to let them know," Farahanipour said. "We call them and give them guidance."

Bush administration officials acknowledged conferring with him but asked not to be quoted by name. "The reluctance you're seeing is people don't want to seem like they're endorsing one group over another," one official said. "Some of the meetings are just, 'Let's see what they've got to say.' "

Living in Two Worlds

Neon lights in Persian script dance outside Farahanipour's office in the Westwood business district that is the heart of Irangeles, a visible manifestation of the diverse and complex ties between Iran and Los Angeles.

The 1979 revolution that overthrew the shah of Iran forced many of his supporters into exile in this country. Subsequent waves of immigrants have included many who initially welcomed the shah's ouster but became disillusioned by the fundamentalist turn of the revolution.

If one thing unites them, it is that many have a foot in both countries. When the Iranian soccer team wins a match in Tehran, people in Encino stand up and cheer. Students in Tehran use cellphones and e-mail to provide people in Los Angeles eyewitness accounts of protests.

People in Tehran call satellite television shows in the Valley to sound off — and are heard by viewers in Iran. Jewish Iranians re-create their Tehran communities at ballroom bar mitzvahs in Beverly Hills — and pressure Tehran to release Jews jailed as spies half a world away.

The opposition group with the most U.S. congressional support — the People's Mujahedin of Iran, or MEK — has been designated a terrorist group by the State Department.

Founded by leftists in the 1960s, the MEK allegedly supported the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, where 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days. Though its leaders deny it, it has been accused of involvement in the murders of Americans in Iran. The group became an opponent of the Iranian government, forged an alliance with Hussein and took refuge in Iraq, where it surrendered voluntarily to U.S. forces in 2003.
In Los Angeles, it has a shadowy presence, with some sympathizers but a low public profile.

America's history in Iran is hardly unblemished, as Iranians of all stripes are quick to point out. In 1953, the CIA engineered a coup that ousted a democratically elected leader and reinstalled the shah.

That intervention and subsequent U.S. support for the shah left a legacy of relationships between U.S. intelligence agencies and Iranians loyal to the shah's heir, Reza Pahlavi, who agitates against the Iranian regime from Washington.

"There is a bridge that has never been broken," said an Iranian exile leader with historic ties to the shah. He spoke over kebabs and basmati rice at a Persian restaurant on Westwood Boulevard, a posh place with polished concrete floors and brushed aluminum accented by red and orange abstract paintings. Rhythmic rai music played in the background.

"We have a good relationship with the agency here. Any time we have good information on the regime, we give it to the agency," he said, referring to the CIA.

The leader, who asked not to be identified, pulled out four cellphones from the pocket of his Italian-cut navy blue suit and placed them side by side on the white tablecloth.

"I only have to answer two of them," he said. "Those are the ones used by my sources in Iran. We've received some information on the nuclear program, and it needs to be verified."

He said he meets with CIA officers in a West Los Angeles office or at the offices of his exile group to discuss how they can gather information on nuclear facilities or Taliban leaders from Afghanistan who have taken refuge in Iran.

"He passes the information to the agency, and they verify it," said his partner, a smartly dressed businessman who also claims to have regular contact with CIA officers.

The conservative leader pulled out a fax, written in wavy Persian script, from a "cell," dated Feb. 2. Its writers had identified more supporters in Tehran and had organized new cells in Isfahan and Shivaz.

The CIA declined to comment.

Courting Iranian Exiles

FBI officials view Los Angeles as a potentially rich intelligence source — a logical place for Iranian operatives to hide and raise money for Hezbollah, a Shiite extremist group backed by Iran that operates mostly in Lebanon. They're also afraid that if the U.S. attacked Iran, Hezbollah might stage an attack in Los Angeles or another city.

"The best place to hide a tree is a forest," said one counterterrorism official.
"And in Los Angeles, we have a big Iranian forest."

So FBI agents give speeches to community groups, recruit covert informants, track suspected Iranian intelligence agents and investigate criminals and terrorists.

They also keep tabs on the temporary Los Angeles polling places set up so Iranian expatriates can vote in elections in Iran.

"When we located them, we would watch them and find out who was sponsoring each station," a former FBI agent said. "And we would investigate them and the people around them."

The FBI also tries to cultivate expatriates who travel between Iran and the United States so it can ask them to collect information.

"We were looking for where [Iran] was building nuclear facilities," the former agent said. "So you would ask these people to ask their friend in the industry for information."

The FBI's highest-profile investigation in Los Angeles has focused on the MEK. Seven Los Angeles-area residents have been charged with providing "material support" to the MEK through donations collected at Los Angeles International Airport. The Justice Department alleges that the money was used overseas to buy rocket-propelled grenades. The defendants say the donations went to destitute children in Iran.

Among those who have been entangled in the government's investigation of the MEK were the four Mirmehdi brothers. Jailed for the past 41 months by federal authorities on grounds that they had terrorist ties to the MEK, the brothers were released Wednesday.

The government's change of heart was so sudden that it left the Mirmehdis stunned, and elated. They plan to get on with their lives selling real estate in the Valley as they continue fighting the government's efforts to deport them.

"It was all very strange," said Mohsen Mirmehdi, 37. "After being locked up as terrorists for almost four years, we were told to leave the jail, or they would kick us out."

Los Angeles is not the only seat of intrigue.

In San Francisco, an Iranian student named Rooz found himself the subject of FBI scrutiny when he wrote a letter to a friend last year criticizing U.S. human rights abuses during the war in Iraq and stating that it was time for students to "get back to our mission."

His San Francisco attorney, Banafsheh Akhlaghi, said the FBI interpreted that language as a call to terrorism.

Rooz, who spoke on the condition that his last name not be revealed, said his statement referred to reviving a dormant student website.

The next thing he knew, Rooz, 25, a legal U.S. resident for 19 years, was jailed at an immigration facility in Florence, Ariz., while Department of Homeland Security officials tried to have him deported as a national security threat. Akhlaghi said it took her a month to persuade officials that Rooz was not, and he was freed.

Fomenting Dissent

FBI agents think twice before attempting such heavy-handed tactics in the upper echelons of Los Angeles' Iranian community, whose members live in Beverly Hills, Bel-Air, Encino and Santa Monica.

In a guest house behind the Tarzana home of a leader of the Constitutionalist Party of Iran, party members who favor a constitutional monarchy have set up a nerve center for their efforts to oppose the country's Islamic government.

"We have to keep the office secret because of the terrorist regime," said Farzad Farahani, an officer of the party, in a reference to the Iranian government. "We don't want a Molotov cocktail or an assassination."

Inside, a poster-sized photograph of Pahlavi — who the group would like to see crowned king of a future Iran governed by a prime minister and parliament — dominated the room. The television was tuned to a Fox TV program on "The Hunt for Bin Laden."

Foad Pashai, the secretary-general of the party — whose father-in-law's portrait of the shah's widow, Farah Pahlavi, dominates his living room — offered to call pro-democracy activists in Tehran. The phone rang a few times and a young activist named Mohammed answered — though he didn't tell them what they wanted to hear.

Mohammed said there were few supporters of the monarchy in Iran, and "I don't trust them."

The constitutional monarchists in the room, who believe the shah's son has a place in Iran's future, exchanged chagrined glances.

"The only trustworthy group is the student's movement," Mohammed said. "The students never worked with the regime or the shah. Iranian people trust them."

Recent arrivals from the student movement in Iran, such as Farahanipour, try to maintain a friendly distance from the Los Angeles monarchists and the MEK.

His group, whose English name is Iranians for a Secular Republic, envisions an Iran free of undue Western influence and its current religious leaders.
But fleeing into exile has not meant leaving behind Iran's historical baggage.

During Iran's June 2001 presidential elections, Farahanipour said, a member of his group was punched in a melee between supporters of the Islamic Republic and opponents at an absentee polling place set up at Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel.

Almost every day, Farahanipour watches as a dapper elderly man — who people say was once a torturer for the secret police of the shah — takes his afternoon stroll in front of Farahanipour's office.

"They say he was a torturer for the Savak," Farahanipour said, referring to the shah's intelligence agency. "We see him all the time. Most people hate him."

In Irangeles, dreams of Iran's future are as pervasive as reminders of its past.


An Iranian presence

Estimates of the number of Iranians in the U.S. and in Los Angeles vary widely. Not all Iranians indicate their Iranian heritage on census forms, and the diversity of Iranian ethnic minorities -- including Jews, Armenians and Kurds -- makes it difficult to identify Iranian surnames. Some estimates:
--
Iranians in the U.S.
Census Bureau: 330,000
Iranian Interest Section: 900,000
--
Iranians in California (most are thought to live in the L.A. area)
Census Bureau: 159,016
Unofficial estimates: 500,000 or more
--
Religious organizations:
Iranian American Jewish Federation
Iranian Muslim Assn. of North America
--
Political organizations:
Iranian American Republican Council
Iranian American Democrats of Los Angeles
--
In the Iranian Yellow Pages:
20 Iranian television stations
2 Iranian daily newspapers
10 weekly and monthly magazines
200 Iranian attorneys
350 Iranian physicians
150 Iranian dentists
nearly 100 entertainers


Sources: National Iranian American Council; Iranian Yellow Pages
Graphics reporting by Anne-Marie O'Connor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Times staff writer Greg Miller contributed to this report.

Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times

http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me irangeles20mar20,0,1725850.story?

[al-Canine]

Goss says CIA ban excludes terrorists

By Shaun Waterman
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
Published March 25, 2005

CIA Director Porter J. Goss told lawmakers that the ban on assassinations by U.S. intelligence is still in force, but that it does not prohibit the agency from killing the terrorist enemies of the United States.

The assassination ban, contained in Executive Order 12333, "would not bar the use of lethal force in self-defense, for example, in appropriate cases against members of al Qaeda planning attacks against the United States," Mr. Goss said.

His comment, an unusually candid statement about an area of law and policy that officials rarely touch on in public, came in a series of written answers to questions from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The CIA declined to comment on the remarks, but according to one former senior intelligence official, the decision to get around the ban, rather than to rescind or waive it, was made soon after the September 11 attacks.

"They wanted to keep the ban in place," the former official said. The self-defense exemption "was a legal fabrication to save face, to say, 'Yes, it still applies, but just not in these cases.'*"

The former intelligence official said some Bush administration lawyers used a theory of anticipatory self-defense to justify their legal analysis that the ban did not apply to terrorists.

The Clinton administration had a similar reluctance to repeal the ban, despite the 1998 attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.

Richard A. Clarke, who led the White House's counterterrorism efforts under President Clinton and in the early part of President Bush's first term, said this reluctance resulted in "a very Talmudic and somewhat bizarre series of documents" from the Clinton White House that gave extremely specific authorities for particular operations.

In testimony to the joint congressional inquiry into the September 11 attacks, which was declassified last year, Mr. Clarke said there was enormous resistance to the idea of authorizing the deliberate killing of specific people, even bin Laden.

"The administration, and particularly the Justice Department, did not want to throw out the ban on assassination," he told the inquiry.

"There was concern ... that we not create an American hit list that would become an ongoing institution that we could just keep adding names to and have hit teams go out and assassinate people," Mr. Clarke said.

Some in the Clinton administration -- reportedly including Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger -- had suggested as long ago as 1998 that the assassination ban should be amended to legalize killings specifically authorized by the president.

But others maintained that such changes were unnecessary because the ban didn't cover killings that were carried out to defend the United States against an attack and because the president could issue overriding policy orders.

http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050324-114414-9779r.htm

[Casey]

Panel claims FBI failing to adjust
Former commission members say bureau is struggling after 9/11
By DAN EGGEN, Washington Post
First published: Tuesday, June 7, 2005

WASHINGTON -- The FBI has stumbled badly in attempts to remake itself since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and is plagued by high turnover, poor training and its continued inability to build a modern computer system, according to a panel convened Monday by the members of the commission that investigated the terror strikes.

The problems are so acute that members of the influential commission may want to reconsider whether the United States needs a separate agency to handle domestic intelligence, a Democratic member said.


Jamie S. Gorelick, a former deputy attorney general, said the commission was "taken aback" by the extent of FBI failures documented in several recent reports, including the scrapping of an expensive computer upgrade and its continued difficulty hiring qualified intelligence analysts. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III and other officials had assured the commission such problems were being addressed, commission officials said.

The remarks came during the first in a series of hearings to be held this summer by former members of the Sept. 11 commission, which was officially disbanded after the release of its report last year but has reorganized as a private nonprofit group.

The 10-member bipartisan panel plans to issue a "report card" on the government's performance in improving its counterterrorism efforts. Its two leaders, Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton plan to send a letter to government agencies this week asking administration officials to appear at hearings and provide records documenting their efforts since the report was issued.

Unlike the commission itself, which forced passage of a broad intelligence reform law, the private group has no power to issue subpoenas or compel production of records. But Kean said in an interview that he hopes the panel can leverage its remaining clout to get government cooperation.

FBI Assistant Director Cassandra M. Chandler said Monday that the FBI has undergone "an unprecedented transformation," since Sept. 11, 2001, including creation of an intelligence directorate, increased cooperation with local law enforcement and other improvements.

"By building our intelligence capabilities, improving our technology and working together, we have and will continue to develop the capabilities we need to succeed against all threats," Chandler said.

Monday's hearing was held to discuss CIA and FBI reforms, but most of the focus was on the FBI. John Gannon, a former veteran CIA official, said the FBI "has not made an adequate investment" in creating a cadre of experienced intelligence analysts with status equal to FBI special agents.

"If you are not an agent, you are furniture," Gannon said, echoing a report that found analysts handle phones and other menial tasks.

In related news reported Monday by The Associated Press:

Pakistan said it handed over a senior al-Qaida suspect to the United States, even though he had been the country's most wanted man for allegedly masterminding two attempts to kill President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Abu Farraj al-Libbi, a Libyan, reportedly was flown from Pakistan to an undisclosed destination a few days ago. U.S. officials in Islamabad and in Washington declined to comment.

A former University of South Florida professor went on trial on charges of supporting a pro-Palestinian terror cell blamed for scores of suicide attacks in Israel. Sami Al-Arian, who was fired after his arrest, and three co-defendants face a 53-count indictment that includes charges of providing material support to terrorists, racketeering and conspiracy.

http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=367703

[Casey]

Article Last Updated: 6/07/2005 01:17 AM

Detecting threats is still a challenge for intelligence agencies9-11 recommendations: Experts say there still are gaps in the nation's efforts to fight against terrorismBy Chris Mondics
Knight Ridder News Service

Salt Lake Tribune -
WASHINGTON - Nearly four years after the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackings, American intelligence agencies still are struggling to improve their ability to detect potential threats, experts testified Monday before a panel seeking to focus attention on gaps in the nation's terror defenses.

Former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and John Gannon, a former senior official of the CIA, said the capacity of the FBI and the CIA to anticipate terrorist attacks remains hampered by a shortage of analysts and by obstacles to sharing information.

''There is a lot being done but that doesn't answer the question that concerns me most: Will it last?'' Gannon said.

Monday's hearing was organized by former members of the Sept. 11 Commission, which disbanded last year after it completed a highly critical 567-page report on the failures of the Bush and Clinton administrations to react to signals that the al-Qaida terror network was preparing an attack on American soil.

Members of the commission, which was chaired by former New Jersey Gov. Thomas Kean, have said they intend to try to keep the public spotlight on the issue to improve chances that all their recommendations will be enacted.

They have established the 9-11 Public Discourse Project, funded through private grants, to follow-up on their work. Last year, President Bush signed legislation enacting one of the commission's top proposals, establishment of a national intelligence director to coordinate intelligence gathering across the federal government. But other recommendations, including a proposal to intensify congressional oversight of intelligence gathering, have languished.

Gannon said the FBI still was having difficulty switching from its traditional focus on solving crimes to employing the analytical techniques needed to thwart a terror attack.

Although the FBI is the nation's lead domestic intelligence agency, Gannon said anyone other than a traditional crime fighting FBI agent is treated within the agency like ''office furniture.''

Stephen Kodak, a FBI spokesman, said Monday that the bureau was addressing the problem by hiring more staff to enhance its analytical capabilities.

The bureau's terrorist-fighting operations also are struggling to come back from the cancellation earlier this year of a $170 million program to upgrade its computer systems. The Virtual Case File system, which was supposed to permit FBI agents to access case files from the field, was cancelled because bureau officials concluded it was out of date - even before it had been put into use. FBI director Robert S. Mueller III testified before Congress earlier this year that the problems stemmed in part from a poorly drawn contract and from the bureau's failure to grasp the complexity of the project.

Kean and other members of the 9-11 commission worried last summer as they issued their final report that flaws in the nation's terror defenses were so complex and numerous that sustaining interest would be difficult.

Toward that end, former commission members have scheduled eight hearings focusing on intelligence, foreign policy and the potential use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.

http://www.sltrib.com/nationworld/ci_2787214

[Casey]

Today: June 17, 2005 at 14:54:31 PDT
Panel Weighs Creating New Intel Agency

By MARK SHERMAN
ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON (AP) - After new reports of FBI anti-terror blunders and persistent problems with bureau computer systems, an old idea has resurfaced: setting up a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI to deal with the terror threat.

Two commissions that looked at intelligence failures - the Sept. 11 commission and a presidential panel - rejected the concept of an independent domestic intelligence agency, the U.S.-equivalent of Britain's MI5. But the presidential commission suggested in March that such an organization might be necessary if the FBI could not transform itself into a topflight intelligence service.

In recent weeks, fresh reports critical of the FBI have heightened concerns. The long-delayed release last week of the Justice Department inspector general's report on intelligence failures leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks criticized the FBI for its failure to uncover vital information that might have led agents to the hijackers.

"When we keep getting these negative reports about whether the FBI is meeting its responsibilities, in particular its new responsibility with regard to the war on terrorism, all I can say is they're failing and the leash is getting much shorter," said Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

Grassley said he is not calling for stripping the FBI of its intelligence operations. "But the latest developments and reports cause me to look more seriously in that direction," he said.

Sept. 11 commissioner Jamie Gorelick said there were two major reasons the commission did not call for a domestic intelligence agency - civil liberties concerns about the government spying on Americans and a belief that FBI Director Robert Mueller would put reforms in place.

The civil liberties issues haven't changed, but criticism of Mueller has increased, said Gorelick, deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration.

Another Democratic Sept. 11 panel member, former Indiana Rep. Tim Roemer, also said the issue is one of leadership, not the need for a new agency. "It's not just Mueller," Roemer said. "The president really needs to oversee the transformation of the FBI from a Mafia-fighting-centered institution to one that puts the highest priority on finding al-Qaida cells in the United States."

Mueller, testifying on Capitol Hill last month, told skeptical lawmakers he does not have an estimate of the cost of a new computer system to give the bureau an instantaneous and paperless way to manage all types of investigations. Mueller scrapped the bureau's Virtual Case File earlier this year at a loss of more than $100 million.

This month's first follow-up hearing by Sept. 11 commissioners since releasing their report last June dwelled on lingering problems in sharing intelligence, computer problems and FBI personnel issues, including a low regard within the bureau for counterterror analysts.

"I think that we have been taken aback collectively by the failure of the Virtual Case File," Gorelick said at last week's hearing.

Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who participated in the hearing, called the system "an unmitigated failure."

The FBI did not make anyone available for this article. But Mueller has been leading the charge in defense of his agency, which has hired hundreds of intelligence analysts and instituted widespread reforms since the terror attacks in 2001. He has unstintingly opposed loss of intelligence-gathering to a new agency.

When first suggested, proponents said it would make communications easier between intelligence agencies because it would remove from the equation the FBI's culture of working within the criminal justice system.

MI5 describes itself as Britain's defensive security intelligence agency. It cannot detain or arrest its targets but seeks "to gain the advantage over (them) by covertly obtaining information about them, which we can use to counter their activities."

Mueller has argued that both law enforcement and counterterrorism rely on the ability to gather intelligence, and that the FBI has first-rate investigative talents. Led by the Patriot Act, changes in federal law have made it easier to share information, he has said in one public appearance after another.

The FBI, while insisting that it has made progress, also acknowledges more remains to be done. Gorelick agreed. "The challenge is ensuring that the culture that breeds a good cop can also breed and nourish and train a good intelligence investigator," she said. "It's a tough challenge."

Richard Falkenrath, a former Bush national security aide who is now at the Brookings Institution, said he believes the FBI will retain its intelligence arm, despite the latest criticism. "The FBI is a sort of Teflon-coated agency," Falkenrath said. "Talk is cheap, but so far there's not any indication that the president or attorney general is dissatisfied."

---

On the Net:

FBI: http://www.fbi.gov (http://www.fbi.gov/)

Justice Department inspector general: http://www.usdoj.gov/oig (http://www.usdoj.gov/oig)

9/11 Public Discourse Project: http://www.9-11pdp.org/ (http://www.9-11pdp.org/) --

http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/bw-exec/2005/jun/17/061700404.html

[Casey]

FBI says it didn't seek terror expertise



By The Associated Press

Monday, June 20, 2005

WASHINGTON -- The G-men who fashioned the FBI's war on terrorism since Sept. 11 have a pointed message for agents looking to rise to the top: no Middle East or terrorism expertise required.

"I wish that I had it. It would be nice," Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald said when asked recently about his grasp of Middle East culture and history as the FBI's top official in the war on terror.

In sworn testimony that contrasts with their promises to the public, the FBI's top counterterrorism managers say Middle East and terrorism expertise weren't important in choosing the agents they promoted after Sept. 11.

And they don't believe such experience is necessary today even as terrorist acts occur across the globe.

"A bombing case is a bombing case," said Dale Watson, the FBI's terrorism chief in the critical two years after Sept. 11, 2001. "A crime scene in a bank robbery case is the same as a crime scene, you know, across the board."

Bald agreed.

"You need leadership. You don't need subject matter expertise," Bald testified in an ongoing FBI employment case. "It is certainly not what I look for in selecting an official for a position in a counterterrorism position."

In a development that has escaped public attention, FBI agent Bassem Youssef has questioned under oath most of the FBI's top leaders, including Director Robert Mueller and his predecessor, Louis Freeh, in an effort to show he was passed over for top terrorism jobs despite his expertise. Testimony from his lawsuit was recently sent to Congress.

Those who have held the bureau's top terrorism-fighting jobs since Sept. 11 often said in their testimony that they -- and many they've promoted since -- had no significant terrorism or Middle East experience. Some couldn't even explain the difference between Sunnis and Shiites, the two primary groups of Muslims.

"Probably the strongest leader I know in counterterrorism has no counterterrorism in his background," Bald insisted.

The hundreds of pages of testimony obtained by The Associated Press contrast with assurances Mueller has repeatedly given Congress that he was building a new FBI, from top to bottom, with experts able to stop terror attacks before they occurred, not solve them afterward.

"The FBI's shift toward terrorism prevention necessitates the building of a national level expertise and body of knowledge," Mueller told Congress a year after the suicide hijackings as lawmakers approved billions of new dollars for the war on terror.

Despite the testimony of its managers, the FBI said it has fundamentally reshaped itself to ensure the field agents on the ground who work the cases have the necessary skills, training and background for fighting terror. It noted it hired or redeployed more than 1,000 agents to counterterrorism and hired another 1,200 intelligence analysts and linguists.

"We fundamentally changed the criteria for hiring special agents and intelligence analysts to ensure that we get the critical skills, knowledge and experience we need to address today's threats," Assistant Director Cassandra Chandler told the AP.

"New agents receive personalized training from Muslim leaders. Street agents and managers in every field office have gotten to know the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities in their territories and regularly attend training sessions sponsored by community leaders," she said.

Daniel Byman, a national security expert who worked on both Congress' and the presidential investigations of terrorism and intelligence failures, reviewed the Youssef case for the court and concluded the spurned agent is one of the government's most-skilled terrorism fighters and that the FBI overall remains weak in expertise on the Middle East, terrorism and intelligence liaison.

"Many of its officers -- including those quite skilled in other aspects of the bureau's work, lack the skills to work with foreign governments or even their U.S. counterparts," Byman concluded.

"Knowing about counterterrorism would help a supervisor ensure a proper investigation and avoid missing important aspects of the case," he said.

Watson, who oversaw the first two years of transformation, testified he could not recall a single meeting in the aftermath of the suicide hijackings in which FBI leaders discussed the type of skills or training needed for counterterrorism.

Youssef's lawyer, Steve Kohn, pressed further.

"What skill sets would they need to better identify, penetrate and/or prevent a future Osama bin Laden-style terrorist attack?" Kohn asked.

Watson answered: "They would need to understand the attorney general guidelines for counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigation."

"Anything else?" the lawyer inquired.

"No," Watson answered.

John Pikus, who held a key supervisory job during the massive reallocation of agents from traditional crime-fighting to terrorism, testified the FBI didn't create new screening standards to promote terrorism experts to its upper ranks.

"Strengthening up the criteria for selection," Pikus answered when asked where the FBI was deficient in its terrorism hiring.

Pat D'Amuro, one of the FBI's most-experienced senior managers in terrorism, testified that when he was brought to Washington to oversee the Sept. 11 investigation, eventually promoted to executive assistant director, he brought lots of agents with him from New York who had terrorism backgrounds.

But rather than conducting a systematic search for the bureau's most-talented Middle Eastern and terrorism agents worldwide, D'Amuro testified, he brought to Washington the agents he personally knew had worked successfully on al-Qaida and other terror cases.

He said that in later promotions Middle East and terrorism experience was helpful but not mandatory, noting the FBI also must deal with terrorism from domestic sources and the Irish Republican Army.

"It could be a benefit. When you look for managers, you're looking for people that can lead people, manage people, knows how to conduct an investigation, knows how to collect certain intelligence or information, you know," he testified.

When asked if he had any formal terrorism training that justified his appointment as the No. 3 FBI official, Bald said, "It would have been on-the-job in the counterterrorism division." Bald entered the counterterrorism division in 2003 after leading the FBI's Baltimore office during the Washington sniper case.

The assistant Bald brought in to run the division last year gave a similar account.

"It's a tremendous learning experience, the seat that I'm sitting in. You learn every single day about this," Deputy Assistant Director John Lewis testified.

When asked whether he, as the FBI's former counterterrorism chief, could describe the differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Watson answered, "Not technically, no."

He also said that his assertion a few years ago that Osama bin Laden had been killed -- a declaration that conflicted with CIA assessments and fresh video evidence -- wasn't based on fact. "It's my gut instinct," he answered.

Youssef, the agent suing the bureau, was credited with improving relations with Saudi Arabia during the late 1990s as bin Laden's threat grew and the bureau struggled to solve the case of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.

He received a special award from the intelligence community for meritorious work and was singled out by his managers for "continuous creativity and perseverance" in terrorism cases. Saudi officials said they regarded Youssef as the most-skilled U.S. agent in conducting lie detector tests on Arabic-speaking suspects.

But after Sept. 11, Youssef repeatedly was passed over for top-level headquarters jobs in terrorism, instead offered same-rank positions in budgeting or exploiting intelligence from terrorism documents.

Former Director Freeh, who left that job three months before the terror attacks, testified that he believed Youssef should have gotten an important terror-fighting job in the post-Sept. 11 era.

"I think, you know, given his experience, certainly his language, you know, domestically he would probably have a much more required role and be of greater help back at headquarters," Freeh said. Another FBI supervisor, just-retired Agent Paul Vick, testified Youssef had the "many skills that were badly needed" after Sept. 11 and the FBI's failure to utilize him was "inappropriate and a waste of a very important human resource."

http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/terrorism/s_345709.html

[Casey]

Jun 20, 1:09 PM EDT

FBI Says Counterterror Experts Not Crucial

By JOHN SOLOMON
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The FBI vowed to build national expertise for fighting terrorists after the Sept. 11 attacks, but the supervisors who crafted that war plan now say Middle East and terrorism experience haven't been important for choosing their agents.

"You need leadership. You don't need subject matter expertise," Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald recently testified in a little noticed employment case now catching the eye of Congress. "It is certainly not what I look for in selecting an official for a position in a counterterrorism position."

The lawsuit, brought against the FBI by one of its most accomplished pre-Sept. 11 terror-fighting agents, provides sharp contrasts between the bureau's public promises and the reality of how it has chosen the agents who run its war on terrorism.

In hundreds of pages of sworn testimony obtained by The Associated Press, senior FBI managers argued repeatedly that Middle East and anti-terrorism experience aren't required for promotion and that they see little difference between solving a traditional crime and a terror attack.

"A bombing case is a bombing case," said Dale Watson, the FBI's terrorism chief in the two years after Sept. 11, 2001. "A crime scene in a bank robbery case is the same as a crime scene, you know, across the board."

Watson couldn't describe the difference between Shiites and Sunnis, the two major groups of Muslims. "Not technically, no," Watson answered when asked the question.

Bald, the FBI's current anti-terrorism chief, said his first training in that area came "on the job" when he moved to headquarters to oversee anti-terrorism strategy two years ago. when asked about his grasp of Middle Eastern culture and history, he replied: "I wish that I had it. It would be nice."

FBI agent Bassem Youssef has questioned under oath many of the bureau's top leaders, including Director Robert Mueller and his predecessor, Louis Freeh, in an effort to show he was passed over for top counterterrorism jobs despite his expertise. Testimony from his lawsuit was recently sent to Congress.



FBI Didn't Seek Terror Expertise After Sept. 11

Those who have held the bureau's top terrorism-fighting jobs since Sept. 11 often said in their testimony that they - and many they have promoted since - had no significant anti-terrorism or Middle East experience.

"Probably the strongest leader I know in counterterrorism has no counterterrorism in his background," Bald insisted.

The hundreds of pages of testimony obtained by The Associated Press contrast with assurances Mueller has repeatedly given Congress that he was building a new FBI, from top to bottom, with experts able to stop terrorist attacks before they occurred, not solve them afterward.

"The FBI's shift toward terrorism prevention necessitates the building of a national-level expertise and body of knowledge," Mueller told Congress a year after the suicide hijackings, as lawmakers approved billions of new dollars to fight terrorism.

Despite the testimony of how its managers were chosen, the FBI said it has fundamentally reshaped itself at the field level to ensure the agents who work the cases have the necessary skills, training and background for fighting terrorism. It hired or redeployed more than 1,000 agents to counterterrorism and hired an additional 1,200 intelligence analysts and linguists.

"We fundamentally changed the criteria for hiring special agents and intelligence analysts to ensure that we get the critical skills, knowledge and experience we need to address today's threats," FBI Assistant Director Cassandra Chandler told the AP.

Daniel Byman, a national security expert who worked on both congressional and presidential investigations of terrorism and intelligence failures, reviewed the Youssef case for the court. Byman concluded the FBI overall remains woefully weak in expertise on the Middle East, terrorism and intelligence liaison.

"Many of its officers, including those quite skilled in other aspects of the bureau's work, lack the skills to work with foreign governments or even their U.S. counterparts," Byman concluded.

Watson testified he could not recall a single meeting in the aftermath of Sept. 11 in which FBI leaders discussed the type of skills or training needed for counterterrorism.

Youssef's lawyer, Steve Kohn, pressed further.

"What skill sets would they need to better identify, penetrate and/or prevent a future Osama bin Laden-style terrorist attack?" Kohn asked.

Watson answered: "They would need to understand the attorney general guidelines for counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigation."

"Anything else?" the lawyer inquired.

"No," Watson answered.

John Pikus, who held a key supervisory job during the reallocation of agents from traditional crime-fighting to terrorism, testified that the FBI did not create new screening standards to promote terrorism experts to its upper ranks.

"Strengthening up the criteria for selection," Pikus answered when asked where the FBI was deficient in its terrorism hiring.

Pat D'Amuro, one of the FBI's most-experienced senior terrorism managers, testified he didn't conduct a systematic search for the bureau's most talented Middle Eastern and terrorism agents worldwide after Sept. 11. Instead, he said, he brought to Washington the agents he personally knew had worked successfully on al-Qaida and other terrorism cases.

D'Amuro said that in later promotions, Middle East and terrorism experience was helpful but not mandatory. He noted the FBI also must deal with terrorism from domestic sources and the Irish Republican Army.

"It could be a benefit. When you look for managers, you're looking for people that can lead people, manage people, knows how to conduct an investigation, knows how to collect certain intelligence or information, you know," D'Amuro testified.

Youssef, the agent suing the bureau, was credited with improving relations with Saudi Arabia during the late 1990s as bin Laden's threat grew and the bureau struggled to solve the case of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. service personnel.

He received a special award from the intelligence community for meritorious work and was singled out by his managers for "continuous creativity and perseverance" in terrorism cases. Saudi officials said they regarded Youssef as the most skilled U.S. agent in conducting lie detector tests on Arabic-speaking suspects.

But after Sept. 11, Youssef repeatedly was passed over for top-level headquarters jobs in terrorism. Instead, he was offered same-rank positions in budgeting or exploiting intelligence from terrorism documents.

Freeh, the former FBI director who left that job three months before Sept. 11, testified that he believed Youssef should have gotten an important terror-fighting job in the post-Sept. 11 era.

"I think, you know, given his experience, certainly his language, you know, domestically he would probably have a much more required role and be of greater help back at headquarters," Freeh said.

One FBI supervisor, just-retired Agent Paul Vick, testified that Youssef had the "many skills that were badly needed" after Sept. 11 and the FBI's failure to utilize him was "inappropriate and a waste of a very important human resource."

---
http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/F/FBI_TERROR_JOBS?SITE=CAWOO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2005-06-20-00-09-30

[The 801]

Sickening.

[The 801]

U.S. Spy Plane Crashes in Southwest Asia

BAGHDAD, Iraq - A U.S. Air Force U-2 spy plane has crashed in southwest Asia, the U.S. military announced Wednesday, and one official said the location has not been released because "host nation sensitivities" are involved.


The cause of the crash and the pilot's status were not known, U.S. Central Command said in a brief written statement. The crash happened Tuesday night at 2330 GMT.

The Central Command's statement used the term southwest Asia, which can be used as a substitute for describing the Middle East.

"The specific location is not releasable due to host nation sensitivities," U.S. Air Force Capt. David W. Small, a Central Command spokesman, said in an e-mailed response to a query for more information.

Small said he expected that the military would release more information shortly.

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20050622/ap_on_re_mi_ea/spy_plane_crash

[al-Canine]

Choking Deep Throats

Time Magazine's decision to obey the US Supreme Court and hand over a reporter's confidential notes and sources is a bad day for journalism. By Steven Downes, Times Online

A sad day for journalism, and a bad one for freedom of information. Time Inc, the New York-based publishers of Time magazine, last night caved in to pressure brought through the US legal system to agree to reveal confidential sources of information following the naming of an undercover CIA agent.

Matthew Cooper, the reporter, and a New York Times journalist, Judith Miller, had both faced jails terms and their employers punitive fines after the US Supreme Court turned down appeals on Monday. Time opted to give way and hand over Cooper's notes, the New York Times, a newspaper that has endured its fair share of problems of late, bravely chose to stand its ground.

"In philosophical terms, this means that not protecting the source is always wrong."
Prof Tim Crook, University of London

Time's was a benchmark decision, though certainly not, as some in America have claimed, unique. We in Britain have too long a line of former unnamed sources who have in some way been outed by the Government after providing journalists with information for a story - from David Kelly, through to Sarah Tisdall, whistle-blowers have paid a price, whether through a jail term or in meeting a tragic end, as in Dr Kelly's case.

There is irony in the timing of the news, too, coming barely a month after Mark Felt admitted, finally, that he was the legendary source, Deep Throat.

Mr Felt, when No2 at the FBI in the early 1970s, helped Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein unravel the Watergate conspiracy, bring down a President, and launch hundreds, if not thousands, of journalism careers.

Without his steers and insights, the Washington Post journalists would never have had the confidence to run with their stories. Without confidence in the journalists' pledge to keep his identity secret, Mr Felt would never have spoken as he did to Woodward.

Next week, after faithfully keeping his secret for three decades, Woodward publishes his book, The Secret Man, which tells all that could not be told before, a sort of All The President's Men Part 2, but with better footnotes.

Given the way that Woodward, Bernstein and the Post famously resisted all legal attempts to uncover their sources, and given the manner in which the First Amendment to the US constitution is supposed to protect the freedom of speech, today's decision of Time seems a little feeble.

Certainly, Cooper was very unhappy at his employers' decision. "For almost two years," Mr Cooper said, "I've protected my confidential sources even under the threat of jail. So while I understand Time's decision to turn over papers that identify my sources, I'm obviously disappointed by what they chose."

The documents include Cooper's notes of interviews with a member of the Bush administration who identified "energy analyst" Valerie Plame as a CIA agent and expert on weapons of mass destruction.

The leak*was in fact all part of a concerted White House plan to discredit Ms Plame's husband, former ambassador* Joseph Wilson,*who in 2003 had denounced the US government, saying that "some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear programme was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat". Those who followed the Kelly case and its suggestions that the British government had "sexed up" its dossier on Iraq's WMDs, may find too many*parallels for comfort here.

The action is a profound betrayal of the cardinal principle of journalism
Aidan White, general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists

In Britain, the Press Complaints Council rule on confidential sources is clear in matters of this sort. "Journalists have a moral obligation to protect confidential sources of information," the PCC says. The National Union of Journalists code of ethics leaves little room for manoeuvre: "A journalist shall protect confidential sources of information." Professor Tim Crook, a senior lecturer*in media law and ethics*at London's Goldsmith College, has said: "The obligation brooks no qualification... In philosophical terms, this means that not protecting the source is always wrong."

So where does this leave Time? In deep ordure, judging by the opprobrium heaped upon them this morning.

"The action is a profound betrayal of the cardinal principle of journalism," Aidan White, the general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists. "The company's decision to repudiate their own reporter when he seeks to defend the ethics of journalism is unconscionable."

Reporters Without Borders described it as a "dangerous move and a defeat for journalism".

Given the popularity of blogging as a means of disseminating the information that those in power do not want to have disseminated ("Everything else in advertising," as Lord Beaverbrook once said), the court action may prove to be the last attempt to keep the genie in the bottle.

But there must be a fear*that when a whistleblower next considers whether to become the "new Deep Throat", they will probably keep their mouth firmly shut, possibly to the detriment of us all.

Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,8210-1677057,00.html

[Casey]

Negroponte Says Terror Database Is Working

By MICHELLE SPITZER
Associated Press Writer

September 27, 2005, 11:51 PM EDT

MIAMI BEACH, Fla. -- New York City police were led to a possible al-Qaida associate last month after a search of a federal terror database during a routine traffic search, National Intelligence Director John D. Negroponte said Tuesday.

In a speech at the annual conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Negroponte offered the incident as an example of increasing cooperation between local law enforcement and federal agencies.

Negroponte spoke of success he said local law enforcement officials have had in working with the FBI-run Terrorist Screening Center, the government's new central database for terror suspects.

According to Negroponte, the New York City Police Department called the center last month because a routine search on a parking violation alerted officers that the individual might be a terrorist suspect.

"Sure enough, TSC database searches identified the subject as an alleged alien smuggler possibly associated with al-Qaida," Negroponte said. "Identifying terrorists who wish to do us harm, intercepting them when necessary and preventing attacks before they occur is a tall order, but it is the right order."

Negroponte said it was important for agencies from around the world to work together and share information. However, there are still issues that need to be addressed, including privacy and civil liberties.

The screening center was created in September 2003 by a presidential directive. It combines about a dozen databases from nine agencies that any government official -- from a Customs agent at an airport to a state trooper watching for speeders -- can consult to check the name of someone who has been screened or stopped.

Earlier this year, Inspector General Glenn A. Fine said in an audit that the database was missing some names that should be in it and had inaccurate information about others.

Donna Bucella, the center's director, has said the problems have been corrected.

* __

Associated Press Writer Katherine Shrader in Washington contributed to this report.
Copyright 2005 Newsday Inc.

http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/sns-ap-terrorist-negroponte,0,5694142.story?coll=sns-ap-nation-headlines

[al-Canine]

CIA faces spy shortages as staffers go private

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - As CIA Director Porter Goss tries to rebuild the agency's global operations, he faces a shortage of experienced spies created by a post-September 11 stampede to the private sector, current and former intelligence officials say.

Goss, who a year ago inherited a CIA wracked by criticism of intelligence failures over Iraq and the September 11, 2001, attacks, has come under fire from critics about the publicized departures of several high-level clandestine officers.

Reform advocates see the loss of senior officials as a natural consequence of changes intended to root out an old guard blamed for lapses that prompted Congress to put the CIA under a new director of national intelligence, John Negroponte.

"The CIA and the intelligence community failed this country pretty badly. That's why there's new leadership at the CIA. Change is not easy," said Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the Republican chairman of the House of Representatives intelligence committee.

But current and former officials say Goss does face problems stemming from the agency's reliance on a robust private contracting market for skilled intelligence and security workers that has grown more lucrative since the September 11, 2001, attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

"Goss realizes he has a major problem in the (clandestine service) because he's having major bailouts among the old guard and also retention problems all the way down the ranks," said a former clandestine officer.

Experienced spies have been surrendering their blue staff badges and leaving the CIA in droves, often to return the next day as better paid, green-badged private contractors, current and former officials say.

But as contractors, they can no longer supervise fresh recruits at a time when the CIA is pursuing a 50 percent increase in spies. Nor can they supplement a pool of experienced operatives from which the agency traditionally draws its top leaders.

"You've got a seismic shift with the contractor issue," said a intelligence official who views the trend as byproduct of low morale among clandestine staff officers.

"It's frankly scary to look at the number of middle managers that are diving out with 10, 15, 20 years in because they're going to make $175,000 or $200,000. It reduces what we call the 'blue badges' -- government people with clearances."

PAY IS BETTER FOR PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

A $200,000-a-year contracting salary compares with annual pay of about $135,000 for experienced CIA staffers at the very top of the scale used to set federal salaries in Washington.

"Often you leave behind the deadwood. The deadwood gets in charge, and then even more people move on," the official said.

CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Millerwise Dyck said Goss is determined to stem the trend toward private contracting by rebuilding the blue-badged workforce as CIA operations expand worldwide.

"He believes we should be primarily a blue-badged workforce, and he intends to build that way," she said.

Officials say the U.S. Congress set the stage for today's shortage of experienced staff by ordering a 17 percent across-the-board reduction in agency personnel in the mid-1990s after the Cold War.

The Directorate of Operations, which runs CIA clandestine activities, has dwindled to fewer than 5,000 staff members from a peak of over 7,000 in the 1970s, intelligence sources say.

To supplement the clandestine ranks, Goss issued an appeal to former senior intelligence officers over the summer to consider returning to help train new recruits.

But already, inexperienced clandestine officers have shown up at the CIA's Baghdad and Kabul stations in numbers that some current and former officials find worrying.

"They're great places to learn. But where are the people to lead?" complained a former senior clandestine officer. "Running around Afghanistan trying to recruit Afghans is a piece of cake compared with trying to recruit an Iranian nuclear scientist."

But Goss' success could depend on how he is perceived by the remaining clandestine staff.

He has been portrayed as a director struggling against opposition from clandestine officers who some say are offended by his reliance on a personal staff known to insiders as the "Gosslings."

"We hear people feel like there's no strategic vision coming out of Goss. He's behind a wall of staff and his staff are disruptive," said a congressional aide briefed by CIA officials.

Added a former clandestine officer with long experience in world hot spots: "The old CIA is finished. What happens now, I don't know."

© 2005 Reuters

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/30/AR2005093000839.html

[rectar]

overheard at the madrass....

It is generally believed that the present insurgency is spearheaded by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), an underground organization that traces its roots to the leftist Baloch Students Organization at Balochistan University during the Cold War era. In an attempt to counterbalance US influence and Pakistan, the former Soviet Union funded the BLA with money, arms and logistics. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much has been heard of the BLA.

However, after the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, when many of them fled to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the US thought it prudent to establish its own spy network to keep a check on the validity of the information it was being fed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. Anti-Taliban nationalist elements, whether Pashtun or Baloch, were thought to be the best tool for this.

It was not a surprise, therefore, that Baloch nationalist leader Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal returned to Pakistan after a long exile in London, and soon several hundred youths were trained under the banner of the BLA. This was done at a base in Kohlu, near Dera Bugti in Balochistan. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the Afghan and Indian governments played a role in this. Apart from this group, powerful tribal chiefs, such as Nawab Akbar Bugti, Mengal and Nawab Khair Bux Mari incited their tribes to revolt against the Pakistan army.

According to Asia Times Online's sources the army believes that if it launched a major offensive it could crush the insurgents in Balochistan as the terrain is nowhere near as harsh as South Waziristan's. But it is reluctant to become involved on two fronts, and there is also the danger of a serious backlash, both on the province and beyond. Pakistan's political opposition parties are already making loud noises about stopping military intervention.

Instead, a number of local leaders have been arrested or warrants issued for their arrests. The aim is that while in captivity they can be persuaded to influence their followers to stop the unrest.

Still troubled over Iraq
With a Saudi proposal to raise a Muslim army to help with security in Iraq rejected by most Arab and Muslim countries, Pakistan has also officially announced that it will not send troops to Iraq.

However, Asia Times Online has learned that in the backrooms of General Headquarters (GHQ) preparations for sending troops are still under way.

Former Corps Commander Rawalpindi and presently military secretary in GHQ Rawalpindi, Lieutenant-General Arif Hasan has been assigned to work on different options:

Send a selection of servicemen from the army reserve corps.
Offer officers and soldiers who are on the verge of early retirement, and then send them as a separate unit, not as a part of the Pakistan army.
<LI>Raise a separate volunteer force comprising retired army officers and soldiers.

In the meanwhile, a very limited number of the last group could be sent soon to guard United Nations premises in Iraq - Pakistani Jehangir Ashraf Qazi has been appointed as the new UN envoy to Iraq.

[The 801]

Rectar,
Link please.....

[Vancouver]

Hi 801,
That one seems to have come from Asia Times a year back:
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH07Df03.html

...nationalist insurgents are conducting an ongoing campaign for more control over the area's vast natural-gas and mineral resources... plus all that opium :)

[Casey]

Intelligence-gathering moves out into open
By Scott Shane The New York Times
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2005
WASHINGTON (http://www.iht.com/cgi-bin/search.cgi?query=WASHINGTON&sort=swishrank) A documentary on Italian television accuses U.S. forces of using white phosphorus shells in the assault on Falluja, Iraq, last year not just for nighttime illumination, their usual purpose, but to burn to death Iraqi insurgents and civilians. The mainstream American news media, whose reporters had witnessed the fighting and apparently seen no evidence of this, largely ignored the claim.

But on the Internet home page of the Open Source Center, a new U.S. intelligence unit that keeps an eye on the global flood of nonsecret information, a report on the documentary was featured prominently.

"We posted it because it was getting significant play on the Web and in foreign media, which means it could influence public opinion," said Douglas Naquin, director of the center. The Web site, open to government workers and contractors, included links to the video and to news reports about it from the BBC in London to The Daily Times in Pakistan.

In the jargon-happy world of spying, Humint is human intelligence, or the recruitment of foreign agents; Sigint is signals intelligence, or eavesdropping; and Imint is imagery intelligence, or satellite photography. But those costly disciplines are best for obtaining well-hidden nuggets: plans for the next Qaeda attack, or the state of North Korea's nuclear program.

By contrast, Osint, or open-source intelligence, is a low-cost way to try to understand the Islamic militancy that fuels Al Qaeda or to track subtle shifts in the public statements of Kim Jong Il, the North Korean dictator. It gleans insights not just from foreign newspapers and television but from the ballooning riches of the Web and such diverse sources as Palestinian rap and Indonesian T-shirts.

The creation of the center, announced last week, might seem like it comes late in the game, given that the Web has been a resource for years. Indeed it reflects a growing consensus that open-source intelligence has been neglected, in part because it lacks the attraction of stolen secrets.

"Collecting intelligence these days is at times less a matter of stealing through dark alleys in a foreign land to meet some secret agent than one of surfing the Internet under the fluorescent lights of an office cubicle," Stephen Mercado, a CIA analyst, wrote last year in the agency's in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence. The presidential commission on intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction agreed, recommending last summer a major expansion of the open-source collection.

John Pike, who follows U.S. intelligence agencies at a Web site, GlobalSecurity.org, that itself is a rich compilation of open-source material, noted that the use of public information had grown since the 1940s, when the government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service began translating media. He said the greatest challenge for the center, which replaces FBIS, would be to select what is most revealing. "It's like drinking from Niagara Falls," he said.

Some might question what can be learned from inflammatory T-shirt slogans or Web scribblings. But officials say such easily collected items help fill in the intelligence mosaic, allowing agents and eavesdroppers in the other intelligence spheres to focus on the truly hard-to-get secrets.

Open-source officers scan technical journals for evidence of suspicious work on toxins or germs that might be used in an attack.

They follow trade publications to identify companies capable of supplying parts to illicit nuclear programs. They lurk in foreign-language chat rooms, hunting for insights into shifting public opinion. The center's officers have found that Farsi, the language of Iran, is among the top five languages used by bloggers, who can be quite informative. Snapshots posted on Iranian blogs show how young women are following or flouting the strictures of the ruling clerics on head coverings and skirt lengths - not exactly a code-cracker, but one gauge of the public mood.

"There's not much difference between working with a disgruntled military officer as a clandestine agent and reading what a disgruntled military officer posts on a blog," Naquin said.
Pages also track Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose savvy use of the news media make them natural open-source targets.

Even as Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, has eluded capture, his group has issued daily Web reports on its attacks, often with video.

Some of the posted information, albeit unvetted, would be a coup for any secret agent. On Friday, for instance, a Web communiqu&#233; described in detail the hotel bombings in Jordan, giving the nationality, gender and noms de guerre of the attackers.


http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/13/news/intel.php

[The 801]

Casey, if you were a US citzen, I would have my congressman get you an interview. Alas....

[Occupant]

For anyone interested in the CIA publication cited in the article Casey posted:

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article05.html

It's a very interesting read.

[The 801]

Occupant, that is a good read. But I am surprised that it indicates that open souce is not that great a basis of information to the CIA at this time. It also indicates that what we do here is pretty valuble. Umm.

[Occupant]

Occupant, that is a good read. But I am surprised that it indicates that open souce is not that great a basis of information to the CIA at this time. It also indicates that what we do here is pretty valuble. Umm.
I think it validates what is being done by those who work here and elsewhere, at least admitting a greater role for Osint than it usually does. Combined with the admission that the Internet is playing an important role in communications, one can see that the work has some potential benefit -- even without public admission of the actual successes.

[al-Canine]

Goss says disclosures undermine job of CIA

Director cites 'very severe' damage to mission from leaks on programs; Negroponte defends warrantless eavesdropping effort

February 2, 2006, 2:28 PM EST

WASHINGTON -- U.S. intelligence officials told Congress today that disclosure of once-classified projects such as President Bush's no-warrant eavesdropping program have undermined their work.

"The damage has been very severe to our capabilities to carry out our mission," CIA Director Porter Goss told the Senate Intelligence Committee, citing disclosures about a variety of CIA programs that he suggested may have been compromised.

Goss said a federal grand jury should be empaneled to determine "who is leaking this information."

But Democratic members of the panel accused the Bush administration of wanting to have it both ways.

"The president has not only confirmed the existence of the program, he has spoken at length about it repeatedly," while keeping Congress in the dark, said Sen. Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, the panel's senior Democrat.

Rockefeller suggested that such "leaks" most likely "came from the executive branch" of the government.

That brought a terse response from FBI Director Robert Mueller, who said, "It's not fair to point a finger as to the responsibility of the leak."

The sometimes pointed exchanges came as leaders of the nation's intelligence agencies appeared before the panel in a rare public session to give a rundown on threats facing the world.

Committee Democrats sought to change the focus to the president's decision to authorize the National Security Agency to eavesdrop -- without first obtaining warrants -- on communications to and from those in the United States and terror suspects abroad.

National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, who oversees all intelligence activities, strongly defended the program, calling it crucial for protecting the nation against its most menacing threat.

"This was not about domestic surveillance," he said.

Negroponte called al-Qaida and associated terror groups the "top concern" of the U.S. intelligence community, followed closely by the nuclear activities of Iran and North Korea.

Goss complained that leaks to the news media about classified CIA programs -- such as reported CIA secret prisons abroad -- had damaged his own agency's work.

"I use the words 'very severe' intentionally. And I think the evidence will show that," he said.

Goss cited a "disruption to our plans, things that we have under way." Some CIA sources and "assets" had been rendered "no longer viable or usable, or less effective by a large degree," he said.

The revelations have also made intelligence agencies in other countries mistrustful of their U.S. counterparts, Goss said.

"I'm stunned to the quick when I get questions from my professional counterparts saying, 'Mr. Goss, can't you Americans keep a secret?'"

Goss, when pressed, said he was speaking of programs run by the CIA, and would let NSA officials speak for themselves.

Gen. Michael Hayden, the principal deputy director of national intelligence and a former NSA director, said it was hard to characterize any damage done to his agency in an open session.

But, he said, "Some people claim that somehow or another our capabilities are immune to this kind of information going out into the public domain.

"And, I can tell you, in a broad sense, that is certainly not true."

After a public session lasting just under four hours, the committee and its witnesses went into a closed-door session.

In assessing risks to the United States, Negroponte testified that Iran probably does not yet have nuclear weapons, nor the fissile material needed for producing them.

"Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate concern," he said.

Iran already has "the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East," Negroponte said.

Meanwhile, he said that North Korea's assertions that it has nuclear weapons are "probably true."

Negroponte told the panel that some 40 terror groups, insurgencies or cults have obtained or want chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Negroponte spoke as U.S. and European diplomats worked behind the scenes to build support for their decision to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council over concerns that it is seeking nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-nation board of governors began a two-day meeting on a European draft resolution calling for Tehran to be referred to the Security Council, which can impose sanctions.

It was Negroponte's first public appearance before a congressional committee since his confirmation hearings last April. His job was created by Congress to coordinate the work of the government's 15 intelligence agencies.

Negroponte said great strides had been made in fighting global terrorism.

"We have eliminated much of the leadership that presided over al-Qaida in 2001," he said, "and U.S. -led counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continued to disrupt its operations, take out its leaders and deplete its cadre."

But, Negroponte added, the terror organization's core elements still plot and make preparations for terrorist strikes.

He suggested that "high impact attacks" would continue, and said al-Qaida continues to pursue chemical, biological and atomic weapons in hopes of attacking the United States.


http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-intel0202,1,3105604.story?

[Casey]

White House lists 10 foiled attacks

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- President Bush said Thursday that the U.S.-led global war on terror had "weakened" al Qaeda and cited as proof international efforts that he said had thwarted a terrorist plot to attack Los Angeles.

Members of an al Qaeda affiliate in Asia had planned to crash a commercial airplane into the U.S. Bank Tower in Los Angeles in 2002, Bush said.

In a speech at the National Guard Memorial Building, Bush gave more details on the purported plot.

It was one of a list of 10 terrorist plots that U.S. authorities first released in October 2005.

The list and details from the White House:

1. West Coast airliner plot:

In 2002 the United States disrupted a plot to use shoe bombs to hijack a commercial airliner to attack the tallest building in Los Angeles. The plot was "set in motion" by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks.

"Rather than use Arab hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed sought out young men from Southeast Asia whom he believed would not arouse as much suspicion," Bush said.

2. East Coast airliner plot:

In mid-2003 the United States and a partner disrupted a plot to use hijacked commercial airplanes to attack targets on the East Coast of the United States.

3. The Jose Padilla plot:

In May 2002 the United States disrupted a plot that involved blowing up apartment buildings in the United States. One of the alleged plotters, Jose Padilla, allegedly discussed the possibility of using a "dirty bomb" inside the United States. Bush has designated him an "enemy combatant."

4. 2004 British urban targets plot:

In mid-2004 the United States and partners disrupted a plot to bomb urban targets in Britain.

5. 2003 Karachi plot:

In spring 2003 the United States and a partner disrupted a plot to attack westerners at several targets in Karachi, Pakistan.

6. Heathrow Airport plot:

In 2003 the United States and several partners disrupted a plot to attack London's Heathrow Airport using hijacked commercial airliners. The planning for this alleged attack was undertaken by a major operational figure in the September 11, 2001, attacks.

7. 2004 Britain plot:

In the spring of 2004 the United States and partners, using a combination of law enforcement and intelligence resources, disrupted a plot to conduct large-scale bombings in Britain.

8. 2002 Arabian Gulf shipping plot:

In late 2002 and 2003 the United States and a partner nation disrupted a plot by al Qaeda operatives to attack ships in the Arabian Gulf.

9. 2002 Strait of Hormuz plot:

In 2002 the United States and partners disrupted a plot to attack ships in the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean.

10. 2003 tourist site plot:

In 2003 the United States and a partner nation disrupted a plot to attack a tourist site outside the United States. The White House did not list what site that was.


Find this article at:
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/02/09/whitehouse.plots

[Casey]

Al Qaeda answers CIA's hiring call

By Michael Sulick, Michael Sulick is a former CIA associate deputy director for operations and former CIA chief of counterintelligence.

As many as 40 possible terrorists may have attempted to infiltrate U.S. intelligence agencies in recent months, CIA expert Barry Royden reported at a national counterintelligence conference in March. If that news isn't sufficiently terrifying, consider this chilling paradox: Though the agencies caught the potential spies at the job application stage, post-Sept. 11 pressures to quickly boost staffing make it increasingly likely that a terrorist could sneak into the intelligence community's ranks.

Since Al Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington four years ago, the Sept. 11 commission and other investigative bodies have criticized intelligence agencies for failing to hire enough qualified personnel. President Bush ordered the CIA to increase analytic and operational personnel by 50%.

ADVERTISEMENT
In response, intelligence agencies have launched ambitious campaigns to attract new recruits, even enlisting advertising agencies and running glitzy commercials. But this scramble to hire leaves agencies vulnerable, as a woefully small number of security analysts attempt to vet the flood of applicants. Job seekers with the native language skills and overseas experience that much intelligence work requires are among the most difficult to screen for security.

This conundrum comes to light as intelligence agencies have finally recognized that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups operate like traditional intelligence services. Terrorists spy before they terrorize. They case and observe their targets. They collect intelligence about their enemy's vulnerabilities from publicly available information and by eliciting secrets from unwitting sources. Like intelligence officers, terrorists also practice tradecraft — the art of blending seamlessly into a society's fabric for months or years before striking.

Consider two men whom U.S. officials have linked to Al Qaeda: Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen, exploited his job as a truck driver to plan ways to sabotage bridges and derail trains across the country. And Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and a convert to Islam, could maneuver in Western society without the scrutiny given those of Middle Eastern background. Padilla's ultimate mission, allegedly, was to explode a "dirty bomb" in a U.S. city.

Considering their backgrounds, these recruits would presumably have failed to pass muster if they attempted to find jobs in U.S. intelligence.

But what about John Walker Lindh? Dubbed the American Talib, Lindh was of a different mold. He came from an affluent Marin County suburb, had decent academic credentials and no criminal record. If the U.S. hadn't captured him in Afghanistan, if he'd simply returned home to the U.S. after his secret training and indoctrination, his knowledge of Arabic and Middle East travel may have made him an attractive candidate for U.S. intelligence. That others with similar experience will infiltrate intelligence agencies is a real risk.

In the war on terrorism, intelligence has replaced the Cold War's tanks and fighter planes as the primary weapon against an unseen enemy.

A single mole in the CIA, the National Security Agency or the FBI could inflict far more damage to national security than Soviet spies did during the Cold War. Because the U.S. and Soviet Union never went head-to-head in war, the Soviets never fully exploited the advantages from its spies.

Now, however, our nation is at war. Imagine the damage Al Qaeda could do with the help of an infiltrator such as FBI spy Robert Hanssen or CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, each of whom passed a wealth of classified material to the Russians.

To prevent that sort of catastrophe, our intelligence agencies need to strike a difficult balance. Starting immediately, they need to develop common databases to share hiring information, and they need to add investigators and counterintelligence experts to bolster security screening.

Senior officials must resist political pressure and exercise patience in investigating each applicant thoroughly. U.S. counterintelligence safeguards must remain impregnable even as agencies push to replenish the depleted ranks of intelligence professionals.

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/suncommentary/la-op-ciaterror10jul10,1,6542453.story?coll=la-headlines-suncomment

[rectar]

Al Qaeda answers CIA's hiring call




Senior officials must resist political pressure and exercise patience in investigating each applicant thoroughly. U.S. counterintelligence safeguards must remain impregnable even as agencies push to replenish the depleted ranks of intelligence professionals.
I wana job....

http://www.diversitycareers.com/articles/pro/05-octnov/images/news/ADA-15th-Anniversary_SM.jpgDOL's Dr Roy Grizzard chats with Tara Hughes. Hughes began with the government in 1996 as a summer intern in the workforce recruitment program for college students with disabilities. She rose through a number of jobs and offices, and today she's chief of the program analysis office in the office of the national counterintelligence executive.

[al-Canine]

Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to Mine Data

By JOHN MARKOFF

PALO ALTO, Calif., Feb. 23 — A small group of National Security Agency officials slipped into Silicon Valley on one of the agency's periodic technology shopping expeditions this month.

On the wish list, according to several venture capitalists who met with the officials, were an array of technologies that underlie the fierce debate over the Bush administration's anti-terrorist eavesdropping program: computerized systems that reveal connections between seemingly innocuous and unrelated pieces of information.

The tools they were looking for are new, but their application would fall under the well-established practice of data mining: using mathematical and statistical techniques to scan for hidden relationships in streams of digital data or large databases.

Supercomputer companies looking for commercial markets have used the practice for decades. Now intelligence agencies, hardly newcomers to data mining, are using new technologies to take the practice to another level.

But by fundamentally changing the nature of surveillance, high-tech data mining raises privacy concerns that are only beginning to be debated widely. That is because to find illicit activities it is necessary to turn loose software sentinels to examine all digital behavior whether it is innocent or not.

"The theory is that the automated tool that is conducting the search is not violating the law," said Mark D. Rasch, the former head of computer-crime investigations for the Justice Department and now the senior vice president of Solutionary, a computer security company. But "anytime a tool or a human is looking at the content of your communication, it invades your privacy."

When asked for comment about the meetings in Silicon Valley, Jane Hudgins, a National Security Agency spokeswoman, said, "We have no information to provide."

Data mining is already being used in a diverse array of commercial applications — whether by credit card companies detecting and stopping fraud as it happens, or by insurance companies that predict health risks. As a result, millions of Americans have become enmeshed in a vast and growing data web that is constantly being examined by a legion of Internet-era software snoops.

Technology industry executives and government officials said that the intelligence agency systems take such techniques further, applying software analysis tools now routinely used by law enforcement agencies to identify criminal activities and political terrorist organizations that would otherwise be missed by human eavesdroppers.

One such tool is Analyst's Notebook, a crime investigation "spreadsheet" and visualization tool developed by i2 Inc., a software firm based in McLean, Va.

The software, which ranges in price from as little as $3,000 for a sheriff's department to millions of dollars for a large government agency like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, allows investigators to organize and view telephone and financial transaction records. It was used in 2001 by Joyce Knowlton, an investigator at the Stillwater State Correctional Facility in Minnesota, to detect a prison drug-smuggling ring that ultimately implicated 30 offenders who were linked to Supreme White Power, a gang active in the prison.

Ms. Knowlton began her investigation by importing telephone call records into her software and was immediately led to a pattern of calls between prisoners and a recent parolee. She overlaid the calling data with records of prisoners' financial accounts, and based on patterns that emerged, she began monitoring phone calls of particular inmates. That led her to coded messages being exchanged in the calls that revealed that seemingly innocuous wood blocks were being used to smuggle drugs into the prison.

"Once we added the money and saw how it was flowing from addresses that were connected to phone numbers, it created a very clear picture of the smuggling ring," she said.

Privacy, of course, is hardly an expectation for prisoners. And credit card customers and insurance policyholders give up a certain amount of privacy to the issuers and carriers. It is the power of such software tools applied to broad, covert governmental uses that has led to the deepening controversy over data mining.

In the wake of 9/11, the potential for mining immense databases of digital information gave rise to a program called Total Information Awareness, developed by Adm. John M. Poindexter, the former national security adviser, while he was a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Although Congress abruptly canceled the program in October 2003, the legislation provided a specific exemption for "processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence."

At the time, Admiral Poindexter, who declined to be interviewed for this article because he said he had knowledge of current classified intelligence activities, argued that his program had achieved a tenfold increase in the speed of the searching databases for foreign threats.

While agreeing that data mining has a tremendous power for fighting a new kind of warfare, John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., said that intelligence agencies had missed an opportunity by misapplying the technologies.

"In many respects, we're fighting the last intelligence war," Mr. Arquilla said. "We have not pursued data mining in the way we should."

Mr. Arquilla, who was a consultant on Admiral Poindexter's Total Information Awareness project, said that the $40 billion spent each year by intelligence agencies had failed to exploit the power of data mining in correlating information readily available from public sources, like monitoring Internet chat rooms used by Al Qaeda. Instead, he said, the government has been investing huge sums in surveillance of phone calls of American citizens.

"Checking every phone call ever made is an example of old think," he said.

He was alluding to databases maintained at an AT&T data center in Kansas, which now contain electronic records of 1.92 trillion telephone calls, going back decades. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital-rights advocacy group, has asserted in a lawsuit that the AT&T Daytona system, a giant storehouse of calling records and Internet message routing information, was the foundation of the N.S.A.'s effort to mine telephone records without a warrant.

An AT&T spokeswoman said the company would not comment on the claim, or generally on matters of national security or customer privacy.

But the mining of the databases in other law enforcement investigations is well established, with documented results. One application of the database technology, called Security Call Analysis and Monitoring Platform, or Scamp, offers access to about nine weeks of calling information. It currently handles about 70,000 queries a month from fraud and law enforcement investigators, according to AT&T documents.

A former AT&T official who had detailed knowledge of the call-record database said the Daytona system takes great care to make certain that anyone using the database — whether AT&T employee or law enforcement official with a subpoena — sees only information he or she is authorized to see, and that an audit trail keeps track of all users. Such information is frequently used to build models of suspects' social networks.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing sensitive corporate matters, said every telephone call generated a record: number called, time of call, duration of call, billing category and other details. While the database does not contain such billing data as names, addresses and credit card numbers, those records are in a linked database that can be tapped by authorized users.

New calls are entered into the database immediately after they end, the official said, adding, "I would characterize it as near real time."

According to a current AT&T employee, whose identity is being withheld to avoid jeopardizing his job, the mining of the AT&T databases had a notable success in helping investigators find the perpetrators of what was known as the Moldovan porn scam.

In 1997 a shadowy group in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was tricking Internet users by enticing them to a pornography Web site that would download a piece of software that disconnected the computer user from his local telephone line and redialed a costly 900 number in Moldova.

While another long-distance carrier simply cut off the entire nation of Moldova from its network, AT&T and the Moldovan authorities were able to mine the database to track the culprits.

Much of the recent work on data mining has been aimed at even more sophisticated applications. The National Security Agency has invested billions in computerized tools for monitoring phone calls around the world — not only logging them, but also determining content — and more recently in trying to design digital vacuum cleaners to sweep up information from the Internet.

Last September, the N.S.A. was granted a patent for a technique that could be used to determine the physical location of an Internet address — another potential category of data to be mined. The technique, which exploits the tiny time delays in the transmission of Internet data, suggests the agency's interest in sophisticated surveillance tasks like trying to determine where a message sent from an Internet address in a cybercafe might have originated.

An earlier N.S.A. patent, in 1999, focused on a software solution for generating a list of topics from computer-generated text. Such a capacity hints at the ability to extract the content of telephone conversations automatically. That might permit the agency to mine millions of phone conversations and then select a handful for human inspection.

As the N.S.A. visit to the Silicon Valley venture capitalists this month indicates, the actual development of such technologies often comes from private companies.

In 2003, Virage, a Silicon Valley company, began supplying a voice transcription product that recognized and logged the text of television programming for government and commercial customers. Under perfect conditions, the system could be 95 percent accurate in capturing spoken text. Such technology has potential applications in monitoring phone conversations as well.

And several Silicon Valley executives say one side effect of the 2003 decision to cancel the Total Information Awareness project was that it killed funds for a research project at the Palo Alto Research Center, a subsidiary of Xerox, exploring technologies that could protect privacy while permitting data mining.

The aim was to allow an intelligence analyst to conduct extensive data mining without getting access to identifying information about individuals. If the results suggested that, for instance, someone might be a terrorist, the intelligence agency could seek a court warrant authorizing it to penetrate the privacy technology and identify the person involved.

With Xerox funds, the Palo Alto researchers are continuing to explore the technology.

Scott Shane contributed reporting from Washington for this article.

Copyright 2006 The New York Times Company

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/25data.html?

[The 801]

U.S. knew about al Qaeda in 1990s says FBI agent
Tue Mar 7, 2006 7:18 PM GMT

By Deborah Charles

ALEXANDRIA, Virginia (Reuters) - The U.S. government knew by the 1990s how al Qaeda trained suicide operatives but missed capturing the man who masterminded the September 11 attacks about four years before they occurred, an FBI agent said on Tuesday.
FBI agent Michael Anticev said in testimony at a sentencing trial for September 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui that the U.S. government knew by the mid 1990s that there were several al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and other countries.

Operatives at the training camps were taught how to carry out terrorist operations, including suicide missions, and were trained in how to avoid detection, he said.

At that time, the U.S. government was tracking several top al Qaeda members, Anticev said, and between 1996 and 1998 made an attempt to arrest Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- the man who has been described as the brains behind the September 11 hijackings.

Anticev said the attempt, made "somewhere in the Middle East", failed after Mohammed was apparently tipped off.

Anticev was responding to questions from defence attorney, Edward MacMahon, who was trying to refute the government's argument that if Moussaoui had not lied to the FBI in the days before September 11, 2001, the hijackings could have been stopped.

The question of Moussaoui's lies while in custody on immigration charges from August 16, 2001, are at the heart of a sentencing trial to determine if he receives the death penalty for conspiracy in connection with the September 11 attacks.

Moussaoui's lawyers have said the government will be hard-pressed to prove that Moussaoui could have told the FBI anything that would have prevented the hijackings.

Moussaoui, an admitted al Qaeda member, pleaded guilty in April to all six conspiracy charges against him. The sentencing trial is being held to determine if he will be executed for his crimes or sentenced to life in prison.

When he pleaded guilty last year, Moussaoui said he was not meant to be part of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon which killed 3,000 people.

But he said he was part of a broader conspiracy to use airplanes as a weapon and said he was being trained on a 747 airliner to strike the White House.

The 37-year-old Frenchman of Moroccan descent did not speak while the court was in session, but sat stroking his bushy beard and smiling at times when FBI agents identified the September 11 hijackers and explained the overall plot.

In response to questions from MacMahon, Anticev said the U.S. government was also aware before September 11 there had been a plan in the 1990s to blow up 12 U.S. airlines.

"Do you know if the FBI was concerned before 9/11 about the possibility of al Qaeda using planes as weapons?" MacMahon asked.

"I don't know if that's correct," Anticev replied, but then said the FBI had been concerned about possible hijackings.

http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-03-07T191836Z_01_N07391235_RTRUKOC_0_UK-SECURITY-MOUSSAOUI.xml&archived=False

[Casey]

04/17/06

Agencies lack guidelines for sharing terrorism info

By Alice Lipowicz
Staff Writer

Federal policies for information-sharing against terrorism are fragmented and haphazardly applied, according to a Government Accountability Office report issued today.

The problems reflect not only the huge challenge of the task, but also that responsibility for information-sharing has been shifted among several agencies. The duties were passed from the Office of Management and Budget to the Homeland Security Department in 2003, but neither has completed the task, the report said.

In 2005, under the intelligence reform legislation, the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence took responsibility to create and oversee a new Information-Sharing Environment. However, that program has been stalled since at least January, when its program manager resigned, GAO said.

“More than four years after Sept. 11, the nation still lacks governmentwide policies and processes to help agencies integrate the myriad of ongoing efforts … to improve the sharing of terrorism-related information that is critical to protecting our homeland,” GAO wrote.

Federal agencies use 56 different sensitive, unclassified designations to protect information such as investigative leads on suspected criminal activity, drug enforcement case backgrounds and nuclear power plant information. Most of the categories lack common definitions and policies for sharing.

More than half the federal agencies reviewed by GAO reported challenges in sharing sensitive but unclassified information in the 56 categories, the report said. Without overall policies, the agencies are making decisions about sharing on a case-by-case basis and are applying the classifications in a fragmented manner.

For example, sometimes different types of information are labeled similarly, and sometimes similar information is labeled differently depending on the agency, GAO said.

In addition, there are no policies to govern which government employees, and how many, should have authority to designate that specific data be considered sensitive. Nor are there policies on how to train those employees and review their performance.

“The lack of such recommended internal controls increases the risk that the designations will be misapplied,” GAO report said.

GAO recommends that the director of national intelligence and OMB review inventories of agencies’ sensitive but unclassified procedures, and develop a policy that consolidates the designations and makes them consistent. GAO also advises that internal controls be put into place for information-sharing.

The director of national intelligence neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s findings; however, the director also declined to comment on GAO’s draft report, saying that the review of intelligence activities is “beyond GAO’s purview.” GAO disagreed with that assessment.

John Russack, the former program manager of the information-sharing environment, announced his resignation Jan. 26. His replacement, John McNamara, a special assistant to the president for national security affairs and former ambassador to Columbia, was announced March 20 by the White House to fill the post.

http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/1_1/daily_news/28399-1.html

[Casey]

May 4, 2006, 6:08PM
Pentagon Surfing Thousands of Jihad Sites

By KATHERINE SHRADER Associated Press Writer
© 2006 The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A Pentagon research team monitors more than 5,000 jihadist Web sites, focusing daily on the 25 to 100 most hostile and active, defense officials say.

The team includes 25 linguists, who cover multiple dialects of the Arabic language and provide reports on events sparking anger on extremist Web sites, Dan Devlin, a Pentagon public diplomacy specialist, said Thursday. The researchers, for instance, focused in November on the backlash caused by the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.

Devlin testified to Congress as part of a briefing on how terrorists use the Internet.

Extremist propaganda is most often used to recruit jihadist fighters and supporters between the ages of 7 and 25, the officials said. But "we've seen products that are aimed at ages even lower than 7," testified Pentagon contractor Ron Roughhead. His company wasn't identified, for security reasons.

According to the briefing, al-Qaida has advertised online to fill jobs for Internet specialists, and its media group has distributed computer games and recruitment videos that use everything from poetry to humor to false information to gather support. The media group has assembled montages of American politicians taking aim at the Arab world.

"This crusade _ crusade _ crusade _ is going to take awhile," President Bush says in one video, edited to make him repeat the word "crusade" six other times.

The officials said they are hoping to give a version of the briefing eventually to all U.S. soldiers in Iraq and the broader region.

The goal is "to help train U.S. forces deploying to Iraq on radical Islam and the need to respect Arabic and Muslim culture," said House Intelligence Chairman Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich.

Also Thursday, the Senate Judiciary Committee discussed legislation that would go after al-Qaida's more private communications using Bush's warrantless surveillance program.

The committee broke without voting on several bills to govern the controversial program, which allows the National Security Agency to monitor _ without court warrants _ terror-related communications between the U.S. and overseas.

Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, R-Pa., has introduced a bill that would require the administration to get approval for the surveillance from a secretive federal court every 90 days. He circulated a possible modification to his proposal late Wednesday that Democrats suggested would give the government more flexibility to conduct surveillance.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., asked Specter to postpone consideration of any bill until she and other lawmakers get more information on the program from the administration. "We cannot fairly consider legislation," she wrote Specter.

___

On the Net:

House Intelligence Committee: http://intelligence.house.gov/

Senate Judiciary Committee: http://judiciary.senate.gov/

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/politics/3841757.html

[Casey]

RCMP foiled dozen plots in past two years


JEFF SALLOT AND BRIAN LAGHI
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail

OTTAWA — The RCMP has quietly broken up at least a dozen terrorist groups in the past two years, according to documents obtained by The Globe and Mail.


"We have completed 12 disruptions of national-level terrorist groups across the country," the Mounties say in briefing notes prepared for Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day.


Disruptive tactics -- sometimes as simple as letting targets know they are under close surveillance -- are used to prevent a terrorist attack when the police do not have enough evidence to lay criminal charges, the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service say.


aPs="boxR";var boxRAC = fnTdo('a'+'ai',300,250,ai,'j',nc);
Unlike the high-profile arrests and court proceedings resulting from the weekend roundup of terrorist suspects in Southern Ontario, the public rarely learns about these operations, federal security officials say.


The briefing notes, released to The Globe under the Access to Information Act, are part of the transition book prepared by the RCMP for Mr. Day when the Conservatives formed a new government in February.


The material does not provide details of the 12 disruption operations. Nor does it identify the groups or indicate where they were located.
But the RCMP stated that as a result of its projects and investigations, "the threat of terrorist activity in Canada and abroad has been reduced."


Illustrating this reduced threat, the RCMP document says, is "the fact there has not been a border-related national security threat against either the government of Canada or the United States or the general population" since the two countries established Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.


Disruptive tactics can take many forms, including interdiction of persons or matériel at border points, denial of charitable status to front groups, deportation of non-citizens on security grounds, or "defensive actions as a result of threat assessment," CSIS spokeswoman Barbara Campion said. CSIS, the RCMP and other agencies "have a duty to prevent and disrupt terrorist acts . . . before these individuals have the opportunity to carry out their terrorist plans."


Use of disruptive tactics in anti-terrorism cases represents a sea change in the way the RCMP deals with security threats, senior Mounties say. Police officers by inclination and training try to collect evidence that can be used to support a criminal charge and prosecution. But officers are now recognizing that disrupting a plot in its early stages can be a bigger success than making arrests, often after crimes have already been committed.


Disruptive tactics fell out of favour with the RCMP as a result of Mountie security-service scandals in the 1970s. Mounties then sometimes broke the law to disrupt groups, such as the now infamous case of the burning of a barn in rural Quebec to prevent the building from being used as a meeting place by Quebec separatists and the U.S. Black Panthers.


The RCMP briefing book for Mr. Day describes the terrorist threat most often as an international phenomenon. Police activity is focused on border security and preventing foreign-based groups operating in this country.
There are about 30 to 40 terrorist groups worldwide affiliated with al-Qaeda, "with presence in 60 countries," the briefing notes say.


References to the "homegrown threat" -- the threat the RCMP say was represented by the suspects arrested on the weekend -- are few. But one key paragraph describes the emergence of "Baby al Qaeda" -- the next generation of terrorists "composed of dozens of loosely structured networks . . . [that] undertake operations without central command structures."


A source with access to high-level security briefings said yesterday that the kind of persuasion that takes place between those promoting violence and younger Muslims is a more common occurrence than Canadians think.
"Let me put it this way, before this event, it was more widespread than most people believed," the source said.


The source said one of the chief challenges the government faces is how to prevent early efforts to engage young Muslim men by those who preach a philosophy of hatred, while falling short of promoting criminality. The issue is tricky because government cannot be seen to abridge free speech, but must still dissuade youth from dealing with older individuals acting as recruiters.
"It's been heightened in the minds of those who monitor this that they need to be on top of it," the source said.


Security officials will both have to increase covert efforts by infiltrating such groups and also overtly by dealing with those who preach hatred.
"It's a debate we haven't had," the source said.


Conservative MP Rahim Jaffer said yesterday that Mr. Day has already begun meeting with heads of various multicultural communities and that he also hopes to step up his involvement in community outreach. Mr. Jaffer said the government can work both through the Immigration Department and through Mr. Day's department to try to reach youth.


Meanwhile, Anne McLellan, the public safety minister in the last Liberal government, said she and other senior ministers had been informed by the authorities some time ago that there was a potential threat from a homegrown group in Southern Ontario and thus she was not surprised by the weekend arrests.


With a report from Jane Taber



http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060607.wxterrordisrupt07/BNStory/National/home

[al-Canine]

Scheuer Vs. Burke: Where do we really stand in the fight against al-Qa'ida?

By Jeffrey Cozzens

Michael Scheuer and Jason Burke last week published very different assessments of whether the West is gaining the upper-hand in the fight against the global jihad of al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its Emir, Usama bin Laden (UBL). Both authors are highly regarded experts who have written perhaps the most defining works on al-Qa’ida to date. However, these authors employ quite different approaches and metrics to determine Western success (or lack thereof) against the global jihad. Their perspectives represent two primary (and generally conflicting) views on the current state of the global movement and its chief symbol. Generally, Scheuer sees UBL’s glass as half-full; Burke sees it as half-empty.

The following analysis considers Burke’s and Scheuer’s views, which generally summarize those found in the wider U.S. counter-terrorism community, then offers its own set of criteria that might be appropriate to consider in any “scorecard” that evaluates our current efforts against global jihadism.

First, concerning Burke’s analysis in the Guardian, several prominent themes emerge in his argument that AQ is losing:

• Burke’s determination that we are winning is based upon a broad-brush approach that factors in a holistic picture of the evolution of Islamic militancy, its root causes and nuanced, regional forms. It is also obvious that he considers bin Laden to be merely a spoke in the evolving “wheel” of militant Islam.

• Reason for Western optimism 1: AQ’s strategy of igniting a global awakening has faltered because of its exclusive reliance upon violence.

• Reason for Western optimism 2: Islamic militancy is serious, but it has not impacted the West to a large extent. We can live with minor inconvenience and restrictions.

• Reason for Western optimism 3: Polls demonstrate that the vast majority of Muslims worldwide prefer non-violent contention and are increasingly less-enthusiastic in their admiration of bin Laden.

Scheuer’s assessment is markedly different; as seen below, he argues that UBL is likely pleased with where things stand today:

• Scheuer’s argument that UBL and the global jihadi movement have some reason for optimism is based on a qualitative method that attempts to assess the present geopolitical context “through our enemies’ eyes.” In so many words, Scheuer pays homage to the jihadi perception of UBL as a mujadid—one who would awaken Muslims to their obligations—and therefore views him with central importance as an inspirational figure.

• Reason for AQ’s optimism 1: As UBL has noted, he never considered himself (or AQ, for that matter) the sole carrier of the burden of jihad; it was merely an incendiary force. The killing of individual jihadi figureheads like al-Zarqawi will therefore not eliminate this function.

• Reason for AQ’s optimism 2: Western policies in the Islamic world have given prescience to the arguments of UBL and other figureheads; thus UBL’s “tight focus” on these Western policies is motivating “an increasing number” of Muslims to respond to his call to arms.

• Reason for AQ’s optimism 3: There have been a number of AQ-inspired—though not directly linked—attacks around the globe.

So, which expert is correct?

Unlike natural science, no one can ‘prove’ either author right or wrong, just as no one can say with certainty that we are winning or losing the battle against Islamic militancy. This answer is evasive owing to two abstractions, time and quality, which work in concert to produce a muddied picture of a battlefield that looks different to many of the combatants. That being said, I will briefly evaluate some of the merits and short-comings of both experts’ arguments.

First, as Andrew Cochran recently indicated, an outright assessment of victory and defeat is premature in the first instance and cannot be measured in the same way that we evaluate other military campaigns; we are fighting ideas. This war is not fought over territory alone, nor are we struggling to subdue a politically instrumental adversary. Those who clamor for such a pronouncement must never forget that we are in a “historic challenge,” as jihadi “interpreter” Louis Attiyat Allah wrote after 7/7. This battle has an epic timeline (at least according to AQ) and the scope and nature of its information campaigns set it apart from previous wars; it is one where victory is synonymous not only with understanding the adversary, but with a reformulated understanding of patience and gaining the upper-hand in a moral, narrative duel. Moreover, we must recall that AQ’s self-conception as the “victorious sect” lends itself to an apocalyptic time horizon that cannot be measured by recent polling data.

Second, in terms of Scheuer and Burke’s contentions, both open themselves wide to countervailing points. In determining where we stand vis-à-vis our fight against AQ, Scheuer’s arguments are strong owing to his attempts to perceive the situation through the eyes of the jihadis; however, this particular analysis (like so many others) is overly UBL-centric. The “war” is not entirely about bin Laden, regardless of his credentials; it is about him and others like him who follow a “heroic” template to “raise the banner of Islam” by expelling un-Islamic forces from Muslims lands and unseating “apostate” regimes. Like UBL, these forsake the love of the world with humility to shoulder an obligation to jihad while living continually “in the trenches” and within the shadow of martyrdom, their stated ambition. That’s why we must not only concentrate on taking out “nodes” in the global network of jihad; we must simultaneously erode the narrative lines and social trust that link these nodes to each other by re-evaluating our policies and exploiting cleavages within the global “culture” of jihad. Thus Zarqawi’s death, while a deserved morale boost to our troops and certainly a set-back for al-Qa’ida in Iraq, is merely an end that those who aspire to fight jihad claim to seek and anticipate. Nevertheless, kudos to Mike Scheuer for offering a strategic evaluation of AQ’s progress through UBL’s worldview; this is a critical approach that Burke (like many others in the global security business) fails to adopt.

In contrast, Burke factors in a more comprehensive awareness of a rapidly changing Islamic world. Unlike Scheuer, he does not base his assessment largely around one individual, but takes a more holistic account of the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, his approach is somewhat marred by a reliance on quantitative data that can change on a dime and should be contextualized and qualified.

Third, while I buy Burke’s argument that there is broad disgust with the late Zarqawi’s tactics in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world, on the other hand, as Scheuer indicates, there most certainly has been a rise in major attacks and plots by AQ sympathizers - particularly in the West - during the same time. Which figure is a better indicator of our success or failure, the Islamic world’s recent general disapproval of UBL (as Burke claims) -- a figure that could easily change pending the outcome of the Haditha enquiry, or the recent Gitmo suicides, for example -- or the rise in plots in the West? For our purposes, the later seems to indicate that the battle of ideas is heating-up, not winding down. Although it is clear that bin Laden’s “awakening” has not started to the degree that he desires, we discount at our own peril atrocities like the 3/11 and 7/7 bombings, and the recent (2005-2006) alleged plots in Los Angeles, the UK and Canada.

Finally, one must take issue with the main pillar of Burke’s argument: “We have had to submit to new laws, expense and inconvenience certainly, but things are not so different from before.” Burke’s argument is a nice counter-weight to others that point to a jihadi lurking behind every tree; which refuse to contextualize and differentiate between the “al-Aqsa Intifadah” and al-Qa’ida’s jihad; and proclaim the 4th Mechanized al-Qa’ida Infantry’s imminent insertion into the National Capitol Region. However, it is a pity that Burke did not canvass the wider Muslim community in Great Britain, which would undoubtedly take issue with that statement. In some cases, it could be argued that perceptions of heavy handedness, in combination with a foreign policy widely viewed as adversarial to Islam, have created a situation in the minds of some young British (and American? and Canadian? and Western European?) Muslims that their country is now at war with them. This view is a necessary precursor to both emigration for jihad and fighting jihad in one’s non-Muslim nation of residence.

Along these lines, it must also be questioned whether America’s post-9/11 foreign policy direction, re-calibration of its national security architecture, and domestic security legislation like the Patriot Act constitutes “business as usual.” Some might argue that the sum of these developments constitutes a semblance of victory for strategic thinkers like Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose long-term ambition has been to alternatively provoke, strike and goad al-Qa’ida’s enemies into divisions at home and abroad, culminating in their eventual physical and political withdrawal from the Muslim world.

On balance, while Burke’s perspective reflects his significant “in-country” experience and his (however implicit) justifiable cynicism, Scheuer’s argument carries a bit more weight because he plays the ultimate “Red Side” actor: he offers an assessment through the lens of the adversary.

That being said, perhaps we need to also consider other criteria in future assessments of “who is winning?” Some of these (inherently qualitative and difficult to measure) might come in the form of answers to the following questions:

• Are we doing a good job training the “next generation” of analysts to actually understand the nuances, drivers, processes and methods of Islamic militancy?

• How well are we fighting at the “moral level” of warfare, which is perhaps the most important in the struggle against global jihad?

• Are we making useful distinctions between Islamist reformers and global jihadis and harnessing the former in a narrative battle against the other?

• Are we pursuing Muslim hearts and minds with the same intensity and effect that we are global jihadi icons like Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi?

• Are we preparing the United States to fight fictional adversaries at great expense to taxpayers, or are our conceptions of the adversary’s characteristics and methodology reflective of more fiction than evidence-based analysis?

Regardless of how such an assessment is formulated, any metric that does not provoke soul-searching and call for brutal honesty is a disservice to those it is designed to protect.

June 12, 2006 02:11 PM

Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/scheuer_vs_burke_where_do_we_r.php)

[Casey]

Scheuer Vs. Burke: Where do we really stand in the fight against al-Qa'ida?


First, concerning Burke’s analysis in the Guardian, several prominent themes emerge in his argument that AQ is losing:


• Reason for Western optimism 2: Islamic militancy is serious, but it has not impacted the West to a large extent. We can live with minor inconvenience and restrictions.


Scheuer’s assessment is markedly different; as seen below, he argues that UBL is likely pleased with where things stand today:

• Scheuer’s argument that UBL and the global jihadi movement have some reason for optimism is based on a qualitative method that attempts to assess the present geopolitical context “through our enemies’ eyes.” In so many words, Scheuer pays homage to the jihadi perception of UBL as a mujadid—one who would awaken Muslims to their obligations—and therefore views him with central importance as an inspirational figure.

• Reason for AQ’s optimism 1: As UBL has noted, he never considered himself (or AQ, for that matter) the sole carrier of the burden of jihad; it was merely an incendiary force. The killing of individual jihadi figureheads like al-Zarqawi will therefore not eliminate this function.

• Reason for AQ’s optimism 2: Western policies in the Islamic world have given prescience to the arguments of UBL and other figureheads; thus UBL’s “tight focus” on these Western policies is motivating “an increasing number” of Muslims to respond to his call to arms.


So, which expert is correct?


They are both right.



That being said, perhaps we need to also consider other criteria in future assessments of “who is winning?” Some of these (inherently qualitative and difficult to measure) might come in the form of answers to the following questions:

• Are we doing a good job training the “next generation” of analysts to actually understand the nuances, drivers, processes and methods of Islamic militancy?

This is most vital for what will happen down the road. Pull the politics out of the equations and get to the root of the issues.



• How well are we fighting at the “moral level” of warfare, which is perhaps the most important in the struggle against global jihad?

• Are we making useful distinctions between Islamist reformers and global jihadis and harnessing the former in a narrative battle against the other?

• Are we pursuing Muslim hearts and minds with the same intensity and effect that we are global jihadi icons like Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi?


And these are hugely important issues internally and globally.




Regardless of how such an assessment is formulated, any metric that does not provoke soul-searching and call for brutal honesty is a disservice to those it is designed to protect.

June 12, 2006 02:11 PM

Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/scheuer_vs_burke_where_do_we_r.php)

[Casey]

CSIS spy school curriculum too secret to talk about

Service mum on identity of foreign students

James Gordon, CanWest News Service

Published: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 There are probably few schools in the world with a curriculum like it.
Counter-terrorism 101. Security screening basics. The role of an intelligence service in a democracy.

Every summer for the past seven years, espionage specialists from around the world have gathered in Ottawa for spy school. The teacher is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The pupils are a state secret.
Course materials obtained by CanWest News Service, however, give an inside look at what Canuck spies are telling their counterparts.

Most of the material still visible after vast censorship is surprisingly innocuous. Although there is a broad overview of the terrorist threat to this country, the documents also contain amusing intel on our favourite pastime (hockey, of course) and our preferred junk food.

"Favourite desserts include ice cream and fruit pies - especially apple, blueberry, peach and rhubarb pies," CSIS divulges, quoting from the World Book Encyclopedia. "Hot soup is common with lunch and dinner," it adds. "Coffee, tea, milk, soft drinks, beer and wine are popular beverages."
Large sections of presentations and notes are blacked out when the two-week course moves on to more serious matters.

On terrorism, CSIS tells the foreign visitors: "Many of the problems we face today are inherited." It says Canada welcomes upward of 250,000 new immigrants annually, of which about 30,000 are refugee claimants.

There is no mention of how many spies took part in the July 2005 course or which countries they come from, though references in the documents suggest they are not traditional allies.

CSIS spokesperson Giovanni Cotroneo said the service won't comment on who the spies are, how many attended last summer or where they come from.

He said the course is designed to show "various foreign partners what the role of an intelligence service is in a democratic country. Among other things, it's an opportunity to establish new relationships or build on existing ones."

Cotroneo insisted the service isn't doling out sensitive national security information.

Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former senior CSIS spy turned security and intelligence contractor in Ottawa, agreed.

He explained sensitive information about Canadians isn't passed on via these types of courses, but though memoranda of understanding between different countries. CSIS has more than 100.

"The people that will be sent (to the course) ... they are not at the right level to get that kind of information," he said. "They're grunts. They're the guy in the trenches. It's a reach-out program, basically."

He added the the rationale behind creating the CSIS Intelligence Development Course was to "inject the Canadian way" into a field that's very easy to abuse in developing countries.

Although the course has large sections on ethics, it isn't referred to as an ethics course.

CSIS "doesn't necessarily want to be seen as lecturing or patronizing anybody - we declare it under the perspective of being an intelligence course," he said. "Come and learn to be a better intelligence officer, but with a Canadian flavour" i.e. a Canadian ethic.

There are probably few schools in the world with a curriculum like it.
Counter-terrorism 101. Security screening basics. The role of an intelligence service in a democracy.

Every summer for the past seven years, espionage specialists from around the world have gathered in Ottawa for spy school. The teacher is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The pupils are a state secret.
Course materials obtained by CanWest News Service, however, give an inside look at what Canuck spies are telling their counterparts.

Most of the material still visible after vast censorship is surprisingly innocuous. Although there is a broad overview of the terrorist threat to this country, the documents also contain amusing intel on our favourite pastime (hockey, of course) and our preferred junk food.

"Favourite desserts include ice cream and fruit pies - especially apple, blueberry, peach and rhubarb pies," CSIS divulges, quoting from the World Book Encyclopedia. "Hot soup is common with lunch and dinner," it adds. "Coffee, tea, milk, soft drinks, beer and wine are popular beverages."
Large sections of presentations and notes are blacked out when the two-week course moves on to more serious matters.

On terrorism, CSIS tells the foreign visitors: "Many of the problems we face today are inherited." It says Canada welcomes upward of 250,000 new immigrants annually, of which about 30,000 are refugee claimants.
There is no mention of how many spies took part in the July 2005 course or which countries they come from, though references in the documents suggest they are not traditional allies.

CSIS spokesperson Giovanni Cotroneo said the service won't comment on who the spies are, how many attended last summer or where they come from.

He said the course is designed to show "various foreign partners what the role of an intelligence service is in a democratic country. Among other things, it's an opportunity to establish new relationships or build on existing ones."

Cotroneo insisted the service isn't doling out sensitive national security information.

Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former senior CSIS spy turned security and intelligence contractor in Ottawa, agreed.

He explained sensitive information about Canadians isn't passed on via these types of courses, but though memoranda of understanding between different countries. CSIS has more than 100.

"The people that will be sent (to the course) ... they are not at the right level to get that kind of information," he said. "They're grunts. They're the guy in the trenches. It's a reach-out program, basically."

He added the the rationale behind creating the CSIS Intelligence Development Course was to "inject the Canadian way" into a field that's very easy to abuse in developing countries.

Although the course has large sections on ethics, it isn't referred to as an ethics course.

CSIS "doesn't necessarily want to be seen as lecturing or patronizing anybody - we declare it under the perspective of being an intelligence course," he said. "Come and learn to be a better intelligence officer, but with a Canadian flavour" i.e. a Canadian ethic.

http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=309acf12-f73c-413c-964b-bc713e5ba1a1&k=88992

[al-Canine]

Report Faults Pace of Intelligence Overhaul

WASHINGTON, July 27 — In a blunt assessment of the efforts to overhaul the United States’ spying apparatus, a bipartisan group of lawmakers criticized the director of national intelligence on Thursday for a “lack of urgency” in addressing failures that led to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the faulty assessments about Iraq’s banned weapons programs.

The assessment was in a report by the House Intelligence Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight

More than a year after the director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte, was given a mandate to fuse the operations of 16 disparate intelligence operations, the report said that an incremental approach had been taken when urgent steps were needed to correct “the deficiencies identified by study after study.”

The report, the first official report card on Mr. Negroponte’s office, also concluded that one of the primary reasons for the intelligence failures before the Iraq war — a “groupthink” among analysts across the spying community — had yet to be seriously addressed and that intelligence analysis remained clustered around just 10 percent of the available data.

“Judging from the analysis presented in the briefings the committee has received on various topics over the past year,” the report stated, lawmakers were “concerned that the analytical community is still too risk-adverse and subject to groupthink.”

The report also criticized continued lack of communication between spy agencies and a cumbersome bureaucracy that governed security clearances. Noting that “information sharing within the community is one of the most critical tenets of intelligence reform,” it stated that progress on that front was “limited to understanding the task at hand.”

The criticisms echoed complaints voiced in recent months by top lawmakers, including Representatives Peter Hoekstra, Republican of Michigan, and Jane Harman, Democrat of California, the senior members of the Intelligence Committee.

In a statement, Mr. Negroponte said Thursday that the report “helps us take stock of our progress and chart the way ahead.”

“We recognize that change does not come easily to large enterprises,” he said, “and that we must continue to aggressively work to fulfill the mandate of the intelligence reform legislation.”

In addition, Mr. Negroponte, whose office opened in April 2005, also issued a progress report, citing the achievements of his office in carrying out recommendations of a 2005 White House commission that studied the failures in assessing Iraq’s weapons.

His report cited improvements in intelligence sharing between the United States and its allies, including a recently completed project that allows the British, Canadian and Australian intelligence services access to classified American systems. The report also cited new “structural changes,” like creation of the National Security Branch at the F.B.I.

The changes at the Federal Bureau of Investigation were also noted in the House report, which concluded that “the transformation of the F.B.I. to an intelligence agency with law enforcement power is starting to take root.”

Lawmakers praised Mr. Negroponte for having the intelligence briefing that is delivered to the White House each morning draw its analysis from across the intelligence community, and no longer just from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[url=http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/washington/28intel.html?]The New York Times[/url

[Casey]

Aug 30, 2006

FBI Demos Terrorism Database

AUG 30, 2006 01:34:54 PM


[/URL]
The FBI has constructed a database that houses upwards of 659 million terror-related records drawn from more than 50 of its own sources—as well as those of other government agencies—and it claims the tool is one of the most efficient information analysis systems at the hands of U.S. law enforcement and antiterror officials, [URL="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/29/AR2006082901520.html?nav=rss_technology"]WashingtonPost.com reports (http://www.cio.com/blog_view.html?CID=24385).


Representatives of the bureau demonstrated the new tool on Tuesday for reporters to showcase its capabilities and to show the agency’s progress in data analysis since the 2001 terror attacks on New York City, according to the Post. The FBI has been accused of failing to detect signs of an impending attack on the city before 9/11, and for its lack of the necessary technology to do so.


The Investigative Data Warehouse has been the target of criticism from a handful of privacy groups and activists since its 2004 launch, due to concerns over the duration of time that information is kept, as well as whether U.S. citizens should be able to access it and correct erroneous information if necessary, the Post reports.


Approximately 25 percent of the information in the database is drawn from FBI sources, and the remaining data, such as suspect financial activity reports and stolen passport data, comes from the U.S. departments of Treasury, State and Homeland Security, according to the Post.


Gurvais Gregg, FBI Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force acting director, said, “That’s where the real knowledge comes from…sharing information,” according to the Post.


Grigg showed off some of the system’s capabilities by typing in the name of one of the Sept. 11 bombers and the words “flight training,” and some 250 articles related to the man were detected, the Post reports.


Amherst, Mass.-based Chiliad developed the system, and Grigg said it can be used to send agents notifications whenever relevant information is added, according to the Post. Various forms of records, including Social Security numbers and driver’s license information, among others, can be cross-referenced across the database’s millions of filings, though no top secret information is housed there, according to the Post.


Until 2002, officials would’ve had to spend some 32,000 hours checking 1,000 names and birthdays across 50 databases, but now the task can be performed in a half hour, Grigg said, the Post reports.


Roughly 13,000 officials use the database every month, making some 1 million queries, Grigg said, according to the Post.


For an additional layer of security, the system never actually accesses the database; rather, it connects to copies of database records that are updated frequently, Grigg said, the Post reports.


Grigg also said that all information within the database has been reviewed by the appropriate security, legal and IT staffers, and the bureau has drawn up an information privacy impact document, according to the Post.



http://www.cio.com/blog_view.html?CID=24385

[Occupant]

FBI Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills
33 of 12,000 Have Some Proficiency

By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, October 11, 2006; Page A01

Five years after Arab terrorists attacked the United States, only 33 FBI agents have even a limited proficiency in Arabic, and none of them work in the sections of the bureau that coordinate investigations of international terrorism, according to new FBI statistics.

Counting agents who know only a handful of Arabic words -- including those who scored zero on a standard proficiency test -- just 1 percent of the FBI's 12,000 agents have any familiarity with the language, the statistics show.

Continued.... (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001388.html)

Mind-boggling :mad_12:

[al-Canine]

The Eye of The Storm

In a secret, high-tech spy hub near Washington, the war on terror is 24-7

By Kevin Whitelaw

Every weekday at 8 a.m., Kevin Brock hefts a thick white ring binder onto a sleek, oval conference table. Labeled "Read Book," the deceptively plain folder houses the "Threat Matrix," a top-secret compendium of the most troubling reports of possible terrorist activity, drawn from the nation's 16 intelligence agencies. It is thicker than usual on a recent Monday morning, packed with 66 separate items that came in over the weekend. Brock, the principal deputy director of the National Counterterrorism Center, is about to brief some of the government's most senior officials on the latest threat information.

First, though, he must sort through the reports, most of which are vague-and sometimes little more than anonymous tips. Many are false alarms. ("If we could eliminate all the jilted lovers and ex-spouses," Brock says later, cracking a smile, "we would greatly reduce the number of threats we receive on a daily basis.") But some of the nuggets-coming from CIA operatives, FBI sources, or reliable foreign spy agencies-must be taken seriously. Brock, after meeting with the leadership of the counterterrorism center, decided to present 18 of the threat reports at the 8 a.m. videoconference.

Facing a wall of secure video feeds, Brock watches top leaders from a dozen key players gather-the CIA, the FBI, the eavesdroppers at the National Security Agency, even the White House. A briefer from the center, running through the 18 items, discusses possible terrorist action in south Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, even inside the United States. Brock raises the recent release of a videotape showing two of the September 11 hijackers smiling for the camera. He pays particular attention to overseas threats that have a possible domestic angle. "NCTC was created to ... ensure the handshake occurs between international intelligence collection and the FBI or others within the country to take action," says Brock, a career FBI agent. "And we're seeing that take place on almost a daily basis."

"No boundaries."

Housed in an unmarked office complex in Northern Virginia, the National Counterterrorism Center has become the centerpiece of reform efforts to integrate the far-flung intelligence community. The NCTC was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks to reduce the gulf between America's spy agencies and domestic law enforcement. With more than 30 separate, highly classified government networks pumping information into NCTC headquarters, it has unfettered access to the crown jewels of the U.S. intelligence community-including raw cables from CIA spies and detailed FBI case files. One congressional staffer with knowledge of intelligence matters calls it a "miracle," only half joking. "We're the only place in the U.S. government where all that information comes together," says retired Vice Adm. Scott Redd, the center's director. "There are no boundaries in this business."

Inside and outside the intelligence world, however, people are still confused about what the two-year-old organization is supposed to do-and what it's not. U.S. News was granted unprecedented access to the senior leadership of the NCTC, which is supposed to become the primary hub for tracking and analyzing the terrorist threat. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte calls it the single biggest change during his 18 months in office. "The center is really looked to as the principal source of analysis of these kinds of developments," Negroponte tells U.S. News. The NCTC is still building up its ranks, but already it is butting up against the other agencies that work on terrorism, particularly the CIA, which has run its own CounterTerrorism Center since 1986.

The 2004 law that formalized the NCTC also gives it a "strategic operational planning" role, which has taken some time to define. In some ways, it's easier to explain what it isn't. Redd is quick to say that, unlike in the popular TV spy show 24, they don't go after any terrorists themselves. "Jack Bauer doesn't live here," he says.

NCTC officials might not be prowling dark alleyways in Cairo or camping out in Pakistan's lawless borderlands. But the NCTC is, for the first time, trying to make sure that all the operational agencies don't unwittingly trip over one another in the field. "NCTC is not directing operations," says Brock. "We're here just to kind of act as the air traffic controller and make sure everybody is talking." Most of this work is so highly classified that it is difficult to discuss, but Brock tries to describe a recent example in general terms. During the daily 8 a.m. videoconference earlier this year, one intelligence agency announced that it had an imminent opportunity to capture a key terrorist suspect in a Middle Eastern country. Another agency piped up, warning that a productive source of intelligence might be lost if the suspect were nabbed. Brock asked the two agencies to work it out themselves, which they did (although Brock declined to describe how).

Disney-esque.

NCTC officials also monitor unfolding plots and investigations, producing continually updated reports called Threat Threads on the most dangerous cases. There are as many as a dozen Threat Threads at any given time; on a recent Monday, the NCTC was tracking 11 different threats. A Thread report came in handy when, for example, the NCTC was coordinating the fast-moving investigation into this summer's alleged plot in Britain to blow up as many as 10 aircraft using liquid explosives. At first, officials had been following the investigation from a distance, because it appeared to be a largely U.K. plot.

But after receiving what officials call "a very specific piece of intelligence" that the suspected plotters were targeting airplanes heading for the United States, the NCTC swung into high gear. Redd was at the White House every day as the investigation built to a climax. At the same time, his aides were helping to coordinate how much information was released to officials at key government agencies, particularly the Department of Homeland Security and its Transportation Security Administration. "They don't need to know what we know about what's going on in Pakistan," says Redd. "But they very much want to know what data we have to be on the lookout for and how does this change our screening procedures."

The NCTC's showpiece is its 24-hour operations center. Designed with input from, among others, Walt Disney's Imagineers, it looks like a film director's version of a high-tech government command post. Giant screens dominate the front of the room, displaying anything from broadcast of an Arab satellite news channel or the radar map over New York City to a highly classified live feed from an armed Predator drone over Afghanistan. An NCTC watch team of at least a dozen people is on duty at all times, while the FBI and the CIA each maintain their own independent terrorism watch centers in the same space. "We are getting paid to say who knows about this information we've just come across, who needs to know about it, and what are they doing about it," says Don Loren, a retired naval officer who runs the operations center.

"Historic baggage."

Every watch officer can, in theory, access any piece of counterterrorism intelligence in the entire U.S. government. "We're pretty much the cutting edge," says an air marshal from the TSA assigned to the watch center for the past 18 months. "We're the first ones to see it, and we push it to wherever it needs to go." There are limits, however: To send a piece of raw intelligence from an agency's operational files out to the rest of the community, an NCTC official must first secure the permission of the agency that issued it.

The bulk of the NCTC's work remains on the analysis side. But the road to becoming the hub for U.S. counterterrorism analysis has been rocky. The NCTC (and its predecessor organization, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center) got off to a slow start. "Initially, there was a reluctance on the part of government agencies to let people from other agencies have access to their networks," says John Brennan, who founded the Threat Integration Center and ran the NCTC for its first year. "A lot of people didn't understand what NCTC's mission was."

Getting enough experienced analysts was another problem, and the NCTC had several early tussles over personnel with the CIA's CounterTerrorism Center. Officials insist the wrinkles have largely been ironed out. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, took the first big step last year when he ordered some 90 CIA analysts to move over to the NCTC. Gen. Michael Hayden's arrival as CIA director (after a stint as the deputy DNI) helped to further cement NCTC's status. Almost immediately, Hayden dispatched an additional 28 analysts to NCTC, and he has pledged to send over 50 more in the next year.

Some critics worry that taking analysts from the CIA could harm the ability of its own CounterTerrorism Center to use analysis to target operations aimed at capturing or killing terrorists. But officials insist that, if anything, the new structure frees up the CIA's center from much of the broader analytical work. "I actually think that NCTC may offer us better opportunities to support all the elements of national power because an awful lot of our activity here, quite legitimately and quite naturally, was focused in on supporting our operations," Hayden tells U.S. News. "We can't take all of America's analytic expertise and hard-wire it to any kill or capture operation. So I was willing to take the risk of shifting some of the weight of our analytic force from here to NCTC." Another factor is the civil liberties concern of giving the CIA, which is barred from domestic spying, access to law enforcement case files. Hayden says that it is better to bridge that gap "in a new location, without any historic baggage to worry about."

This summer, the CIA and the NCTC also agreed to adhere to what officials call "lanes in the road," which lay out who is responsible for reporting on which general areas. It's a tough balancing act, between reducing overlap on one side and ensuring competitive analysis on the other. "The worst thing in the world would be to have one gigantic organization that did all the thinking on counterterrorism for the entire government because the 'groupthink' syndrome comes into play," says Andy Liepman, a career CIA official who now manages the 200 analysts inside the NCTC.

Liepman's most active analysts work in the Al Qaeda and Sunni Affiliates group. One team in the group is dedicated solely to al Qaeda's plotting inside the United States. "Most of the [homeland] plots we believe are credible have in their ancestry an al Qaeda brain," says Liepman. Other groups look at all the other terrorist organizations, as well as their interest in weapons of mass destruction. A fourth tracks the logistical aspects of terrorism, including travel, financing, and communications. "You can't just disrupt the attack," says Redd. "You have to go after every element of that life cycle."

Critics have faulted the NCTC for weak analysis on longer-term strategic topics, such as which factors in Islamic societies help generate more terrorists. Part of it is a staffing problem-there is just so much demand for the tactical work of chasing terrorism suspects. "We have not been able to work the long-term strategic issues to our satisfaction," says Dawn Scalici, a veteran CIA officer who is the deputy director for mission management at the NCTC. "We're stretched pretty thin." Eventually, NCTC officials plan to double the number of analysts. For now, more than half of the 200 analysts have less than three years' experience working on counterterrorism issues. "The fact is that they don't have the culture of analysis that the CIA has built up over decades," says a recently retired intelligence analyst. "They need to develop the analytic tradecraft."

The NCTC's analysts do have one tremendous advantage-wide access to both domestic and foreign raw intelligence traffic. But their physical isolation from the bulk of the CIA's regional and cultural experts could make it more difficult to detect emerging threats. "The analysts are further away from many of the specialists in the intelligence community," says Paul Pillar, a 30-year veteran of the CIA who once served as the deputy chief of its CounterTerrorism Center. "Consultation with them would be essential to help have early warning." Liepman counters that much of that contact is already happening in secure online forums these days. "There is a very good, very healthy, substantive discussion going on now between people who follow Hezbollah and people who follow Iran," he says. "Just because they are not at NCTC or in the counterterrorism community, it doesn't mean they don't have a voice."

The technological challenges have been daunting. When U.S. News visited the Terrorist Threat Integration Center three years ago, then director Brennan had five different computers under his desk to access all the different agencies' networks. That problem remains, and, if anything, is even worse now that the NCTC has even greater access to data. In fact, with more than 30 computer networks wired into the NCTC, analysts in the operations center have to use multiple desks to access them all-the switching equipment they use to toggle between networks can accommodate a maximum of only nine systems. Also, analysts cannot yet search all the networks at the same time with a single command. That technology, says Chief Information Officer Bill Spalding, is still "a couple of years away."

"The fight of a generation."

The deluge of information is intimidating. The NCTC maintains the intelligence community's ever expanding central repository of suspected terrorists, called the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (which is used to feed several terrorist watch lists, including the TSA's no-fly list). Russ Travers, a career Defense Intelligence Agency official, manages a youthful team of 80 analysts who sort through the mass of reporting on possible terrorist names. Every day, the NCTC receives as many as 2,000 cables-containing some 5,000 to 7,000 names. The database has quadrupled to 400,000 names in three years (although about 100,000 of the names are aliases). Further complicating the task is the fragmentary, often contradictory, nature of the intelligence and the language barrier. "Right away, you run into the whole problem with Arab names," says Travers. "Trying to sort out this 'Mohammed Mohammed' from that 'Mohammed Mohammed' can be a tremendous challenge for these young people."

Perhaps the most ambitious part of the NCTC's mission is its strategic operational planning function. As the "mission manager" for terrorism, the NCTC is supposed to work with the newly created DNI's office, which is charged with reforming the intelligence community, to eliminate gaps in the U.S. counterterrorism effort as well as unnecessary overlap. Without direct command authority, however, the NCTC will have to rely on the DNI's influence over the budget to help push change. It is unclear just how much clout either organization will have.

The NCTC has already issued several plans, including the first National Action Plan to Combat Foreign Fighters in Iraq, completed in June. Officials are now working on another, to counter terrorists' use of the Internet. The most comprehensive effort is the now completed National Implementation Plan, a nearly 200-page document that has become the de facto war plan for the struggle against terrorism. Signed by President Bush in June, the classified plan assigns a lead agency to each of more than 500 different tasks related to the war on terrorism. Some of them are obvious, such as the FBI's lead role in hunting terrorists at home. Others relate to the war of ideas and the need to quell violent Islamic extremism, an area where the State Department has many of the lead roles. The new plan tries to take a broader view, including goals like bolstering educational institutions that focus on Islam and the Muslim world. "This is the fight of a generation," says Vice Adm. Bert Calland, a former deputy CIA director who is now the deputy director for strategic operational planning at the NCTC. "We need to start establishing processes and capabilities with that in mind." Many experts are skeptical; previous efforts by the Bush administration to do outreach to the Muslim world have foundered.

"Radicalization."

At the same time, the terrorist threat and the al Qaeda network have become increasingly diffuse. NCTC's analytical director Liepman says that the most credible terrorist plotting appears to have some al Qaeda link back to Pakistan and Afghanistan, but officials are increasingly worried about individual extremists-particularly Muslim men already living here who may be drawn to jihad but who have no ties to known terrorist groups. "In looking at threat reporting on a daily basis, you tend to get a sense of issues of concern and things that might help us understand where radicalization is taking place, why it's taking place, and what we need to be worried about in the future," says principal deputy director Brock. "Radicalization happens in different ways, at different times, with different people, and that's what makes it such a difficult problem."

Redd offers a simple, if unsettling, way to measure their success: "Do the 5-year-olds of today turn into terrorists or do they decide there is something better out there?"

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061029/6center.htm

[Casey]

Web Terrorism Course Is Sellout with Security Pros
By Reuters
October 30, 2006

LONDON (Reuters)—Security professionals from around the world have snapped up places on a Scottish university's pioneering new terrorism course, which went live on Monday via the Internet.
ADVERTISEMENT

Organizers said some 140 people have so far signed up for the University of St Andrews's Web-based "Certificate in Terrorism Studies," with about half starting on Monday and bookings now running into 2007.

Participants include police, military, coastguard and aviation officials from Britain, Australia, Canada, Scandinavia and Thailand, among other countries.

"A lot of the training they undergo is very operational—which bag to open, and so on. What they would like deepened is their background understanding of what these (terrorist) movements are about—the modus operandi, the philosophy," said Oliver Gadsby of publishing and training group Informa Plc, which launched the new course in collaboration with St Andrews.

The venture, whose homepage is at www.terrorismstudies.com, is billed as the first transnational e-learning course of its kind. It requires about four hours of study each week and is designed to last 16 weeks.

Participants have the chance to contact leading academics and each other, although Gadsby said it was possible some would not want to disclose their real names.

"Some will be fully comfortable to share information. Others won't want to, and it's entirely in the students' control," he said.

He did not rule out applications from the general public, but said all candidates were carefully scrutinized for security reasons. "I'd probably better not spell out what we do, but there is a vetting process."

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,2047130,00.asp?kc=EWRSS03129TX1K0000614

[Casey]

RAND Voices of Jihad Database

This online database is a compilation of speeches, interviews, statements, and publications of jihadist leaders, foot soldiers, and sympathizers. Nearly all content is in English translation, and has been collected from publicly-accessible websites. Original links are provided, along with excerpts and full-text content when available.

The voices of jihad are numerous, varied, and constantly evolving. Jihadists often disagree on goals, tactics, and worldview; they may also change their message depending on the intended audience. The database content reveals several aspects of what might be termed a jihadist ideology, including:

* Worldview (e.g., on democracy, the role of women, and global institutions)
* Grievances (e.g., on the West or secular Arab regimes)
* Justification of Terror and Violence
* Exhortations and Calls to Jihad
* Problems and Disagreements
* Strategy and Tactics

Content is indexed by date, author, affiliated group, online source, and keyword.

This effort extends RAND's 30-year involvement in the study of terrorism. RAND began exploring this problem in the wake of the murder of Olympic athletes in Munich and has carried on this research without interruption since 1972. Indeed, RAND remains dedicated to an investigation of the origins, development, and implications of terrorism for policy officials, the private sector, and first responders. By compiling the Voices of Jihad Database and making it available to the public, RAND hopes to enhance counterterrorism analysis, policymaking, and response.


RAND Home | About RAND | Research Areas | Reports & Bookstore | RAND Div

http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism/database/

[al-Canine]

for anyone who was wondering...

Buying Your Way Into al Qaeda

Getting agents into Islamic terrorist organizations has proved very difficult. There are several reasons for this. First of all, most terrorists come from cultures where the language spoken (Arabic, for example) is difficult to learn, and there are not many speakers of these languages that could otherwise qualify for a job in the CIA or FBI. Then there are the problems with background checks. Islamic terrorists are big on background checks. Not only do they know how to use Google, but they will also, eventually, send someone to your "hometown" to ask questions. The CIA has discovered that, Google alone has made it much more difficult to create "legends" (the fake background information agents require). But the discovery that al Qaeda will even send people out to check legends, was really scary. With all that, al Qaeda is also very patient, and is willing to wait years, before giving a new guy more access to top people, and more important information.

As a result of all these obstacles, the CIA has found it more effective to put more effort into recruiting existing terrorist leaders. Turns out that corruption has long been a problem with al Qaeda. While al Qaeda exists largely to fight the corruption of Moslem leaders, they have not been able to completely rid themselves of larcenous and deceptive habits. Among the many al Qaeda documents captured in Afghanistan, there were quite a few letters and reports dealing with embezzlement and other evidence of corrupt leadership. Apparently, many al Qaeda regulars eventually get tired of the life. It's a hard life, and often a very precarious one. Despite the culture of suicide and sacrifice within al Qaeda, many of the members have families, and attachments develop. Some members change their minds, and this provides opportunities for any CIA people who have some channels open to these guys. Opening up these channels, which allows some messages to be sent either way, is now a major effort. This sort of thing can be moved along quickly via the use of lots of money. You can get to the non-terrorist kin of al Qaeda members, or tribal leaders, by using cash. You can see where this is going. If you can't easily train agents to spy from inside al Qaeda, then work on hiring someone who is already there. Apparently, several of the al Qaeda big shots who were taken down, went partly because of information from an al Qaeda member that was already bought, or on short-term lease.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/articles/20061031.aspx

[Casey]

After reading this article I realized it is pretty much the same article that was in the news last October http://wincoast.com/forum/showpost.php?p=838829&postcount=44

and earlier last year when the Iraq documents became available.

The only thing new in this article is the incoming Director of National Intelligence (which overseas all US intelligence agencies) retired Navy Vice Adm. John M. McConnell

Hopefully Adm. McConnell gets things moving.
================================================== ==

US Intelligence to Hire More Arab-Americans
Barbara Ferguson, Arab News

WASHINGTON, 11 February 2007 — Since the Sept. 11 attacks and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, American agencies have been slow to hire Arab- and Muslim-Americans to help them wade through Mideast and South Asian cultural and language operations.

At the FBI, if one counts the agents there who know a handful of Arabic words — including those who scored zero on a standard proficiency test — just 1 percent of the FBI’s 12,000 agents have any familiarity with the language.

These numbers reflect the FBI’s continued struggle to attract employees who speak Arabic, Urdu, Farsi and other languages of the Middle East and South Asia, even as the bureau leads a fight against terror groups primarily centered in those parts of the world.

The same challenge is facing the CIA, the US military, the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies working in these regions and with Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans at home.

In Washington, it was reported last year by an Inspector General that thousands of hours of intelligence tapes remain untranslated.

Even at the State Department, only 10 of 34,000 employees are rated fully fluent in Arabic.

In Iraq, the military sorely lacks American translators, forcing reliance on foreigners. This correspondent found herself having to translate for her unit while embedded as journalist with the Marines at the start of the Iraq war.

Due to these significant operational failings, the incoming Director of National Intelligence (which overseas all US intelligence agencies) retired Navy Vice Adm. John M. McConnell, garnered much interest when he announced last week that he intends to improve security rules to make it easier for US intelligence agencies to hire first-generation Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans for highly sensitive jobs.

The current rules, which date from World War II, limit intelligence agencies’ ability to employ first-generation Americans “who might have native language capabilities from serving in some of these very sensitive positions in the intelligence community” and thus hinder efforts to deal with radical Islam, McConnell said during his confirmation hearing last week before the Senate Select Committee.

According to McConnell, the current rules require citizenship verification for access to the most highly classified data. For American citizens born overseas, their citizenship must be verified, as well as the US legal status of immediate family members, including “spouse, cohabitant, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters,” — according to the directive.

Another issue that must be considered when hiring is “foreign influence,” according to guidelines adopted by the White House in 2005.

These include “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulations, pressure or coercion.”

McConnell said he wants to change these directives because they constitute “one of the areas that needs probably the greatest deal of attention and improvement... using people who speak the native language, understand the culture and the tribal conditions.”

This decision, he said, comes after embarrassing revelations that America is not equipped with Arabic or South Asian speakers.

http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=92028&d=11&m=2&y=2007&pix=world.jpg&category=World

[Casey]

War on Terror
West Point terrorism research center's mission is to learn as much as possible about the enemy

By Michael Hill
ASSOCIATED PRESS

12:55 a.m. February 16, 2007

WEST POINT, N.Y. – Jarret Brachman recently told a class of West Point cadets that many Americans had an unsophisticated image of Islamic terrorists – that they live in caves, “you know, beating the women over their heads.”
On the contrary, the U.S. is fighting a far more technologically savvy enemy – one adept at both propaganda and Power Point – said Brachman, the director of research at the United States Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center.

“This is a war of information,” he said.

The enemy distributes video games in which players shoot down American soldiers with President Bush's face, he said. The enemy also produces the “Mujahedeen World Cup” for the Web, complete with a U.S. troop vehicle exploding as announcer shouts: “Goooaaalll!”

When they are not teaching cadets, the small group of academics at the Combating Terrorism Center, known as the CTC, publish analytical papers on al-Qaeda and other terror networks that have landed on newspaper front pages and the desks of U.S. policy makers.

The group's central tenet is as old as war itself: Know your enemy.

“We have not been focused on the power of ideas, or been as sensitive to the power of ideas as much as they have,” said Brachman, a former CIA analyst. “So how do we move forward from that? It starts with knowing who our enemy is, what they're saying.”

Brachman's reading list touches on everything from the Quran to captured al-Qaeda documents to angry postings on jihadi Web sites. Such readings are grist for CTC reports that interpret the operations and intentions of terror networks.

In November, for instance, CTC fellow William McCants edited the Militant Ideology Atlas, which ranks the most influential thinkers in the jihadi movement.

The most cited figure is not Osama bin Laden, but Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian executed in 1966 who is a sort of intellectual godfather to modern terrorists. The list is rounded out by other thinkers, many of them not well known to the public.

This sort of opposition research is already done by jihadists, who have studied U.S. homeland security bureaucracy down to the number of FBI branch offices and special agents.

The CTC's research portrays the jihadi movement as rife with internal fractures and intellectual inconsistency. Brachman said the question for the U.S. is how to expose the internal fractures.

The CTC's report “Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook” argues that direct engagement with the U.S. has been good for the jihadi movement because it rallies locals and drains American resources.

The report, written by Brachman and McCants, suggests the U.S. work indirectly through groups with more credibility in the Middle East. The government could, for example, fund a media campaign that broadcasts images of attacks that killed Muslim children.

There is some evidence that the information war is at least on the radar in Washington.

The Iraq Study Group chided the government in its report last year for not doing enough to “understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode” the bombs killing U.S. troops.

Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University terrorism expert and senior fellow at the CTC, said there also was recognition of the issue in the Bush administration's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism released last fall.

Meanwhile, Brachman can take solace in making an impression on the West Point cadets who will soon lead patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“In Iraq, it's not about kicking doors down,” senior cadet Matthew Hubbard said after a recent class. “It's about seeing the same faces day after day.”

The CTC has captured the attention of terrorists. Brachman said one jihadi site warned that the center was compiling “a frightening amount of information.”

A paper by the CTC's Brian Fishman on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was posted on a Web site in Arabic, along with Fishman's picture and a description of him as a “cursed infidel.”

“I took it as a compliment,” Fishman said.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On the Net:
www.ctc.usma.edu/default.asp

Find this article at:
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20070216-0055-westpoint-informationwar.html

[al-Canine]

U.S. Intel Can't Keep Up With New Technology

Newsweek | Aug. 6, 2007 issue

Six years after 9/11 , U.S. intel officials are complaining about the emergence of a major "gap" in their ability to secretly eavesdrop on suspected terrorist plotters. In a series of increasingly anxious pleas to Congress, intel "czar" Mike McConnell has argued that the nation's spook community is "missing a significant portion of what we should be getting" from electronic eavesdropping on possible terror plots. Rep. Heather Wilson, a GOP member of the House intelligence community, told NEWSWEEK she has learned of "specific cases where U.S. lives have been put at risk" as a result. Intel agency spokespeople declined to elaborate.

The intel gap results partly from rapid changes in the technology carrying much of the world's message traffic (principally telephone calls and e-mails). The National Security Agency is falling so far behind in upgrading its infrastructure to cope with the digital age that the agency has had problems with its electricity supply, forcing some offices to temporarily shut down. The gap is also partly a result of administration fumbling over legal authorization for eavesdropping by U.S. agencies.

The post-Watergate Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) required a warrant for eavesdropping on people in the U.S. But after 9/11, the administration asserted that warrants weren't needed to surveil communications involving suspected terrorists even inside the U.S. The controversy over "warrantless wiretapping" made intel officials gun-shy about eavesdropping even on messages they would have regarded as fair game before 9/11.

According to both administration and congressional officials (anonymous when discussing such issues), the White House and intelligence czar's office are now urgently trying to negotiate a legal fix with Congress that would make it easier for NSA to eavesdrop on e-mails and phone calls where all parties are located outside the U.S., even if at some point the message signal crosses into U.S. territory.

Much of the electronic communications NSA once pored over, between two parties communicating with each other outside the U.S., used to travel via satellite or radiolike signal, leaving NSA free to pluck the messages out of the air. Technological innovations, however, have shifted more and more traffic—both e-mail and telephone calls—to hard-wired or fiberoptic networks, many of which have critical switching or transit facilities inside the U.S. Therefore, intel-collection officials concluded that FISA court authorizations should be obtained to eavesdrop not just on messages where at least one party is inside the country, but also for eavesdropping on messages between two parties overseas that pass through U.S. communications gear. Two officials familiar with the controversy, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive material, said that had the administration initially been candid about its antiterror surveillance plans, it could have worked with Congress years ago to tweak the FISA laws to account for the technological changes. One of the officials said the administration's secretiveness had, in this case, created problems for antiterrorism efforts.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20010712/site/newsweek/

[al-Canine]

Waterboarding ‘probably saved lives’

Ex-CIA officer says technique worked, but he now considers it torture

The Washington Post
updated 12:33 a.m. CT, Tues., Dec. 11, 2007

A former CIA officer who participated in the capture and questioning of the first al-Qaeda terrorist suspect to be waterboarded said yesterday that the harsh technique provided an intelligence breakthrough that "probably saved lives," but that he now regards the tactic as torture.

Zayn Abidin Muhammed Hussein abu Zubaida, the first high-ranking al-Qaeda member captured after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, broke in less than a minute after he was subjected to the technique and began providing interrogators with information that led to the disruption of several planned attacks, said John Kiriakou, who served as a CIA interrogator in Pakistan.

Abu Zubaida was one of two detainees whose interrogation was captured in video recordings that the CIA later destroyed. The recent disclosure of the tapes' destruction ignited a recent furor on Capitol Hill and allegations that the agency tried to hide evidence of illegal torture.

"It was like flipping a switch," said Kiriakou, the first former CIA employee directly involved in the questioning of "high-value" al-Qaeda detainees to speak publicly.

In an interview, Kiriakou said he did not witness Abu Zubaida's waterboarding but was part of the interrogation team that questioned him in a hospital in Pakistan for weeks after his capture in that country in the spring of 2002.

He described Abu Zubaida as ideologically zealous, defiant and uncooperative — until the day in mid-summer when his captors strapped him to a board, wrapped his nose and mouth in cellophane and forced water into his throat in a technique that simulates drowning.

35 seconds before breakdown

The waterboarding lasted about 35 seconds before Abu Zubaida broke down, according to Kiriakou, who said he was given a detailed description of the incident by fellow team members. The next day, Abu Zubaida told his captors he would tell them whatever they wanted, Kiriakou said.

"He said that Allah had come to him in his cell and told him to cooperate, because it would make things easier for his brothers," Kiriakou said.

Kiriakou's remarks came a day before top CIA officials are to appear before a closed congressional hearing to account for the decision to destroy recordings of the interrogations of Abu Zubaida and another senior captive, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Last Thursday, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden announced that the recordings were destroyed in 2005 to protect the identities of CIA employees who appear on them.

The recordings were destroyed despite orders from judges that required the government to preserve records related to its interrogation programs. The lawsuits were filed by captives at the Guantanamo Bay military prison who were contesting their detentions.

Also yesterday, the House intelligence committee's chairman, Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), and ranking Republican Pete Hoekstra (Mich.) announced that the panel is launching its own investigation into the tapes' destruction. Reyes and Hoekstra said in a statement that Hayden's assertion that the committee had been "properly notified" of the destruction "does not appear to be true."

The Justice Department and the CIA inspector general's office also have begun a preliminary inquiry into the tapes' destruction. Members of the bipartisan commission that investigated the Sept. 11 attacks have said they were repeatedly told that the CIA did not have videotapes of interrogations.

Agency officials have said they briefed intelligence committee leaders from both parties over the course of two years on interrogation techniques. Officials said the briefings included mention of the tapes, but none of the lawmakers asked to view them.

U.S. intelligence officials confirmed that Kiriakou was a CIA employee involved in the capture and questioning of Abu Zubaida. Kiriakou, a 14-year veteran of the CIA who worked in both the analysis and operations divisions, left the agency in 2004 and works as a consultant for a private Washington-based firm.

After the hospital interviews bore no fruit, Abu Zubaida was flown to a secret CIA prison, where the interrogation duties fell to a team trained in aggressive tactics, including waterboarding. Shortly before the transfer, Kiriakou said he left Pakistan for Washington, where he said he continued to monitor the interrogation through classified cables and private communications with colleagues.

Kiriakou said he did not know that the interrogations were videotaped, although there often were closed-circuit video systems in the rooms where questioning took place. He said he also had no knowledge of the decision to destroy videotapes of the interrogations. Officials said there are hundreds of hours of recordings, but most are of Abu Zubaida alone in his cell recovering from his injuries.

Interrogation circumstances unclear

The circumstances surrounding Abu Zubaida's interrogation and treatment are still murky and fiercely disputed. FBI agents have opposed the use of coercive techniques as counterproductive and unreliable; intelligence officials have defended the tactics as valuable.

President Bush and others have portrayed Abu Zubaida as a crucial and highly placed terrorist, but some intelligence and law enforcement sources have said he did little more than help with logistics for al-Qaeda leaders and their associates.

In documents prepared for a military hearing at Guantanamo Bay, where he is still held, Abu Zubaida asserted that he was tortured by the CIA, and that he told his questioners whatever they wanted to hear to make the torture stop.

At the time the tapes were destroyed, several federal judges had issued court orders requiring the CIA and other government agencies to preserve records related to the interrogation and detention of alleged terrorism suspects after the Sept. 11 attacks. Some attorneys are seeking new orders for preserving the records.

Destruction in violation of judge’s order?

In one case, attorneys for Yemeni national Mohmoad Abdah alleged in a motion filed Sunday that the CIA may have violated an order issued in June 2005 by U.S. District Judge Henry H. Kennedy Jr. in Washington. Kennedy told the government to "preserve and maintain all evidence and information regarding the torture, mistreatment, and abuse of detainees now at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."

Because Abu Zubaida had provided information that led to the capture of several Guantanamo Bay detainees, defense attorneys argue that any recordings of his interrogation should have been preserved.

"The revelation that the CIA destroyed these videotapes raises grave concerns about the government's compliance with the preservation order entered by this Court," wrote Abdah's lawyers, David H. Remes and Marc D. Falkoff.

Kiriakou, whose account first appeared in a story on ABC News's Web site, said he decided to go public to correct what he says are misperceptions about the role played by CIA employees in the early months of the government's anti-terrorism efforts.

"It's easy to point to intelligence failures and perceived intelligence failures, but the public has to understand how hard people are working to make them safe," he said.

Kiriakou said he first spoke to Abu Zubaida in a Pakistani military hospital. Abu Zubaida was recovering from wounds he suffered in the gun battle that led to his capture.

Talkative after coma

After he came out of a coma, Abu Zubaida was initially talkative, holding long conversations with Kiriakou from his hospital bed. The two discussed personal matters that ranged from religion to Abu Zubaida's private regret about having never married or fathered children.

Kiriakou said he repeatedly counseled Abu Zubaida to provide details about al-Qaeda's infrastructure, leadership and plans. Abu Zubaida refused and eventually became more defiant.

He was later flown to a secret CIA prison, where he was subjected to harsher methods, including waterboarding, Kiriakou said. Kiriakou said he made a final appeal to Abu Zubaida shortly before the waterboarding began.

"You have one more opportunity to cooperate. My guys are telling me that you're being a jerk," Kiriakou recalled telling Abu Zubaida. His reply, according to Kiriakou: "They're being jerks, too."

Kiriakou said he now has mixed feelings about the use of waterboarding. He said that he thinks the technique provided a crucial break to the CIA and probably helped prevent attacks, but that he is now convinced that waterboarding is torture, and "Americans are better than that."

"Maybe that's inconsistent, but that's how I feel," he said. "It was an ugly little episode that was perhaps necessary at that time. But we've moved beyond that."

Staff writers Walter Pincus and Michael Abramowitz and staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

© 2007 The Washington Post Company
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22192375/

[Casey]

February 6, 2008
Intelligence Chief Cites Qaeda Threat to U.S.
By MARK MAZZETTI

WASHINGTON — Al Qaeda is gaining in strength from its refuge in Pakistan and is steadily improving its ability to recruit, train and position operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United States, the director of national intelligence told a Senate panel on Tuesday.

The director, Mike McConnell, told lawmakers that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, remained in control of the terrorist group and had promoted a new generation of lieutenants. He said Al Qaeda was also improving what he called “the last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S.” — producing militants, including new Western recruits, capable of blending into American society and attacking domestic targets.

A senior intelligence official said Tuesday evening that the testimony was based in part on new evidence that Qaeda operatives in Pakistan were training Westerners, most likely including American citizens, to carry out attacks. The official said there was no indication as yet that Al Qaeda had succeeded in getting operatives into the United States.

The testimony, in an annual assessment of the threats facing the United States, was the latest indication that Al Qaeda appears to have significantly rebuilt a network battered by the American invasion of Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 attacks.

It follows a National Intelligence Estimate last summer that described a resurgent Al Qaeda, and could add fuel to criticisms from Democratic lawmakers and presidential candidates that the White House focus on Iraq since 2002 has diverted attention and resources from the battle against the Qaeda organization’s core.

In recent weeks, fresh concerns about the threat posed by Al Qaeda have prompted senior Bush administration officials to travel to Pakistan to seek approval for more aggressive American military action against militants based in the tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.

As part of his testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, also offered the government’s most extensive public defense for the use of waterboarding, saying that the C.I.A. had used the harsh interrogation technique against three Qaeda operatives in 2002 and 2003 in a belief that another terrorist attack on the United States was imminent. He identified the three as Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

General Hayden said the technique, which induces a feeling of drowning, had not been used since 2003. Mr. McConnell said that a future C.I.A. request to use waterboarding on a detainee would need to be approved both by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey and by President Bush.

The C.I.A. is the only agency permitted under law to use interrogation methods more aggressive than those used by the American military. Senate Democrats sought to use the hearing to exploit divisions about those techniques.

Both Robert S. Mueller III, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers that their agencies had successfully obtained valuable intelligence from terror suspects without using what Mr. Mueller called the “coercive” methods of the C.I.A.

But General Hayden bristled when asked about Congressional attempts to require that C.I.A. interrogators be required to use the more limited set of interrogation methods contained in the Army Field Manual, which is used by military interrogators.

“It would make no more sense to apply the Army’s field manual to C.I.A.,” General Hayden said, “than it would to take the Army Field Manual on grooming and apply it to my agency, or the Army Field Manual on recruiting and apply it to my agency. Or, for that matter, the Army Field Manual on sexual orientation and apply it to my agency.”

During the testimony, Mr. McConnell tried to recalibrate somewhat the intelligence agencies’ view of Iran’s nuclear program, telling senators that the public portion of a National Intelligence Estimate released in December placed too much significance on the fact that Iran had halted secret work on nuclear weapons design in 2003.

On Tuesday, Mr. McConnell said that weapons design was “probably the least significant part of the program” and that Iran’s refusal to halt uranium enrichment meant that it still posed a potential nuclear threat.

The fact that Iran was continuing its enrichment efforts was mentioned in that intelligence assessment, but Republican lawmakers and many conservative commentators have criticized the report as misleading.

Intelligence officials have defended the assessment on Iran as an example of the more rigorous analysis that American spy agencies have adopted in response to the prewar intelligence failures on Iraq. But while Mr. McConnell praised the assessment, he said his office had not been clear enough about its conclusions as it hurried to make it public.

“In retrospect, as I mentioned, I would do some things differently,” he said.

Among his litany of worldwide threats, Mr. McConnell also warned the Senate panel about the growing threat of “cyberattacks” by terror groups or homegrown militants. He said President Bush signed a classified directive in January outlining steps to protect American computer networks.

In his testimony on Al Qaeda, Mr. McConnell said Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri were precluded by “security concerns” from the day-to-day running of the organization. But he said both men “regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers through public statements.”

Mr. McConnell said the flow of foreign militants into Iraq slowed somewhat during the final months of 2007. At the same time, however, he warned that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the largely homegrown Sunni insurgent group in Iraq that American officials say is led by foreigners, could shift its focus to carrying out attacks outside Iraq.

Based on captured documents, Mr. McConnell said, fewer than 100 militants from Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia to date have left Iraq to establish cells in other countries.

Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said: “Unfortunately, many of our government’s policies have, in fact, hindered our counterterrorism efforts. The focus of America’s military forces and intelligence resources were mistakenly shifted from delivering a decisive blow against Al Qaeda, which is the enemy.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/washington/06intel.html

[Chuckles]

Here is the long version of the NYT article Casey posted.

Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080205_testimony.pdf) (PDF)

[al-Canine]

After a Decade at War With West, Al-Qaeda Still Impervious to Spies

By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service

BARCELONA -- A decade after al-Qaeda issued a global declaration of war against America, U.S. spy agencies have had little luck recruiting well-placed informants and are finding the upper reaches of the network tougher to penetrate than the Kremlin during the Cold War, according to U.S. and European intelligence officials.

Some counterterrorism officials say their agencies missed early opportunities to attack the network from within. Relying on Cold War tactics such as cash rewards for tips failed to take into account the religious motivations of Islamist radicals and produced few results.

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, officials said, al-Qaeda has tightened its internal security at the top, placing an even greater emphasis on personal and tribal loyalties to determine who can gain access to its leaders.

Alain Chouet, former chief of the security intelligence service of the DGSE, France's foreign spy agency, said it can take years for informants to burrow their way into radical Islamist networks. Even if they're successful at first, he said, new al-Qaeda members are often "highly disposable" -- prime candidates for suicide missions.

He said it might be too late for Western intelligence agencies, having missed earlier chances, to redouble efforts to infiltrate the network. "I think you cannot penetrate such a movement now," he said.

At the same time, those agencies have made their task harder by blowing the cover of some promising informants and mishandling others.

In January, Spanish police arrested 14 men in Barcelona who they suspected were preparing to bomb subways in cities across Europe. Investigators disclosed in court documents that the arrests had been prompted by a Pakistani informant working for French intelligence.

The revelation infuriated French officials, who were forced to withdraw the informant -- a rare example of an agent who had successfully infiltrated training camps in Pakistan. Spanish authorities expressed regret but said they had no choice; after they failed to find bombs or much other evidence during the arrests, the case rested largely on the informant's word.

"Suicide attacks don't allow for a lot of margin to make a decision," said Vicente Gonzales Mota, the lead prosecutor. "Acting after an attack would be a tragedy."

Ten years ago, on Feb. 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring it "the individual duty of every Muslim" to kill Americans and their allies around the world. Looking back, some U.S. and European intelligence officials said their governments had underestimated the enemy and thought they could rely on old methods to destabilize al-Qaeda.

During the Cold War, for example, the CIA had enjoyed some success in recruiting KGB moles and persuading Soviet officials to defect. The agency was also able to buy off Afghan warlords with suitcases of cash, persuading them to fight Soviet forces in the 1980s and to turn on the Taliban in 2001. A similar approach has worked, to a limited extent, against insurgents in Iraq: An informant's tip led directly to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the group al-Qaeda in Iraq, in 2006.

But al-Qaeda's core organization in Pakistan and Afghanistan has so far proved impervious to damaging leaks.

Part of the problem is that the CIA and FBI had very few Arabic-speaking officers who could handle or recruit informants. Instead of making it a priority to develop human sources, the agencies assumed they could rely on spy satellites and other high-tech tools.

Arab and Pakistani spy agencies, preoccupied with domestic politics and other threats, weren't much help either, officials said.

From 1992 until November 2004, "we worked side by side with the Egyptians, the Jordanians -- the very best Arab intelligence services -- and they didn't recruit a single person who could report on al-Qaeda," said Michael Scheuer, who in the 1990s led the CIA unit dedicated to finding bin Laden. He left agency in November 2004.

After Sept. 11, U.S. officials tried another tried-and-true tactic: offering huge rewards for information leading to the capture or death of al-Qaeda leaders, including $25 million apiece for bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

That lure, however, has proved largely ineffective in Pakistan and Afghanistan. No rewards have been publicly announced under the program in either country since Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the organizer of the Sept. 11 attacks, was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003.

Scheuer said money and other traditional inducements are unlikely to persuade Islamist radicals to betray a religious cause to which they are fervently committed. While people operating on the fringes of al-Qaeda -- arms suppliers, narcotics dealers and rival extremists -- might be tempted, he said, the chances are remote with people higher up the chain of command.

"We're still kind of stuck in the Cold War approach to this," Scheuer said. "This is a much more difficult target than the Soviets were. These people are true believers. They're living according to their beliefs, not in the lap of luxury."

Walled Off Against Spies

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the FBI and European law enforcement agencies have had some luck recruiting informants in their own countries, enabling them to break up alleged terrorist cells in Miami, New York, London and Copenhagen.

But al-Qaeda's central leadership in Pakistan has remained immune, in part by further tightening its already sophisticated internal security apparatus, current and former intelligence officials said.

Its recruiters cautiously seek out new operatives at training camps run by other radical groups, such as the Taliban. Those chosen are given specific assignments and rarely come into contact with high-ranking al-Qaeda figures. They must also pass extensive background checks, which usually require personal references from movement sympathizers, officials said.

Tribal or family connections are paramount, and certain categories of people automatically come under suspicion, officials said. For years, al-Qaeda avoided Algerian recruits, they added, because it was assumed that Algerian terrorist groups had been infiltrated by that country's security services.

"We're facing a very disciplined organization," said Louis Caprioli, former chief of international counterterrorism for France's domestic security service and now a consultant for GEOS, a global security firm. "These people have well understood they are the target of informants, so it makes it all the more difficult to penetrate them."

U.S. and European spy agencies have avoided sending their own undercover officers to training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, officials said.

Few operatives, they said, have the language skills, personal backgrounds and knowledge of radical Islam that would enable them to talk their way into the camps. Plus, the political consequences of having a spy unmasked by al-Qaeda would be enormous, they added.

Beyond that, undercover officers usually require an extensive support network that would be hard to sustain for the several years it might take to worm into the al-Qaeda hierarchy, said a former senior British intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Undercover operatives might also find themselves ordered by al-Qaeda to organize a suicide attack or kill someone. "Which you can't let them do," the former British official said. "You have an obligation to prevent it from happening."

Attempting to wiggle out of such an assignment would only raise suspicions. Al-Qaeda people are "very canny about this sort of thing," the former official said. "They have this preemptive and fairly brutal approach. If you're suspected of being an informant or agent, you're dead."

Recruiting outsiders to serve as spies has its own challenges. The United States and European countries have restrictions on hiring informants with shady pasts. In 1995, for instance, the CIA adopted guidelines that require special approval to recruit paid sources who have been accused of human rights abuses or serious crimes.

Partnering with such people, moreover, can backfire.

Last month, authorities in Casablanca arrested a Belgian-Moroccan citizen, Abdelkader Belliraj, and charged him with plotting terrorist acts. Investigators said he worked closely with al-Qaeda and had met in Afghanistan with Zawahiri, the network's deputy leader, in 2001. During his interrogation, according to Moroccan officials, Belliraj confessed to involvement in six unsolved murders in Belgium in the late 1980s.

The case exploded into a scandal a few days later when newspapers in Brussels reported that Belliraj had served as a paid informant for Belgium's domestic intelligence service, even as his network plotted assassinations and robbed armored cars in Europe.

'Inside the Jihad'

But counterterrorism officials maintain the hope that one day they will succeed in placing someone inside al-Qaeda. The network does have a vulnerability, they note: It remains dependent on a fresh flow of outsiders to replenish its ranks, and agents could be introduced into that flow.

On March 6, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an al-Qaeda commander, posted an audio recording on the Internet in which he advertised for recruits to fight NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The network has a particular need for engineers and doctors, he said, adding, "Your brothers in Afghanistan are waiting for you."

Al-Qaeda has also shown that it will accept newcomers from unusual backgrounds.

Adam Gadahn, a 29-year-old Californian with Jewish roots, moved to Pakistan after he converted to Islam a decade ago. He joined al-Qaeda a few years later and now serves as a propaganda adviser, in direct contact with Zawahiri and other top leaders. In 2006, he was indicted for treason by a U.S. grand jury.

In the mid-1990s, a Moroccan-born informant working for France's foreign intelligence service infiltrated two training camps in Afghanistan and forged a personal relationship with several high-ranking al-Qaeda figures.

The informant -- a wine-loving, tobacco-smoking Muslim with the gift of the gab -- found his way to the camps simply by showing up in Pakistan and asking around, according to a book he published in 2006 titled "Inside the Jihad."

Writing under the pseudonym Omar Nasiri, the informant said his French handlers had discouraged him from undertaking the mission because they doubted he could succeed.

"I was a gift that walked in the door, but they always underestimated me," Nasiri said in a recent interview. "I told them, 'You know, guys, I'm not doing even 10 percent of what I can do.' And it made them mad when I said that. But they knew I was right."

He was placed in a witness protection program in 2000. European intelligence officials confirmed that he had worked as an informant but would not discuss details.

In the interview, Nasiri said it would be very difficult, but not impossible, for paid informants to infiltrate al-Qaeda in South Asia today. "Every moment of my existence was a test, every little answer, every little movement," he recalled of his time in the camps. "You had to show complete devotion to the cause. If someone does all this to blend in, even if it is deception, the risk is that sooner or later he will believe it."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/19/AR2008031903760.html

[al-Canine]

CIA enlists Google's help for spy work

US intelligence agencies are using Google's technology to help its agents share information about their suspects

Google has been recruited by US intelligence agencies to help them better process and share information they gather about suspects.

Agencies such as the National Security Agency have bought servers on which Google-supplied search technology is used to process information gathered by networks of spies around the world.

Google is also providing the search features for a Wikipedia-style site, called Intellipedia, on which agents post information about their targets that can be accessed and appended by colleagues, according to the San Francisco Chronicle.

The contracts are just a number that have been entered into by Google's 'federal government sales team', that aims to expand the company's reach beyond its core consumer and enterprise operations.

In the most innovative service, for which Google equipment provides the core search technology, agents are encouraged to post intelligence information on a secure forum, which other spies are free to read, edit, and tag - like the online encyclopedia Wikipedia.

Depending on their clearance, agents can log on to Intellipedia and gain access to three levels of info - top secret, secret and sensitive, and sensitive but unclassified. So far 37,000 users have established accounts on the service, and the database now extends to 35,000 articles, according to Sean Dennehy, chief of Intellipedia development for the CIA.

"Each analyst, for lack of a better term, has a shoe box with their knowledge," Mr Dennehy was quoted as saying. "They maintained it in a shared drive or Word document, but we're encouraging them to move those platforms so that everyone can benefit."

The collection of articles is hosted by the director of national intelligence, Mike McConnell, and is available only to the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, and other intelligence agencies.

Google's search technology usually rates a website's importance by measuring the number of other sites that link to it - a method that is more problematic in a 'closed' network used by a limited numbr of people. In the case of Intellipedia, pages become more prominent depending on how they are tagged or added to by other contributors.

As well as working with the intelligence agencies, Google also provides services to other US public sector organisations, including the Coast Guard, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.

Often, the contract is for something as simple as conducting earch within an organisation's own database, but in the case of the Coast Guard, Google also provides a more advanced version of its satellite mapping tool Google Earth, which ships use to navigate more safely.

There is no dedicated team promoting sales of Google products to the British Government, but a Google spokesperson said the company did target public sector organisations such as councils, schools and universities through the team that run AdWords, its internet advertising platform.

http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article3652494.ece

[al-Canine]

Just in time for UBL's 2nd message in a 2-day time frame... :sad_01:


May 21, 2008

Wider Antiterrorism Role for Elite Forces Rejected

By THOM SHANKER

WASHINGTON — The military’s elite Special Operations Command has quietly stepped back from a controversial plan that gave it the authority to carry out secret counterterrorism missions on its own around the world.

The decision culminates four years of misgivings within the military that the command, with its expertise in commando missions and unconventional war, would use its broader mandate too aggressively, by carrying out operations that had not been reviewed or approved by the regional commanders.

A new Special Operations commander, Adm. Eric T. Olson of the Navy Seals, has now said publicly that he intends to play a different role, and will instead continue the command’s new mission as coordinator of the military’s counterterrorism efforts around the world.

The shift reverses what Donald H. Rumsfeld put in place as defense secretary in 2004, when he said he wanted the Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, Fla., to operate unilaterally; he believed that it would be more aggressive in hunting down terrorists than the regional commanders, who are tied most closely to conventional forces.

Roger D. Carstens, a 20-year veteran of Special Operations missions who is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington policy institute, said the Special Operations Command finally “came to the conclusion that its role is not to be that of a global Lone Ranger who shows up at the last second to dispatch the bad guys.”

“That just can’t be done,” Mr. Carstens said, “or rather it should not be done.”

The change is the latest rejection of initiatives that Mr. Rumsfeld set forth during almost six years as defense secretary, before stepping down in 2006. His successor, Robert M. Gates, has increased the size of the ground forces, a move Mr. Rumsfeld resisted; signed off on a plan to keep more troops in Europe than Mr. Rumsfeld had envisioned; and called for future budgets to focus on the weapons needed to fight insurgents and terrorists today, rather than on investments in next-generation technology advocated by Mr. Rumsfeld.

Mr. Gates, a former director of central intelligence, has also reined in some Pentagon intelligence operations and has otherwise sought to ease tensions caused by what intelligence officials saw as Mr. Rumsfeld’s attempts to give the Pentagon a more dominant role in American spying efforts.

It is not known how Mr. Gates views the decision by the Special Operations Command to back away from Mr. Rumsfeld’s view of its role. Mr. Gates has not discussed it publicly, and senior aides said they were not privy to his thinking on the matter.

But senior Pentagon and military officers made clear that the Special Operations Command was not independently carrying out its own secret counterterrorism missions, but was instead coordinating counterterrorism planning across the military, as well as fulfilling its traditional role of training and equipping Special Operations forces for the armed services.

Mr. Rumsfeld outlined his views in 2004 by advocating what was known as a new Unified Command Plan, one that would have shifted the center of gravity within the military. It declared that the Special Operations Command “leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks.” He stressed that his reorganization was intended to permit the command to send out its own small teams to capture or kill terrorists.

But Admiral Olson used a speech in March to the Center for a New American Security to register disagreement with that approach. “There was some sense that from our headquarters in Tampa we were in the business of directing specific activities that were really in the area of operations of other commanders, and we really don’t do that,” he said in the speech. He initially spoke off the record, but under an agreement with his command, the policy institute later posted his remarks on its Web site, www.cnas.org. “What we really do is, we synchronize plans and planning in the global war on terror,” he added.

Counterterrorism missions continue to be carried out under regional commanders, Admiral Olson said. Officers at the Special Operations Command, he said, “receive the plans, review the plans, coordinate the plans, deconflict them.” He also said the command made recommendations to the Joint Chiefs and the defense secretary “on how resources ought to be allocated around the world to match the demands of the global war on terror.”

Senior officials familiar with the admiral’s thinking say his comments reflect the same deliberate approach that his predecessors have adopted in interpreting Mr. Rumsfeld’s directive, and they say it is in keeping with the instruction that the Special Operations Command carry out its own missions only when first directed by the president or the defense secretary. Senior officials said that such missions had rarely, if ever, actually happened.

Mr. Carstens, of the Center for a New American Security, said that when the Unified Command Plan was first approved by Mr. Rumsfeld, many people thought the Special Operations Command would conduct military operations regardless of whether regional commanders had approved the missions. He said the Rumsfeld vision had been rejected. “It is not what we thought it was going to be when we first received the authority,” Mr. Carstens said. The way missions are carried out today, he added, “is not much different than what we have always done.”

In many ways, Mr. Rumsfeld’s goals for the Special Operations Command are being carried out by a subordinate unit, the Joint Special Operations Command.

That command is in charge of the armed forces’ most secretive counterterrorism units, and is credited with capturing or killing many of the most wanted terrorist or insurgent leaders, including Saddam Hussein. This elite command operates in full coordination with the regional commanders in the Middle East, East Asia and other parts of the world.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/washington/21military.html?hp

[Casey]

Meet the cyberspies living among the world's deadliest terrorists

20/06/2008
By Eric Silver in Tel Aviv, Jewish Chronicle

In a Tel Aviv office, under-cover agents are infiltrating the world’s Islamist websites

Shortly before Manchester United footballers flew to Saudi Arabia for an exhibition match in January, Israeli internet monitors overheard Islamic extremists plotting an attack while the team was in Riyadh. They tipped off British intelligence. Sir Alex Ferguson’s boys strutted their stuff, peddled their club shirts, signed their autographs — and flew safely home to Old Trafford. The cyberspies hope they had helped.

They were working for Terrogence, a private Israeli company that sells its product to police and intelligence services, as well as private clients, in Israel and around the world. Its 25 full-time and 20 part-time experts, almost all graduates of military intelligence, have fabricated radical Muslim identities to talk their way into hundreds of closely guarded global jihad websites and forums. Here the fanatics recruit and instruct, spread their ideas and techniques, plan their operations and brag of their prowess.

Terrogence is based in a converted chicken house a short drive north of Tel Aviv. The company was founded three years ago by Gad Aviran, a weapons specialist who had spent his adult life in counter-terrorism. Until recently, he was one of the Israel Defence Forces’ top bomb-disposal experts and a researcher into terrorist capabilities. He paints a chilling picture of a vulnerable 21st-century world.


“In the last four or five years,” Aviran reflects, “terrorist activity has shifted to the virtual world. The terrorists have harnessed the internet to their purposes, creating a flat world without borders and without time zones. There’s no need for a terrorist to train in another country. He can find all the information he needs on the internet. He doesn’t even have to have a computer. A smart-phone provides him with the exact access to exactly the same places.

“An incident in one part of the world can be duplicated in hours somewhere else. We’re seeing an increasingly rapid information flow, with regard to ideology, doctrine, tactics, chemistry, physics. All the information is there. All you’ve got to do is lift your finger and tap the layers of information.”

What Terrogence has done, he says, is move in with the terrorists. “We live in those worlds. We surf the same forums, we surf the same websites. We see what the terrorists see when they seek information. Then we analyse.

“We try to work out who are the players. You can be completely anonymous on the internet. You can have 20 identities, but you are the same person. We want to know where they live, what they do, how good they are professionally and how far their information goes.”

Analysts also scour their networks, Aviran adds. “On what platforms do they talk? What do they say? What effects do they have on those platforms, the forums and the websites? If somebody tells somebody else: ‘Take chemical A and chemical B and you will have an explosive called XYZ’, we test it. If it works, we produce it and we pass that on as intelligence to our customers.”

During its short life, Terrogence has proved itself at home and abroad. It warned French security services about a potential plot to destroy the thin wall between the Paris sewage system and the Metro. A high-ranking jihadi activist spotted the chance after watching a National Geographic do*****entary.

He posted the film, dubbed into Arabic for Al Jazeera, and gloated: “The film shows Paris’s dark side. It shows how even a small malfunction of the sewage system would destroy the city and turn it into a third-world city. Paris can be brought back to the 13th century this way.”

The Israeli company helped the Vatican thwart a computer attack on its banking system. The plan was to put the banking network out of action for a long time, using a programme devised by an activist in Saudi Arabia. The hackers posted an announcement calling on surfers to download the programme and use it at a designated time. The attack began as scheduled, but because of the warning it was only partly successful. The server was slowed, but not shut down. The cyberspooks alerted an Israeli bank to a similar attack.

Less dramatically, they alerted Britain to a camera-toting Islamist radical touring London to map possible sites for bombers — and showing them off to his friends via the internet.

Eavesdropping on a Hamas video, one of the team noticed a vehicle with a machine-gun that could shoot at aircraft. “No one knew that Hamas had this kind of capability,” says Noam, an expert on weapons of mass destruction who does not want his full name published. “When we called the army, they were really surprised. We gave them the details, the pictures, all the images. It took them only one week to track and stop this vehicle. Then they took it out.”

The internet, Noam explains, can be thought of as a castle with 1,000 rooms. “Everybody can walk into every room. But we know how to take our customers to the specific room where the terrorists are discussing a manual to build explosives. We take them into the specific drawers where you can find the missile, the explosives ingredients, whatever.”

Infiltrating the terrorist world takes special skills, more readily found in multilingual Israel than most other countries. “You have to understand intelligence and you have to understand Islam,” says Tzahi, an expert on global jihad. “Most of us have a background in intelligence. We have mastered either the Arabic language, or the Farsi or Turkish languages. We even know dialects. We have to know the terminology those jihadists use in those forums and the specific terms they use.”

To win the trust of its foreign clients, Terrogence takes steps to convince them that it is not spreading Israeli disinformation. Transparency is all. The researchers supply a translation of their findings together with the raw material. The client can check it for himself.

“Our core business is capabilities,” Noam says. “We don’t go into why Al Qaeda would want to attack a particular target.”

So far, all of Terrogence’s digital agents remain online. None of their covers has been blown. In their operations room, a central computer constantly supervises the many fictional identities, often more than one to a person, to make sure there are no slip-ups.

But the cyber spies know they are engaged in a never-ending battle of wits. The terrorists, says Gad Aviran, are always one jump ahead of governments.

Wanted: online espionage experts

A visit to the job-offers section on the Mossad website shows that Israel’s spy service is more eager to hire computer programmers than the next James Bond. The leap in the electronic eavesdropping capabilities of western espionage agencies has enabled them to listen in on to the private conversations of the international terrorist networks. The electronic intelligence-gathering organisations — the NSA in the US, Britain’s GCHQ and Israel’s unit 8200 of military intelligence — have built up massive super-computers capable of sifting through billions of words daily. But they still need something to look for: a key phrase, a number known to belong to an operative, any detail that will give the geeks something to work on. The hottest trade on the international intelligence exchange, where the spymasters peddle their wares, is in “magic words”, which will enable the electronic brain to pick out one seemingly innocent exchange. Which brings us back to old-fashioned spy in the field — from whom the magic word is going to come. Anshel Pfeffer

http://northwestnationalists.blogspot.com/2008/06/meet-cyberspies-living-among-worlds.html

[al-Canine]

Justice Department Considers Racial Profiling For Terror Prevention

AP | LARA JAKES JORDAN | July 3, 2008 08:28 AM

The Justice Department is considering letting the FBI investigate Americans without any evidence of wrongdoing, relying instead on a terrorist profile that could single out Muslims, Arabs or other racial and ethnic groups.

Law enforcement officials say the proposed policy would help them do exactly what Congress demanded after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks: root out terrorists before they strike.

Although President Bush has disavowed targeting suspects based on their race or ethnicity, the new rules would allow the FBI to consider those factors among a number of traits that could trigger a national security investigation.

Currently, FBI agents need specific reasons _ like evidence or allegations that a law probably has been violated _ to investigate U.S. citizens and legal residents. The new policy, law enforcement officials told The Associated Press, would let agents open preliminary terrorism investigations after mining public records and intelligence to build a profile of traits that, taken together, were deemed suspicious.

Among the factors that could make someone subject of an investigation is travel to regions of the world known for terrorist activity, access to weapons or military training, along with the person's race or ethnicity.

More than a half-dozen senior FBI, Justice Department and other U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the new policy agreed to discuss it only on condition of anonymity, either because they were not allowed to speak publicly or because the change is not yet final.

The change, which is expected later this summer, is part of an update of Justice Department policies known as the attorney general guidelines. They are being overhauled amid the FBI's transition from a traditional crime-fighting agency to one whose top mission is to protect America from terrorist attacks.

"We don't know what we don't know. And the object is to cut down on that," said one FBI official who defended the plans.

Another official, while also defending the proposed guidelines, raised concerns about criticism during the presidential election year over what he called "the P word" _ profiling.

If adopted, the guidelines would be put in place in the final months of a presidential administration that has been dogged by criticism that its counterterror programs trample privacy rights and civil liberties.

Critics say the presumption of innocence is lost in the proposal. The FBI will be allowed to begin investigations simply "by assuming that everyone's a suspect, and then you weed out the innocent," said Caroline Fredrickson of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Attorney General Michael Mukasey acknowledged the overhaul was under way in early June, saying the guidelines sought to ensure regulations for FBI terror investigations don't conflict with ones governing criminal probes. He would not give any details.

"It's necessary to put in place regulations that will allow the FBI to transform itself ... into an intelligence gathering organization in addition to just a crime solving organization," Mukasey told reporters.

The changes would allow FBI agents to ask open-ended questions about activities of Muslim- or Arab-Americans, or investigate them if their jobs and backgrounds match trends that analysts deem suspect.

FBI agents would not be allowed to eavesdrop on phone calls or dig deeply into personal data _ such as the content of phone or e-mail records or bank statements _ until a full investigation was opened.

The guidelines focus on the FBI's domestic operations and run about 40 pages long, several officials said. They do not specifically spell out what traits the FBI should use in building profiles.

One senior Justice Department official said agents have been allowed since 2003 to build "threat assessments" of Americans based on public records and information from informants. Such assessments could be used to open a preliminary investigation, the official said.

However, another official said the 2003 authorities are limited, tightly monitored by FBI headquarters in Washington and, overall, confusing to agents about how or when they can be used.

Justice spokesman Brian Roehrkasse said the guidelines governing when to open a national security investigation are part of a "harmonizing" process that will not give the FBI any more authority than it already has. He declined further comment, but he and two other senior Justice officials, would not deny the changes as they were described to AP by others familiar with the guidelines.

"Any review and change to the guidelines will reflect our traditional concerns for civil liberties and First Amendment liberties and our traditional investigative emphasis on using the least intrusive means feasible," Roehrkasse said Wednesday.

Although the guidelines do not require congressional approval, House members recently sought to limit such profiling by rejecting an $11 million request for the FBI's security assessment center. Lawmakers wrote it that was unclear how the FBI could compile suspect profiles "in such a way as to avoid needless intrusions into the privacy of innocent citizens" and without wasting time and money chasing down false leads.

The denial of funding could limit the FBI's use of profiles, or "predictive models and patterns of behavior" as the government prefers to describe the data-mining results, but would not change the guidelines authorizing them. The guidelines would remain in effect until a new attorney general decided to change them.

Courts across the country have overturned criminal convictions when defendants showed they were targeted based on race. Racial profiling generally is considered a civil rights violation, and former Attorney General John Ashcroft condemned it in March 2001 as an "unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection under our Constitution."

President Bush also has condemned racial profiling as "wrong in America" and in a December 2001 interview had harsh words for an airline that refused to let one of his Secret Service agents board a commercial flight. The agent was Arab-American. "If he was treated that way because of his ethnicity, that will make me madder than heck," Bush said.

Immediately after 9/11, hundreds of Muslims and Arabs were detained, deported and monitored as the government urgently sought information that could prevent another attack. Despite efforts to repair and nurture relationships with those groups, Muslim- and Arab-Americans still complain of being singled out by federal security practices.

Martin Redish, a constitutional and civil rights scholar at Northwestern University School of Law, said courts are likely to give the FBI a lot of leeway in deciding how to open national security investigations.

"But it's a very fine line to be drawn when the basis of the investigation is dominated by the ethnic background of the subject," Redish said. "And when the investigation results in harassment, you have a serious constitutional concern."

Citing Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh _ two white Americans _ the ACLU's Fredrickson said: "Profiling has sent us in the wrong direction. ... I thought we learned our lesson in that regard."

http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g07mkwmsp4l_Q5H-YBiHq6phbimgD91LUBOO0

[Casey]

Terrorism and the Internet: US Senate Report

July 14, 2008
The following analysis of the US Senate Report was provided to
Right Side News from the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC)
Terrorism and Internet: a US Senate report1 analyzes the extensive use made by Al-Qaeda of the Internet in its war for hearts and minds.
The report voices concerns over the exposure of American citizens to the websites of Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations.

A poster produced by the Global Islamic Media Front, Al-Qaeda’s media center, published on Maktoob, an online forum not affiliated with Al-Qaeda (April 18, 2008). The poster reads: “The nation of Islam still stands since it was founded upon the skulls of Crusaders and infidels”.

Overview
1. Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere have managed to harness the media revolution which has taken place in the last decade. Those terrorist organizations massively exploit such media as Internet and television for the battle for hearts and minds which takes place alongside the ongoing fighting on the ground. Using an extensive infrastructure of websites and other media, they disseminate their ideology and political messages, generate public interest in their activities, and try to win support and sympathy for their cause.

2. In our age, Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic terrorist organizations have come to realize that the Internet is just as important as the Kalashnikov, the rocket, or the roadside charge. Therefore, those terrorist organizations make extensive use of the Internet, both in the intensive battle for hearts and minds and to advance operative needs: maintaining contact between terrorist organizations and their operative infrastructures, at times separated by considerable distance; transferring such know-how as manufacturing explosives and building rockets; and collecting donations either directly or through Islamic charitable societies affiliated with the various terrorist organizations. Those uses are described in detail in the US Senate report (analyzed below) and in Information Bulletins published in recent years by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center . 2

3. Using the Internet, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations can overcome geographic distances and quite easily circumvent the restrictions imposed by the international community. They do so by exploiting the freedom of speech (the First Amendment to the United States Constitution) and the commonly held public view that the Internet should remain free of censorship, also taking advantage of the fact that Western countries do not take effective measures against terrorist organizations' websites. Thus, the Internet remains a medium in which radical Islamic ideology is distributed virtually undisturbed, preaching hatred, violence, and terrorism, and transferring operative instructions to terrorist networks across the globe.

The US Senate report on the extensive use made by Al-Qaeda of the Internet
4. On May 8, 2008 , the United States Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released a report titled Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat. The report deals with the use made by Al-Qaeda, global jihad elements, and groups affiliated with radical Islam of the Internet and voices concerns about the exposure of American citizens to Al-Qaeda's websites (the complete report is available on the Senate website). 3 Those issues should also be of concern to other countries facing an increase in the number of “homegrown terrorists” inspired by the violent ideology of radical Islam, distributed through the Internet and other media.

The cover page of the Senate report

5. According to the report, Al-Qaeda and radical Islam have at their disposal a widespread media system operated by the organization's media committee, making extensive use of the Internet both directly and through Islamist websites that are not affiliated with Al-Qaeda (according to the report, such Islamist websites number in the thousands). Al-Qaeda has four major production centers which produce its messages through the Internet:
a. As-Sahab (“the clouds”)—affiliated with Al-Qaeda's high command. That production center distributes, among other things, the audio tapes of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.
b. Al-Furqan (an Arabic word which means distinguishing between truth and falsehood, salvation, proof, and divine revelation; commonly used to refer to the Quran)—belongs to Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
c. Al-Lajna al-I'lamiyya (“The Media Committee”)—the organization's information branch in North Africa .
d. Sawt al-Jihad (“Voice of Jihad”)—affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula .
6. Those production centers produce a wide variety of information, including news and ideology: updates and official statements on Al-Qaeda's activity, videos of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and global jihad elements, image archives, songs, translations, animations and graphic designs, online newspapers, and even poetry. It should be noted that in addition to those centers, there are also organizations which support Al-Qaeda's media activities, even though they are not directly affiliated with it. 4


(left)A tape of Ayman al-Zawahiri distributed by As-Sahab, a production center affiliated with the Al-Qaeda leadership (right) A tape of Bin Laden produced and distributed by As-Sahab, a production center affiliated with the Al-Qaeda leadership.

(left) An Al-Qaeda poster published on an online forum belonging to popular TV channel Al-Jazeera (September 15, 2007). The text reads: “We are at your command, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi [the leader of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq', i.e., the Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq]; we are at your command, the Islamic State of Iraq” 5

7. According to the Senate report, those web surfers who visit Al-Qaeda's websites may undergo a process of Islamic radicalization and, later on, initiate contact with radical Islamic operatives worldwide and join operative activities or raise funds, maintaining a significant degree of anonymity. The report details four typical stages which characterize the process of Islamic radicalization which an anonymous surfer may undergo while visiting Al-Qaeda's websites, as laid out by the NYPD report.

The stages are:
a. Pre-radicalization: the stage which precedes the exposure to radical Islamic ideology on the Internet.

b. Self-identification: the stage in which web surfers gradually lose their previous identity and start embracing radical Islamic ideology.

c. Indoctrination: the stage where the web surfer is re-educated (or brainwashed) until he has completely identified with the new ideology.

d. Jihadization: the final stage of the radicalization process, which can eventually lead to operational planning for and participating in a terrorist attack.

8. According to the report, the Internet plays an important role in the process of radicalization and shaping a new self-identity. This process takes place, inter alia, in the US , where it is reflected in the growing willingness of American citizens to take part in terrorist activity out of radical Islamic motives. 6
9. Following are some of the report's insights into the contribution of the Internet to the process of Islamic radicalization:
a. Encouragement of terrorist activities: the report provides several examples of cases in which American citizens who underwent a process of Islamic jihadist radicalization (in which the Internet played a key role) planned terrorist attacks in the US . The report stresses that even in cases where planners of radical Islamic terrorist attacks were not given specific instructions by Al-Qaeda, the contents which appear on the Islamic websites, including the justification of terrorist attacks against Western targets, were a source of inspiration for the terrorist attacks' planners. The Internet is therefore a firm ideological platform for the emergence of radical Islamic ideas which lead to violence and terrorism.

Scenes from a video produced by Al-Furqan (Al-Qaeda's production center in Iraq ) documenting a terrorist attack against the American forces in Iraq . The video was published on the Al-Jazeera online forum (updated on September 15, 2007). 7

b. The nature of the messages which contribute to radicalization and anti-Western terrorism: the report mentions that radical Islamic websites are replete with anti-Western rhetoric. That rhetoric is based on several key messages: the West wages a war against Islam; the Muslims must protect their religion as stipulated in Islamic religious law; therefore violence is the way to protect Islam from its enemies.

c. Virtual schools: the report states that the websites of radical Islamic elements have turned into virtual schools of sorts. The learning materials are radical Islamic texts, including those written by the Al-Qaeda leaders, used as a source of inspiration for the perpetrators of terrorist attacks. This is reflected in a US Army report dated May 2007, which shows that the computers of the perpetrators of the Madrid train station terrorist attacks (March 2004, 191 killed) contained some 50 downloaded books written by radical Islamic ideologists and used as a source of inspiration by the terrorists.

d. Virtual training camps: the report notes that radical Islamic movements have come to rely on the Internet as somewhat of a virtual substitute for training camps. They use it to transfer operative information between various geographic locations, easily disseminate their ideology, and prepare new operatives both ideologically and operatively. It can be argued, therefore, that the Internet has replaced the training camps in Afghanistan , turning the whole world into one big virtual training camp.

e. The US and English speaking countries as a favorite target: the report states that in the past year, Al-Qaeda has made a decision to increase the number of its English-language publications (including original materials in English and translations from Arabic) to directly address English-speaking target audiences. One clear example is Bin Laden's tape from September 8, 2007, titled “Message to the American Nation”, in which he addresses his target audience directly. Following that tape, Ayman al-Zawahiri released a tape in English addressing the American audience.

f. Improving the connection with the target audiences: in December 2007 Al-Qaeda conducted a first of its kind interactive activity, in which Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's deputy, released a video tape asking for questions from web surfers on Islamic online forums. On April 2, 2008 , he gave detailed answers to some of those questions. This evolving trend means that direct contact is now possible between the organization's leadership and web surfers across the world.

g. Virtual mosques: according to the report, radical Islamic operatives are highly active on forums and in chat rooms, which have become a virtual substitute for gatherings in mosques and in community centers where their extremist messages occasionally meet with resistance. Those are usually young web surfers, and there is a constant rise in the number of women participating in chats and online forums. It should be noted that the chats make it possible for Islamic terrorist operatives to bond with each other, exchange e-mails and cellular phone numbers, and continue their relationship outside of the Internet.

Adam Gadahn—an American Jew who converted to Islam and is now considered Al-Qaeda's chief spokesman for the American target audience. He is wanted by the American authorities having been convicted for treason in absentia. 8

10. The report indicates that there are also Al-Qaeda websites which target teenagers from around the world in order to recruit them to the violent Islamic movement. One of the most prominent organizations which distribute radical, violent Islamic ideology is the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). 9 The materials disseminated by those websites are used to inspire particularly young people to perpetrate violent activities. One example is a rap song released in August 2007 titled Dirty Kuffar (“kuffar” being the Arabic word for “nonbelievers”), which was downloaded by millions of web surfers worldwide. The video for the song, which is sung in English, praises Bin Laden, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and features a masked Muslim rapper who carries a rifle and a Quran and lashes out at US President George Bush and former British PM Tony Blair.

From the video of Dirty Kuffar

Weak points in the Senate report
11. The Senate report points out several incidents where US citizens have planned terrorist attacks after going through a process of Islamic radicalization in which the Internet played a key role. However, the report does not thoroughly explain why US citizens find themselves in a process of losing their identity, why they are persuaded by the radical Islamic messages on the Internet, who are the civilians which may potentially fall victim to the process of radicalization and jihadization, and what steps must be taken, educationally and socially, to deal with the phenomenon. The report also does not indicate what operative measures are necessary to combat the use made by Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic terrorist organizations of the Internet (frequently assisted by Western and even American Internet companies). 10

Similarities and differences between the websites of Al-Qaeda and those of Hezbollah and Hamas
12. Hamas and Hezbollah are radical Islamic terrorist organizations, the former Sunni and the latter Shi'ite. They too have managed to harness the Internet revolution for the battle for hearts in minds, albeit to a lesser extent than Al-Qaeda. Both organizations have created an extensive Internet infrastructure over the last decade, based on a unified propaganda policy. They have invested considerable resources in their websites and upgrade them on a regular basis.

13. At the same time, they have created satellite TV stations (Hezbollah's Al-Manar and Hamas's Al-Aqsa) which, together with the Internet, spearhead the battle for hearts and minds. It should be noted that the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center has been monitoring the “media empires” founded by those organizations. The Information Center 's website contains a wealth of information on it and on the countries and companies which assist it.

14. A global view of target audiences: even though Hezbollah and Hamas are Islamic terrorist organizations of Lebanese and Palestinian character (respectively), their ideology is aimed at worldwide target audiences. As a result, their Internet infrastructure (as well as their TV stations) caters to broad target audiences in the Arab and Muslim world, in the Middle East , and elsewhere in the world. In this context:

a. Hezbollah's Internet infrastructure consists of some 15-20 websites in five languages: Arabic (first priority), English (second priority), French, Persian, and Hebrew (third priority). There are also blogs written by the organization's supporters across the globe, such as in South America , who do not belong to Hezbollah but still sympathize with the organization.

b. Hamas's Internet infrastructure consists of over 20 websites in eight languages: Arabic, English, French, Russian, Urdu, Malay, and Turkish. While Shi'ite Hezbollah is basically hostile towards Al-Qaeda, Hamas's websites occasionally show support for Bin Laden and radical Islamic terrorist organizations worldwide. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda antagonizes Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah in particular, all the more so in recent times. Al-Qaeda's attitude towards Hamas ranges from sympathy to criticism.

A poster featured on the Hamas forum, supporting Al-Qaeda (updated on May 29, 2007). The poster shows photographs of Osama Bin Laden, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, and an Al-Qaeda operative holding an RPG launcher and a Quran. The text reads: “The root of humiliation will not be destroyed but by a volley of lead. The free man will not lay the [responsibility of] leadership on any infidel or bandit. Without bloodshed, there is no erasing the mark of disgrace from our forehead”. 11

15. Similarly to Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah routinely use the Internet to disseminate radical Islamic ideology of blatantly anti-Western character. All three organizations preach terrorism and hatred (see below), but each belongs to a different brand of radical Islam: Hamas's is a radical Sunni ideology inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood and interwoven with Palestinian nationalism; 12Hezbollah's ideology is of the radical Shi'ite kind, inspired by the teachings of Imam Khomeini and interwoven with Iranian characteristics; 13Al-Qaeda has a radical Sunni ideology which does not focus on any particular country but instead operates on the global scene, as formulated by Osama Bin Laden and his supporters in recent decades.

16. As is the case with Hezbollah's and Hamas's websites, the websites of Al-Qaeda preach terrorism and violence, providing them with religious (Sunni or Shi'ite) justification and using the Internet for the operative needs of their terrorist activity (such as transferring know-how and raising funds). However, the target for terrorism of Hezbollah's and Hamas's websites is Israel , even though Hamas tends to sympathize with the activities of radical Islam across the globe. Operatively, Al-Qaeda's websites have a much wider operative horizon, targeting the US , the West, Israel , the Jewish people, as well as Arab and Muslim pro-West regimes.

17. Hezbollah and Hamas, just like Al-Qaeda, make considerable efforts to harness advanced Western technology and use it for their own ends as part of the battle for hearts and minds. Their websites include television and radio broadcasts, downloadable Islamic literature, as well as newspapers and periodicals. Thus, Hezbollah and Hamas are able to bypass the restrictions imposed on them by the US and, to a lesser extent, by European countries. Hezbollah and Hamas, like Al-Qaeda, are assisted by Western and East European companies, as well as companies from South East Asia, Iran, Syria , etc. At the same time, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas oppose Western messages distributed through the Internet (democracy, freedom of expression, gender equality, etc.). That can be seen in Hamas's censorship of Internet websites in the Gaza Strip and the severe limitations imposed by Iran , Hezbollah's patron, on Internet access in its territory.

Hezbollah's online fundraising. Left: a leaflet published by the Support Association of the Islamic Resistance found in south Lebanon in the second Lebanon war. The key message of the cover illustration: the donations will be used to purchase arms for the destruction of Israel . Right: the Wa'ad website, asking for donations to the Support Association of the Islamic Resistance. 14

Hamas transfers operative know-how through the Internet: instructions for assembling a rocket published on the Hamas/Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades forum (May 1, 2007)

Appendix
A selection of bulletins published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center on terrorist organizations' use of the Internet

1. Terrorism and Internet: Hamas has recently upgraded the website of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, its military-terrorist wing. Upgrading the website, which incites to hatred and anti-Israeli terrorism, reflects the importance Hamas places on its website network as a central component in the battle for hearts and minds ( June 22, 2008 ).

2. The Internet as a battleground used by the terrorist organizations: How Hezbollah and Hamas exploit the Internet in the battle for hearts and minds, and how to combat them ( August 1, 2007 ).

3. Hezbollah as a case study of the battle for hearts and minds (June 2007).

4. Hamas recently upgraded its TV station and Internet sites. Although the Hamas government is bankrupt, the movement has invested massive sums in improving its propaganda assets, aware of their importance in the battle for hearts and minds against Israel and against its opponents in the internal Palestinian arena (February 23, 2007).

5. The Internet in the service of terrorist organizations: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Internet network and the service providers by which the organization is supported (updated to September 18, 2007 ) ( September 24, 2007 ).

6. Terrorism and Internet: Hezbollah's widespread use of the Internet as a means to distribute anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish, and anti-American incitement as part of the war for the hearts and minds (as at December 3, 2006 ).
7. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad Internet infrastructure and its Internet Webhosts (December 2005).
8. Terrorism and Internet: an examination of Hamas's websites and the hosting providers used by them ( June 20, 2006 ).

9. Marketing terrorism by Internet: the Hamas terrorist movement continues using Internet Service Providers in Eastern Europe and South East Asia to operate its leading sites (October 2005).

http://www.rightsidenews.com/200807141431/global-terrorism/terrorism-and-the-internet-us-senate-report.html

[al-Canine]

Travelers' Laptops May Be Detained At Border
No Suspicion Required Under DHS Policies

By Ellen Nakashima
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, August 1, 2008

Federal agents may take a traveler's laptop computer or other electronic device to an off-site location for an unspecified period of time without any suspicion of wrongdoing, as part of border search policies the Department of Homeland Security recently disclosed.

Also, officials may share copies of the laptop's contents with other agencies and private entities for language translation, data decryption or other reasons, according to the policies, dated July 16 and issued by two DHS agencies, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

"The policies . . . are truly alarming," said Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.), who is probing the government's border search practices. He said he intends to introduce legislation soon that would require reasonable suspicion for border searches, as well as prohibit profiling on race, religion or national origin.

DHS officials said the newly disclosed policies -- which apply to anyone entering the country, including U.S. citizens -- are reasonable and necessary to prevent terrorism. Officials said such procedures have long been in place but were disclosed last month because of public interest in the matter.

Civil liberties and business travel groups have pressed the government to disclose its procedures as an increasing number of international travelers have reported that their laptops, cellphones and other digital devices had been taken -- for months, in at least one case -- and their contents examined.

The policies state that officers may "detain" laptops "for a reasonable period of time" to "review and analyze information." This may take place "absent individualized suspicion."

The policies cover "any device capable of storing information in digital or analog form," including hard drives, flash drives, cellphones, iPods, pagers, beepers, and video and audio tapes. They also cover "all papers and other written documentation," including books, pamphlets and "written materials commonly referred to as 'pocket trash' or 'pocket litter.' "

Reasonable measures must be taken to protect business information and attorney-client privileged material, the policies say, but there is no specific mention of the handling of personal data such as medical and financial records.

When a review is completed and no probable cause exists to keep the information, any copies of the data must be destroyed. Copies sent to non-federal entities must be returned to DHS. But the documents specify that there is no limitation on authorities keeping written notes or reports about the materials.

"They're saying they can rifle through all the information in a traveler's laptop without having a smidgen of evidence that the traveler is breaking the law," said Greg Nojeim, senior counsel at the Center for Democracy and Technology. Notably, he said, the policies "don't establish any criteria for whose computer can be searched."

Customs Deputy Commissioner Jayson P. Ahern said the efforts "do not infringe on Americans' privacy." In a statement submitted to Feingold for a June hearing on the issue, he noted that the executive branch has long had "plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border without probable cause or a warrant" to prevent drugs and other contraband from entering the country.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff wrote in an opinion piece published last month in USA Today that "the most dangerous contraband is often contained in laptop computers or other electronic devices." Searches have uncovered "violent jihadist materials" as well as images of child pornography, he wrote.

With about 400 million travelers entering the country each year, "as a practical matter, travelers only go to secondary [for a more thorough examination] when there is some level of suspicion," Chertoff wrote. "Yet legislation locking in a particular standard for searches would have a dangerous, chilling effect as officers' often split-second assessments are second-guessed."

In April, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in San Francisco upheld the government's power to conduct searches of an international traveler's laptop without suspicion of wrongdoing. The Customs policy can be viewed at: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissability/search_authority.ctt/search_authority.pdf.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/01/AR2008080103030.html

[Casey]

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[Casey]

Al-Qaida positioned for attacks on West, intelligence officer says
By David Wood | Sun reporter
4:05 PM EDT, August 12, 2008

WASHINGTON - From its sanctuary in Pakistan, al-Qaida has succeeded in recruiting, training and "positioning" terrorist agents for attacks against the West, including the United States, a senior U.S. intelligence officer said today.

The new assessment updates a National Intelligence Estimate issued a year ago, which said al-Qaida was seeking to deploy agents trained to operate in the West.

It has now achieved that capability, despite intense U.S. surveillance and occasional attacks on al-Qaida sanctuaries in Pakistan, the officer said.

Ted Gistaro, national intelligence officer for transnational threats, said the agents include North American and European citizens and legal residents who have passports that allow them to travel to the United States without a visa, making it easier for them to slip undetected across borders.



Overall, Gistaro said, the terrorist organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks has strengthened key elements of its ability to attack the United States and intends to hit "prominent political, economic and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction and significant economic and political aftershocks."

As a national intelligence officer, Gistaro's analysis represents the combined judgments of all U.S. intelligence including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

He spoke today at a gathering sponsored by the Washington Institute for Near East policy, a nonpartisan think tank.

Richard Willing, a spokesman for the director of national intelligence, said Gistaro's unclassified remarks were based on existing intelligence estimates and open-source reporting.

Gistaro said al-Qaida's undiminished capability to attack the United States comes despite significant setbacks it has suffered as the United States and others have disrupted known plots and killed a number of high-ranking al-Qaida operators.

Earlier today, Pakistani officials said a senior al-Qaida commander, Abu Saeed al-Masri, was killed in fighting with Pakistani security forces in Pakistan's tribal areas. Last month, a senior al-Qaida weapons expert, Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed by a missile fired by an American drone operating over South Waziristan near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.

Despite such losses, al-Qaida "has replenished its bench of skilled mid-level lieutenants capable of directing its global operations," Gistaro said.

Al-Qaida's founders and key leaders, Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have developed the capability to quickly replace even senior leadership, choosing from a "deep bench" of proven battlefield commanders.

Although bin Laden and his senior associates constantly operate under the threat of attack if their security is breached, Gistaro said they are able to provide strategic and even tactical guidance to al-Qaida units.

Given bin Laden's determination to drive the United States from the Middle East, Gistaro said he anticipates that al-Qaida will continue to try to acquire and use chemical, biological and radioactive material in attacks on the United States.

He also said he expects that al-Qaida will increase its propaganda blasts at the United States as the November presidential election approaches.

Bin Laden has not indicated a preference in the presidential race but has asserted that "big corporations" control the election.

On Sunday, al-Qaida released a videotape in which al-Zawahiri spoke in English to complain about Pakistan's efforts to crack down on extremist groups and about U.S. influence in Pakistan.

Intelligence experts say they expect al-Qaida to issue more such direct communications to the West.

david.wood@baltsun.com
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/world/bal-qaida0812,0,5668106.story

[Casey]

http://hstoday.us/content/view/4948/92/

2008 Homeland Security Report Card
by David Silverberg
Monday, 01 September 2008


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overseas and Foreign Policy

The global war on terror and Al Qaeda

The year in review: A year that saw significant successes against terrorism in Europe but also increased Al Qaeda activity in Algeria, North Africa and Afghanistan. Cancellation of the Dakar-to-Lisbon auto race was an Al Qaeda success in this regard. Increased media activity by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri seemed designed to shore up crumbling support for Al Qaeda around the world and compensate for its increasing incapacity to mount major physical operations. In the Western Hemisphere, the Colombian FARC received significant blows and appears near elimination.

Grade: Better. Al Qaeda appears weakened and less capable in most theaters, despite a growing presence in Afghanistan (see below). Vigilance in Europe and successes there were particularly significant against what had been seen as a growing threat. Nonetheless, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri remained free and at large throughout the year.

Key Events

2007

Sept. 4: Danish police raid 11 homes and arrest eight suspects to foil a terrorist plot.

Sept. 5: German police arrest three Muslims belonging to the Islamic Jihad Union, breaking up an elaborate plot to bomb Ramstein Air Base and Frankfort Airport.

Sept. 7-20: Al Qaeda releases three videos by Osama Bin Laden, who calls on the West to convert to Islam, provides the last will and testament of a 9/11 hijacker and orders jihad against Musharraf.

Dec. 11: Twin bomb blasts rip the façade off the United Nations office building in Algiers, Algeria, killing dozens. The other target is the Algerian Supreme Court. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility.

Dec. 16: Ayman Al Zawahiri releases a 90-minute audio tape calling for a purge of traitors among mujahedin in Iraq and calls on Muslims to join the jihad in current battlefields, as well as to overthrow the governments of Egypt and Pakistan.

Dec. 21: Belgian authorities arrest 14 suspects accused of plotting to free Nizar Trabelsi, an incarcerated Al Qaeda operative.

Dec. 21: Saudi authorities arrest seven non-Saudi Arabs, accusing them of a plot to disrupt the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

Dec. 25: A family of four French tourists is murdered by robbers in Mauritania. Three of the attackers are linked to Al Qaeda, and France issues a travel warning to the country. On Jan. 4, the Dakar Rally international road race from Lisbon, Portugal, to Dakar, Senegal, is cancelled due to terrorist threats.

2008

Jan. 7: Adam Gadhan, the American Al Qaeda propagandist, issues a video calling on Muslims to greet President Bush with bombs during his tour of the Mideast. Gadhan rips up his American passport on camera.

Jan. 16: Over 900 people respond to an invitation to submit e-mailed questions to Al Qaeda number two, Ayman Al Zawahiri, first made on an Al Qaeda website in December.

Jan. 26: Fourteen South Asians are arrested in Barcelona, Spain, for allegedly planning to attack public transportation throughout Europe.

Feb. 13: A Danish newspaper re-publishes a caricature of Mohammed to assert freedom of the press.

Feb. 27: Ayman Al Zawahiri, in video, vows revenge for the death of Al Qaeda commander Abu Laith Al Libi in Waziristan (northwest Pakistan) in January.

March 4: Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos charges in a press conference that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez provided FARC with $300 million and that FARC was seeking material for a dirty bomb, both charges based on information found in a laptop computer at the FARC camp in Ecuador raided by Colombian forces.

March 5: Saudi authorities arrest 28 people accused of rebuilding the Al Qaeda terror network in Saudi Arabia.

March 10: Al Qaeda in the Maghreb announces that it kidnapped two Austrian tourists in Tunisia on Feb. 22.

March 14: The US Defense Department announces that it has incarcerated Muhammad Rahim, a high-level Afghan Al Qaeda operative, in Guantanamo Bay and has been holding him since the previous July when he was arrested in Pakistan.

March 15: An attack on a restaurant frequented by foreigners in Islamabad, Pakistan, injures four FBI agents and kills a Turkish woman.

March 18: Three mortar rounds launched at the US embassy in Sanaa, Yemen, hit the courtyard of a girls school instead, killing a guard and injuring 17.

March 19: On the Al Qaeda website, Bin Laden issues a warning to Europe because of Danish caricatures of Mohammed.

March 20: Bin Laden urges Muslims to keep up the struggle against US forces in Iraq as a path to “liberating Palestine.” On March 24, Ayman Al Zawahiri calls for attacks on the US and Jewish targets everywhere.

April 2: Turkish police seize 45 people with possible Al Qaeda affiliations who are suspected of planning attacks in Istanbul.

April 2: In a lengthy audio address, Ayman Al Zawahiri responds to questions submitted over the Internet and defends the killing of innocents.

April 3: Trial begins in London, UK, of eight conspirators who planned to blow up seven airliners in August 2006.

April 9: A US counterterrorism official tells the media that Obaidah Al Masri, a top Al Qaeda operational planner and longtime veteran terrorist, is believed to have died of natural causes in the previous year somewhere in Pakistan’s border region.

May 15 and 18: Osama Bin Laden releases an audio message on the 60th anniversary of the founding of Israel, saying the fight against Israel remains the central issue for Al Qaeda. In a second audio message, Bin Laden again attacks Israel and calls for the overthrow of corrupt Arab leaders including Hasran Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, who Bin Laden says should attack Israel if he is strong enough, as he claims.

May 20: FARC leader Nelly Avila Moreno, known as “Karina,” surrenders to Colombian forces.

May 24: Colombian Defense Ministry announces that Manuel Marulanda, founder of FARC, is dead.

June 2: A car bomb explodes outside the Danish Embassy in an upscale area of Islamabad, Pakistan, killing at least four people.

June 16: British officials warn of high risk of terror attacks in the United Arab Emirates.

July 2: Colombian commandos rescue 15 hostages from FARC control, including Ingrid Betancourt, held for six years, and three American contract personnel.

July 25: Nine explosions rock Bangalore, India, killing one woman and injuring eight other people.

July 26: Sixteen bombs go off in Ahmedabad, India, killing at least 49 people.

July 27: Twin bomb blasts in Istanbul kill at least 17 people and injure as many as 150.



Iraq

The year in review: The surge worked. Bombings and civil strife declined and something regarding normal life returned in many areas, making possible political progress. Al Qaeda was defeated in large part by the indigenous Sunni Awakening movement and large infusions of US cash, but also by its own brutality and propensity to target Muslims. Targeted assassinations of Sunni leaders failed to stop the anti-Al Qaeda movement. However, Iranian involvement and support for anti-American attacks continued and in some ways intensified through supplies of deadlier weapons and expertise.

Grade: Better. There may never be a moment of perfect peace or a day when the United States can declare that it has “won” in Iraq. But this homeland security year was an exponential improvement over last year. The next challenge will be ensuring that ethnic strife doesn’t flare again, that a normal economy can begin to function and that Iranian meddling can be held at bay.

Key Events:

2007

Sept. 3: President Bush pays surprise visit to Anbar Province in Iraq and meets with Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who turned on Al Qaeda. Abu Risha is later assassinated.

Oct. 23: Osama Bin Laden releases audio tape to Al Jazeera television ordering Al Qaeda groups in Iraq to unite and admitting that mistakes were made in the jihad there.

2008

Jan. 8: US forces launch Operation Phantom Phoenix against Al Qaeda throughout Iraq, but especially in Diyala province.

Jan. 27: Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, a tribal security chief and police official in Anbar province, alleges that the Seifaddin Regiment, which includes foreign fighters, is supported by Seif Islam Qaddafi, 36, the eldest son of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, and was responsible for the Mosul bomb blasts.

Feb. 2: In Baghdad, two mentally retarded girls are rigged with explosives and detonated by remote control in a pet market, killing over 100 people.

Feb. 11: Twin car bombs target a meeting of Sunni anti-Al Qaeda tribal leaders in Baghdad, killing as many as 22 people.

Feb. 19: Iraqi authorities begin a sweep of the mentally ill and homeless in Baghdad in an effort to prevent their exploitation by Al Qaeda in Iraq.

March 2: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visits Iraq and accuses the United States of terrorism.

March 13: In Mosul, Iraq, the body of the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop of Mosul, Paulos Faraj Rahho, is found after a call from his kidnappers. He was seized on Feb. 29.

March 24: United States military death toll in Iraq reaches 4,000.

March 25: Iraqi and US forces battle Shiite militias in Basra. The battle spreads to Baghdad.

March 27: Tahseen Sheikhly, a spokesman for the Baghdad security plan, is abducted from his east Baghdad home in mid-afternoon by gunmen.

April 8: Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the state of affairs in Iraq, with Petraeus saying he will halt any withdrawals after July to assess any drawdowns. The three presidential candidates are present together on the panel and question Petraeus.

April 15: In audio tape, Abu Omar Al Baghdadi, who allegedly heads the Islamic State of Iraq, calls for Sunni unity and urges Sunnis in the Iraqi army, police and “Awakening Councils” to abandon fighting the mujahedin and instead to again turn their guns against the United States.

April 18: In an audio tape, Ayman Al Zawahiri mocks President George W. Bush, saying the US invasion of Iraq has brought nothing but “failure and defeat.”

May 8: Iraqi forces announce that they have seized the commander of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub Al Masri, in Mosul. US officers subsequently dispute his identity.

June 30: Iraq allows foreign firms to bid to develop its oil fields.

Afghanistan

The year in review: Jihadists, both Taliban and Al Qaeda, clearly shifted their emphasis to Afghanistan over the past year. Their successful prison breakout was a major embarrassment and defeat for the government and the Coalition, although the attempted attack on Kandahar that followed failed, much as the mujahedin’s conventional attack on Jalalabad failed in 1989.

Grade: Worse. Jihadist attacks are increasing and getting bolder; the hold of the government of President Hamid Karzai remains tenuous and seems to be weakening. Pakistani anti-terror efforts seem ineffective where they do not seem suspiciously supportive. Afghanistan is becoming the center of gravity in the war on terror as it was in 2001.

Key Events

2008

Jan. 14: Taliban forces raid Hotel Serena in Kabul, attacking foreigners and killing eight people.

Feb. 11: Mansur Dadullah, a top Taliban commander and brother of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in May 2007, is wounded and captured in Pakistan.

Feb. 28: News breaks in Australia, Germany and the United States that Britain’s Prince Harry is on the front lines in Afghanistan. He is later withdrawn.

May 12: Al Qaeda announces that Abu Suleiman Al Otaibi, formerly one of its leaders in Iraq, has been killed in fighting with US-led forces in Afghanistan.

June 13: A suicide attack and subsequent assault blow open the gates of an Afghan prison and allow about 1,000 prisoners to escape, including Taliban fighters. In the following days, about 1,000 coalition forces battle the Taliban in 10 seized villages in the Arghandab area, driving them out. The Taliban were thought to be preparing an assault on Kandahar.

June 30: International casualties in Afghanistan exceed those in Iraq for a second month, with 45 troops killed, 27 of whom were American.

July 7: A massive suicide bombing outside the Indian embassy in Kabul kills at least 40. The bombing appears designed to derail an Afghan-Indian rapprochement.



Reducing proliferation and controlling weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

The year in review: A year of great success on the North Korean front where the North Korean nuclear program appeared to be terminated, apparent success on the Syrian front where Israel terminated Syria’s program and little apparent progress on the Iranian front, where Iran continued its nuclear efforts despite increasing international pressure, especially from friends like Russia. Indeed, in 2008 war fears intensified over the Iranian nuclear program, the potential Israeli response and Iranian military activities in the Persian Gulf.

Grade: The same. Iran’s defiant continuation of its nuclear program balanced out the great success of getting North Korea to abandon its own. The apparent destruction of Syria’s program—and in a way that did not result in a general war despite a military strike—represented a level of success, but also exposed the extent of covert proliferation. Still, nuclear proliferation remains a dangerous and combustible issue, especially given Iranian activities and defiance.

Key Events

2007

Sept. 2: North Korea says it will disable all nuclear programs and account for nuclear material.

Sept. 2: Iran’s president states that Iran is now running 3,000 nuclear centrifuges.

Sept. 6: Israeli aircraft strike a target in Syria. According to later accounts, the target was a nuclear reactor being built with North Korean expertise with the aim of constructing a nuclear weapon.

Dec. 3: A US National Intelligence Estimate is released stating that Iran ceased nuclear weapon development in 2003.

2008

March 3: The United Nations approves a third round of sanctions against Iran.

May 26: The International Atomic Energy Agency delivers a report saying that Iran is withholding critical information.

June 26: North Korea delivers documentation of its nuclear program to China, and Bush initiates removal of North Korea from the list of countries supporting terrorism and lifts sanctions. The following day, the cooling tower of the Yongban nuclear reactor is demolished.

The Middle East and Asia

The year in review: Pakistan was a critical battlefield, and all sides clearly viewed it as such. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto was an enormous blow to the West and Pakistani democrats. However, by the end of the year Al Qaeda and the jihadists had not overthrown the government, although they remained a powerful factor in the territories bordering Afghanistan and the government had still not asserted control there. Lebanon slipped into Hezbollah control, wiping out democratic gains made since the murder of President Rafik Hariri in 2005 and extending Syrian and Iranian reach. An overt war between Iran, Iraq, the United States and Israel was avoided, but tensions remain high and could result in military confrontation in the next year.

Grade: The same. Although the jihadists did not achieve their aims in Pakistan last year, the West essentially lost its previous gains in Lebanon, strengthening Hezbollah and the Shia jihad and extending Iranian reach. In the next year, Pakistan will continue to be a significant battlefield, and the possibility of a US-Israeli war with Iran remains high.

Key Events:

2007

Sept. 4: Two suicide attacks kill 25, including two intelligence officials, and wound more than 70 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The attacks appear aimed at the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Army.

Oct. 6: Musharraf wins the most votes in the presidential election. The Supreme Court says no winner can be formally announced until it rules whether or not the general is eligible to stand for election while still army chief.

Oct. 18: Two bombs explode in Karachi, Pakistan, killing over 100 people during a triumphal return procession marking the return of Benazir Bhutto from exile.

Nov. 3: Musharraf declares a state of emergency and suspends the Constitution. The army rounds up opposition leaders and dismisses the Supreme Court.

Nov. 25: Nawaz Sharif, former prime minister of Pakistan, returns to Pakistan from exile in Saudi Arabia.

Nov. 27: A Middle East peace conference takes place on the grounds of the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md.

Nov. 28: Musharraf steps down from the Army, hands command to General Ashfaq Kayani and is sworn in as civilian leader the next day.

Dec. 15: Musharraf lifts the state of emergency.

Dec. 21: A suicide bomber kills at least 50 people in a blast at a Peshawar, Pakistan, mosque in an apparent attempt to kill former Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao, who is unharmed.

Dec. 27: Benazir Bhutto is assassinated.

2008

Jan. 6: Iranian fastboats harass US Navy ships in the Straits of Hormuz.

Feb. 14: The Philippines military announces it has discovered a plot to assassinate embattled president Gloria Arroyo by a domestic militant group with ties to Al Qaeda.

Feb. 18: Opposition parties sweep parliamentary elections in Pakistan.

March 6: A lone Palestinian gunman bursts into a Jewish seminary in Jerusalem and kills eight students before being killed himself.

March 11: Large, suicide-borne bombs go off in Lahore, Pakistan, two of them targeting the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters, which is demolished, the other an advertising agency in a residential neighborhood. At least 28 die in the attacks.

March 11: Adm. William Fallon resigns as commander of Central Command, allegedly over disagreements with the White House over policy toward Iran, a charge denied by the White House and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

March 12: Two suspected terrorists are gunned down by police in India’s financial hub of Mumbai. The men were planning a major attack in the city, according to police.

March 26: Israeli security forces arrest Hamas commander Omar Jabar in the Tulkarem area of the West Bank. He was wanted for playing a key role in a 2002 suicide attack that killed 30 people in the Israeli town of Netanya.

April 22: An Indonesian court sentences Abu Dujana, the self-proclaimed leader of the Islamic militant group Jemaah Islamiyah, blamed for the 2002 Bali bombings, to 15 years’ jail on terrorism charges.

May 10: Gun battles break out in Beirut, Lebanon, when the government announces the closing of Hezbollah’s broadcast station, ultimately leaving Hezbollah in control of about half the city.

May 25: Gen. Michel Suleiman, Lebanon’s army chief of staff, is sworn in as Lebanon’s new president in what is widely seen as a victory for Hezbollah.

June 19: Israel and Hamas initiate a six-month cease-fire after secret negotiations.

July 3: Husam Taysir Dwayat, a Palestinian construction worker, kills three Israelis using a bulldozer in a rampage in Jerusalem.

July 9: Three guards and three gunmen are killed in an attack on a guard post outside the US consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.

July 9: Iran test-fires nine long and medium-range missiles and sends up a second group on the following day.

July 16: Israel exchanges prisoners for the bodies of two soldiers with Hezbollah, which claims victory in the swap.

July 22: A second Palestinian bulldozer operator goes on a rampage in West Jerusalem before being killed.

Overall overseas and foreign policy grade: Better. Though tensions with Iran rose as the Bush administration drew to a close and the situation in Afghanistan remained worrisome, American successes in Iraq and against Al Qaeda, as well as success with North Korea, made the 2007-2008 homeland security year a largely favorable one. It is worth remembering, however, that foes will always try to counter trends favorable to the United States and its friends, that the drain of the Iraq war has weakened American capabilities, that Iran remains aggressive and that Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri remain alive, at large and active.






--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Nation

Funding

The year in review: The FY 09 administration budget request increased overall homeland security funding by 10.7 percent, the highest percentage increase in government. Both the White House and members of Congress from both parties sought to increase homeland security spending, while arguing over the overall budget impact of increases and funding emphases and priorities. Nonetheless, the overall effort was positive. However, if Congress fails to see through the appropriations process to its conclusion in 2008, it will have failed in its fiscal responsibilities, which may have a deleterious effect on homeland security well into the 2009 calendar year.

Grade: Undetermined. A congressional failure to meet its Oct. 1 appropriations deadline is bad government, no matter what the political situation. However, if the FY 09 request is funded in full, it will present a significant boost to the nation’s security. If appropriations with increased funding pass, the grade will be better. If they don’t, it will be worse as inflation and rising prices eat into the spending power of FY 08-level grants and appropriations.

Key Events Funding

2007

Nov. 30: The Associated Press reports that the Office of Management and Budget intends to slash homeland security funding by half in the FY 2009 budget request. Congressional reaction is immediate and furious.

2008

Feb. 1: Chertoff releases 2008 homeland security grants program guidance.

Feb. 4: The FY 2009 presidential budget request is released. DHS is to receive a total of $50.5 billion, a 6.8 increase over the previous year, while homeland security functions throughout the government are increased by 10.7 percent, the highest percentage.

June 26: The House Appropriations homeland security subcommittee approves $40 billion for DHS, increasing the proportion of grants over the president’s request and cutting “low priority or poorly managed programs” while increasing funding for border and port security and state grant programs.

July 10: Rep. David Obey (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, suspends the committee’s deliberations for the rest of the session, scheduled to adjourn on Sept. 26.

July 25: DHS announces awards of $1.8 billion in preparedness grants.

Vigilance, alertness, planning & preparedness

The year in review: A year of incremental progress in emplacing procedures and implementing programs. There were no spectacular plots publicly uncovered, changes to the alert system or major revelations.

Grade: Better. Homeland security procedures and programs were increasingly institutionalized and stabilized.

Key Events

2007

Oct. 15: DHS and local officials conduct the TOPOFF 4 exercise in Arizona, Oregon and Guam.

Nov. 2: DHS releases Appendix A of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, listing chemicals that require companies to register with the department.

Nov. 19: Frances Townsend, White House homeland security and counter-terrorism advisor, announces her resignation.

2008

Jan. 11: DHS issues rules for REAL ID requirements.

Feb. 29: The deadly toxin ricin is found in a Las Vegas hotel room.

March 10: Kenneth Wainstein is named White House advisor on homeland security and counterterrorism.

March 12: The US Capitol is evacuated when a small aircraft enters restricted airspace.

April 28: DHS unveils the Small Vessel Security Strategy.

May 2: DHS moves the TWIC compliance date to April 15, 2009.

June 23: The Supreme Court decides not to hear a plea by two environmental groups to limit the Bush administration’s power to waive laws in order to construct a fence along the US-Mexican border.

Intelligence

The year in review: Release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in December 2007 constituted a vote of “no confidence” in war with Iran by the US intelligence community—and if not presented in precisely that way by its authors, it certainly had that impact. After being used and feeling abused by the White House in creating the rationale for the war in Iraq, the intelligence community in effect said that the same scenario would not be repeated with Iran. Otherwise, the opening of the intelligence community to the public by former CIA Director George Tenet was reversed by his successor, and the CIA’s public profile declined precipitously.

Grade: Better. The lack of scandals, leaks and publicity seemed to indicate less policy and personal dissension in the community and may mark increased effectiveness. It is difficult to say if the US intelligence community will regain the cooperation of allied intelligence agencies and the effectiveness it had before the war in Iraq, but even from an outsider’s perspective it appeared to be steadier, more confident and realistic than in the immediate past.

Key Events

2007

Dec. 3: The NIE is released stating that Iran ceased nuclear weapon development in 2003.

Dec. 6: The CIA reveals that 2002 videos of interrogations of two major terrorists were destroyed.

Dec. 11: Former CIA operative John Kiriakou gives media interviews saying that waterboarding of Al Qaeda militant Abu Zubayda and another captive “saved lives” during interrogations in 2003, resulting in the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, among other actions.

2008

April 30: The US State Department releases Country Reports on Terrorism stating that Al Qaeda has rebuilt some of its pre-9/11 capabilities from remote hiding places in Pakistan.

May 30: CIA Director Michael Hayden says in a TV interview that Al Qaeda is on the “verge” of suffering a strategic defeat in Iraq and claims US and Iraqi forces are succeeding in shutting down the terrorist network.

June 12: The Supreme Court rules that Guantanamo detainees can appeal their incarceration in civil courts.

Legislation

The year in review: In pre-election jousting, the Democratic Congress resisted President Bush, particularly on privacy matters, but in the end always acceded to executive wishes on critical issues.

Grade: The same. While law enforcement and counterterrorism officials received the tools they needed to continue to track terrorists, a price was paid in personal privacy and legal protections.

Key Events

2008

Feb. 16: The Protect America Act, the law permitting warrantless surveillance and wiretaps, is allowed to lapse after Congress and the White House fail to reach agreement on its renewal.

March 8: President Bush vetoes the Intelligence Authorization Bill because, among other things, it restricts interrogation techniques. The House subsequently fails to override the veto.

July 9: The US Senate passes the new FISA Amendment Act of 2008 granting American telecoms immunity from prosecution for breaking the law while cooperating with US intelligence agencies. President Bush signs it into law the following day.

Overall National Grade: Better. With US politics taken up by the presidential election and no great initiatives by either party or the president, this was a relatively quiet year on the domestic front, with the exception of the intelligence community’s remarkable assertiveness.






--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DHS, Government, States & Localities

DHS leadership & management

The year in review: With the exception of a disastrous FEMA press conference, DHS made steady progress in stabilizing, reducing management churn and improving operations, especially at FEMA. R. David Paulison was very active in his role as FEMA administrator, always traveling out to the scenes of major disasters. Senate confirmations at the secondary and tertiary levels were welcome, although the nomination and confirmation of Paul Schneider took an inordinately long time for such a critical position.

Grade: Better. After the instability and confusion of past years, DHS showed some continuity and steady progress this year, and leaders took the initiative to ensure a smooth transition to a new administration.

Key Events

2007

Sept. 24: Citing financial reasons, DHS Deputy Secretary Michael P. Jackson announces his resignation, which takes effect on Oct. 26.

Oct. 23: FEMA holds news conference on response to California wildfires with FEMA staffers asking the questions and the media kept from participation. The news conference is subsequently exposed as fake by The Washington Post. The director of external affairs for FEMA, Pat Philbin, takes responsibility, leaves his position and is denied a new position at the office of Director of National Intelligence.

Nov. 9: Bernard Kerik, former nominee for secretary of homeland security, is indicted on 16 felony counts of corruption.

2008

Feb. 26: Paul Schneider, acting deputy secretary of DHS since the departure of Jackson in October, is nominated for deputy secretary. He is confirmed by the US Senate on June 5.

March 13: Emilio Gonzalez announces his resignation as director of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

April 2: FEMA Director R. David Paulison announces that he plans to resign at the end of the Bush administration.

June 27: Elaine Duke is confirmed as DHS under secretary for Management.

Emergency preparedness & response

The year in review: A year of extraordinarily violent weather, especially in the country’s mid-section, which was afflicted by tornadoes and floods. California suffered severe wildfires in both October and June.

Grade: Better. There’s not much anyone can do about the weather, but responses were largely swift and competent and FEMA performed well.

Key Events

2007

Oct. 20: Severe wildfires fanned by Santa Ana winds erupt in southern California, especially in San Diego County.

Nov. 7: Cosco Busan, a Korean 810-foot container ship, strikes the San Francisco Bay Bridge, releasing oil into the bay. An early Coast Guard evaluation vastly underestimates the amount of oil spilled.

2008

Feb. 5-6: In an extraordinary outbreak, 81 confirmed tornadoes rip across the South, killing at least 57 people in Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama.

March 14: A tornado strikes downtown Atlanta.

March 17: As a result of wildfires, some Texas counties are declared emergency areas.

May 26: Two counties of Colorado are declared federal disaster areas following tornadoes.

June 6: Storms and heavy precipitation lead to flooding in Indiana and declaration of a major disaster there. The precipitation continues all month, leading to severe flooding throughout the Midwest and along the Mississippi.

June 11: Four people are killed when a tornado rips through a Boy Scout camp in western Iowa.

June 12: In record flooding, the Cedar River floods the city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, despite heroic efforts by residents to build sandbag levees. On the 15th, the waters crest but flooding continues downstream.

June 22: Lightning storms spark over 800 wildfires in California and more in subsequent days. On June 30, President Bush declares California in a state of emergency.

Infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, info-sharing, science & technology

The year in review: A quiet year of steady progress and relative stability.

Grade: Better. DHS continued to fund and promote centers of excellence and specialized research.

Key Events

2007

Sept. 21: DHS and the National Science Foundation announce $8 million for fiscal year 2007 academic research initiative awards.

2008

Jan. 16: Tom Donahue, the CIA’s top cybersecurity analyst, tells a trade group in New Orleans that cyber attackers had hacked into the computer systems of utility companies outside the United States and made demands, in at least one case causing a power outage that affected multiple cities.

Feb. 1: Scott Charbo is named deputy under secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate.

Border, immigration, port and transportation security

The year in review: DHS made steady progress in securing the border, enforcing the law and tightening ports of entry. However, more successful enforcement of border controls also built dangerous pressure in northern Mexico, where Mexican authorities were unable to defeat drug and smuggling gangs, violence rose, high-level Mexican police officials were openly assassinated and order began breaking down. The SBInet program went through considerable turmoil as DHS labored to administer the program, existing management on the DHS side changed and Boeing Co., the prime contractor, struggled to fulfill the contract.

Grade: Better. DHS’ management of SBInet finally stabilized, and improvements were made to the program. Barriers and stricter enforcement, both on the border and inside the country, led to a reduction in illegal immigration. The danger for next year is turmoil in northern Mexico and the possibility that criminals there could overtly challenge political order to an even greater degree than at present.

Key Events

2007

Nov. 29: DHS begins collecting 10 fingerprints from foreign visitors at Washington Dulles International Airport, launching the 10-fingerprint collection program.

Dec. 3: DHS conditionally accepts the first phase of SBInet and begins testing the first 28 miles of virtual border fence in Arizona.

2008

Jan. 19: Border Patrol Agent Luis Aguilar is killed by a smuggler fleeing from the United States into Mexico.

Feb. 21: DHS accepts Project 28, the first 28 miles of SBInet.

April 11: Kirk Evans, SBInet program manager, abruptly resigns and is reassigned within DHS.

May 14: Jayson Ahern, deputy commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, tells the Associated Press that three Mexican police chiefs have requested political asylum in the United States as violence escalates in the Mexican drug wars and spills across the US border. Suspected drug hit men throw grenades and open fire on a police station in Mexico’s Sinaloa state hours after the government sends thousands of troops to fight a powerful drug cartel there. (Also, see “Assassinations.”)

June 23: The Supreme Court declines to hear arguments against the waiver of environmental laws to speed construction of the southern border security fence.

June 30: President Bush signs into law an appropriations bill that includes $400 million for Mexican anti-drug efforts under the Merida Initiative, an effort to fight drugs, terrorism and crime.

State and local security

The year in review: For a nation in the grip of the passions of a national presidential race, the state and local security landscape was relatively calm, despite an unusually high number of mass shootings that seemed to echo the Virginia Tech massacre of the previous year. There were relatively few instances of politically motivated crime, no reports of foreign terrorist attempts in the American homeland and only one major instance of domestic terrorism, conducted by eco-extremists. In state and local relations with DHS, there was none of the outrage and frustration that accompanied previous years’ grant allocations.

Grade: The same. Despite the disturbing number of mass shootings, this appeared to be a relatively quiet year, with few threatening trends.

Key Events

2007

Dec. 1: Leeland Eisenberg, 46, with fake explosives strapped around his vest, holds several people hostage inside the Hillary Clinton campaign headquarters in Rochester, NH, and demands to speak to Clinton. Eisenberg surrenders after several hours.

Dec. 5: Robert Hawkins, a 19-year-old gunman, kills eight people in a Omaha, Neb., mall.

Dec. 9: Four people are killed in two church shootings in Colorado.

Dec. 11: Six students are shot after getting off a school bus in Las Vegas, Nev.

2008

March 3: Fires gut three multimillion-dollar model homes in a Seattle suburb and authorities find a sign left by the Earth Liberation Front mocking claims that the homes were environmentally friendly.

June 29: Sixty police cars are defaced with racist, anti-Obama graffiti in Orlando, Fla.

Aug. 13: Timothy Johnson guns down Arkansas Democratic Party Chairman Bill Gwatney in Little Rock and is slain by police after a 30-mile car chase.

Overall DHS, Government, States & Localities Grade: Better. Much of the public rancor between the states and cities and DHS over grant allocations died down, although differences remained. No major plots were uncovered, although the rise in domestic incidents is worrisome. DHS leadership seemed to stabilize somewhat, although there was some change. The next challenge for DHS will be handling the transition between administrations.

[The 801]

'Grim' Afghanistan Report To Be Kept Secret by US
"No Plans to Declassify" New National Intelligence Estimate for White House
By BRIAN ROSS
September 23, 2008


US intelligence analysts are putting the final touches on a secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan that reportedly describes the situation as "grim", but there are "no plans to declassify" any of it before the election, according to one US official familiar with the process.

Officials say a draft of the classified NIE, representing the key judgments of the US intelligence community's 17 agencies and departments, is being circulated in Washington and a final "coordination meeting" of the agencies involved, under the direction of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, is scheduled in the next few weeks.

According to people who have been briefed, the NIE will paint a "grim" picture of the situation in Afghanistan, seven years after the US invaded in an effort to dismantle the al Qaeda network and its Taliban protectors.

A spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Vanee Vines, said "it is not the ODNI's policy to publicly comment on national intelligence products that may or may not be in production."

The finished secret NIE would be sent to the White House and other policy makers.

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5867448&page=1

Nice.

[Casey]

'Grim' Afghanistan Report To Be Kept Secret by US
"No Plans to Declassify" New National Intelligence Estimate for White House
By BRIAN ROSS
September 23, 2008

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5867448&page=1

Nice.

I've been waiting on this. The silence has been deafening.

If you follow open source venues this shouldn't be a surprise.

[Casey]

moved to Digital Underground.

http://www.wincoast.com/forum/showthread.php?p=1340447#post1340447

[Casey]

JFCOM releases study on future threats

Download "Joint Operating Environment" 2008 (pdf)
http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf

[al-Canine]

Choice of Panetta to head CIA puzzles experts



(01-05) 19:53 PST -- Former U.S. Rep. Leon Panetta of Monterey might face a mission impossible - or at least a mission very difficult - should he win Senate confirmation as the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency, a clandestine government service battered by years of controversy and facing demands for reform.

The reported selection of Panetta, 70, who was White House chief of staff under President Bill Clinton and previously director of the Office of Management and Budget, caused a flurry of head-scratching among former intelligence operatives and policy analysts Monday, mainly because Panetta has no real experience in either intelligence or foreign policy, the bread-and-butter of the spy agency.


That lack of operational experience could prove a hurdle for Panetta during confirmation hearings, despite some speculation among analysts that the longtime Democratic stalwart might have been chosen as someone who could win Congress' approval easily.


"I was not informed about the selection of Leon Panetta to be the CIA director," said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who will chair the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 111th Congress. "My position has consistently been that I believe the agency is best served by having an intelligence professional in charge at this time."


Panetta was not seeking the position, according to all reports - as recently as last month he told The Chronicle that he had no plans to leave his home in Carmel Valley, where he co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy.


"Kind of a mystifying pick, isn't it? ... There's no experience there that suggests he has any talent in the field of intelligence work," said Michael Scheuer, a 22-year veteran of the CIA who once headed the agency's Osama bin Laden unit and is now a vocal critic of the organization.


"To give the president the benefit of the doubt, there probably aren't a lot of talented Americans in either party that want to be head of the CIA," he added.

CIA under fire


There is no question the agency is emerging from a troubled period, criticized by many for failing to stop the Sept. 11 attacks, for mistakenly concluding that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and for shipping terror suspects to secret overseas sites to be tortured or worse.


At the same time, there is broad consensus on the need for a robust and effective intelligence service to meet modern national security and foreign policy challenges.
Under changes established after Sept. 11, the job of briefing the president each morning no longer falls to the CIA director. That job now belongs to the director of National Intelligence, who oversees the CIA and other clandestine services. President-elect Barack Obama has reportedly chosen retired Adm. Dennis Blair for that job.


Under that structure, Panetta's lack of experience in intelligence and service overseas might matter less than his managerial and political experience - and his bipartisan reputation for integrity, several analysts said Monday.


"Panetta's significance will be as a politically adroit manager, not an intelligence professional," said political scientist Richard Betts, a specialist on national security policy and military strategy at Columbia University.


"No one individual has experience in many of the essential aspects of intelligence, which is a sprawling empire of technological surveillance systems, espionage, analysis, covert action and so on," Betts said. "At the top, you need someone who can bring it all together. Experience in some of the intelligence business helps, to be sure, but it's not enough."


What does matter, several analysts said, is the ability to win and hold trust - of the president, of Congress and of the rank and file in the CIA, all of whom will expect, and in some cases fear, big changes in the years to come.

Untarnished by Bush years


That quest for a trustworthy candidate probably led the Obama transition team to pass up almost anybody currently associated with the CIA, said Andre LeGallo, a former intelligence officer and past president of the San Francisco Bay Area chapter of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.


"They don't want to have anything to do with anybody who was in the CIA during the last eight years, because probably he would be torn apart through the congressional process to confirm them," LeGallo said.


Panetta doesn't have that problem, said Thomas Sanderson, a terrorism and intelligence expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Panetta has a reputation for bipartisanship, fiscal discipline and integrity that will help mend relations between the CIA and Congress and help pave the way for reform, he said.


"This is a very solid guy who is trustworthy and is going to be seen as someone who is not going to ruffle feathers ... He doesn't have the arrogance."
But at the same time, several former agents said, Panetta will have to reassure the rank-and-file in the agency that they won't be left holding the bag for the Bush administration's policies.


If he fails, LeGallo said, the result might be a dramatic flight from the agency, similar to what he said happened during the Clinton administration, when some former agents say the White House had a distant relationship with the CIA. The fact that Panetta was Clinton's chief of staff, LeGallo and other agents said, means he would be coming in with one strike against him.


A second strike might be that he would replace Gen. Michael Hayden, who was liked within the agency for getting the CIA off the front pages over the last two years and defending its agents before congressional inquiries into interrogation practices and eavesdropping.


But the same reputation for integrity that might help Panetta reassure Congress that he can deliver reforms within the CIA could help him with the agency's rank-and-file, said Melissa Mahle, another former agent who wrote about her career in "Denial and Deception."

A matter of trust


If the president and Congress trust the head of the CIA, she said, the rank-and-file can concentrate on doing their jobs without a lot of political micromanagement.


"They want to be able to do their work and have the confidence of the president and the confidence of the American people that they're doing the right thing. They don't want to be on Capitol Hill testifying every 10 minutes," she said.


"The challenge for Panetta will be to walk in the door with an open mind but still a clear vision of where he wants to go that's consistent with what the president-elect wants."


http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/06/MN001542QO.DTL (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/06/MN001542QO.DTL)

[NYer]

This tells me that PEBO wants his people to be loyal to him rather than the entrenched bureaucracy, a concept totally missed by his predecessor.

[al-Canine]

Panetta pick as CIA chief under fire



WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Could someone without intelligence experience effectively lead the United States' top spy agency, particularly in a time of war?

Two Democratic sources told CNN on Monday that President-elect Barack Obama will nominate longtime Washington power broker Leon Panetta to lead the Central Intelligence Agency.

The news provoked strong emotions in political and intelligence circles.

Michael Scheuer, a 22-year CIA analyst who worked in tracking Osama bin Laden, likened Panetta to a "political hack" Tuesday.

"He clearly has nothing on his curriculum vitae that suggests he should be the candidate for this job," Scheuer said. "It's not apparent he has any talent that is pertinent to the job."

Scheuer said Panetta's lack of experience could damage the agency and jeopardize national security.

"What Mr. Panetta's appointment says is that there's no urgency in the mind of the Obama administration that they think they can send somebody over there who can learn on the job and that the enemy will wait to attack us," he said. Watch Scheuer question choice of Panetta »

But Panetta supporters describe him as a consummate manager and bipartisan Capitol Hill insider who gets things done without alienating people. The eight-term congressman also has decades of foreign policy experience and was part of the Iraq Study Group, whose recommendations led to changes in U.S. policy in the region.

Panetta, 70, also was director of President Bill Clinton's Office of Management and Budget.

Although he had not officially nominated Panetta, Obama on Tuesday praised his long service in Washington. "I have the utmost respect for Leon Panetta," Obama told reporters. "[He has] an impeccable record of integrity as chief of staff [under Bill Clinton]..."

Vice President-elect Joe Biden agreed. "I think Leon Panetta is totally qualified for this job. He's been a consumer of intelligence for a long time. He was chief of staff. He understands the agency well," Biden said, adding that the CIA's credibility has suffered in the wake of faulty intelligence on Iraq and other issues. "What the agency needs now is a strong figure who understands how it functions and is going to take it up on a new path..."

But former CIA official Robert Grenier is also skeptical of the nomination. Grenier was once the CIA station chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, where he helped plan covert operations in support of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and is now with the investigative firm Kroll.

"This is somebody who seems to be coming in from left field. ... I think he has a lot of wisdom based on experience, but this is not someone who really has been in the foreign policy or intelligence game, so I think it took a lot of people by surprise," Grenier said.

It's going to be difficult for Panetta "to get a running start" with a job that requires him to "speak in that elite forum with a great deal of credibility right from the start," he said.

"I think there is probably a lot that he can learn in a short amount of time, but this is someone who really doesn't know very much about the game as it is currently being played," Grenier said. "And I think that is a particular deficit at this period in time because the CIA is not just being called on to inform policy, the CIA is carrying out policy, particularly in the terrorism field."

Criticism on Capitol Hill concerning Panetta was swift Monday evening.

"Job number one at the CIA is to track down and stop terrorists. In a post-9/11 world, intelligence experience would seem to be a prerequisite for the job of CIA director," said Republican Sen. Christopher Bond of Missouri, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Democrat Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the incoming chairwoman of that committee, bristled when she learned about Panetta's nomination from the media Monday.

"My position has consistently been that I believe the agency is best-served by having an intelligence professional in charge at this time," the California senator said.

On Tuesday afternoon, she issued a statement saying that Obama and Biden explained to her why they chose Panetta -- though she didn't detail that reason. "I look forward to speaking with Mr. Panetta about the critical issues facing the intelligence community and his plans to address them," the statement read.

But advocates of the nomination say the CIA could use an intelligence outsider for practical reasons that shouldn't be underestimated.

Robert Baer wrote a piece in Time magazine praising the nomination. Baer, who had a storied career with the CIA as an operative in the Middle East for decades, is popularly known for having inspired the film "Syriana," which is based on his book "See No Evil."

The CIA could use Panetta to "hold off the Senate and House intelligence committees, which are gearing up to rip into the CIA for the last eight years of renditions, secret prisons and bad intelligence on Iraq," Baer wrote.

"Mistakes aside, the last thing the CIA needs is another round of overly intrusive congressional hearings like those that so badly damaged it in the '70s. If today's Congress were to deliver a coup de grace to the CIA, the Pentagon would effectively be the nation's only intelligence agency."

Most relevant for Panetta's possible new job is that he has been a vocal critic of the agency's interrogation techniques, which Obama decried as torture during the presidential campaign.

In an early 2008 Washington Monthly editorial, Panetta wrote: "Those who support torture may believe that we can abuse captives in certain select circumstances and still be true to our values. But that is a false compromise. We either believe in the dignity of the individual, the rule of law, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or we don't. There is no middle ground. We cannot and we must not use torture under any circumstances."

Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat who is a member of the Intelligence Committee, praised Panetta as a pick to lead the CIA, hoping that if he gets the job, it will lead to the agency being more transparent about its practices.

"For too long, our nation's intelligence community has operated under a policy of questionable effectiveness and legality in which consulting two members of the Senate Intelligence Committee counted as consulting with Congress," he said.

"I look forward to working with Mr. Panetta to declassify much of the story of what went wrong at the CIA these last eight years, so that we can both take steps to make Americans safer and protect the values that define us as Americans." iReport.com: Share your thoughts on Obama's picks

Some backing Panetta say that his lack of experience in intelligence is less significant because he will largely answer to Adm. Dennis Blair, Obama's pick to be the national director of intelligence.

But the director of the CIA still had tremendous power. Scheuer worries that Panetta would hurt agency morale, making agents feel that they are trading a "silk purse for a pig's ear."

Panetta would replace Michael Hayden, a retired Air Force general with decades of intelligence experience. Hayden is much beloved for defending agents for doing what "they were ordered to do by the president," Scheuer said.

Hayden's most recent predecessors also had intelligence experience.

Porter Goss, appointed by President George W. Bush, was a clandestine services officer in the CIA from 1962 to 1971 and chaired the House intelligence committee from 1997 to 2004. George Tenet, first appointed by President Clinton, was on the staff of the Senate intelligence committee from 1982 to 1986 and also served as deputy CIA director.

Other critics have noted that apart from his work with the Iraq Study Group, Panetta has had no direct experience in Washington for years. For the past decade, he has been running a think tank in California that bears his name. Even during his eight terms in Congress representing Monterey, California, Panetta did not once serve on the House Intelligence Committee.

Panetta's nomination comes after John Brennan, Obama's first choice to lead the agency, dropped out.

In a letter to Obama obtained by CNN in early December, Brennan said he was dropping out of consideration for the job because of strong criticism by people who associated his work at the CIA with controversial Bush administration policies on interrogation techniques and the preemptive war in Iraq.

The 25-year veteran of the CIA has been the target of liberal bloggers who opposed his potential appointment as the agency's director. He wrote that the criticism would be a distraction from important issues.

Brennan defended himself, saying that his critics didn't take into account that he was "not involved in the decision making process" for those controversial policies.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/06/panetta.pros.cons

[al-Canine]

EDITORIAL CONTENT: OPINION ONLY

Letter: Paneta will gut the CIA


Thursday, January 08, 2009

To the Editor:

Barack Obama has proposed Leon Paneta as the new CIA director under his administration. This choice should raise suspicions in the mind of every American who cherishes freedom and trusts every president to protect our security. According to retired Col. David Hunt, military analyst, his military and intelligence contacts are nearly unanimous in their opinion that this is a disaster for the American intelligence community. His CIA contacts told him that large numbers of senior members of the agency who are eligible are deciding to take retirement rather than finish their careers under what they fear is coming. What do they fear is coming? Hunt makes it starkly clear. "What they (Obama) have done, in putting Paneta in there, is putting a stake in the heart of the agency and try to kill it."

I agree totally with Hunt's assessment. As soon as I heard Paneta's name mentioned for the job I told a colleague that he was being sent to gut the CIA as surely a Jimmy Carter did with Stansfield Turner, or Bill Clinton with John Deutch.

Under Clinton and Deutch, the Agency was expected to gather intelligence mainly through spy satellites. Human intelligence sources were allowed to dry up. Congressional interference even made it illegal to get intelligence information from sources who were involved in criminal enterprises. The fact that world terrorism uses such people, drug cartels for instance, to sell their drugs or buy their munitions, seems to have escaped those Wizards of Washington. Clinton's policies contributed hugely to the faulty intelligence the Bush administration relied on before, and during the beginning years of the Iraq war.

Since 9/11, President Bush has worked tirelessly to rebuild our intelligence capability, always in the face of strong hostility from the left, and often from our self-serving Congress. Let's review.

• The Patriot Act tore down the wall Clinton's AG, Janet Reno, had imposed that prevented the FBI and the CIA from sharing information. It also "allowed the FBI to wiretap terrorists the same way they capture communications in organized crime cases."

• Bush ordered intercepts by the National Security Agency that "opened a window for the FBI on terrorist activity within the U.S.

• He established the National Counterterrorism Center "where 200 analysts from the CIA and FBI sit side by side analyzing threats 24 hours a day. Secure video conferences three times daily include representatives from all parts of the intelligence community and the White House analyzing threats and parceling out leads."

Some on the left claim these actions invade our privacy but there hasn't been even one court case. We have, however, gone seven years without another major attack on our soil, while other nations have suffered multiple hits.

Paneta believes that our CIA should follow the same rules of interrogation listed in the Army Field Manual, which forbid any questioning which makes the subject "uncomfortable." It must be nice to live in such a sanitized world. In the past, the CIA has been a buffer between us and our enemies, keeping us from nuclear war. Today's enemy is a different kettle of fish - murderous, unyielding, willing to kill innocent men women and children to further their cause, which is the death or subjugation of all who do not bow to their religion. Spying is not a gentleman's sport. It is a nasty, no-holds barred struggle that we must win. Paneta will break the back of our intelligence gathering corps if he imposes bureaucratic controls that stems the aggressiveness of agents as they seek to protect us.

Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst, flatly predicts that, if Obama follows through on this apparent new policy that Paneta's appointment suggests, we will suffer another major terrorist strike very soon into the new administration. He says it will be, for the terrorists, "too good a chance to miss." If he is right, it will be a major, unforgivable disaster for the new president.

http://campverdebugleonline.com/main.asp?SectionID=36&subsectionID=73&articleID=21965

[Casey]

I think this is long overdue.

Pentagon Crafting Program Data Security Standards
By JOHN T. BENNETT
Published: 5 May 2009 21:13

Pentagon officials are crafting an unprecedented set of data standards aimed at preventing the theft of sensitive weapon program information by U.S. adversaries.

Robert Lentz, deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber, identity and information management, told Defense News the still-under-development policy would require that program acquisition strategies guarantee compliance with data security standards.

Those guarantees would then be built into contracts with the industry contractors helping to develop and build U.S. weapon systems, Lentz said.

The idea is to require program acquisition plans to specifically refer to new information security standards in the Defense Department's 8500 series documents, which spell out the military's data assurance guidelines.

The notion of guarding U.S. weapons data is a hot issue in Washington on the heels of an April 21 Wall Street Journal report that cited six sources confirming allegations that China had hacked into F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program networks. (The Pentagon and F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin say no such program breach occurred.)

Lentz said the new policy likely will be released for public comment "in a couple of months."

He broadly alluded to the new security policy May 5 during testimony before the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee, and added more details during a brief interview following the hearing.

Asked by subcommittee members whether industry has objected to the new standards, Lentz replied that companies are "asking for the standards." After the session he said that is because industry wants to protect its data, and wants "specifics" from the Pentagon on what data-security standards it will be expected to meet after contracts have been signed.

Additionally, Army Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency, told the panel finalizing a comprehensive cyber strategy that incorporates the entire federal government "is going to take some work." Alexander also is the commander of the military's Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare.

The Obama administration is amid a 60-day review of federal cyber requirements. The White House is expected in coming weeks to issue a study that will lay the foundation for such an all-of-government strategy.

Within the Pentagon, experts say, cyber operations have become increasingly important. In fact, Air Force Lt. Gen. William Shelton, the service's chief of warfighting integration and its chief information officer, said, "our networks are literally under attack every day."

It remains unclear, however, what service or command or other entity is leading efforts to deflect electronic attacks on Pentagon networks and take the initiative in conducting the military's offensive cyber operations. Senior defense officials are still mulling what kind of organization they will establish - and with what kinds of budget and operational authority - to fill the void.

The 60-day-review, Alexander told the subcommittee, is expected to "say here is the White House's role" in federal cyber activities. What will be needed from that point, he said, is a clear explanation by the administration what are the roles of the military services, the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, and a myriad other federal entities.

Alexander said the Pentagon has a firm hold of certain "legal frameworks" needed to begin crafting a cyber strategy. It is the operational plans, he said, that need more work.

Defense officials told the subcommittee that the military and intelligence community are far ahead of the rest of the federal government in building cyber capabilities and organizations.

He called for greater coordination between all federal agencies, the White House and the private sector – which owns much of the nation's critical infrastructure – to fashion a comprehensive strategy that steels sensitive American data from theft by potential foes.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4075168&c=AME&s=TOP

[The 801]

AP sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted Zazi

By ADAM GOLDMAN and BRETT J. BLACKLEDGE (AP) – 4 hours ago

NEW YORK — The airport shuttle driver accused of plotting a bombing in New York had contacts with al-Qaida that went nearly all the way to the top, to an Osama bin Laden confidant believed to be the terrorist group's leader in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence officials told The Associated Press.

Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an Egyptian reputed to be one of the founders of the terrorist network, used a middleman to contact Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi as the 24-year-old man hatched a plot to use homemade backpack bombs, perhaps on the city's mass transit system, the two intelligence officials said.

Intelligence officials declined to discuss the nature of the contact or whether al-Yazid contacted Zazi to offer simple encouragement or help with the bombing plot prosecutors say Zazi was pursuing.

Al-Yazid's contact with Zazi indicates that al-Qaida leadership took an intense interest in what U.S. officials have called one of the most serious terrorism threats crafted on U.S. soil since the 9/11 attacks.

"Zazi working with the al-Qaida core is exceptionally alarming," said Daniel Bynam of the Brookings Institution's Saban Center. "The al-Qaida core is capable of far more effective terrorist attacks than jihadist terrorists acting on their own, and coordination with the core also enables bin Laden to choose the timing to maximize the benefit to his organization."

U.S. intelligence officials said earlier that Zazi had contact with an unnamed senior al-Qaida operative. That helped distinguish Zazi from other would-be terrorists who have acted on their own in planning or attempting U.S. attacks.

The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the case remains under investigation, declined to describe al-Yazid's specific interaction with Zazi, who has pleaded not guilty to conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction. But one senior U.S. intelligence official said the contact between Zazi and the senior al-Qaida leader occurred through an intermediary.

Just weeks before U.S. intelligence officials identified Zazi as a possible terrorist threat in late August, John Brennan, President Barack Obama's top domestic terrorism adviser, told a Washington audience that "another attack on the U.S. homeland remains the top priority for the al-Qaida senior leadership."

U.S. intelligence officials and prosecutors have said that Zazi was recruited and trained by al-Qaida. They say he and others traveled last year to Pakistan to receive the training.

Prosecutors say Zazi, during meetings with federal investigators before his arrest last month, "admitted that he received instructions from al-Qaida operatives on subjects such as weapons and explosives" during his trip to Pakistan.

Zazi, who is being held without bond in New York while awaiting trial, has denied receiving al-Qaida training or visiting one of the group's training camps. He said before his arrest that he traveled to Pakistan to see his wife, who lives in Peshawar.

In court documents, prosecutors say Zazi is linked to three e-mail accounts that he used to pursue his bomb plot. Investigators say they found nine pages of handwritten bomb-making instructions when searching two of the e-mail accounts. The notes were sent to the e-mail accounts while Zazi was in Pakistan last year, prosecutors say.

The bomb, which can be made of hydrogen peroxide and flour, is similar to the explosives used by terrorists in the 2005 London subway bombings that killed 52 people.

Prosecutors say Zazi accessed the bomb-making instructions and downloaded them on to his computer after moving to the Denver area in January. In a Colorado hotel suite in early September, Zazi contacted someone "on multiple occasions" for help correcting mixtures of bomb ingredients, "each communication more urgent in tone than the last," court papers say.

Al-Yazid, 53, also known as Abu Saeed al-Masri and Sheikh Said, is a well-known al-Qaida figure who initially disagreed with bin Laden's 9/11 plot, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. Al-Yazid was known at the time of the attack as head of al-Qaida's finance committee.

He proclaimed in a June interview with Al-Jazeera television that al-Qaida would use nuclear weapons in its fight against the United States.

A member of Eygpt's radical Islamist movement, al-Yazid took part in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, according to "In the Graveyard of Empires," a book by counterterrorism expert Seth G. Jones. He spent three years in prison, where he joined Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jones wrote. al-Zawahiri is considered al-Qaida's No. 2 leader, behind Osama bin Laden.

Al-Yazid left Eygpt for Afghanistan in 1988 and later moved to Sudan in 1991 with bin Laden, serving as his accountant. Al-Yazid returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and became a confidant of bin Laden and a member of its Shura Council, according to Jones.

In 2007, al-Yazid took over al-Qaida operations in Afghanistan.

He was reported killed last year in clashes with Pakistani forces near the Afghan border in August 2008 but re-emerged to the surprise of counterterrorism officials.

Terrorism experts say al-Yazid's contact with Zazi in the foiled New York City bombing plot underscores the seriousness of the threat.

"I think that it would suggest the Zazi was taken seriously by Al Qaida, and that they wanted him to feel encouraged and supported," said Charles S. Faddis, who headed the weapons of mass destruction unit at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center until he retired in May 2008.

"It may also have meant that they were attempting to determine to what extent he represented an opportunity to do something inside the United States," Faddis said, who also ran operations against al-Qaida. "For instance, they may have been trying to figure out if they were looking only at an individual or at someone who represented a larger group of jihadists."

Blackledge reported from Washington, D.C. Associated Press writers Eileen Sullivan and Lolita Baldor in Washington contributed to this report.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gT-Kwm3eHQPp5qw5B5yzpuy07XuwD9BB1GB00

[The 801]

U.S. Tomahawk Missiles Deployed Near China Send Message
Time.com

By MARK THOMPSON / WASHINGTON Mark Thompson / Washington – 50 mins ago

If China's satellites and spies were working properly, there would have been a flood of unsettling intelligence flowing into the Beijing headquarters of the Chinese navy last week. A new class of U.S. superweapon had suddenly surfaced nearby. It was an Ohio-class submarine, which for decades carried only nuclear missiles targeted against the Soviet Union, and then Russia. But this one was different: for nearly three years, the U.S. Navy has been dispatching modified "boomers" to who knows where (they do travel underwater, after all). Four of the 18 ballistic-missile subs no longer carry nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. Instead, they hold up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each, capable of hitting anything within 1,000 miles with non-nuclear warheads.

Their capability makes watching these particular submarines especially interesting. The 14 Trident-carrying subs are useful in the unlikely event of a nuclear Armageddon, and Russia remains their prime target. But the Tomahawk-outfitted quartet carries a weapon that the U.S. military has used repeatedly against targets in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Sudan. (See pictures of the U.S. military in the Pacific.)

That's why alarm bells would have sounded in Beijing on June 28 when the Tomahawk-laden 560-ft. U.S.S. Ohio popped up in the Philippines' Subic Bay. More alarms were likely sounded when the U.S.S. Michigan arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on the same day. And the Klaxons would have maxed out as the U.S.S. Florida surfaced, also on the same day, at the joint U.S.-British naval base on Diego Garcia, a flyspeck of an island in the Indian Ocean. In all, the Chinese military awoke to find as many as 462 new Tomahawks deployed by the U.S. in its neighborhood. "There's been a decision to bolster our forces in the Pacific," says Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There is no doubt that China will stand up and take notice."

U.S. officials deny that any message is being directed at Beijing, saying the Tomahawk triple play was a coincidence. But they did make sure that news of the deployments appeared in the Hong Kong–based South China Morning Post - on July 4, no less. The Chinese took notice quietly. "At present, common aspirations of countries in the Asian and Pacific regions are seeking for peace, stability and regional security," Wang Baodong, spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said on Wednesday. "We hope the relevant U.S. military activities will serve for the regional peace, stability and security, and not the contrary." (See pictures of the most expensive military planes.)

Last month, the Navy announced that all four of the Tomahawk-carrying subs were operationally deployed away from their home ports for the first time. Each vessel packs "the firepower of multiple surface ships," says Captain Tracy Howard of Submarine Squadron 16 in Kings Bay, Ga., and can "respond to diverse threats on short notice."

The move forms part of a policy by the U.S. government to shift firepower from the Atlantic to the Pacific theater, which Washington sees as the military focus of the 21st century. Reduced tensions since the end of the Cold War have seen the U.S. scale back its deployment of nuclear weapons, allowing the Navy to reduce its Trident fleet from 18 to 14. (Why 14 subs, as well as bombers and land-based missiles carrying nuclear weapons, are still required to deal with the Russian threat is a topic for another day.) (See "Obama Shelves U.S. Missile Shield: The Winners and Losers.")

Sure, the Navy could have retired the four additional subs and saved the Pentagon some money, but that's not how bureaucracies operate. Instead, it spent about $4 billion replacing the Tridents with Tomahawks and making room for 60 special-ops troops to live aboard each sub and operate stealthily around the globe. "We're there for weeks, we have the situational awareness of being there, of being part of the environment," Navy Rear Admiral Mark Kenny explained after the first Tomahawk-carrying former Trident sub set sail in 2008. "We can detect, classify and locate targets and, if need be, hit them from the same platform."(Comment on this story.)

The submarines aren't the only new potential issue of concern for the Chinese. Two major military exercises involving the U.S. and its allies in the region are now under way. More than three dozen naval ships and subs began participating in the "Rim of the Pacific" war games off Hawaii on Wednesday. Some 20,000 personnel from 14 nations are involved in the biennial exercise, which includes missile drills and the sinking of three abandoned vessels playing the role of enemy ships. Nations joining the U.S. in what is billed as the world's largest-ever naval war game are Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Peru, Singapore and Thailand. Closer to China, CARAT 2010 - for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training - just got under way off Singapore. The operation involves 17,000 personnel and 73 ships from the U.S., Singapore, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. (See "Hu's Visit: Finding a Way Forward on U.S.-China Relations.")

China is absent from both exercises, and that's no oversight. Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea. And the U.S. military remains concerned over China's growing missile force - now more than 1,000 - near the Taiwan Strait. The Tomahawks' arrival "is part of a larger effort to bolster our capabilities in the region," Glaser says. "It sends a signal that nobody should rule out our determination to be the balancer in the region that many countries there want us to be." No doubt Beijing got the signal.

[Casey]

Murdered Spy Helped Foil al-Qaeda Plot
And he wasn't a transvestite killed by a lover
By Jane Yager| Posted Aug 31, 2010 7:10 AM CDT|

(Newser) – The British spy found stuffed into a duffel bag in his London apartment last week was a math genius codebreaker who worked with the American NSA as well as UK intelligence, in part helping to decode emails that were used to convict three men connected to an al-Qaeda bigwig who plotted to bomb transcontinental flights. Gareth Williams, who also helped break coded Taliban communications, flew to the US three to four times a year to visit NSA headquarters, Wired reports.


Adding to the mystery of Williams' murder, there were no signs of forced entry into his apartment, nor of a struggle; his cell phone and various SIM cards were neatly laid out on a table near his body. And police have nixed earlier tabloid reports that Williams was a transvestite and bondage equipment was found in his flat—nothing in his personal life, investigators say, offers a motive for the murder. A toxicology report should be released today.

http://www.newser.com/story/99386/murdered-spy-helped-foil-al-qaeda-plot.html